

**ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**WHAT JUSTIFIES RESISTANCE?
RESISTANCE AS THE NECESSITY OF FREEDOM**



M.A. THESIS

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Department of Political Studies

Political Studies M.A. Program

JUNE 2016

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**DİRENİŞİ NE HAKLILAŞTIRIR?
ÖZGÜRLÜĞÜN ZORUNLULUĞU OLARAK DİRENİŞ**

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
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To those who have been fighting for freedom,



FOREWORD

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WHAT JUSTIFIES RESISTANCE? RESISTANCE AS THE NECESSITY OF FREEDOM

SUMMARY

The present thesis zeroes in directly on resistance and the question of how to justify resistance. In this study, resistance as a basic relational element is discussed not only as a political event but also as a natural becoming. Whereas legitimization requires an authority and law, justification is a matter of defining rights. In sovereignty theory, the boundaries of the right of resistance are drawn in accordance with law. However, since Power spreads beyond the frame defined by law, resistance overflows this frame. Thus we face a question of justification that is not determined by legitimization. To be able to focus on an extralegal right, going back to power relations is essential. The main argument of the present thesis is that the right of resistance is an effort to stay in being naturally and to affirm its power; that it can never be handed over or limited by law and that it is opposed to all forms of Power. A natural right is preserved in civil state, as well. That is why resistance as an expression of power is first separated from the domination of the fictional subject and laid within the framework of power relations. The subjective elements of resistance are worked through on epistemological terms and its objective elements on ontological terms and these terms form the basis respectively of speculative -based on consciousness- and actual -based on power- components. A resistance, considering the way it manifests itself, can be classified according to its quantitative, contextual and instrumental features. The types are decided upon considering affirmation and negation functions independently of form. What renders resistance meaningful and valuable is its affirmative and negative role in power relations. While handling bodies and becomings in, neglecting their affections or defining them as utopic subjects lead us to fall into some kind of a fallacy incompatible with the human nature. Therefore, a body strives to stay in being and increase its power of acting to the extent that its power as its essence defines its right. Negation has to be reduced to being a speculative and secondary element of resistance in regard to increment of power. As for the right of resistance, it is justified to the extent it can lead to that and it can produce life while refraining from nihilism –which is affirming difference in other words.



DİRENİŞİ NE HAKLILAŞTIRIR? ÖZGÜRLÜĞÜN ZORUNLULUĞU OLARAK DİRENİŞ

ÖZET

Bu tez doğrudan direniş ve direnişin gerekçelendirilmesi sorusu üzerinde durmaktadır. İlişkiselliğin temel ögelerinden biri olarak direniş, bu çalışmada yalnızca politik bir olay olarak değil, aynı zamanda bir doğal oluş olarak ele alınmıştır. Meşruiyet, bir otorite ve hukuku gerektirirken, gerekçelendirme bir hak tanımını üzerinden yapılır. Direnme hakkının sınırları, egemenlik teorisinde hukuk çerçevesinde belirlenmiştir ancak iktidarın hukukun belirlenimlerinin dışında yayılmasından dolayı, direniş de hukuksal çerçeveden taşar. Böylece meşruiyetin belirlemediği bir gerekçelendirme sorunuyla karşılaşırız. Hukuk dışı bir hak vurgusu içinse güç ilişkilerine geri dönülür. Bu tezin savı, direnme hakkının doğal olarak bir varlıkta kalma, gücünü olumlama çabası olduğu, hiçbir şekilde devredilemeyeceği, yasayla sınırlandırılmayacağı, dolayısıyla iktidarın her biçimine karşı olduğudur. Doğal hak, sivil durumda da korunur. Bu nedenle ilkin, direniş, bir gücün ifadesi olarak kurgusal öznenin tahakkümünden ayrılmış, güç ilişkileri içine yerleştirilmiştir. Direnişin öznel unsurları epistemolojik temelde, nesnel unsurları ontolojik temelde incelenir ve bu temeller sırasıyla spekülative (bilince dayalı) ve edimsel (güce dayalı) bileşenlere dayanak sağlar. Bir direniş, tezahür biçimine göre niceliksel, bağlamsal ve araçsal özelliklerine uygun olarak sınıflandırılabilir. Türler ise biçimden bağımsız olarak, olumsuzlama ve olumlama fonksiyonlarına göre ayrılmıştır. Direnişe bir anlam ve değer atfeden ise güç ilişkilerindeki olumlayıcı ya da olumsuzlayıcı karakteridir. Bedeni ve oluşu gerçekliği içinde ele alırken duygulanımlarını göz ardı etmek ya da ütöpik bir özne olarak tanımlamak insan doğasıyla uyuşmayan bir kurguya düşmemizi sağlar. Bu nedenle oluşun özü olarak gücü onun hakkını tanımladığı ölçüde beden, varlıkta kalmaya ve eyleme kudretini arttırmaya çabalar. Olumsuzlama, kudret arttırımında direnişin ancak spekülative ve ikincil bir ögesi olarak kalır. Direnme hakkı ise ancak buna sebep olabildiği, nihilizmden kaçıp hayatı üretebildiği, yani farkı olumladığı ölçüde gerekçelendirilmiştir.



1. INTRODUCTION

Social uprisings, demonstrations, disobediences against the governmental policies and warps in social processes have reached to the advanced stage since the second half of the 20th century. The distinctive feature of these actions is that they are being more peaceful compared to other forms of resistance such as wars or national resistance movements. However, these demonstrations in which people get together to preserve their own rights, or demand rights, demand recognition, security or to take their place in politics, or prevent injustice are faced with the government security forces most of the time when the reactions are directed against the government or government-related interest groups. Even though these peaceful resistances were sometimes formed around the demands of environmentalism, human rights, prevention of State violence, democracy, peace and free expression; the sovereign who has the legitimacy via legal ground and consents of its subjects confronted the will of the people in these resistance movements claiming the rights that are determined in a frame of law were violated. Under these circumstances, there are two views contradicting each other: (i) the Power¹ is being exercised illegally against the rightful oppositions, or (ii) when resistance is evaluated in legal forms that are determined by the sovereign and in its relation with the sovereignty institutions and relations, it indicates an illegality by way of an opposition to the legal authority. Besides, there are exercises of Power outside the juridical forms and they also go beyond the legal frame. These forms of resistance that escape from the field of sovereignty or exceed the field of sovereignty attract attention.

Foucault suggests three forms of resistance: those (i) against forms of domination, (ii) against forms of exploitation, or (iii) against forms of subjectivity and submission (Foucault, 1982, p. 781). These forms of resistance escape from the field of sovereignty and juridical forms and they spread among the whole society because the

¹ There are no distinct correlates corresponding to Latin words *potentia* and *potestas* that simply mean respectively *power to* and *power over* in English (see section 2.2.2.1). For that reason, the difference is addressed through capitalization of the letter *p* such as suggested by Michael Hardt in his translation of *Savage Anomaly* into English (Negri, 1991, pp. xi-xii).

Power that process against them also goes beyond the sovereignty's definition of centralized Power. So, how does the decentralization of Power or its being handled beyond the juridical forms affect the value of resistance in power relations such that such values are always attributed to norms? What are the elements of justification against the effort of a Power in order to devaluate any resistance opposing to it? Or, what determines the superiority of resistance in power relations if a resistance is exercised against the other mechanisms of Power –cultural, gender related, artistic, domestic or medical? Resistance generally depends on a right when it refers to a law, a system of values that constitutes morals. Is resistance a right in this sense? Whether this is the case or not, what justifies resistance? In the present thesis, these will be the questions that would be tried to be answered.

The basis for the dynamics that give societies and history a motion and a change involves resistances in it. Thus, it is understood that the term resistance has a basic and constituent importance in politics, both practically and theoretically. The purpose of this thesis is to inquire the ground and the values that make resistance a justified action. For example, resistance was generally taken as withstanding the ruler who was exercising her/his legitimate or non-legitimate Power arbitrarily. However, now, with the contemporary conceptions of Power and by the effects of Power instruments, it started to be understood as it is now; many things and many ways started to be used as a means for resistance that is also used as a means for an end. The entitlement is now serving a wider field actually. For instance, we can nowadays consider music simply as a medium for resistance. Some art forms are even interpreted as resistance objects, too. Protests, occupations, strikes have also become the most prominent forms of resistance in today's world, as in the 19th and 20th centuries. In addition, resistances are not only exercised against the governments. These acts are exercised because it is thought that resistance is now sometimes used for opening freedom spaces and sometimes used for preserving the existing individual and social freedom spaces. In short, it is thought resistance has an emancipatory influence, even if these spaces may be an ideological, a moral or a political scope for an *episteme*. More investigations over the things that make us think on it are needed in order to study resistance that spreads into the history.

1.1 The Two Aspects of Resistance

There were many resistance events in the world history, but in different forms and qualities. This chapter has an aim to open an area to problematize the meaning of the different resistances. There are two aspects of resistance: resistance as an event and resistance as a concept. First, the different resistance events –which are the objects of our ideas on resistance- and different resistance forms in history will be looked into in order to see the formal diversity among them. It is going to be stated that the appearances of resistance may differ depending on time, place and context. Then we are going to see resistance has an aspect of concept beyond its event aspect.

1.1.1 Resistance as an event

Event is a becoming, clustering of forces that breaks the regularity and stability. It is a process and it touches on every other event (Williams J. , 2011, p. 81). Resistances are the events spreading in time and space by their vibrations and their effects. Resistances are often understood in history as the national liberation movements against the legally established governments or other kinds of authority and Power, or against occupations. *Resistance movement*, as a specific term, is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as an organized civil effort against either legally established government or an occupying power (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 204). So, judging from the definition of the U.S. Department of Defense, resistance, as a movement and an event, occurs through civilians in two conditions: The first is the management under a legal government, and the other is the conditions of occupation. However, there are different samples of resistance in addition to these requirements. Some of the rest use armed forces as a means, others do not. They can form as symbolic, social, violent, collective, and so on. Some tried to establish new types of organizations and governments according to their ideologies or their religious beliefs; some tried to preserve their current customs and life-styles. These different forms and demands show that the widespread meaning does not correspond to every situation.

For instance, the interpretation that the history of societies are the history of class struggles (Marx & Engels, 1996, p. 1) leads us also to see classes as the subjects of the history. And this leads us also to say some forms of resistance are exercised by the residents of the same country with strict ideological precepts in order to re-establish the politics by using armed force or without resorting to brute force in the economic

development process against the government. The Paris Commune was the first example of the working class's taking power (Url-1, 2006) via resistance against French government in 1871 after the defeat of France by Prussia in Franco-Prussian War. After the elections, the elected council declared Paris as an independent and free commune. Then, from labor to social structures, everything was organized according to communist precepts. The experience seems to be a resistance against the exploitation of wo/man by wo/man and the resistance against the State domination (James, 1946). This kind of resistance causes previous meanings to lose their validities because the commune does not strive for nationalist ideals.

Sometimes discourses and practices are constructed and exercised by drawing on an ideology. Ideologies as the systems that are exclusive and unifier tend to gain power and expand. The ideological attachment –that is the situation which the movement names itself after the name of the ideology- does not require only overthrowing the government, but in some cases, the objective to defense self-being becomes more important and comes to the forefront. Upon the rise of fascist ideas throughout the world -especially in Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan- anti-fascist fronts are organized and they resisted against the fascist governments and their national armies. This is also a kind of resistance that is exercised by guerilla forces. Many anti-fascist fronts were organized in these countries such as the Anti-Nazi German resistance movement which was very popular and fought against the regimes. Furthermore, after the coup d'état in Spain by Francisco Franco against the Spanish Republic in 1936, a guerrilla struggle against Francoism arose (Téllez, 2006). Workers declared revolution and they mobilized in order to start a resistance against Franco's armed forces. Republicans are defeated against Francoist forces and surrendered in civil war. Even so, guerrilla activities went on after the defeat. The groups in anti-fascist struggle have solid anarchist, socialist, or communist ideological views and armed resistance may seem to be the most concentrated form of resistance in a struggle. On the other hand, small groups in the resistance movement were still defending their politics of humanity and self-respect despite the fascist oppression (Téllez, 2006).

A resistance can also be released from a strict ideological attachment. Besides, an opposition to economic policies that are applied not only by solely one government, but also a group of countries, in other words international policies, can light the fuse of resistance. In 1994, Zapatistas or The Zapatista Army of National Liberation

(EZLN) captured the southern state of Chiapas in Mexico and also the buildings of government with the armed residents. The rebellion was timed on the same days of the inauguration of The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which is the free trade agreement between Canada, United States and Mexico. This agreement could be interpreted as the exploitation of the wage labor in Mexico by the United States and devaluation of the products over the cheap imports from the U.S. *Subcomandante* Marcos –the leader of the movement-, in this sense, named NAFTA as a *death certificate* of the indigenous farmers in Mexico (Tucker, 2014). Their basic demands of land, home, food, health, education and work, justice, democracy and freedom (Grant, 2014) were clear enough and then they informed the government. However, no demands were covered by the Mexican government for neither EZLN, nor the other Mexicans that stayed out of the resistance. Notwithstanding, Zapatistas continued their resistance and even today, they have their own established institutions and autonomous municipalities. They organize their own syllabus in schools, produce and share according to their own decisions, they have healthcare clinics in their own territory, which means avoiding recognizing the government and they also reject governmental assistance by no means. Thus, the distinct feature of the Zapatista movement becomes evident: Zapatistas do not aim to revolt against the government and take the Power at their hands, but establish a new system in their region (Holloway, 2014). The resistance of Zapatistas against the globalization and international organizations make us wonder about the poles of resistances. The modern interpretations were devaluated in post-modern era and globalization. So, what is the subject of resistance, who resists and who is resisted when the events are considered in the frame of this changed forms of Power?

The resistance movements do not seem only to be exercised against the capitalist States or governments or for the sake of communist or anti-fascist ideas. In Angola case -The Angolan Civil War continued from 1975 to 2002-, CIA-backed (Pawson, 2014) National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) fought against the radical socialist movement The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Besides, Unita allied with the white minority in South Africa instead of demanding equality and freedom for Africa. Similarly, during the Cold War, many anti-communist fronts are resisted against the communist ideas with armed forces in their countries.

A resistance cannot occur only within one's own country and against the government. A resistance can also be exercised by the residents of the country against the occupant forces as was seen during the Vietnam War between 1955 and 1975. After the foundation of National Liberation Front (NLF) against France, they fought with France and won the war. Then Vietnam was divided into North and South as different States. To avoid giving the U.S.-backed South Vietnam an inch for their elections, North attacked to South in order to unite South and North and organize social order. By the direct intervention to the civil war and occupation of the U.S. military forces to save the South and overcome communist North Vietnam government, NLF resistance escalated against the U.S. armed forces. The U.S. troops left Vietnam in 1973 following great losses from both sides (Url-2, n.d.). In this sense, Vietnam War was a war that was caused by the politics of cold war period.

Similarly, another example is the resistance in Algeria against the occupation of France. French occupation and colonization started in 1827 when Algeria was under the domination of Ottoman Empire. Muslim population or native Algerians had fewer rights and more economical disadvantages than the French settlers. The French settlers were regarded as French citizens and they had full rights (Birchall, 2012), whereas the Algerians were only French subjects (House, 2006). The demand for the independent Algeria was rejected rigorously because of the French defeat and occupation of France by Nazi Germany in WWII. Defeatist attitude led France to re-establish its imperial authority at least on Algeria. The resistance movement against the French colonization led to a war between 1954 and 1962 by the foundation of *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN). French government denied to recognize the resistance as a war and criminalized the nationalist fighters, but the fighters were claiming they were defending their country against the unjust occupants. However, armed resistance against the French forces spread across the whole Algeria (Birchall, 2012). In this period, violence even leaped to Paris. The Algerian resistance that was clustered around the national independency ideas resulted in immense numbers of deaths and at last Algeria achieved independence in July 1962 as the French left Algeria.

