The scientific revolution: Historiographical perspectives and the debate over its validity

Abstract

The Scientific Revolution is the historical thesis that claims modern science emerged in 17th-century Europe (the Early Modern period) through an intellectual revolution against Aristotelian natural philosophy. This claim gained acceptance and prevalence in the Anglophone academy in the 1940s and 1950s through the works of Alexandre Koyré and Herbert Butterfield. Koyré and Butterfield, asserting a radical epistemic break during the early modern period, laid the main framework that would prevail for decades. Their followers, such as A. Rupert Hall and Richard S. Westfall, established an academic tradition grounded in this framework, and the Scientific Revolution became the central concept and big picture of the newly emerging academic discipline, the history of science. From the 1940s onwards, in the post-World War II period, it dominated the historiography of science. A great deal of historical research focusing on the primary sources of the early modern period was produced to account for the Scientific Revolution. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, an opposing tendency to criticize and reject it emerged among the next generation of historians of science. This tendency persisted over time, and today the predominant view in recent historiography of science is that the Scientific Revolution is not a coherent historical category and has no historical reality. This study will thoroughly examine five accounts and interpretations of the Scientific Revolution. First, Koyré's account is addressed as a paradigmatic case of extreme internalist historiography. For Koyré, modern science emerged through a conceptual revolution in the 17th century, and this revolution primarily involved the replacement of Aristotelian cosmology and metaphysics with a homogeneous, infinite, and mathematical conception of space and motion. Koyré often labels this revolution "the mathematization of nature." For Koyré, the Scientific Revolution was solely a theoretical and metaphysical transformation; he underscored only the a priori character of this transformation and rejected any influence from empirical or practical changes in the early modern period. For Koyré, the revolution was made by the theoretical works of particular intellectuals (above all, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton). Secondly, Clifford D. Conner's Marxist-oriented account is explored as an example of strong externalism. Conner challenges the intellectual-centered narratives of the Scientific Revolution; he rather underscores the role of artisan practices and knowledge (miners, blacksmiths, technicians, sailors, craftspeople, and other manually working people) and claims that artisanal knowledge determined the theoretical innovations of newly rising "scientific elites" whom Conner contrasts with manually working and illiterate artisans. For Conner, the practical and technological circumstances shaped by the craftspeople and artisans were the central factor in the emergence of modern science. Third, this study engages with Thomas Kuhn's interpretation. Kuhn acknowledges Koyré's claim about the unique importance of the "mathematization of nature" in the emergence of modern physics. However, Kuhn is careful to restrict the transformation in the 17th century to modern physics. He does not say that this transformation is about the rise of a singular modern science; rather, he emphasizes that other sciences, such as biological disciplines and non-mathematized "Baconian physical sciences," have distinct historical developments. Fourth, this study examines Steven Shapin's constructivist perspective, which challenges and rejects the existence of the Scientific Revolution. For Shapin, there was no singular, coherent revolutionary change in natural knowledge during the Early Modern period that transformed into modern science. Instead, Shapin seeks to show the plurality of local, contingent natural knowledge practices during the period, and he emphasizes the incoherence of the Scientific Revolution as a historical category. The fifth account that this study examines is David Wootton's recent defense of the Scientific Revolution. For Wootton, the invention of science during the early modern era is a historical reality, and the Scientific Revolution is a coherent historical category. Wootton marks the invention of modern science to the interval between 1570s (when Tycho Brahe saw a supernova), and the 1700s (when Newton issued his book Opticks). Wootton argues that a radical shift in the way of making natural knowledge occurred during this era. This shift's reality, along with its characteristics, justifies using the term "revolution" to describe it. For Wootton, the Scientific Revolution is a real radical transformation whose influences continue to shape modern society and scientific practices. This thesis will also survey and assess the prevailing counterarguments that have been raised against the reality of the Scientific Revolution and its coherence as a historical category. These criticisms involve several claims, such as that the term "revolution" is misleading and anachronistic, that the historical actors did not have a sense of revolutionary intention, that there was not a unified, coherent movement against Aristotelian learning, that there was not an epistemic advancement which had a direct and rapid influence on society during the early modern era (instead, there was the gradual, scattered, contingent, local changes), and that the early modern practices do not resemble adequately modern science. These criticisms challenge the claim that there was a real, abrupt epistemic break and its sudden influences and consequences on society during the early modern period. Furthermore, this study will examine the methodological shift in the discipline of the history of science from its emergence to today. The shift is from the positivist approach to today's contextualist approach. The debate of internalism-externalism, newly emerged constructivist perspectives in social studies of science, and historicization sensibilities among historians of science to escape anachronistic accounts have all shaped this general shift. It went hand in hand with the discipline's reassessment of the Scientific Revolution and its rejection by the majority of the discipline. Although the criticisms have raised several reasonable points, this study concludes that the Scientific Revolution should be sustained as a credible historical category for the historiography of science. The study argues that the Scientific Revolution is a coherent and valid historical category. Instead of abandoning it, it should be reevaluated in light of the contemporary perspectives in the historiography of science. This study acknowledges that internalist (which takes the history of science as part of intellectual history) and extreme essentialist (which takes science as an enterprise readily demarcated by essentialist definitions) perspectives are not plausible and cannot account for the Scientific Revolution. The internalist and essentialist perspectives are not sound; however, the main idea and framework of the Scientific Revolution are still sound. An account of the Scientific Revolution that includes social and cultural factors should be considered. The contextualist sensibilities should be reflected, while not ignoring the existence of the "big picture" in which a radical transformation leading to the abrupt emergence of modern science during the early modern era is depicted. In this regard, this study concludes that Wootton's account is responsive to the criticisms and contemporary historiographical sensibilities.