Ülke riski analizi

Abstract

Bu tezde ülke riski 6 bölüm halinde anlatılmıştır. îlk bölüm ülke riski araştırmalarının genel olarak incelendiği giriş bölümüdür. Bu bölümde ülke riskinin çok kısa gelişimi ve hangi bölümlerden oluştuğu, nelerden kaynaklandığı ve bankalar üzerinde ne gibi sonuçlar doğuracağı incelenmiş tir, üçüncü bölüm ülke riskinin sistematik incelenmesini anlatmaktadır. Burada ülkenin sosyo-ekonomik yapısının, ekonomik gelişme stratejilerinin, makro-ekonomik yapının, döviz yaratma kapasitesinin, dış borç yükünün, likidite ve nakit akışı yapısının ve politik riskinin nasıl incelenmesi gerektiğinden bahsedilmiştir, ülke risiki ölçmede kullanı lan yöntemler dördüncü bölümün kapsamına girmiştir. Beşinci bölümde ülke riskinin uluslararası sendikasyon kredilerine nasıl yansıdığı kısaca anlatılmıştır, ülke riski hakkında yapılan çeşitli seviyelerdeki araştırmalara ise altıncı ve son bölümde yer verilmiştir.

In its broadest sense, countrya risk can be denined as potential financial losses due to problems arising from macro-economic and/or political events in a country. The types of losses tahat can be involved are discussed in teh next section. Here the meaning of country risk is defined more precisely, particularly with respect to the related terms sovereign risk and transfen risk, and a wider concept which may be termed generalised country risk. The risk for bank loans to governmets or for loans with a government guarantee are straightforward. There the analysis can be called sovereign risk analysis and is the risk that the government at sone stage will be either unable or unwilling to meet its obligations. By definition the servicing of these loans in not linked to the perfor mance of any particular project or enterprise ant therefore there are only two questions: firstly, whther the govenment has the foreign exchange to pay, and secondly, whether it is willing to do so. Loans either to financial or industrial enterprises which are not guaranteed by the government can usefully be seen as subject to three levels of risk. At the micro level there is the crediorthiness of the enterprise itself in terms of its management and commercial viability. At the middle level there is the risk associated with the indus try, For example, an investment or a loan to a copper mine in Africa is subject to the risk that the industry will change dramatically making the project unviable. Neither of these are the concern of the country risk analyst. Then at the country level t are essentially two types of risk. One is in effect identical to the sovereign risk described above and is usually called transfer risk. This II is the possibility that even though the project is generat ing a cash flow in local currency which is sufficient to meet obligations, the government does not have the foreign exchange available to make the foreign currency remittance for servicing the debt. In practice this risk can normally be analysed in exactly the same way as sovereign risk proveded that a nonfmancial concern is involved. Sovereign risk analysis is therefore identical to transfer risk analysis. In the case of a financial institution obliga tions may sometimes be met even while the govenment is For multinational companies, however, these aspects of country risk are crucial. Transfer risk is important since it affects the remittance of profits. However, very often companies have a long time horizon and they can wait if the country is going through a difficult patch. But changes in economic and political conditions can, temporarily or permament eleminate profits or bring large losses. Since investments in developing countries are frequently espe cially difficult and costly to terminate, generalised country risk advice is critical both before an investment is made and during operations. Country risk poblems occur when there is a breakdown in either willingness or ability to service adebt. Up to 1982 only a handful of countries had failed to meet their original obligations to banks. Since then however there has been a flood of countries rescheduling and it is possible now to analyse much more fully the facts behind poblem cases. The distinction between willingness and ability tc repay is crucial although in practice they are difficult to differentiate. A country with the ability to meet 1st commitments might be unwilling to do so on political III grounds, perhaps because of a polital shift or becausi of disapproval of the loans for political or ideological or ideological reasons. But the consequent loss of trade finance and possible seizure of assets abroad could be a heavy cost to pay for a purely political or ideological end. In practice governments of all complexions have recog nised the advantages to them of reaching agreements on foreign debts. Hence if the ability to pay is there the willingness will usually follow easily. On the other hand, when it comes to considering a country's ability to repay the question of willingness is usually linked. Of course to repay the situation in a country has become so difficult that there are ser i onus doubts as to whether the debt could ever be fully serviced. But more commonly the issue is whether the country is willing to go through the painful process of structural adjust ment necessary to generate an improvement in the balance of payments. Or xioes the difficulty of achieving that, given the economic realities of the situation and the domestic political position, push the government to the point where it becomes unwilling to repay? Country risk analysis is a dynamic subject. Unexpected events both