Aforementioned cases were the resistances that involved violence. In spite of that, there is another form of resistance which does not involve violence. However, although

the terms *violent* and *nonviolent*² are used, I do not think the distinction between these qualities are apparent enough. There are no big differences between isolating an individual from political realm and caging her/him in a dungeon or physically harming her/him in order to reduce her/his power to act. The distinction is established in juridical discourse speculatively. Here, the armed forms of resistance and nonviolent forms are taken together because the resistance is simply the instrument-independent action for protection of power, or against the prevention of the spreading of power. After the colonialization, resistances generally took a different mainstream form all around the world: Peaceful protests and nonviolent resistances. These forms of resistance had already existed but the development of the sense of moderate and social democratic State in the developed countries led to a demand politics. Belief in the possibility of a consensus compromise between the society and the State, and the loss of the actuality of occupation of another country in contemporary politics are also the factors for the new prominent forms of resistance.

The first forms of theorized nonviolent resistances are Gandhi's civil disobedience protests in India, and those of Henry David Thoreau and M. Luther King's in the USA. These nonviolent form of resistance involved a refusal to obey the specific laws of government. Thoreau's refusal to pay poll taxes in 1846, Gandhi's disobedience to the Imperial Britain's law that forbade Indian people from producing or selling salt in 1930, or Rosa Park's refusal to give up her seat to a white passenger in 1955 are the prominent acts of civil disobedience that are focused on the refusal of certain laws. In addition to these, conscientious rejection of military service is counted as a civil disobedience (Dworkin, 1978, pp. 206-207) that is exercised against the obligation of military service because of moral reasons, religious beliefs or political views and this means a resistance to an obligation of the State which means law.

During 1960s, there were protests also in the U.S. because of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. In one sense, by the effects of these invitations and demands, in Paris the demonstrations started in 1968 first with the demands of university students for sleeping with each other and then involved the protests against the war in Vietnam in March. The demonstrations for freedom, for removing authoritarian oppressions

² I prefer *nonviolent* instead of *non-violent* because there is a difference between violent and nonviolent in degree, not in kind. "Non-" prefix indicates a contrast which implies a difference in kind.

throughout the country merged with the movement of the workers in May; actually when the workers joined the demonstrations. The labor unions went on a strike longer than a day in an unplanned way. There were eight million workers on strike throughout France (Url-3, 2008) and more importantly the strikes were not led by the labor union representation, but by the workers themselves (Url-4, 2006). Sorbonne was occupied by the students and factories were occupied by the workers (Steinfels, 2008). During demonstrations, improvements were made in the working conditions and wages were increased by the government in order to stop the uprising. By June, de Gaulle went to elections as a tactic in order to quell the uprising, he took power again as the result of the election. Then strikes and demonstrations left off. Although a revolution was not actualized as a result, the feelings and the mood of '68 is still seen as the repetition of the Revolution of 1789. These mass movements occurred in an unpredictable way against government policies.

Similar forms of resistance have occurred with different demands also after the 20th century by the civilians in different countries. Apparently, an anti-globalization, anti-capitalist discourse and a discourse against related State policies pervaded the demonstrations in the 21st century. They were sometimes directed against the State that was subjected to, but the international organizations such as WTO, G-8, G-20, the World Bank, IMF, NATO or UN. Police violence against the protesters of G-8 summit in 2001 is one of such instances. In July 2001, 200.000 supporters of anti-globalization whose demands can be summarized as equal rights for all wo/men and opposing the globalization of finance and trade (The ControG8 Network, n.d.) participated in the demonstrations against the G-8 summit in Genoa. Police violently attacked the peaceful demonstrators, killed Carlo Giuliani with a shotgun and hundreds of protesters were heavily injured because of the police violence (Zaván, 2011). Protests against the Climate Change Conference in 2015 that was held to determine climate change policies by the member governments of international organizations are also an instance (Williams & Srnicek, 2015).

The resistances against the international organizations can occur not only by mass groups, but by individuals as well; as Thoreau and Rosa Park were mentioned above. Similarly, Josephine Witt's aesthetic protest of European Central Bank by leaping over the table and throwing confetti in front of the President of the European Central Bank and Mario Draghi during a press conference on April 2015 were expressions of a kind

of resistance against the policies of the European Central Bank as an international organization (Stewart, 2015). These and similar resistance events are leaderless resistance movements against the system and system integrated States and their policies. They are not gathered around a strict and stable ideology, therefore there is no officially set demands. The Occupy movement in 2011 was one instance of this paradigm and it is seen as a symptom of the crisis of the parliamentary democracy that prevents expression (Gautney, 2011). A similar resistance, Gezi Revolt in Turkey was encountered with the violent attack of the State forces and para-military groups, as well.

Besides, resistances in the 21st century showed the power of social media network for resistance including the Occupy Wall Street, Gezi Revolt, and especially Arab Spring in 2010 which includes the countries Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and Oman. Many protests arose against the conditions of the countries with corruption, torture, injustice, lack of freedom and totalitarian regimes (Url-5, n.d.). In many of them, hundreds of thousands and even millions of people organized via social media and participated in the demonstrations in the squares against their governments. In some countries the Arab Spring overthrew governments, some were encountered with coup d'état, some were dragged into civil war, all of which resulted in a change of power relations throughout the Middle East. Still the situation of this geography is not stable. The failure of the moderate Islamist group Muslim Brotherhood -which was what the resistances pointed out to and was seen as an alternative to the current nation-State and statist supporter governments- resulted in the rise of the radical Islamist terror organization ISIS. This shows us the unpredictable aspects of resistances as events in a dramatic way: A neo-liberal intervention to modernism may reveal a post-modern organized, non-secular and pre-modern ideological violent vein.

There are also demonstrations that took place in the ranks of the right wing. In 1998, Istanbul University banned entrance to the campus with head-scarf and beard drawing on the circular letter that is announced by the National Security Council (MGK) in 1997 (İnce, 2014). Obligations and oppressions against this religious garment was accelerated. People got together throughout Turkey and thousands of people participated in demonstrations in October 1998 to protest head-scarf ban in public

space and State institutions (Ince, 2014). After these influential demonstrations, the organizers were judged with the accusation of disturbing the peace (Ince, 2014).

The oppression the Sovietized countries faced was protested by the intellectuals in Czech Republic in 1977 by declaring *Charter 77* after the defeat of the Prague Spring³. Although this and similar resistances cannot be counted as rightist directly, they were against the oppressions in the Sovietized countries. That is because the situation was similar to “the peace of the cemetery” (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 116). The charter was signed in order to defend human rights against the oppression of the satellite government; Jan Patočka –Czech philosopher- was one of the spokesman for the charter (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 116), and then he struggled against the suppression over him till the end of his life. The government in office accused the signatories of subversion and being anti-socialist, but the action was only a resistance against the hypocrisy, despair, and injustice in society. Jan Patočka delivered some of his writings privately as *samizdat* due to the censorship over his works after that date (Kohák, 1989, p. 351). The resisters said three things: They said to those in power that certain liberties did not exist for them, to the citizens that they should make the State provide these liberties, to the outsiders that they should know the resisters were not afraid (Ricoeur, 1983, p. 117).

There is also another form of resistance which is symbolic. These forms of resistance are not open clashes, but have great effects. One of the first instances is the Boston Tea Party in 1773 which was exercised against the Britain’s colonization of the American colonies and the act escalated the American Revolutionary War in 1775. When East Indian Company and therefore British government reduced the taxes on tea in the American colonies in order to decrease the profits of the foreign merchants and continue the colonial domination (Conway, 2006), the tea coming from the empire was thrown to the harbor by the activists dressed in Mohawk costumes. Actually, the real problem of the colonies was that the parliament of Britain had the right to tax them, but Americans were not represented in the parliament (Burg, 2004, p. 273). Conservative positioned The Tea Party Movement in 2009 was also referencing the Boston Tea Party by using the motto “no taxation without representation” (Connolly, 2010). In a similar vein, the Paris Climate Change Conference in 2015 also witnessed

³ Althusser argues that the thing that masses in Czech Republic want is an independent socialism, not a kind of humanism (Althusser, 1972, p. 36).

a symbolic resistance against the authority of the states over the climate and their ignorance of the indigenous people's situation: Thousands of shoes were left on the streets because of the prohibition of the protests during the emergency state (Sutter, 2015). Another example is PETA's *Meat is Murder* act that is exhibited by packaging a human being like meat in a human-sized meat packaging tray in order to protest killing animals for meat in 2010, New York (siegel2001, 2010). An extreme performative and symbolic resistance was also that of the *Standing Man* during Gezi Revolt that was exercised by a man who was not violating any rules and was not in any direct and physical intercourse by standing and facing the Atatürk Cultural Centre (AKM) in Taksim Square, but he expressed an effective form of resistance against the domination and interventionist applications, against the character of Power, authority and the State without using any kinds of coercive power. The performance of the *Standing Man* symbolized the encounter between the time of artistic performance and the time of *political action* (Rancière, 2015, p. 18).

Using the body as a means and a medium of resistance is old, but it is effective and frequent in the 21st century. The people that are isolated from the means of resistance or means of using power use their bodies -that is inalienable- as a means of resistance. The isolation also involves the restriction of the medium. In these cases, the body becomes the means and the medium for resistance. One of the most symbolic and sensitive example is Iranian Kurdish political poet Abas Aimi's resistance against deportation and migration laws. Due to the refusal of his previously accepted migration request, he sewed up his mouth, eyes and ears, then started a hunger strike in 2003 (Url-6, 2003). He also kept a bottle of petrol ready to use in case of being forcefully fed. This form of action has two targets: the first is the conscience of the people and the authorities, and the second is the legitimacy of the government that is responsible for protecting the lives of their subjects. Hunger strikes and self-immolations are seen as bodily resistances as the last resort and they are generally political actions. Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Đức's self-immolation in 1963 to protest South Vietnam persecution of Buddhists, Jan Palach's self-immolation after Prague Spring in 1969 to protest Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia are prominent examples. Another point is, self-immolation is a kind of resistance in the form of suicide for women who are exposed to domestic violence, social injustice and discrimination in Northern Iraq that is obviously a patriarchal and conservative society (Hamsici, 2013). Likewise,

twenty-six-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in Tunisia triggered the anti-government demonstrations and then started the Arab Spring (Url-7, 2011).

Another form of resistance by using the body as an instrument is hunger strikes. In December 2000, prisoners from 20 different prisons went on a mass hunger strike in order to protest the upcoming F-type cell system and isolation practices in Turkey. Due to the prisoners' refusal of medical examinations, the government started an operation to the prisons to end the strikes (Url-8, 2015). The operation turned into a prison massacre and 30 prisoners and 2 soldiers died (Amnesty International, 2001). Similar ways to resist the practices in prisons or of States were seen in the Irish Republican hunger strike of 1981 that caused the death of 10 prisoners (Url-9).

Resistance with art, using music, cinema, theatre or performative arts are also popular forms of resistance. Sahrawi people in refugee camps are resisting against the Moroccan colonization of West Sahara with young people in a nonviolent way. One of the young people in the camp producing protest music in the rap genre states creative resistance is a nonviolent weapon (Lee, 2014). Besides, protest music is a common form of artistic resistance by way of music.

The resistance of the Amish against modernization and technology; women's resistance to male domination in different areas of knowledge such as literature, international relations or politics; cultural resistances against globalization, capitalism and popular culture; religious resistances against secularism; barricade and ditch resistances against the attacks as in Paris Commune, Paris '68, and Gezi Revolt and so on are different resistance events encountered in the history of the world, current politics and daily life. These and the other examples are only a few of the resistances that have occurred in history.

The event aspect of resistance –it is even understood as an encounter which is actual, spatial and historical- is very related to its conceptualization. While resistance is in fact an event, the concept of resistance is employed to denominate it so that we can use it while reflecting on events. For that reason, the identification of the concept of resistance is important to define events whether they are resistances or not depending on the properties that are included in the concept. A human being is always in action and most of the time in opposition in terms of his/her relations in social, political and natural life. The clarification of the concept, thereby determining its attributes helps

us define events whether they are resistances or not. In this sense, the analysis of resistance events become controversial. The forms of resistance cannot be categorized strictly. Forms relate to each other and may hybridize with another. Although it seems that action is an event that a concept is nominalized on, the discourse of the sovereign power or Power holder defines the status of an action as long as the conceptualization depends on power relations. The governor or the sovereign or the Power holder defines the status of the action according to his/her power to conceptualize. While the resister defines it as resistance, governor or the sovereign may name it a rebellion or terror, as is often the case. General Manuel Prieto Lopez, commander of the Civil Guard in the Spanish Civil War, spoke of the anti-Francoist fighters as bandits and killers in a TV program in 1984 (Télez, 2006). For example, BBC resorts to words like *insurgent*, *militant* instead of using the word *terrorist* in order not to set a barrier (Url-10, 2014). This shows that, depending on the perspective, “[o]ne man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter” (Seymour, 1977, p. 61). The discourse of the powerful gives a shape to the nominalization of the event. It is seen, even from the events, there is a disagreement over resistance. This incompatibility and the struggle causes a critical distinction between *the justification of resistance* and *the legitimacy of resistance*.⁴ Each resistance has different ideals, different demands, methods and forms. Each of these events and all residual resistances make us ask which resistance is rightful. This question leads us to the philosophical investigation of resistance.

The term *resistance* corresponds to different meanings in different times. It existed in time, in nature, and among the first wo/men even before its conceptualization. It is still a word that people encounter in contemporary politics every day; the authorities interpret it, evaluate it and entitle it. People use it in its denotative meaning, in other words they use the word to correspond to some events in its spatiotemporal being. However, the meaning of the word is not as simple as it seems. A philosophical investigation over an event and a concept requires more attention and precision. The term, if it is looked closely, is used for the situations that express an intervention to a time span in historical uniformity, it is used for drawing attention to the attempts of

⁴ Legitimacy is taken in its general meaning as Rousseau uses: the acceptance of the people, being approved generally (Rousseau, 2007, I.IV). Thus, legitimacy is different from justification. Legitimacy is very related to the consents of the people.

destabilizations. In this sense, the study of the term *resistance* becomes important in order to make sense of history and political relations.

There is a diversity among the events that are named resistance. There are different forms by different actors against different targets in different times and places with different aims and ideologies. There is also a diversity among the conceptualizations of resistance-like events. In other words, there is no agreement also on the meaning of it and this makes the concept of resistance controversial. The idea of resistance comes from its spatial existence, from the objects of this idea that can be called events which are the sources of perceptions on the spatial becoming in nature. The denomination of an event as resistance drives us to nominalization and thus the distinction between the event and the concept of resistance. For that reason, resistance is taken into account both an event and a concept. While events are spatial and temporal, have no limits and touch one another; concepts are the words that correspond to general abstractions from particular experiences depending on attributions.

1.1.2 Resistance as a concept

The conceptualization of resistance gains its meaning by means of its usage and founding plane. Every philosopher knows what resistance means basically. The area they think in, the ground which they use the word on shapes its meaning, especially in a political way. In history, resistances have always been in a state of becoming. However, according to many paradigms, the concept of resistance is affirmed if and only if it refers to a moral value system. Therefore, its occurrence as a right or its conceptualization was possible as long as it is appropriate to an end that is in accordance with a specific moral value system. In ancient philosophy, conceptualization depends on the appropriateness of the teleological determinateness. So, the system which philosophers understand resistance in may be a teleological system, therefore it is a resistance to the extent that it is proper to teleological understanding of morality. For e.g., the legitimate resistance leads to doing the right thing via reason in ancient and medieval philosophies.

Then, in the modern era, because of the fact that in civil state morality was established following the establishment of sovereignty (Hobbes, 1996, p. 90), resistance was conceptualized by the concepts of the sovereign power. The sovereign becomes a superior subject that transcends individuals and their particular decisions because of

the subjects' transfer of their rights. So, a subject does not have a right of resistance until the sovereign threatens or cannot protect the life of the subject, which run contrary to the aim of the treaty.

