Why is David Bloor's strong programme not defendable?

Abstract

A long-standing debate between positivist and post-positivist philosophies has been on the nature of scientific knowledge, whether it is socially determined or logically necessary. In his 'strong programme' in the sociology of knowledge David Bloor, a vehement critic of positivism, claims that not only scientific theories but also religious beliefs, philosophical accounts, and common-sense intuitions could all be taken as the knowledge of a society and seen as purely socially constructed. Accordingly, what follows is an attempt to account for whether his proposal is a defendable sociological model. More specifically, the project proposes three difficulties following the programme: 1) epistemological, 2) methodological, and 3) political. This particularly means that, firstly, the strong programme fails to account for the role of nature in explaining the credibility of belief. Secondly, the programme relies on inadequate, readymade sociological standards with a predetermined framework in its analysis of social patterns. Lastly, the programme's symmetry tenet creates further asymmetries in the face of unequally distributed power relations. The project starts with a criticism of David Bloor's social epistemology, and it argues that his sociology depends on an implausible understanding of credibility. In Bloorian sociology, the credibility of scientific knowledge is seen as a matter of contingent determinants that are locally variable. However, scientific credibility depends not only on the local norms but also on the role nature plays in theories. Furthermore, the project questions the strong programme's methodological gesture and claims that Bloorian sociology rests on an inadequate mode of analysis. In the programme, the sociologist scrutinizes the social patterns of the agents by relying on a descriptive sociological framework. Yet, genuine sociological explanation of knowledge relies not on descriptive analysis but on performative and reflexive engagement with agents' lives. Finally, the thesis elaborates upon the symmetry principle and argues that it causes politically harmful consequences. In Bloor's model, the sociologist reduces the epistemological difference between the notions like 'true' and 'false' on the same social level for a symmetrical explanation. However, the extension of such symmetrical reading to political notions such as 'good' and 'bad' precludes the possibility of criticizing what is democratically 'incorrect', thereby conspiring with the already existing authority. The legitimate political criticism does not stem from a strong symmetry but from a weak asymmetry in which there is enough room for criticizing the powerful. The thesis considers these three gestures essential to proper sociological analysis and claims that the strong programme is not defendable when seen in the light of these categorial perspectives.