internal and external to a particular country play against a backgronund of shifting trends. Hence just as stock markest can move sharply on "news" but also exhib it longer cycles so country risk perceptions behave in a similar way. The factors which go to make a country vulnerable or not can change through both internal and external events. The most important events internally are of course politi cal upheavals. But they are difficult to foresee and their impact on the economy in both the short and the long run IV are virtually impossible to forecast. External factors too can alter unexpectedly and trans- fonm perceptions of country risk. In the last ten years oil has played the major role. Before 1973 the coming bonanza for oil exporters and the approaching problems for major oil importers were not foreseen. Then during much of the 1970s analysts regarded high oil imports as aserious risk factor given the possibility of another dramatic rise and the expectation that oil prices would always be firm. Finally in 1982-83 the breakdown of lending to many Latin American countries was triggered by the liquidity crisis in Mexico, a major ail ewporter. This of cours resulted partly from an unixpectedly long world recession and partly from unforeseen levels of interest rates. Predicting which external factors will be important over the next few years is likely to prove equally as difficult as in the 1970s. It would be rash to suppose that they will be the same. Suppose, for example, that world trade stagnates due to protectionism and slow gowth in the developed countries. Then the small Asian countries depen dent on imports and relying on manufactured exports both to generate foreing exchange and lead economic growth may fare much worse than is widely ewpencted at present. Large countries with greater natural resources, scope left for import substitution and with less population pressure on the land could do better. Or suppose that there was a najor regional war. The impacts on individual country risks would be enormaus. Perceptions of country risk, therfore, are inevitably subject to change depending on the way the world economy and international politics unfold. The analyst has to be concerned with both the developments in individual coun- tries and the impact of world developments on them. It is the uncertainty involved which makes lending risky and therefore involves risk-taking organisations like banks in the first place, It also makes country risk analysis a very exciting activity. But the nature of these risks has sever al important implications for the ways country risk analy sis is approached and for the way the risk itself is han dled. First, it means that analysis needs to be based on analysis of fundamentals. Without a full undesrtanding of the country's economic situation and political system it is impossible to predict the likely reaction to changed world or domestic circumstances. This will usually require the analyst to visit the country at least once a year. Secondly, it is vital to identify key vulnerabilities even if circumstances are favourable at that time. Depen dence on, for example, aid support or on manufactured exports or on workers' remittances are all potential vul nerabilities if circumstances alter. Thirdly, it is wise to make use of scenario analysis and sensitivity techniques to help identify these vulnera bilities Fourthly, it is sensible to recognise that any judg ment on country risk is subject to uncertainty. In trans mitting this judgment to others it may be appopriate to indicate the degree of uncertainty attaching to it. Fifthly, it should be remembered that whereas some times a judgment can be given which in asense represents an average of the likely outcomes this may not always be possible. If a country is seen as being a moderate to good VI risk with several possible problems but no one outstanding vulnerability. Iran, for example, was a good risk in all respects except the possibility of major political upheav al. It would be inappropriate to describe such a risk as "moderately good" when it clearly has two dimensions. Sixthly, the way to deal with uncertainty is to spread risk across a variety of countries. It is important, then, to balance the portfolio in terms of types of risk, e.g. oil-producing countries or aid-dependent countries. Country risk analysis is ultimately a matter of judg ment and the profound uncertainties involved make it more art than science. Nevertheless most banks and many compa nies use systems of one sort or another if they are in volved with more than a handful of countries. Two types of systems are commonly used. First there are systems for assessing risks. These range from simple checklist, through complicated statistically-based weighting systmes, to sophisticated techniques such as discriminant analysis. The purpose of these systems is to aid in arriving at the country risk judgment. The second type of system is used to signal this risk judgment within the bank or company. Usually a formal rating system is established so that, for example, a C-rated country is immediately understood by the users as having a certain risk. The ideal system should try to other countries. Although these two types of systems are conceptually distinct, in practice they will inevitebly be linked. For example, if the objective of the risk analysis is to plave a country within an A to E rating category the analysis from the start will be geared towards this. Some organisa tions formally combine the two with the risk assessment system itself automatically generating country ratings.