Locke takes the properties of the individuals as the center as inalienable natural rights of wo/men. These properties are life, liberty and possessions. In this context, if the sovereign power acts outside the scope of the contract that civil society -or people-agreed on, the resistance is conceptualized and it is a right to restore or re-establish the agreement (Locke, 2003b, §243).

The conceptualization of resistance outside law can be seen in Clausewitz's theories on war. The definition of war and setting its aim as making the opponent incapable of further resistance (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 13) gives resistance an attribution. It is a potentiality that actualizes in case of war. Thus, it seems, resistance is also the motor force of relations in a war.

Marx and Engels propose reading history as the history of class struggles (Marx & Engels, 1996, p. 1). In one sense this means determining classes as the subjects of history. This means the resistance should actualize between different *subjects* of history, that are the classes. A hostile opposition is required for the formation of a class (Marx, 1954, p. 109) and a resistance occurs between two or more classes that have different characters, but that are on the same plane.

Resistance occurs as a consequence of a reaction that is a response to an action. The relation between the active and reactive refers to the master and slave morality. Nietzsche argues the values of the slave are produced by its *ressentiment* to the master. For that reason, resistance and reaction are not valuable and they produce *ressentiment* because of the lack of affirmation; because they are based on negation (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 20). They have *ressentiment* in the essence of their actions. So, resistance is not something affirmed by Nietzsche.

Foucault uses the concepts of *power* and *freedom* at the base of his conceptualization of resistance and thus, he states that resistance spreads into every cell of society with Power. When resistance is taken in terms of power relations, a wider view for resistance can be seen. Such relations exceed the relations between firm persons or institutions in juridical and bureaucratic forms. The relations between men-women, parents-children, psychiatry-mentally ill are some new forms of resistance pairs which

are actually anti-authoritarian struggles (Foucault, 1982, p. 780). On the other hand, the central role of freedom in a resistance comes from the *agonism* between power relations and the obstinacy of freedom (Foucault, 1982, p. 792).

The effort for reconciling the relations among human beings, trying to count these relations and actions as determined for the sake of sciences, for the sake of making them *facts* always caused a gap to ignore the potentiality and power of politics. The effort to put politics into bureaucracy and law is an effort to render it predictable and alienate its contingency. This may be so because of the ambition of science and scientists to be the authority in the Power of knowledge, on politics and other human relations. Science has been trying to make human relations and politics the object of observation by using the disciplines such as psychology, sociology, economics, probability and statistics. However, as Proudhon remarked, “[t]he fecundity of the unexpected far exceeds the statesman's prudence,” (as cited in Arendt, 1970, p. 7) and also the scientists’. There is not an agreement over resistance, as is seen, and this frame makes us ask the position of resistance in life again: Is it in the scope of law or politics? Is it a lawful concept or a political concept? As it was seen previously, the conflict between politics and law drives us to the origin of resistance. The justification problem is collateral with its classification under rights. Thus, the fundamentals of resistance and its conditions of justification should be examined under the title of *the right of resistance* indeed.

1.2 The Framework and Outline

In this chapter resistance is divided into two as an event and a concept. A historical reading of the events such as civil wars or demonstrations that are encountered in our daily life drive us to different forms and types of resistance as is seen. In some sense it may be political, other similar themes may be economic, cultural, artistic, violent, etc. as it can be observed from the examples given in this chapter. Some of them are against the occupants, others against the legal governments, some of them are against international or non-governmental organizations. People resisted either individually or collectively in these actions. Different forms were executed in resistances such as using armed forces, nonviolent instruments, bodies, or art.

In addition to being an event and spatiotemporal becoming, the conceptualization of resistance helps us to find and determine the common qualities among different

resistance events. After the explanation of different forms of resistance, different conceptions were given by different theoreticians in order to see the common properties of resistance events. The difference among the definitions and attributions of resistance prevents us from evaluating the events and choose the right kind of action. In this thesis, the justification of resistance will be questioned depending on our definition of resistance.

In the second chapter of this thesis, the concept of resistance is analyzed in order to accomplish this challenging task. The major conceptions of different theoreticians such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, Clausewitz, Marx and Engels, Nietzsche, Weber, Arendt, and Foucault on resistance are given. These definitions drive us to two types of the establishment of resistance, which are *identity based* and *power based*. Regarding also this implication, then, the *subjective* and the *objective* features of resistance are put forward. Subjective features of resistance are *recognition* and *intention*, which are both speculative. These speculative features become the optional elements of resistance while the objective features of resistance heap together around the terms of action, opposition, relation and power. *Power* itself involves all the others and expresses the objective feature of resistance which is necessary and common for all resistances. A brief explanation on power is presented and it is formed in order to provide a stable medium for resistance. Setting off from these views, a clear and inclusive definition of resistance is put forward in this context.

The third chapter focuses on the types of resistance. It is actually an advanced analysis on resistance. To serve this aim, the forms of resistance and the types of resistance are separated from each other. Forms differ according to the quantity of agents, the context resistance occurs in, and the means resistance uses. Types, on the other hand, remark the genetic quality of resistances. They are divided into two as *negative* and *affirmative* according to their constitutive movements that are negation and affirmation respectively. This part was improved especially in light of the works of Nietzsche and Deleuze's study on Nietzsche *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1986). Finally, the results of these two kinds of resistance will be handled which can be counted as nihilism and life. These are the results of negative resistance and affirmative resistance respectively. Thus, the values a resistance reveals, the affections it exposes are indicated.

Resistance is regarded in its actuality and its effects are seen with regard to its type. However, what justifies resistance? This is a question about the origin and tendency

of resistance. In the fourth chapter, different answers to this question are introduced through comparing different ethical theories. Ethical theories are also justification theories and they have different groundings from each other. Their superiority to juridical forms comes from the difference between justification and legitimatization. First, this difference is studied and justification is associated with *right* while legitimatization is associated with *law*. So, resistance's being a right is only possible when it is justified. The ethical theories of virtue ethics, natural law theory, deontology, utilitarianism and natural right theory are compared here, and as a result, the reason why natural right theory is the most proper way to justify resistance and its accordance with the nature of resistance is given. Here, natural right theory is beyond its known meaning, but instead it is the assertion of a right's expansion to the extent the power of acting reaches.

The infinite affirmation of the power of acting, therefore right harasses. Thus, the question of the organization of this power reveals. In chapter five, a suggestion is made in order to solve this problem and to justify resistance. The rights which come from the human nature should be executed in accordance with its nature again. For that reason, rights are resituated in this chapter first. Then, the fact that human beings have a presence in society and s/he has a relation with them is handled. This does not require her/him being politic, but being social. Political is obtained only by increasing the power to act which is the natural inclination of any being. Resistance makes sense and does not contradict or collide with natural rights of the being only in this case. This is possible by acting in accordance with the natural laws of good connections. Good connections are established via good encounters. The quality of the knowledge and ability to organize these encounters cause either freedom or slavery. The origin and right of resistance come from this natural inclination for freedom, that is *conatus*.

2. ON THE CONCEPT OF RESISTANCE

There are many interpretations and conceptions on resistance. However, there is no consensus on this concept. In this chapter, the diversity among the different conceptions of resistance will be evaluated briefly and an analysis of the concept of resistance will be offered. This is because without knowing what a thing is, it is not possible to determine whether it is a right or not. The subjective and the objective features of resistance will be given in detail to this end. Then, after the analysis of resistance by studying its constituents, the definition of resistance will be given.

Resisting or *resistance* is one of the prominent concepts in politics. Besides its political meaning, it indicates the relation which occurs because of the force of resistance that is the force that the object touching another or a flow or a current running in an environment exposes in physics. In its most general sense, it is the resistant power that is against the movement and act of a matter in a spatial existence. Air friction, surface friction, electric resistance are some kinds of resistance forces that are the counter-forces usually used in physics. Except these specifications of the concept in scientific research, its origin goes back to the Latin word *resistentia* which is derived from the verb *resistere*⁵ that means “to stand back, withstand” (Skeat, 1967, p. 444; Partridge, 1991, p. 625).

2.1 Conceptions of Resistance

There is a diversity among the views on the concept of resistance. This means, there are different interpretations of the concept. The lack of an agreement among the theoreticians makes the concept of resistance a contested one. The conceptions of resistance are important but they are not enough to identify the concept of resistance. Every conception consists of different sets of principles and they specify the concept in common (Rawls, 1999, p. 5), therefore the conceptions of resistance specify the concept of resistance. For that reason, the different conceptions of resistance have to

⁵ Resist. *re-*, back; *sister*, to stand.

be inquired and the common points and differences have to be taken out in order to specify the meaning of resistance as a concept. There is a contrast between the concept and the conceptions of this concept depending on their levels of abstraction; concept is more general, and it is an arrangement of discrete ideas that can be employed to all interpretations (Dworkin, 1986, p. 71). The required features and constituents of resistance may differ from one conception to another. However, the concept itself is immune to the controversies. The relation between the concept and its conceptions drives us to a cognitive understanding of the concept itself, just as the centroid of a cluster. The commonalities and differences among the conceptions establish the identity of it.

Resistance is something situational and contextual. It occurs differently in different situations and contexts. Presence of resistance is not fixed, constant or something that has an essence. The need for its relationship with other bodies makes it a becoming. Taking the ontology of a becoming in progress and continuity provides infinite relational links between different becomings. Presence, thus, is not ideal, is not a fixed material that is identical to its essence, or cannot exist on its own, but always in a formation as becoming. Hence, the establishment of resistance is not something *a priori*, but empirical. Resistance as an event is also a constellation of becomings. It occurs in a plurality. The meaning of resistance is formed within its relation with other becomings, in flows. The becoming is a node that is made possible depending on the power to affect or to be affected in the flows of becomings. Resistance, therefore, cannot be handled in a static, isolated time and space, but in movement and flow, in its relation with other becomings –not independently. These encounters and becomings made philosophers state different conceptions on resistance.

For example, a definition of resistance cannot be found in the works of Aristotle directly, but his conception of resistance is formed under the circumstances of revolutions against the constitution. Each constitution is a type of government and his theory of revolutions is the part in which he evaluates political resistance. Political resistances are the rebellions against the established constitution, which may appear either as (i) the constitution, therefore the form of government, turns into another one by destruction –e.g., from oligarchy to democracy-, or (ii) some changes in the constitution, but the constitution –type of government- remains unchanged such as (ii.i) taking power into hand by revolution, (ii.ii) a change in degree in the same type

of government such as more or less oligarchic in its base, or (ii.iii) a change in the specific part of the constitution (Aristotle, 1984c, 1301a20-1302a15). In this theory, the aspect that results in little changes in the constitution is not that important for Aristotle. His main issue is the changes of constitutions by coercive power, in other words the first one. For Aristotle, the cause of revolutions is generally inequality and every kind of constitution is open to revolutions as long as the two types of equality – numerical equality and equality according to merit- are not corresponding to justice, in other words when people have the idea that there is inequality between them and the others.

Aristotle's conception of resistance has a base of constitutional change. He both ignores the importance of other aspects of resistance on the same ground and ignores the resistances in other contexts such as social, cultural or economic resistances. Or, the resistance in the private realm is out of context for him probably because of the truth of the superiority of men in householding; the order in the household is unquestionable. On the other hand, rather than an effective resistance, he gives recommendations in order to avoid resistances in his theory of revolutions because he puts law above everything else. Thus, resistance becomes something exceptional and immoral like an illness of the body instead of an actuality and a natural political action. On the other hand, because of the bloody revolutions in his time, Aristotle does not think much on nonviolent forms of resistances. In Aristotle's philosophy and political thoughts, it is not seen any comment or saying about the right of resistance. But rather, he uses revolution theory only for determining methods in order to prevent rebels against the State (Aristotle, 1984c, 1307b25-35). Rousseau notes in his *The Social Contract* that Machiavelli actually tutors to the republicans, not the prince, but he necessarily seems to be a tutor to the prince in his political circumstances (2007, III.VI). However, Aristotle's status is not like this.⁶

⁶ Contrary to an immense number of scholars' view that Aristotle has nothing on resistance, Andres Rosler says in his book *Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle* (2005) in section 7.4 "We have seen so far that Aristotle's political theory does not make sense if it is read as subscribing to a theory of unconditional political obligation. In what follows I shall argue that his political theory also accommodates the notion of a right of resistance." When we enquire his arguments, his main references (for e.g. *Politics IV.10*, *Politics III.15*) are indeed warnings and advices to a king for avoiding being a tyrant in order not to be overthrown. Then he says "Is the case for attributing to Aristotle the notion of a right of resistance proved yet? Were we to leave aside Aristotle's moral theory of political predication, the political bearing of his views on slavery and the passage we just saw in *Politics IV.10*, it might look

Resistance for Hobbes is something exercised intentionally because when a man lays down the right of resistance voluntarily, it means it is exercised intentionally –so, unintentionally exercised actions cannot be laid down. And this right of resistance is a right any human has in the state of nature, but in civil state, he gives it up via a covenant in order not to resist the orders and the actions of the sovereign in return for security. However, in case of immediate death, naturally everyone is inclined to preserve their own lives. So, in such a condition, a man uses his right to preserve his own life –or right of self-preservation- by using the natural right which he cannot lay down or transfer via any covenant (Hobbes, 1996, p. 98). The non-transferable power of man to the sovereign seems as the right to self-preservation in case of an immediate death or the situations similar to death such as wounding or imprisonment, and an immediate death cannot bring a future utility or provide security anymore (Hobbes, 1996, p. 98). Therefore, in this situation, a man has a right to disobey and resist an order or an immediate attack, even if it comes from the sovereign. Hobbes does not see forceful resistance as the only characteristic of resistance: Disobedience to the orders of the sovereign as a kind of resistance should be counted as a non-forceful resistance. Thus, in civil law, rebellion is forbidden (Hobbes, 1996, p. 232) because it means resistance to the given rights of sovereignty and thus the legitimization of absolute sovereignty renders invalid.

By taking the right to resist from the citizen and giving it to the sovereign for the sake of an absolute monarchy makes the citizen isolated from its political character. Thus, as Rousseau indicates, Hobbes sees people as the properties of a man, mankind is like the herds of cattle and each of them has a master who looks after it in order to eat (Rousseau, 2007, I.II). However, it is not that conceivable for anyone to renounce his/her political activity and rights, and especially his/her freedom, for the sake of an uncertain security. The subject becomes devoid of his/her autonomous power while the sovereign has all possessions. On the other hand, an absolute monarchy -what Hobbes is an advocate of- is inconsistent with civil society (Locke, 2003b, §90) because the one who holds whole sovereign power in his hand has no reason to be fair and objective. Thus, renouncement of the right of resistance makes the wo/men passive

as though the right of resistance comes to the surface, if at all, just a couple of times in Politics *V.1* and *V.2*, not to be heard of again.” *V.1* and *V.2* are about the prevention of revolutions against constitutions and do not provide the existence of the right of resistance.

in the face of the sovereign and the activity occurs only in the state of nature such as an animal-like instinct for self-preservation. In other words, Hobbes transforms the creative activity of resistance into a mere obedience and subjection.

Resistance is not regarded as such a clear and important manner till Locke. In Locke's point of view, the foundation of the government and State is unavoidable because of their function in preserving the property and punishing the offences of the society (Locke, 2003b, §87, §94). Values are determined depending on this idea of individual –citizen- and his/her rights that are natural and essential. The State is responsible for protecting these rights and this prevention of violation also legitimizes the foundation of the State. Locke's conception of resistance as a right occurs under the conditions of the violations of the inalienable natural rights: during an attack on the properties of wo/men which are life, liberty and estate. This means, providing that the ruler exercises his/her legitimate or non-legitimate power –coercive or not- arbitrarily (Locke, 2003b, §216, §220), the right of resistance is exercised by the subjects of this sovereign. Thus, it can be inferred that the resistance as an event occurs between two sides, which are the government and the citizens. So, resistance in Locke is, actually, a justified revolution against anyone –government in general- who violates the natural law that the wo/man is surrounded by and that coincides with the positive law. In this conception, the establishments of the subjects are based on the juridical system and in the domestic affairs of the State.

Locke puts human into society by giving up the executive power of the law of nature to the society; and the government has the right to use it in the name of society. According to Locke and other right based views, some of the natural rights are preserved in civil state –these were life, liberty and estate for Locke-, but the others are transferred to the government -that is the authority- as can be seen in case of the transfer of the right to punish. The right of resistance is exercised under the situations of the violation of inalienable natural rights of the individual. That is also the situation in which the community uses its right of sovereignty through revolution. Resistance, in this sense, is not a continuous relation, but an exercise of an exceptional case. This exceptional status points to a general critique of the liberal tradition which Locke is a prominent representative of. Liberal model is mostly based on the idea of the individual that has certain rights which cannot be violated. This individualism prevents liberal thought from understanding the formation of the collective identities (Mouffe,

2013, p. 4). In other words, taking the individual as a substance avoids the opposition in politics and in the power relations. Marx's critique of the liberal political-economy was also on their avoiding class struggle and the antagonism –antagonism is the essential of the political- between the proletariat and the capitalist class in the theory of labor (Althusser, 1972, p. 32). Liberal thought is not established basing on *difference*. Political and antagonism is the blind spot in liberal thought (Mouffe, 2013, p. 3). Avoiding both essential antagonisms and collective identities makes liberal thought even avoid the necessity of resistance and the theory of rights truly. That is because rights are determined in the realm of the political which depends on the power relations. Thus, there are overdeterminations and external conditions on the determination of rights. Resistance also has a legal ground for Locke. Here, resistance is a kind of defense in one sense in Locke's idea in order to protect the inalienable natural rights of wo/men. However, natural rights of life, liberty, and estate and the precious duty of preserving and respecting them are not justified firmly and slurred over by Locke. Besides, these rights have no existence to be destroyed or preserved and they are "nonsense upon stilts" (Bentham, 2011, p. 328), they are fictive *if the natural rights are regarded in a Lockean sense*. Besides, rationalist and individualist frames do not employ passions and desires in their understanding of ethics and politics. Thus, they cannot give a solution to the problems of politics because of their exclusion of the emotions and collective identities behind the political (Mouffe, 2013, p. 6).

The formation of history is an important process because it requires a formative subject in order to be formed. The concept of *subject* becomes prominent in modern philosophy. The concept of *subject* and *the subject of history* are important because the subject is the one who can create events, who can develop the world, the one who is in action, the subject of history is the one *who* makes history. The view of the subject of history inherently indicates a move of focus from rights to progress. For example, for Hegel, the subject of history is the State (Hegel, 1988, pp. 40-42) and the history is shaped by the relations between States. War is the political and theoretical necessity and essence of States (as cited in Popper, p. 65). Thus, any kind of subject enters into a relationship with another one on a basis of contradiction and history is made as a result of essential wars of the States. In Hegel's thought, resistance is the relationship between contradictories and the movement force of the progress which has an ultimate end as the end of history: absolute Spirit.

Hegel's seeing every difference first as opposition, then contradiction causes a view of the world in progress and development as a compound of contradictions. The progressive movement of the world, even as an existence in itself is negative. The constitutive movement is identified as negation. So, resistance seems inevitable, but inevitably nihilistic. The differences are negated and denied, thus the plurality in society and in other contexts seems contradictory. Nevertheless, contradictions are resolved through synthesis (Hegel, 1988, p. 105). The war and resistances between States are resolved on the purpose of the world State. Jouvenel indicates the people who contemplates on the unfolding of the ages think that war is the activity of States and it is related to their essences (as cited in Arendt, 1970, p. 36). He is Hegel who sees world history as the unfolding of *Spirit* in time (Hegel, 1988, p. 75). If so, is the end of war also end of States, and does the disappearance of the war between States also indicate the end of Power (Arendt, 1970, p. 36) and therefore resistance? This investigation also interests Clausewitz's views on resistance and war.

Resistance is something that occurs as a result of the deeds inherent to the actors. However, a flow of power that is not prevented does not constitute resistance. So, the resistance should depend on and be taken under certain conditions of relations. It is something relational. The conceptualization of resistance through wars means that it occurs between the forces of distinct countries. In others words, the subject of resistance is a country. However, resistance does not depend only on coercive force of armies. For Clausewitz, resistance is an expression of power and the power of resistance consists of the total means at disposal and the strength of will (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 16), which means the resistance has both a physical and moral form (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 36). Clausewitz's classifying resistance under the title of "defense" makes one think that without defense, there is no resistance. Resistance is a form of fighting and its aim is destroying only enough force of the opponents to make them renounce from their intentions (Clausewitz, 2007, p. 36). So, Clausewitz sees the action and opposition which are the properties of resistance depending on the perspective of war. It is natural for Clausewitz to conceptualize resistance in the framework of war between the States as a soldier in 18th and 19th centuries when the wars between nation-States are at its highest level.

However, this conceptualization of resistance confines resistance to wars between States. For Clausewitz, war is the continuation of politics with other means

(Clausewitz, 2007, pp. 28-29). Clausewitz, while understanding resistance in case of war, isolates it from the rest of politics in his conception. Regarding resistance as a subset of politics makes us miss the reality of war and struggle, therefore it makes us think resistance under politics rather than resistance in politics. Clausewitz states resistance is a forceful relation, a relation between two sides, especially between equal sides. This provides the removal of the determined properties originating from the hierarchy and difference between the subjects that leads to an asymmetric power and Clausewitz suggests an understanding of symmetric power. When his thoughts are regarded generally, it can be asserted that Clausewitz introduced Nietzsche and Foucault.

The need to examine both the subjective and the objective aspects of resistance is obvious in Marx and Engels. The information about resistance can be deduced from the process of exchange of commodities. Taking resistance as a conscious process leads us to the question of the resistance of unconscious beings, e.g., the resistance of wages against supply. Commodities are things, and therefore they lack power of resistance against men (Marx, 1977, p. 88). The unconscious matters lack the ability of action. Therefore, they are subjected to the laws of nature and science. The argument that a thing is unable to act and thus the power of resistance makes us think it is not possible to resist the imperative laws. Because a stubborn fact accepts no resistance (Engels, 1989, p. 214). Resistance is not accepted under the determinations of supreme laws that are the laws of material sciences, or nature. These laws are transcendent to contractual laws. Their rights are determined by nature. However, under the conditions where the capitalist maintains his/her right whereas the laborer maintains his/her own, they have equal rights. This antinomy involves an opposition. And these equal rights determine their destiny with force (Marx, 1977, p. 225). As a result, for Marx and Engels, there are some requirements of resistance which are (i) between conscious subjects, (ii) between equal rights, and (iii) those exercising force. This interpretation, in a kind of way, refers to the resistances and conflicts between classes that is the motor of history. The consciousness urges people to gather around their common interests (Marx, 2005, p. 188) and this class consciousness forms the historical subject or *agent of history* as classes.

Another interpretation which is the thesis that claims the history of the societies of all times is actually the history of class struggles (Marx & Engels, 1996, p. 1) explicitly

states that the political and historical accumulation is still being shaped by events, which are generally called resistances that are the relations between two or more sides and historical subjects as classes. They see the political action as a conscious action because the classes are the subjects of the action who reach the consciousness of themselves. However, reading resistance as a relation of power necessarily drives us to accept the presence of resistance where power lies. Marx and Engels seem to ignore unconscious procedures and actions in the formation of resistance. Both Hegel and Marx sees history as has an end and the historical subject would carry it. Therefore, a view of historicism lies in their theories (Popper, 1966). This view of historicism takes its base from a kind of essentialism. However, resistances are the events and they unpredictably break the order of uniformity and there is a continuity in history, not an end. The *subject* of history is not important anymore, but the class struggle which is the motor of history is in the front rank anymore (Althusser, 1972, p. 28). History is a process that has no *subject* (Althusser, 1972, p. 29).

Nietzsche equals the relation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the relation between the slave morality and the noble morality (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 18). Marx and Engels see the action between these two classes as resistance. Nietzsche thinks so as well, but, for Nietzsche, resistance is the action of reaction that is in the situation of passivity; the constitutive forces of resistance are reactive and it is hindered from what it can do (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 346). The will to power of resistance is negation because it always seeks something to negate. This way, it does not create any values and it produces nihilism that is despised and abhorred by Nietzsche. Nietzsche argues anarchists and socialists, and their primitive addiction of commune are reactionary (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 16) because it produces insignificance and nihilism. They do not create their own values depending on only their affirmative actions, but the values are reactively produced. Their revolt is a slave revolt according to their moral values. The morality of the slave is the value production of *ressentiment* against and negation of the different, establishment of the other (Nietzsche, 1994, pp. 21-22). Resistance is not valuable and it produces *ressentiment* and has *ressentiment* in its essence because of the lack of affirmation, so presence of negation in its base.

Nietzsche rightfully embraces the concept of resistance in the relation of forces. In addition, he excludes the conceptions which are based on the essential subjects, subjects as substances. He converts the whole plane, from identity to power. Every

resistance becomes nihilistic as long as they are reactionary and not affirmative in this relations of power, therefore forces. An intrinsic value and an affirmation cannot be produced from the *ressentiment* producing resistance. Thus, resistance does not seem promising for a life, does not seem having an affirmative power. Despising resistance makes the political action and the effect of resistance ambiguous in founding political life. However, Nietzsche does not emphasize and talk about the affirmative aspect of resistance for life.

Weber's conception of resistance can be derived from his definition of Power and authority. The Power (*Macht*) in his conception is the probability of carrying out the actor's –who is in social relationship- own will despite resistance (Weber, 1978, p. 53). In this conception Weber puts Power opposite resistance. This means Power involves the probability of conflict and necessarily involves resistance. The situation when the presence of resistance is abolished is the state of domination different from Power. It seems Weber sees power relations as the tension between Power and resistance. On the other hand, domination (*Herrschaft*) is the authoritarian power of command (Weber, 1978, p. 946) that establishes its legitimacy through the consents of the subordinates. Via consent, the authoritative power extinguishes the high probability of resistance. However, he admits that the definition of Power in sociology is *amorphous* (Weber, 1978, p. 53). So, Weber does not give a concrete definition of resistance to us, but he makes us think of the power relations.

Although Weber's definitions of Power and resistance are established on the plane of power relations, his definition of Power always tends to be centralized, to be institutionalized in bureaucratic forms. Weber sees the Power actors as centralized organizations and means such as bureaucracy and institutions –for e.g., State organization. However, he fails to notice the other Power mechanisms that are rooted and processing among the whole society. Therefore, resistance, also, does not occur in the tension between the institutions of centralized Power and the opponents, but in the whole society. The power relations that are diffused in society is not of any concern to Weber.

Arendt puts the political in the center of her works. Any political action, including resistance, is not affirmed by her as long as it abolishes the political realm or shrinks the power to act. Resistances are the potentialities of political action. Political actions such as revolutions, rebellions, wars are events and an event is the occurrence that

interrupts uniform processes. The power to act is the thing that makes wo/men political and therefore it is very related to freedom (Arendt, 1970, p. 82). Violence –whether it is an instrument of Power or resistance against Power- falls to the opposite side of politics by violating the order of politics (Arendt, 1970, p. 14). Although violence is an instrument of Power, it seems antagonistic with Power –this does not mean Power provides an area for political action when it is away from violence, as in the case of bureaucratic States. A resistance should have moral characteristics such as having feelings of justice and compassion, and it should not be independent from one’s personal interests. A person should not taboo emotions just as progressivism and science do. Violence should only be an instrument for resistance till the aim is accomplished and its justification lies here. Nevertheless, it seems Arendt excludes violence in the context of political action and gives no credit to it.

Arendt, because of her definition of Power, is unable to see the mechanisms over people that produce active consent and take the duty of acting in the name of them for the sake of them. When we take the apparatuses exercising on bodies as institutionalized and organized control mechanisms rather than the disciplinary instruments directly used by human, it can be seen that violence is reversed to the one resorting to it as a life reducing element. *Violence at the hands of Power* is an activity that diminishes, scatters, prohibits because of its difference from nonviolence in degree. For that reason, Arendt was unable to see resistance necessarily opposite to the Power. She thought of preventing conflicts by giving the Power to the majority, but she did not mention the negative ontology of Power itself and its inhibitory mechanisms, including the mechanisms any person employs on himself. As long as resistance stays passive⁷ -not tacit consent- (Arendt, 2003, pp. 47-48) while these mechanisms are working, resistance can just reduce the acceleration of the increment of Power. Thus, resistance stays unable to be activated until it comes across a breakthrough and it will not mean an obstacle although it is not a support. At the end of this case, either resistance will either be broken by coercion or be included in reformation through reconciliation.

⁷ Arendt mentions about individual nonviolent resistances in her article *Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship* (2003)

Foucault himself indicates the resistance is a relation with Power and where there is Power, there is also resistance against Power (Foucault, 1982, p. 794; Foucault, 1981, p. 95). So, another aspect of resistance is its being in a context of relational deeds. Different from Clausewitz, he reads the politics as a war; politics as a war with other means, but war is not the exception of politics; and therefore resistance and power relations are thought to be spreading among the whole society. The coexistence of Power and resistance is an ontological one. In this relationship, freedom coexists also with resistance because the possibility of resistance shows us the existence of freedom, freedom to avoid the actions of the Power. As in Weber's definition, domination is the absence of resistance for Foucault (Foucault, 1997, p. 283). Therefore, the state of domination that is the absence of resistance is the absence of the activity and it is one of the sides of either: infinite passivity or being open to the effects of the dominator. So, in order that resistance can exist, both of the subjects have to be free to some degree, but the understanding of *subject* is not the modern subject that is conscious and substantial, instead, it is socially constructed in the web of power relations.

Power relations involve at least a strategy of struggle potentially and power relations necessitates resistance points in it (Foucault, 1982, p. 794). So, where there is Power, there are power relations, and therefore resistance. If a society without any power relations can only be an abstraction (Foucault, 1982, p. 791) and if such a society has no actuality, Power and resistance are inevitable. This way, Foucault indicates that he would use *war* –that is the extreme and bare form of power relations- in order to analyze power relations (Foucault, 2003, p. 46). In *Society Must Be Defended* Foucault seems to use *politics* as *the continuation of war by other means* via reversing Clausewitz's statement on war (2003). However, then, he is not sure about giving a definite answer whether every power relation is a warlike relation (as cited in Fontana & Bertani, 2003, p. 282). Even so, resistance does not provide emancipation and every form of resistance seem the same in that they are all against Power. Thus, there is no need to affirm every single resistance in an ethical way. It is true, Foucault sees the freedom effect of resistance, but in its relation to Power. This means, in struggle, or *agonisme* in his words, resistance provides an opportunity, a freedom area, a gap, a line of flight in the confinement tendency of Power. However, is there an innate freedom element, a positive characteristic in resistance? Otherwise, providing freedom has to be either a plane of perpetual *agonisme* or a perpetual resistance necessarily. In

this context, the only possible plane except war seems to be domination. Domination –or we can say it is the situation of the absence of war– is not the presence of peace i.e., providing dominance by guaranteeing the removal of the possibility of resistance to power was Hobbes’ apprehension. Rousseau describes this situation very well: “Men live tranquilly also in dungeons; is that enough to make them contented there? The Greeks confined in the cave of the Cyclops lived peacefully until their turn came to be devoured” (2007, I.IV).

Thus, the integrity of resistance to Power does not provide any possibility for emancipation, but an endless shift of the constellation of Power and resistance (Holloway, 2005, p. 40). From another point of view, his ignorance of the genetic qualities of resistances –affirmative or negative- made him support the Iranian Revolution and Khomeini (Afary & Anderson, 2005). A similar case was seen in Turkey in 2010 when a group of people who are seeking for freedom supported an agent of political Islam –or Islamism- which is resentful and nihilistic. Being against modernism and against rationalism does not require supporting their opponents in case of resistance without regarding their values through genetic qualities. Thus, the idea that propose every resistance is justified because of its only being a resistance, of course, absurd. All resistances do not have the same value. The aim of Power is immobilizing the relations of power. Resistance acts are against this aim and they move parallel with the tendency of freedom. Power and resistance require each other mutually. However, Foucault does not put a difference between different types of resistance that is also a problem of values, and resistance’s essentially being linked to Power does not involve the notion of emancipation.

The common feature that is inherent to the resistance in both modern view –Hobbes, Locke⁸, Hegel and Marx– and many others is the existence of a conscious subject. In this respect, these ideas on resistance can be called *identity based approaches to resistance*. This way, a fiction is put into effect via inalienable rights in the context of responsibility and prohibition. This fiction signifies a civil subject who is responsible for his/her actions, who is self-contained with his/her rights. Thus, a subject refers to the determined and constant essence in the definition of the corresponding concept such as class, State or citizen. The move from right to progress accompanies the move

⁸ Locke’s theory of personal identity is based on the notion of consciousness (Behan, 1991, p. 565).

from individual to upper-subject, which is fictional inclusionary identities such as nationality, class or etc. Identity is determined by essence, by institutionalization; it is the establishment of a fixed subject by an abstraction on common attributes. It is dialectical and concerning to consciousness. Subjects are made to follow the instructions of their essences. Resistance is shown as the relation between different and centered subjects whose interests are conflicting and ontologically requiring each other. The subjective features of resistance require the existence of the subjects as sides in a relation of resistance. The elements of the conscious subject or the operations of the subjective features of resistance can be divided into two as intention and recognition. Both of these qualities are the qualities of the subject and they are the necessary conditions of the conscious subject. However, the exclusion of unconscious and subconscious processes and power flows of the non-living beings and mechanisms from the context of resistance makes the subjective features of resistance problematical. Attributing relations to the determined essences and constant centers causes both the abolishment of the changing and moving essences, and a view that regards resistances as exceptions of politics.

In addition, we can name the relational and material existence of resistance as its ontological aspect. The ontological aspect or objective features of resistance are independent from the comprehensions of the subjects with their minds. The ontological aspect is the existence of resistance outside the conditions of the conscious subjects. Ontology of resistance flees from the subjective aspect of it. We can call these kind of views on resistance *power based approaches to resistance*. Nietzsche and Foucault also read resistance as dependent on power and a power's relation to another power. Both Nietzsche's and Foucault's views on power relations and resistance are independent from the conditions of a *subject*. These people tend to read events and existence in relation to the actions rather than the essences of the subjects. While the establishment of a constant subject and its essence suggests a kind of morals, an end for actions, the abolishment of it creates a problem of values. The whole history of philosophy is the struggle between subjecting the power to the subject and subjecting the subject to the power. The former is the attitude of the identity based approaches to resistance, and the latter is the attitude of the power based approaches to resistance because according to the power based vein, the subject is a kind of becoming and each becoming is formed by forces in power relations.

Resistance, as an expression of power against another form of power –a differentiation of power-, is independent from consciousness and therefore its features of recognition and intention. On the other hand, the *relations* of power are the prerequisite for the properties of powers as *action* and *opposition*⁹. Power binds action, relation and opposition to itself. As the conditions of resistance, action and opposition involve power together. Power is the moving force of action and the opposition is constituted in the relationship of a power with another one. So, resistance is an event that is independent from conscious subject. This event occurs during the prevention of an action in motion that acts on the actions of the other by an oppositional action in the relationship of power.

- (i) X's action is exercised on Y's actions: X has *power over (potestas)* Y.
- (ii) X's action decreases Y's power of acting: Y's *power to (potentia)* decreases.
- (iii) Y's oppositional-action is an attempt to ward off the effects of X's action on Y's actions in order to increase its own power of acting: Y strives for increasing its power of acting (*power to, potentia*)
- (iv) Y's action creates a change in the extents of power: Power relations are not fixed.

As a result, two controversial aspects of resistance can be counted as the issue of subject that are the subjective features and the issue of relationship that are the objective features. These two aspects have parallels with the two approaches to resistance i.e., *identity based* and *power based*.

2.2 The Analysis of Resistance

Motions of objects, thus also motions of bodies, go on until an external cause makes them stop, and therefore they tend to preserve their situations even in motion (Spinoza, 2002b, p. 255; Hobbes, 1996, p. 15; Newton, 1999, p. 416). This simple principle is the natural principle –Newton's first law of motion- that is going to form all aspects of resistance basically. And again, this simple principle also shows us that resistance is a kind of relation that occurs between bodies. The relation of resistance occurs either

⁹ *Opposition* –by referencing to *the Square of Opposition*- is an epistemological concept, a property of knowledge in Aristotelean logic (Aristotle, 1984a, §7, §8), not a position of forces. However, it is used in the meaning of position of forces to each other here.

(i) between two or more moving bodies, or (ii) between one or more than one motionless body and one or more than one moving body. A relation of resistance may occur also (iii) between two or more motionless bodies, but this can only happen when there is a resisting force between two or more motionless bodies. That is to say, one of the bodies must pursue its motion when its touching counter body disappears. The force of resistance that affects the moving body originates not only from the surface but also from the idiosyncratic structure and *attributes*¹⁰ of the moving object itself. The resistance arises from the inertia of matter which is essential to bodies (Newton, 1999, p. 761). Naturally, a resistance force is not going to occur as long as there is no affecting counter-force to the body. This obviously shows resistance is a relation between forces.

Hollander and Einwohner (2004) induced the four elements of resistance as *action*, *opposition*, *intention* and *recognition* in their study. While intention and recognition are the properties of the subject, therefore they constitute the subjective aspect of resistance, *action* and *opposition* are the properties of the relationship between expressions, or roughly the deeds of actors, therefore they constitute the objective aspect of resistance. There is a big diversity among the definitions of resistance in literature. The diversity arises because of different attributes that resistance has and also because of the different approaches to these attributes. When it is taken within the scope of politics, although resistance has properties such as the *scale*, the *level of coordination*, the *targets*, the *direction* or *goals* that cause diversity; in definition resistance has some core features that are common for all kinds of resistances: *action* and *opposition* (Hollander & Einwohner, 2004, pp. 536-538) which belong to the relationship aspect of resistance. It can be simply said that action requires a kind of immanent power of the actor that pushes it forward into action. In addition to that, opposition is a must because of the requirement for a resisting power that wards off the opponent's action or movement just as in the mechanical explanation of resistance. It is a self-evident fact that without any opposition, the action of an actor will not turn into a resistance. By the same token, without action, opposition is merely being

¹⁰ "By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence" (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 217).

affected passively and being controlled by another power that is over the subordinated. However, this situation does not refer to an opposition to a force.

By definition, in resistance, there are some elements that are common to all relations of resistance and in addition, there are some elements that change in time and place. These four elements come in handy to analyze resistance. The elements of intention and recognition depend on the parties of resistance. Recognition is the faculty of the one who is not the actor of resistance, in other words either the target or the observer. Besides, the action belongs to the actor and intention is the faculty of the actor. These elements are directly attached to the conscious processes of the subjects of resistance. Actually, they are not necessary and essential, but show an alteration according to the subjective circumstances. For that reason, they are entitled to be the subjective features of resistance. Besides, there are the features which do not change depending on time and space. They are independent from the substantive subjective processes of the subjects that are the conscious processes. These features are universal and exist in every resistance. Although these features can be divided into four: power, action, relation and opposition –because resistance as an action is an expression of power in a relation of the opposites. The concept of power involves action, relation and opposition inherently. As a result, it can be said that there are subjective features of resistance such as intention and recognition, and the objective feature such as power.

2.2.1 Subjective features

Both intention and recognition involve being aware of something. The awareness of a becoming depends on the faculty of thinking –acts of thought. Consciousness¹¹ is certain, it is not material and not something spatial for Descartes (Descartes, 2008, p. 124; Descartes, 2009, p. 195) and the thought that one is conscious of is quite true because only certainty exists and s/he is not skeptical when s/he thinks it in a duality. These subjective features are the constituents of the epistemological ground of resistance. Dualism separates body and mind from each other: body as extended part –spatial- and mind as certain part –cogitative. In this context, being conscious is the measurement of reality and truth, because an extended thing is not in me and I cannot be sure of something as long as it is not the result of my thought. So, both intention and recognition are conscious processes which are attributed to different subjects

¹¹ Latin *conscii* and *consciis* means being aware of something.

depending on the modes of their affections, their relations to an action. *Cogito* is the faculty of thinking as thought and it is a representation of consciousness. The existence of a thing is certain only if it can be thought consciously. So, in body-mind dualism, there is a superiority of mind over body resulting from consciousness' being the consistent faculty of thought. However, if conscious thought is a representation¹² plus a reflective act, representation comes before consciousness (Jorgensen, 2014) because mind processes on a representation rather than establishing representation in itself.

Thought is something that one is conscious about. While the order of extended objects is excluded when consciousness –what thought is appraised by- is taken as the measurement, the definition of thought depending on body-mind parallelism instead of dualism turns the direction from idealism to materialism. The idea that “[t]he order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 247) devaluates consciousness in favor of thought. The parallelism between the ideas in mind and the extended objects indicates that the source of ideas is neither imagination nor abstract thinking, but the source of an idea depends on an external cause (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 39). A complex or an abstract idea also depends on the perceptions on spatial becoming (*devenir*) in nature. This is the relation between an idea (*idea*) and the object of the idea (*ideatum*). Similarly, the idea of resistance is derived from the objects of this idea that are called events. So, in actuality, what happens to the body, what affects the body will be presented to the mind (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 251) –referring to *recognition*- and mutually, a representation that is inferred from mind is represented on body –referring to *intention*. Therefore, it seems both intention and recognition depend on parallelism. By the shift from the founder consciousness to the founder body, the mind-body parallelism devaluates consciousness, but does not give superiority to body contrary to mind because dualism is invalidated.

Any affection on body is a representation of the relations of extended objects and they are represented also to mind even they are confused ideas that are different from distinct and clear ideas. The mind becomes conscious of itself through the ideas that body is affected by (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 284). This way, thinking exceeds

¹² According to Descartes, representation is established in the action of thinking subject and the *subject* as substance is the center of these processes.

consciousness and consciousness becomes a degree, a threshold concept of thinking rather than a kind and a faculty. *The unconscious of thought* (Deleuze, 1998, p. 19) - infinitely small reasons have effects on body, but they are unable to reach to the level of consciousness- still represents the orders and connections, but it is unable to have a grasp of reasons.¹³ Thus, we understand that conscious elements –by using *conscious* in its general meaning- were actually fictional¹⁴ and speculative requirements for an act.

2.2.1.1 Recognition

Recognition is acknowledging something by being aware of the perceptible thing's existence and its appropriateness to the correspondent concept or term that it is classified under. Therefore, an action needs a conception of resistance in the minds of either (i) the target -who is the respondent of the resistance- or (ii) the observer -who is generally the social scientist or analyzer, media or public in order to be recognized as resistance. It seems there are two levels of recognition process for the one who the recognition is attributed to: (i) perception of sensible matter, and (ii) matching the event to the conception of abstract thinking. These consecutive two processes and therefore recognition as a whole seems to require the distinction between the body and the mind, a dualistic approach to the subject.

For recognition, a judge position is attributed to the target or the observer. The effects of an action should be attributed to the conception of it by the target. In case of *recognition of the target*, an action is named as resistance when the effects on the observer are conceptually corresponding to the properties of the idea of resistance. In case of *recognition of the observer*, the observer should be qualified culturally in order to label an action as resistance, s/he can understand or recognize it, or s/he can be a competent scholar who is able to analyze relations correctly and diagnose *resistance* for an action.

¹³ Spinoza himself indicates an infant does not suck milk consciously and it is not able to know the reason why it is sucking although thinks it freely wants to suck, and the same is employed for a drunken man or someone acts to take revenge according to his hatred (2002c, p. 280). “Aristotle was right, but he mistook the effect for the cause” (Rousseau, 2007, I.II) is another criticism in a similar way.

¹⁴ In this sense, using the term consciousness in its general meaning, consciousness is the locus of illusion because it takes results as reasons (Deleuze, 1998, p. 19).

The target can label an action against himself/herself as resistance because it may be an obvious attack on him/her. However, being invisible or being not recognized by the target does not deny the power relations and opposition of actions between the actor and the target. *Samizdat* (самиздат) or any underground resistance organization is an effort not to be recognized by the target, it is also a resistance to prevent the recognition of the target, for instance. It would be the same for the situation when there is a struggle and fight between two primitive tribes who are unable to have a conception of resistance and also there is no witness to record it or evaluate it as resistance. Everybody may die during the fight between two tribes. In the former situation –the case of *samizdat*- there is not an overt resistance and the target is lack of an observation on the existence of resistance to match it with his conception. In the latter –the case of tribes- there is a spatiotemporal existence of resistance but no knowledge on the existence of resistance. In the second situation, refusing an action's being resistance drives us to a mere idealism. Recognition is not something extinct even if it is a fiction. Being not conceptualized –or being not recognized- is not a condition and justification for the absence of resistance. It is just not a necessity for resistance.

2.2.1.2 Intention

Intention is the desire to get a result, the plan to do something, a feature of mind to do an action to obtain desired outcomes. It is the attribute that comes before the action and outcomes. The intended action and the intended outcomes are virtual in the beginning. When intention is taken in its virtual sense, an intention to *X* both precedes the action *X* and action *X*'s consequences. However, also the action and its outcomes are intended, intended may diverge in actual sense, rather than virtual; but virtually, the fiction is coherent. If someone intends to go somewhere, s/he necessarily envisions and accepts consciously to be there by means of proper actions and these actions are to some degree envisioned. To say it again, however, intention requires an envisioned precise targeted end. This end has two aspects: (i) the intention to exercise the action just as deontological ethics for the sake of action only, and the other is (ii) the intention to obtain desired consequences. Intention is primarily constructed as virtual, then it must be attributed to the action as *intentional act* in order to be actualized. Since resistance is determined also by action, act establishes and reconfigures itself depending on motive, and motive is virtually envisioned consequences that give movement through action. An intended action means motivated action or having the

motivation during action. As Anscombe indicates, mental-causes are distinct from motives and intentions because they are unable to give genuine answers to the question *why* (Intention, 1956-1957, p. 329) and this means the actor should know the reasons behind his/her action in an intentional act. This awareness drives us to consciousness. Sure, both motive and intention of an action are conscious qualities. Motive has a wider sense than intention. Intention, as a quality of action, focuses only on the action but motive is the driving cause –intention requires being direct cause of an effect- for different sets of actions. While motive is an impetus, intention is an objective. Intentional act is an affirmed situation with the compatibility of the aim and result.

Thus, the planned and willed action as intentional action differs from the action that is unintentional and unconscious. Intention is both a characteristic of an action and a feature of one's mind (Bratman, 1995, p. 380). Intention in other sense is the abstraction of the subject from the deed by giving the responsibility of the act to him/her (Inwood, 1992, p. 32). The outer conduct is isolated from the subject and the source of action is merely designed as the conscious subject itself who has free will and intention on his/her action. This idea regards the actor -who is aware of what s/he is doing- as the source of intention on an act and requires a distinction between the action and the actor as the conscious subject. Intentionality precedes the authority of the subject over the action and the power of choice to do or not to do. However, the devaluation of consciousness (Deleuze, 1998, pp. 17-22) and showing it as a degree of awareness tell us that even though the reasons of relations are not known, the ideas of effects are thoughts and a person has thoughts via his/her body and its affections. When the concept of consciousness is used in its general meaning and its lines are defined by the question *why*, intention requires consciousness. Although the reasons of the relations that are not expressed in language do not mean their causes are unknown, unconscious actions may, of course, be resistance. Statements such as “telling a lie to someone is wrong because it is forbidden” or “telling the truth is right because it is a duty” include reasons for the people who state these claims implicitly. The implicit reasons are represented in these kind of statements and at the end of the reconciliation of the affections on body, hence their ideas as thoughts. Our intellectual activity is to a large extent unconscious, although conscious thought was taken as the only possibility of thought (Nietzsche, 1974, §333). All perfect actions are unconscious actions and they can no longer be subjected to will (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 163). Either

unconscious or unintentional, an action can be classified as resistance. The opposition of a lamb against an eagle is a resistance although it is unconscious. The same goes for screaming in a moment of danger. So, this also shows that the difference between intentional and unintentional acts are too blurred when consciousness is devaluated. Without a full awareness in mind, a person can resist something depending on its affection on his/her body. Some regulations around a wo/man may not be conceptualized yet but it can be defective and the ideas of these regulations naturally may affect his/her body. As a result, an intentional or an unintentional act can be a resistance depending on the context.

As a result, recognition is attributed to a passive subject –the one who is affected by the action- and intent is attributed to the active subject –the one who carries out an action. However, as can be seen, the two main aspects of resistance, intention and recognition, are neutral in definition. Therefore, the constitutor subject seems to be only fiction. In the following parts, resistance is going to be grounded outside the understanding of fictional subjects. These propositions lead us to examine the ontology of resistance. To say it in advance, resistance is something natural; it is not something constructed by rational faculties. It is an event and an obvious, an existential relation, not an ideal fiction, an idea, a substance, or a meaning of something. Recognition of both the target and the observer, and intention of the actor do not constitute a determinant criterion for the definition of resistance.

2.2.2 Objective features

We assert that, the aspect of relation is independent from the aspect of subject and it involves action and opposition. These are the ontological characteristics and the base of resistance. The ontological characteristics of resistance, in other words the objective features do not change in time and context. They are universal and constant. They are the necessary and essential features of every resistance. Resistance is an action and it is independent from the subjective features; it is an extended and temporal becoming.

Many interpretations and also its basic definition in mainstream thought are in favor of action's being an intentional act.¹⁵ If we consider actor as the founder and conscious

¹⁵ The correspondence of *action* in Greek *praxis* (πρᾶξις) means the contemplated acts done by human. Aristotle in his *Ethics* gives *praxis* a contemplated and an intended meaning (1984b, 1113b). Although Greek *poiein* (ποιεῖν) also means *to act*, *action*, or *to produce*, it is differentiated from *prattein* (πραττεῖν)

judge, we have to regard him/her as the one who has a full control over and responsibility for his/her actions, but an actor may not necessarily be conscious in his/her actions. The actor and the action are not separated but the actor is involved in it. Action as the exercise of power reveals itself as what it is. The law and morality uses the conscious subject as an agent because their grounding is based on the idea that human being has free will. The need for a separation between the actor –subject- and the action –object- is due to the need to open up an opportunity for the free will, intention, morality and law. However, there is nothing strange in large birds' preying on lambs (Nietzsche, 1994, pp. 25-26). Intention is out of context here, just like morality is. The reality is the action itself as in the preying of large birds. A flash cannot be seen as the *deed* of a subject called lightening, and therefore they cannot be separated from each other, and *doing* is everything (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 26). Thus, action can be handled without being subjected to a subject that is an invention; action is handled solely as a doing. Resistance is also a kind of expression of power to stand against an attack or an effect. Resistance, in this sense, by preventing the action of the opposite, creates a change in the power of the other and directs him/her into a kind of passivity. For that reason, the exercise of the resister creates a passion in the mind of the other. This relation necessarily leads us to the action of the resister after all. Because no one can stay open to being affected forever.

Action expresses a motion that has a direction but it cannot constitute a relation on its own and thus, opposition is necessarily another constituent. In order for a resistance to take place, the action needs to be a stance against, a *re*-action. Therefore, another objective feature is the relation of opposition between actions. Opposition expresses a relation that involves two or more elements in relation with different directions. Action and opposition constitute a dynamic relation. Opposition characterizes the situations of two or more actions in their relation with each other depending on the difference between them in direction. However, without action, opposition alone cannot

-praxis derives from this word- in ethical correspondence (Peters, 1967, p. 162). The need to make *praxis* a conscious and an intended action, and making it attributed to human is based on the need for making human the subject of ethics. When the action and its subject are separated, then the action (*praxis*) becomes an intended act that human does, the responsibility of an action can be laid to this subject. Therefore, an unintentional or unconscious act becomes out of morality and law. The difference between *poiein* and *prattein* occurs in ethics and it seems the latter includes the relations between conscious subjects in social and political realms, otherwise both mean to act and opposite to *pathos* that is the emotion of to be affected, to suffer (*paschein*). It seems the action is still a controversial concept because there are still discussions, even today, on the concept whether it is done intentionally, consciously, does it have subjects as substance (Lowe, 2010, p. 4).

constitute resistance, and without opposition, action alone cannot do so. Action and opposition necessarily need a different kind of condition which corresponds to the true meaning of relation. Since action and opposition are involved in it, we can assert that the *arkhe* of resistance is power.

2.2.2.1 Power

Power -with a capital *P*- is a relation of power –forces- that is an action on a possible or an actual action (Deleuze, 2006, p. 70); or Power is the set of actions that exercise on other actions (Foucault, 1982, p. 789). An exercise of power comes up as an affect because the power expresses itself with its affect, in practice. Power occurs in a relation of forces and forces are defined with (i) the power to affect the other forces and (ii) the power to be affected by the other forces which they are in relation with (Deleuze, 2006, p. 71).¹⁶ Although resistance's being an action depends on the deeds coming from the actor's body, the affection that activates the deeds comes from outside –passion. Thus, even though resisting forms a movement in its relation with power, the source of affection comes from outside.

The concept of power can be divided into two types; one being the power of doing something, an intrinsic power which is *power to* and the other being the indicator of domination which is *power over*. A mainstream approach to power defined it as asymmetrical -power over- all the time, but actually it is not. The sovereign power has always been taken as the dominant power over others and it makes people subjected to itself. So, Power is something referring to the exercise of the sovereign. The power relations in this sense are confined within the relation between the sovereign or institutional power and the subject. A radical intervention was presenting that the power relations are diffused in society and they lie anywhere. In the former, while writers focus on the power relations between, for example, the State and the society, in the latter, focus shifts to the power relations and mechanisms between the State and another State, an individual and another individual, an individual and the State, men and women, an individual and society or culture, etc. In this sense, Power is not

¹⁶ The action and the passion are actually attributions of the same thing. In the perspective of the subject that something happens to, it is the passion; and in the perspective of the subject who is doing or the actor, it is the action (Descartes, 1989, pp. 327-328). A passive situation does not provide an action. The status of being active is the occurrence of something in us or external to us which we are the adequate cause of it, and thus it is action when we are the cause of an affection –emotion- of a body which is the decrease or the increase of the body's power of activity (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 278).

concentrated on one subject or center, and it presupposes the immanent power in each actor which refers to *power to*. Ontologically, power tends to spread (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 26). Conceptually its idealization is propagation. It tries to develop its means, beneficent or not, each kind of power tries to expand its effective area. Being social is one of the required constituents in order to see this tendency. A person who has knowledge, as a kind of power, also tries to tell and propagate it. *Power to* -power operating on the self- or *power over* -power operating on decreasing the power of the others-, both have this aim. Bodily power as an immanent power or *power to* tries to increase, create and preserve its capacity to survive. *Power over* is the same and it tries to be the superior over others. For that reason, both establish the ways and develop the means in order to accumulate their effects in their spaces, limited or extended. Two or more powers that have this quality encounter each other when their directions and volumes are not the same. They necessarily have contact with another or others. Consequences of the exercise of power cannot be foretold or consistent knowledge of its motives cannot be expressed because the process of an action spreads and endures infinitely throughout time (Arendt, 1998, p. 233). Power causes affections on individuals. It tries to spread as much as it can in time and space. These affections on bodies either reduce or increase the power of the other's act who has affections on. For that reason, it can be said power has a relational characteristic. It has an ability of continuity, until it encounters a superior power (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 323).

Resistance is something that is not dependent on the conscious subjects that have features such as intention and recognition. Resistance is quite related to the concept of power as an actuator and a necessary element. In a similar way, Lukes says that "[...] we will not attribute power to structures or relations or processes that cannot be characterized as agents" (2005, p. 72). The new definition of Power not as something that belongs to a centralized authoritative institution, but as a mode of action that acts upon not directly others, but acts upon their actions drives us to deduce that neither the Power is acting in juridical forms, nor it is established by originating from an intention. In addition, it does not take its origin from the State, in short, it does not fit into *the juridico-discursive framework of power*. The aim of the Power is to determine and immobilize –crystallize- the relations of power. Power and resistance require each other mutually. So, wherever there is Power, there is also resistance (Foucault, 1982, p. 794; Foucault, 1981, p. 95) because Power can only be exercised over the free

subjects. This freedom is not an absolute freedom, but it is always the existence of a gap for resisting, a line of flight. For that reason, the *agonism* occurs between the occlusive Power and the fugitive resistance, between two extreme poles of domination and absolute freedom. Thus, we can assert there are two aspects of resistance's relation to power that also refer to the two aspects of power:

- (i) *Potestas*: Resistance and power as *power over* are inseparable and resistance reveals the productive aspect of Power as the existence condition of resistance; the Power that resistance is in an *oppositional* relation with,
- (ii) *Potentia*: Power as *power to* is the moving force of resistant action in its relation with power as *power over*; the power as immanent force that leads resistance to *action*.

The difference between *power over* and *power to* is very crucial to understand the ontology of resistance and this difference corresponded to the one between Latin words *potestas* and *potentia*.

Power as *potestas* and power as *potentia*

Resistance is an expression of power as long as it has a will to power behind it. The relation of resistance with power can be stated more clearly by an inquiry to the two types of power as (i) the immanent life power and (ii) representational domination power. These powers are the constitutive powers of resistance because resistance as an action is always in relation with these types of power. The relation both produces the power, and at the same time the resistance is shaped by this power. The distinction between *power over* and *power to* is a rooted one, the distinction between *potestas* and *potentia* in Latin.

The difference between *power to* and *power over* is the same difference between ancient Greek *dýnamis* (δύναμις) -which means actually physical power of body or ability to do- and *enérgeia* (ἐξουσία) -which means a moral authority. The same dichotomy corresponds to *potentia* and *potestas* in Latin, *Herrschaft* and *Macht* in

German¹⁷, *potenza* and *potere* in Italian, *puissance* and *pouvoir* in French¹⁸ (Lukes, 2005, pp. 73-74). English language stays deficient for this discrimination and the word *power* corresponds to both of them. They are different aspects of power: *Potentia* is *the power of ability* and *potestas* is *the power of authority* (Tuck, 1974, p. 48). *Potestas* has a quality of asymmetric power (Lukes, 2005, p. 74). The explanation of sovereign powers, political relations, governance and political organizations are not independent from these two kinds of power and their relations. The difference between the prince and the tyrant is obvious: The tyrant is the one who gained or usurped the supreme power by force and out of his right. On the other hand, prince has the right to govern depending on his merit or divine right. The conceptualization of these two types of governing in the relationship between *potentia* and *potestas* is formulated as this: Principality corresponds to the *potestaten sine potentia* –right without might-, and tyranny corresponds to *potentiam sine potestate* –might without right (Tuck, 1974, p. 48). This shows, the right to govern, or political legitimate power is *potestas*, rather than *potentia*. It includes the consent of the law. While *potestas* refers to the power of law, *potentia* refers to the power of body in general meaning.

Potestas is not the power of someone to be influenced or to influence. Because *potestas* itself is not a quality of the subject, but it is quality of the power between subjects. That's why it is not a kind of immanent power such as *potentia*. On the other hand, the source of the power as *potestas* is actually a power as *potentia*. So, *potestas* can be described as a version of *potentia*, but very differentiated. The distinctive quality of *potestas* over *potentia* according to Lukes is that *potestas* provides constraining power and it constraints the choices of others, thus secures their compliance: “[I]t is the ability to have another or others *in your power* [...]” (2005, p. 74).

Furthermore, Tuck indicates that there are different but similar aspects of the same discrimination: While *dýnamis* (*δύναμις*) or *potentia* refers to mightiness or ability, *enérgeia* (*ἐξουσία*) or *potestas* refers to a power that comes from right, property or interest (1974, p. 56). For that reason, it can be said *potentia* as a kind of power exists before being socialized and for that reason it is some power *natural*. On the other hand,

¹⁷ Michael Hardt in the foreword of Antonio Negri's *Savage Anomaly*, corresponds *potentia* with *Vermögen* (1991, p. xi).

¹⁸ According to Lukes, *puissance* signifies *power as capacity* and *pouvoir* as its exercise, although their meanings are too close to each other (2005, p. 74).

potestas is formed in social life. *Potestas* can be named as some power *moral*. The invention of *enérgeia* in ancient philosophy involves its differentiation from *dýnamis*. It can be interpreted as a development of the concept because Aristotle gives *dýnamis* the meaning of the potential power, passive power. Thus, logically *enérgeia* precedes *dýnamis*, *enérgeia* is the active mover power that would be attributed to the first mover, power in action (Peters, 1967, p. 43), so the relation with powers runs between *enérgeia* and *dýnamis*, between active (*poieín*) and passive (*páskhein*).¹⁹ Aristotle's derivation of *enérgeia* from function (*ergon*) (Peters, 1967, p. 56) necessarily puts *telos* in its definition. *Enérgeia* becomes the power that manifests itself in a predetermined and conditioned way according to its function. Therefore, *enérgeia* has a transcend form, but *dýnamis* stays as a formless potentiality and undetermined power to act. And therefore, *dýnamis* seems like it expresses a contingency and a kind of freedom. As seen, in the denotation of the establishment of *enérgeia* or *potestas* from the bottom and relating it with morals, a Hobbesian way of thinking is still held in the sense of morality's and moral values' establishment in civil state.

“*Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essential*”²⁰ (Spinoza, *Ethica*, 2011, p. 128). “*Quicquid conscipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est*”²¹ (Spinoza, *Ethica*, 2011, p. 130). As a complete being, the right to govern -power over things- of God is identical to its power to ability. “*Nihil existit ex cujus natura aliquis effectus non sequitur*”²² (Spinoza, *Ethica*, 2011, p. 130). Cause of a thing comes from God's *potestas*, the power over it and necessarily in God, everything that God has power over them are existed because of its *potentia*. So, for God, its *potentia* determines its *potestas*. And as deficient beings to the God, humans, do not have their *potestas* identical to their *potentia*. In other words, their power of ability does not determine the things that a wo/man have power over because the *potentia* of a wo/man is not the total cause of a thing. However, in a sense, when labor, as an example, is taken into account, it comes from the power to do something -*power to* as a cause. For that reason, the product of

¹⁹ The upside-down maneuver of Aristotle between kinds of power can be seen. Aristotle makes *enérgeia* as the producer or as the cause of *dýnamis*, but in sovereignty theory, and therefore by the help of natural right theory, *dýnamis* becomes the cause of *enérgeia*. It is the difference between the establishment from the top and from the bottom.

²⁰ “God's power is his very essence” (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 238).

²¹ “Whatever we conceive to be within God's power necessarily exists” (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 238).

²² “Nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow” (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 238).

labor is under necessarily the authority of its cause -that is *power to do*. In other words, one has power over the things that s/he is the precise and the total cause of it. However, no one -except God or nature- can be the total cause of a product only by adding his/her labor to it because the cause of its raw material is nature at the first stage. By this way, also the existence of a private property that a person has any kind of right, any kind of authority and decision on it seems impossible. A human being -who is regarded as the owner of the *thing*, as the one who has an unlimited control and decision over the *thing* by adding his/her labor power into nature- seems s/he has a *power over (potestas)* the *thing*. Thus, labor is extolled and consecrated. Labor is excluded from its material conditions and it appears to be productive and determinant by itself. However, all the power over a thing is not attributed to humans because they are not the adequate cause of this particular thing. These illusions of belonging and adequate causes mean avoiding the power of nature. This was an intended bourgeois trick and an ideological apparatus (Althusser, 1972, p. 32). As a result, a person is not the total cause of anything, but s/he can only be the partial cause. Therefore, for human and the other beings, *potestas* is an invention, a fiction. If anything takes a share from the *potestas* partially in proportion to its *potentia*, the sovereign has the aggregation of these transferred *potestases* representatively. However, *potentia* stays as the power that cannot be transferred or renounced. So, in metaphysics, *potestas* is determined by *potentia*. *Potentia* draws the limits of *potestas*, the limits of authorization.²³ So, the authority of the ruler depends on the moral rightness of his/her actions in this frame (Tuck, 1974, p. 57).

When the political governance is taken in the hand, it is obvious that no person exists by the cause of another person. So, except God, no one is the cause of a person. For that reason, any *potentia* of a wo/man does not covers the cause of another person and this makes governance of a person over another unjustified. However, *potestas* works as this: It, in its proper sense, can be named with the concept of domination. Comparisons of power require a common ground (*ratio*) and they may be preferences, welfare or well-being which are the conceiving elements of interests. Interests are

²³ The *author* - Sir Robert Filmer, who Locke mentions in his *The First Treatise*- states with his theory of divine right in his *Patriarcha* that Adam has a natural power over his children, but his children do not have the same kind of power over or an authority on their own children (2003a, §68-§72). Thus, the idea that Adam has an absolute and unlimited paternal authority due to his divine status of prophecy can be inferred.

simply the qualities that their change in amount increases or decreases the ableness of the agent, therefore his/her *power to do*. *Potestas* is one's power over the power of another, in other words, one's power to affect another's interests. In the state of power as *potestas*, to have power is acting against other's interests (Lukes, 2005, p. 83). Power as *potestas*, is a mode of action and acts upon the actions of others (Foucault, 1982, p. 789). *Potestas* requires compliance and its tendency is for securing the compliance of others via constraining the choices others meet. Therefore, two necessary conditions that *potestas* have should be constraint and compliance (Lukes, 2005, p. 83).

While domination discriminated from the beneficent power, such like maternal or paternal power, both of them are classified under the *power over* (Lukes, 2005, p. 84). Discrimination seems to depend on the power's being utile or not. However, both can be counted as domination. The case previously named as *domination* does not require further inquiry, but the latter one, *beneficent power* is also a domination in another sense because it debars the subject from the reasons of an action. It gives only orders outside of the processes of self-experiment and self-examination. It makes a person prohibited from maturity and autonomy. Power as non-domination can only be understood in the case for power is not an invasion to freedom that provides person to live his/her own nature (Lukes, 2005, p. 85).

An exercise of Power tends to generate resistance and this resulting resistance itself is also a form of power (Scott, 2006, p. 131). Power is immanent to action as one of the constituents of resistance, and the relation occurs through the interaction with another power: *Striving for preserving the movement of the thing* is an action and this action interacts with another action. The resistance needs an opposition between the directions of distinct actions. Power and its inevitable relation with other powers only are not sufficient for resistance. So, resistance is the event that occurs during the inhibition of an action in motion by an oppositional action in the relationship of power. Resistance has both subjective and objective features. The subjective features of resistance –recognition and intention- are the speculative elements of it as the properties of the fictional subject or consciousness. That is because consciousness is a representation and abstraction. As for the objective features, they stay actual in power relations in comparison to the subjective features.

2.3 Conclusion

Different conceptions of resistance show that there are two veins which are identity based approach to resistance and power based approach to resistance. While the former brings subjective features of a resistance action to the fore, the latter gives priority to power relations. Recognition and intention which are the subjective features of resistance presupposes a conscious subject and its formative abilities. This *subject* forms the external world and history. This is an anthropocentric approach in this sense. However, for the power based approach, subjective features and a formative subject is secondary in importance because consciousness is a locus of fiction and speculation. The essentiality is power relations because also the subject is established in power relations. The objective features of resistance concern the power based approach. These features are gathered around four terms: action, relation, opposition and power. The other three elements are immanent to the concept of power. However, an important discrimination is necessary here for power: The immanent power which makes an individual act is the power of acting (*potentia*), *power to* or *power* with a lowercase “p”. On the other hand, opposition comes from an action that exercises on another action. This is the second aspect of power which is the inhibitory power (*potestas*), *power over* or *Power* with an uppercase “P”. By this way, power necessarily requires relation. When power is regarded, it is regarded within its relation with other powers and with the external world. In this sense, while power relations are the constitutive elements of resistance and actuality, subjective elements stay as secondary and derivative. So, it is necessary not to focus on the consciousness or subjectivity of the actor or of the one who defines it as resistance, but on the power relations that the resistance is involved in and the resistance produces. This is the thing what gives an origin and type to a resistance.



3. ON THE FORMS AND TYPES OF RESISTANCE

The meaning and value of a resistance differ according to its type. Types are basically different from the forms of resistance. We have seen that the objective feature of resistance is power and power is also the constitutive element of resistance. The construction of power is actually the construction of its type. First, the difference between forms and types will be stated in this chapter. Forms of resistance will be mentioned briefly here, because the chapter focuses specifically on the types of resistance. The two types of resistance –negative and affirmative- will be pointed out. The results of these resistances depending on their constitutive forces and movements –negation or affirmation- will be introduced at last. These results determine the meaning and value of a resistance in its connections with both other bodies and itself. Besides, the types of resistance signify the genetic quality of a resistance.

3.1 Between Forms and Types

Forms of resistance differ in quantity and degree. Forms are simply the classifications that are evaluated depending on their appearances. The visible forms of resistance may be violent or nonviolent, economic or political, individually exercised or mass resistance, etc. In the act and exercise of resistance, forms are not precisely separated from each other. An act of resistance may appear incorporating more than one of the afore mentioned forms such as political nonviolent mass protests. These are the shapes and visible qualities that change by quantity. For that reason, every kind of visible difference actually constitutes a new form of resistance. These visible forms are not sufficient to give us the true reasons and essence that lie behind a resistance. The quality and typology of resistance need a deeper sense. Just as an essence has different appearances or a substance has different modes, a subtler category exists behind forms: types. The point is to come up with an ontological analysis of the constituent forces of resistance rather than an inclusive classification of forms and its superset; just like *eidos-genos* distinction (Peters, 1967, p. 72).

Resistance is an exercise of power as well as it is an event. A power can be expressed in different ways. Resistance, again, as a relation of power can be expressed in different appearances such as war or self-defense, civil-disobedience or armed insurgency. Beyond the appearances of resistance, the constitutor forces of these resistances have connections with each other and they have an ontology. Different from the forms of resistance, the relations between forces constitute the typology of resistance. This difference is not only quantitative, but qualitative and typological as well. In a relation of resistance, a force may be in one of these two states: active or reactive. The difference between types is produced according to the characteristics of the interaction between forces and this difference is an ontological and typological one that is also deeper than and transcendent to the classification of forms. Thus, it can be said types of resistance depend on the constitution of forces, unlike the classification of forms depending on the appearances of events. This is the same distinction between cause and effect, and attributing values to the forms drives us to the wrong implications such as taking effects as causes. The essence of a force is expansion and being in relation with other forces. So, the typological classification of forces will indicate the characteristic tendency of this essence. When the essence of a becoming is its action, force gains its essence in its relations. Here, essence corresponds to meaning and appearance corresponds to the phenomenon (Deleuze, 1986, p. 3) considering the strict distinction between the essence and the appearance, the cause and the effect is not real and reality is only the action. What matters is the event and the forces that are expressed by it. The forces processing in an event give a meaning to it even if it has the same form as other events. Meaning is a constellation as a becoming and the becoming is the expression of forces (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 3-4, 6).

3.2 Forms of Resistance

A becoming has a shape, a visible property in spatiotemporal environment. Becomings are generally categorized according to the context they come up in or depending on the quantity of a feature of it. These general ideas and categories that are attributed to a resistance are *forms*. They are attributed to a resistance depending on its perceptible, observable features. These features are unable to attribute an origin or a value to an event. They are not the genealogical investigations on the event. They become meaningful by the faculties of an estimating subject and by means of invented

measurements and in the categories of time and space. In other words, form is the shape of an event, a scientific, phenomenological inquiry on it. Formally, a look, a glance at the event for an instant will be sufficient to determine its form.

Forms of resistance vary depending on the quantity of the actors that are involved in the act of resistance, the context which the resistance come up in, or the means that are used in the act of resistance to achieve a goal. These categories are augmentable and more than one category can be attributed to a resistance as in collective nonviolent political resistance.

3.2.1 According to quantity

A resistance can vary depending on the quantity of the actors who are involved in the act of resistance. A resistance can be either an *individual* resistance or a *collective* resistance according to the number of participants. Although the precise boundaries for discrimination are too blurred, the individual form of resistance is the resistance that a person tries to diminish the power that acts on his/her actions. This form of resistance arises generally in a case of violation of individual rights of a person or an exercise of power that directly has a negative effect on him/her. An individual resistance is usually limited to the resister's personal power amount. On the other hand, a collective resistance against a power is generally dependent upon the ability to be organized. Individuals organize around common utilities. The main aim of being organized is the increment of power both quantitatively and qualitatively depending on the cohesion between people. The people organized around a class consciousness can be considered an example. A hostile opposition is required for the formation of a class (Marx, 1954, p. 109). A resistance occurs between two or more beings who are in different characters, but on the same plane. So, the resistance should occur among the classes. However, class as a subject is not something individual. The same idea of resistance gathers persons together for common interest against the other (Marx, 2005, p. 188). And the coherency of the class determines the power of resistance. The more the class is coherent the more the power of resistance is (Marx, 1977, p. 474).

3.2.2 According to context

Resistance can occur in different contexts and contexts can form the resistance. A resistance may be *economic*, *social* or *political* depending on the context it is appearing in. These classifications require a kind of specialization in knowledge in order to

distinguish their areas. This way an action can be identified as economic, social or political. A resistance may also occur in a scientific context as scientific revolutions clearly show us, in other words, the resistance of the areas of knowledge –paradigms or *epistemes*.²⁴ A resistance is economic when its action depends on the exchange of meta, money circulation, economic sanctions, investment policies, etc. In short, the main axis is the effect on economic parameters in this form of resistance. Iran's economy policies are a kind of economic resistance against the international embargo since 1979. The resistance against a mode of production is also an economic resistance in some way if we take *base* as the founder side in its relation with superstructure. Economic resistance is exercised against economic sanctions by using economic power and requires a specialization in knowledge. Besides, social resistance is the resistance against the alienating forces that act on cultural elements. Social is about the relations among persons that occur outside the realm of necessity. Preserving language, customs, educational or cultural situations, etc. against a dominant force that tries to impose its own values or tries to assimilate others are the actions that are in the context of social resistance. Social resistance is a struggle to preserve the identity of the self. It aims to organize the relations among persons in opposition to the Power, or to preserve these relations against an imposition of change. As for political resistances, they are the resistances depending on the political realm such as the relations between governments, leaders, laws, war, etc. For example, coups can be classified as political forms of resistance; political is about governmentality. However, one event of resistance can involve all of these aspects, but it is mostly about one of them. These contexts actually cannot be separated from each other precisely, for example the resistance of the hand-loom weavers against mechanization is social as it is economic and political.

3.2.3 According to means

A resistance can vary according to the means or the category of methods that are used in order to resist. There are two basic forms of resistance according to the means:

²⁴ The spatial ontology of action is not proper to the explanation of mental aspect of resistances. Thought as a mental element, for example, is not theoretical anymore and its implications can be seen as exercises of power. Thought, can be seen from its effect, the will to power behind it. For that reason, mental elements can express themselves with their effects, their actions can be seen from their effects. The power of thought is expressed as long as it reconciles, repels, breaks, unites, binds, splits up, form the subjectivities and affects over them, therefore the thought is in itself an action (Foucault, 2002, p. 357).

violent forms and *nonviolent* forms. Nonviolent resistance is the act of the will to change, the will to achieve some goals by using nonviolent methods such as civil disobedience, symbolic protests, demonstrations, noncooperation, strikes, etc. Thus, the means for nonviolent action seems as non-recognition, being not involved in a relation with the other, not recognizing its authority. The main argument of this method is that violence is not a productive, but a destructive means for life and resistance. In addition to this, another argument is that it always results in worse outcomes such as giving the other an excuse to use coercive power legitimately. La Boétie is one of the earliest advocates of civil disobedience and he points out the Power of any tyrant comes from the consents of his subjects and resisting to him does not require even fighting him or attacking him; in order to destroy him, disobey him; giving up the servitude is enough for this aim (La Boétie, 2007, pp. 116, 118-119). In a juridical sense, Rawls indicates that civil disobedience is a public, nonviolent, conscientious political act and it is nonviolent because (i) it is also a public act for expression like a public speech, and (ii) it is only disobedience to particular laws, but in fidelity to law (Rawls, 1999, pp. 320-322). On the other hand, the base of an action in relation to violence depends on the category of means-end and by its nature; violence is instrumental (Arendt, 1970, pp. 4, 79). Violence involves the danger of being overwhelmed by the means. Means that are used in action are aimed to hurt, damage or kill the opponent by using coercive force, or harming him/her mentally by using psychological oppression. Rebellion, uprising, revolt, insurgency; all of them have similar meanings and use similar means –that is violence-, but they are different in structure. Nevertheless, each of them has the objective features of a resistance and thus, they are all under the category of resistance depending on their formation in power relations. Violence can be justified by the arguments such as eye-for-an-eye to resist the dominant power, or some interests of the resister can only be achieved or guaranteed by the recognition of himself by the Power. For that reason, the resister appeals to violence that deter or make Power take the resister seriously in order to avoid being harmed.

3.3 Types of Resistance

A force really and actually exists. However, it exists necessarily in relation with another force. The difference between the quantities of forces determines their

qualities and without the will to power²⁵, a quality cannot be attributed to a quantitative force. Will to power is the thing that makes a force active or reactive. It is the differential and genealogical element that determines the relation of a force with another force and this way, the will to power has to appear in the force (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 61-62). In other words, the will to power prohibits a possible problem of rootlessness and attributes an origin, a root to a force. Therefore, the value of a force does not appear in quantitative forms and objects, but it becomes qualitative depending on its relation with other forces and with the intervention of the will to power. The flow of a force is like the flow of a wind as a result of the pressure difference between anticyclone and cyclone, from anticyclone to cyclone. These poles point to the will to power that is not the source but the immanent reason behind the force. The will to power is the differential element in the force. Without the will to power, the force is like a stray dog which is released from its collar.

Existence is a constellation of forces. These forces are divided into two according to the way they are established, in other words, according to their positioning within their relations with other forces: active forces and reactive forces (Nietzsche, 1994, pp. 20-21). The value of a resistance changes depending on the characteristics of the forces which form resistance. The becoming as a body is a result of non-equal forces which enter into a connection with each other. While active and reactive express the genetic qualities of a force, affirmation and negation express the basic qualities of the will to power (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 53-54). The fact that the method of the will to power is affirmative makes the quality of force active –that commands-, and when it is negative, the quality is reactive –that obeys. The evaluation of the forces whether they are active or reactive does not depend on the situation of a system of forces or the result of the struggle between forces (Deleuze, 1986, p. 58), but on the activity of the forces, the method, the founder characteristics of the will to power as an origin. Thus, it is obvious

²⁵ The concept of *will to power* is used in a Nietzschean sense. The primary supplementary resource for the explanation of the will to power is Gilles Deleuze's book *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1986). The original French version of the book (*Nietzsche et la Philosophie*) was first published in 1962 (Young, Genosko, & Watson, 2013, p. 218). His another shorter work on Nietzsche that is *Nietzsche* (2005) was published in French in 1965 (Young, Genosko, & Watson, 2013, p. 219). These two works are analogous with each other and works were studied comparatively in this thesis. Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche's shameful intervention to *Will to Power* (1968) was known and mentioned during the Nietzsche colloquium organized by Deleuze in Royaumont on 4-8 July 1964 (Deleuze, 2004). Explanations on this concept in his later texts and conversations have parallels with the definitions in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*.

that every activity has affirmation, and every reactivity has negation. Meaning and value depend on the forces and will to power and therefore interpretation and evaluation henceforth. In short, the evaluation and recognition of the will to power beyond a force is not only something more than an exclusion of essentialism, but it is also the necessity of materiality and a relatedness.

3.3.1 Negative resistance

Resistance itself, or reaction is a kind of action that is hindered from moving forward, therefore it is a passive situation (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 346). In this sense, resistance is directly related to reactive forces and it is about being affected rather than affecting. Reactive forces are against active forces and the quality of their will to power is negation rather than affirmation. Reactive forces are the forces which the active forces dominate. In other words, reaction is the genetic quality of a force that indicates a relational situation of a force with another force. Reactive forces cannot form an active force; they always dissolve the active force (Deleuze, 1986, p. 57). The basic three features of reactive forces are as follows: (i) they are adaptive, not active but situated according to active forces, (ii) they are the forces that separate active forces from what the active forces can do, they negate and deny active forces, and (iii) they are the forces which are separated from what they can do, also they deny and turn against themselves (Deleuze, 1986, p. 61). In other words, not depending on its quantitative scantiness of force, but the one is weak and slave when it is separated from its force regardless of its quantity –that indicates a quality.

Reactive forces also have a will to power, but the quality of their will to power is negation. Negation as the quality and the method of reactive forces denies what is different. The force that has negation as its will to power will negate the forces outside itself. The negation of difference is the founder power of dialectic and reactive forces do not have enough force to affirm themselves, but they deny and react against the dominant force. The difference between the reactive force and the active force in their relation depends on, first, the difference in quantity, and therefore the difference between the qualities. From the perspective of the reactive, reactive force denies and negates the active one and difference turns into negation (Deleuze, 1986, p. 56). Turning difference into the negation of difference produces an opposition and then contradiction. The active force -whose will to power is affirmative- becomes an element of contradiction in dialectic relation as a consequence of the negative will to

power of the reactive force. Reactive forces act like the establishment of consciousness with contradiction (Deleuze, 1986, p. 41). In short, negation as the quality of the reactive forces' will to power results in contradiction. Actually, it is not difference which presupposes opposition, but it is opposition which presupposes difference (Deleuze, 1994, p. 51) and when opposition is in process, the dialectic is found in opposition and contradiction. Thus, the false image of difference becomes the speculative element of opposition and contradiction. If the will to power was a will of Power, or power would become the object of representation and it would want to represent; the will to power to represent. The relation of representation is a recognition between two sides. However, recognition is the request of the slave. Without the active force, there is no reactive force, and therefore no slave. The slave necessarily requires the existence of the master and its recognition. Actually, the elements of representation and recognition are also the constituents of consciousness. As defense presupposes attack in warfare, reactive forces presuppose active forces. The slave needs to be recognized by the master for his/her self-being: S/he demands recognition and appreciation of its *superior*.

The minute will to power is a willing for Power -it is even partial-, it seeks subjects who recognize its superiority. And the minute it enters into a relation of recognition, the establishment of Power is actualized. These processes and phases are the constitution of representation, therefore Power. The willing for power is a willing for representation, it is the production of the slave and dialectic. The slave fights for attribution of the established values; s/he tries to take the Power, the established values on himself/herself, rather than creating his/her own values. It is a war for utilization of the current values (Deleuze, 1986, p. 82). This war really exists and it is not a speculation, but this war is unable to create any values and for that reason, it is nihilistic. The slave fights on the plane of established values and aims for the Power or recognition. Master and slave are on the same plane although they are different in kind -recognition may be the demand of the slave from the master and the Power is the domination of the slave. In other words, the formation of conflict into a means is possible only by the intervention of the slave's reactive force as a dissolver to the noble's active force. Therefore, refutation is seen as a reaction rather than an action and rather than an element of establishment: "What business is it of mine [*the noble*] to refute!" (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 6).

Contradiction is established only through negation and dialectic is established by opposition and contradiction. It proceeds by opposition, then development of opposition which corresponds to contradiction and last, the solution of this contradiction (Deleuze, 1986, p. 157). The quality of the will to power of all these processes is negation and the quality of the forces behind them are reactive. As long as dialectic is a movement, its movement is shaped within the limits of reactive forces (Deleuze, 1986, p. 159). There are two kinds of contradiction that is taken as the constitutor of dialectic and as both the means and the result of the negative will to power: antagonistic and non-antagonistic. So, the establishment of resistance depending on the negative will to power has two kinds, i.e. antagonistic resistance and non-antagonistic resistance.

3.1.1.1 Non-antagonistic resistance

In contradiction, opposites cannot be both true and false at the same time. Propositions of the opposites negate each other mutually in logic; these stable and abstract propositions involve contradictions and they are unable to develop. However, in social theory of dialectic, every becoming develops and actualizes itself by means of contradictions.²⁶ At the moment movement is added to logical propositions of contradiction, as poles enter into a continuous contradictory relation with the opposite. It means not only thought, but the world also contains contradictions. In dialectic, (i) one or more fixed and distinct becomings are taken and (ii) contradictions emerge among them. Then, (iii) contradictions are resolved in a higher becoming, concept or category (Inwood, 1992, pp. 81-82). This means regular dialectic method provides a reconciliation and merge in order to form a more perfect becoming. *A* and its opposition *not-A* are involved in a higher establishment as a result of a contradiction and as a side of a new contradiction. Becoming, teleologically, moves towards resolving the contradictions in it; it exceeds itself by involving its opposition –this

²⁶ There are not two things identical to each other as Leibniz asserts in his anecdote about the search for two identical leaves on the tree (Hegel, 2010, p. 366). $A=A$ is the basic and the first law of logic: the law of identity. The proposition $A=A$ says a thing is identical to only itself, but there is no need to give a proposition for a thing that is identical to itself. The expression *A* is sufficient for that. Itself is essence but not determined yet (Hegel, 2010, p. 357). The identity of *A* to *A* -as proposition- is only possible with the differentiation from *A* to *A* in the two sides of =. This means, the identity can be comprehended only by difference. The difference becomes true only by the differentiation of the static expression in time and the identity of *A* is inferred by the exclusion of the difference (total difference). For that reason, $A=A$ becomes dynamic by the proposition of $A=-(-A)$ and this proposition produces both identity and the difference in movement.

process is named as *Aufhebung*. Conflict as the means and process of the resolution of the contradictions is approved, because it resolves contradictions and reaches to a unity, it is seen as a progressive movement –development (Tse-Tung, 2007, p. 73). Contradiction is seen as the source of life in this view.

The sides of non-antagonistic contradictions are in relation with each other as reconcilable and the resolution of these contradictions are provided by reconciliation, criticism and the struggle for rectification. The quality of a contradiction is determined according to the situation of the relations. In the cases when there are contradictions between two sides, and they have common interests. Anyway, reconciliation is used in order to resolve contradictions and this kind of contradiction is called non-antagonistic contradiction. For example, in feudal era, the antagonistic contradiction lay between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. However, the social contradictions between the working class, in other words the class which was exploited, and the bourgeoisie was not antagonistic, because the contradiction between them was not mature enough. When the conditions changed in the capitalist mode of production and era, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie became antagonistic. In this case, there is no way to reconcile the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. They exclude each other mutually, but they also need each other to exist: the exploited and the exploiting classes. Instead of revolutions, different methods are employed in order to resolve these non-antagonistic contradictions. Collectivization and mechanization in agriculture are employed in order to resolve the contradiction between the working class and the peasant class in a socialist society –but especially in a socialist society because of some certain conditions of it-, the contradiction within the communist party and the contradiction between society and nature are resolved by the methods of criticism and self-criticism respectively, and developing the productive forces (Tse-Tung, 2007, p. 78). These sides of the non-antagonistic contradictions tend to turn into their opposites and they have the potential to become united, they ontologically involve also the ability to reconcile. The poles of the contradiction are not in an extreme degree and the contradictions between them are resolved by reconciliation through a higher being. This way, reform can be taken as a reconciliatory type of resistance in its relation to non-antagonistic contradiction.

Reform is a process for changing the applications and the structure –non-radically- of the sovereign power or the principal aspect of the contradiction. Reform seeks a means

and a means to resolve contradictions by involving the opposites. Reform is an articulation or an effort to become the principal aspect of a contradiction. It is also an effort to be recognized by the sovereign power. If the will to power of resistance tends to be a reform, it demands that the Power recognizes and enhances the applications or politics according to the consideration of the resister. Reformist resistance affirms the base of order but is not pleased with the Power. It does not have a problem with the essence of the system and its base, but its execution. After the resolution of antagonistic-contradictions by a revolution –that generally has a reputation for the exercise of coercion and repression-, the non-antagonistic contradictions remain. These are not the contradictions between people and their enemies, but among the people; and the methods to resolve these type of contradictions require resistance also. Democratic method, the method of discussion, of criticism and education are seen as the methods for resolving the controversial issues among people (Tse-Tung, 2007, p. 135) by reconciliation. For non-antagonistic contradictions, criticism and struggle are employed in order to reach a new unity on a new basis. Reform also predicts an improvement and it opposes to revolution politically.

In this sense, reformation and reconciliation are generally understood as nonviolent enhancements as in a civil disobedience. Civil disobedience is offered to redress a particular problem or a wrong application of the government by resisting, non-cooperating with the execution of unjust laws (Gandhi, 2001a, p. 310; Gandhi, 2001b, p. 179). The aim is not a total, but a particular resistance and struggle by refusing cooperation for the execution of the particular unjust laws. Mass or individual, civil disobedience seems to be a method to frustrate, or jam the Power in operation or to create an awareness for behaving conscientious. So, it is a politics of demand depending on recognition. The aim is not the change of all established values or putting Power at the hands of the resisters, but a reconciliation and reformation depending on the morality and humanist ideas like equality –equal rights and freedom among citizens. The unjust and the effort to provide the just involves the attribution of the *just*, which is a constellation of established values, on the resister and enhancing the applications of the Power by struggle and gaining validity and power in opposition to the Power. The thing to do is withdrawing himself/herself from the wrong which s/he condemns in the case of an injustice by the government (Thoreau, 1992, p. 233). The genitive of *civil* refers to be in a social state under the laws of a government. So, it

inherently involves the legitimacy of the government and does not involve a rejection of the established government and its laws. It is a kind of reformation within the plane of the law that the government is established on. The imprisonment as the result of disobedience is accepted before resistance and the resister surrenders and does not avoid imprisonment after breaking the law (Gandhi, 2001b, p. 180) and the demonstrations are also exercised against lawlessness and corruption of the Power. The non-antagonistic resistance moves drawing on a slave morality and tries to be recognized by the Power as fearless against its force, it forms itself depending on recognition and in the game of the other in order to enhance the rules of the game. This is a kind of resolution of the contradictions between two sides. For the quality of the resistance –in this section it is civil disobedience-, the will to power behind it should be understood.

3.1.1.2 Antagonistic resistance

In dialectic development, contradicting beings change and they tend to turn into their opposites because they also involve their opposites in themselves in unity and contradiction gives them a move in the struggle of opposites. The linked oppositions cause the opposites to turn into each other and this way contradictions are resolved under certain circumstances; the struggle between contradictories seems absolute and goes on till the end of the process (Tse-Tung, 2007, p. 98). The reconciliation of the opposites in unity involves the question as to the existence of the antagonistic opposition and contradiction. In this situation –the situation of antagonistic contradiction- the degree of the opposition does not permit a reconciliation between the opposites. Although it is a kind of contradiction, it represents an extreme kind: a complete opposition. There is still struggle between the opposites but it does not provide a resolution in a dialectical process. Antagonistic contradictions differ from non-antagonistic ones in nature; both depend on their types of relation with their opposites and depend on the ways of resolution of their contradictions.

The sides of antagonistic contradictions are in a relation with each other as irreconcilable extremes (Mitin, 1931) and these contradictions can only be resolved by revolutions. Antagonistic contradictions are seen between enemies (Tse-Tung, 2007, p. 131) and there is no way to reconcile the interests and enemies' ways of affirming themselves at the same time. The difference between enemies are precise and they are absolutely opposite, they do not give a chance to a mediatory concept between them

like a consensus or joining. For example, socialist revolution is the only way to resolve the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, Mao says, national revolutionary war is the only method to resolve the contradiction between the colonies and imperialism, the method of democratic revolution is the only way to resolve the contradiction between the great masses of the people and the feudal system (Tse-Tung, 2007, p. 78). All these contradictions signify a deepening extreme contradiction in the relation of the opposites. Revolution is the method for resolution instead of reconciliation because these types of oppositions threaten the situation of non-contradiction in progress ontologically. This way, I name the type of resistance in a relation of antagonistic contradiction mentioned here as *negative revolution* which is the sub-element of negative resistance.

Considering all these inferences, we can read revolution as a progressive and radical transformation in time that provides a relative stability in comparison with previous struggles. The poles of a contradiction can be seen as paradigms and contradiction becomes more obvious when the contradictories mature. During a process, a contradiction may evolve into an antagonistic form. Depending on the quality of the contradiction that is antagonistic, the aspects do not have a tendency to turn into each other in this phase. However, this is not the struggle of the dominated one –or secondary aspect- in order to be the dominant one –the principal aspect. The secondary aspect of a contradiction –the contradiction whose sides necessarily require each other and which is antagonistic as a consequence of its sides’ expressing irreconcilable opposition- does not involve an endeavor to determine itself as the principle aspect in the contradiction, but a breakthrough to make the other *disdirected*. The sides, of course, may be a subject, a class, or a paradigm. On the plane where the struggle between contradictories are established on, the dominated one attributes the established values of the dominant to itself. Negative revolution –revolution is generally understood in its negative sense- is a substitution of Power: an endeavor of a class for Power can be read this way. Revolution involves the defeat and death of one side by the other in the contradiction not only for the political actors in social order, but also for scientific paradigms, and other areas of knowledge and power. So, we can evaluate revolution as a quality of the relation between forces rather than fixed and rigid agents. These are two or more actualities that cannot coexist. Formation actualizes, here, depending on the relation with the opposite and contradiction. The

accumulation of power to reverse the relation between the sides may seem teleological depending on the determined calculation of development of the sides, but endeavor of the sides –especially for revolution- is also important for the *destiny* of their relation in order to avoid historicism.

3.3.2 Affirmative resistance

Active, in its basic meaning, is reaching out for power (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 347). In other words, it is the situation of force -also a quality of force- that is not separated from what it can do contrary to passive and reactive forces as the constitutive forces of negative resistance. Active force moves in a certain limit: It flows as long as its capacity allows it to. Active forces are the dominating and higher ones hierarchically in their relations to the reactive forces in terms of their genetic quality. These forces that avoid the reactive forces do not depend on an existence or a production of an opposition in their movement. The affections of a body and a force is active insofar as the force appropriates the things resisting to it, insofar as the inferior forces obey it (Deleuze, 1986, p. 63). For that reason, contrary to *ressentiment* -that is the feeling of reactive forces-, aggression is employed as the feeling of active forces. The will to power behind active forces has a quality of affirmation instead of negation. Affirmation is the affirmative power of active-being (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 53-54). Affirmation is not a movement of opposition and then contradiction. It depends on difference, and affirmation of the difference instead of negation of it. Affirmation has the practical element of difference (Deleuze, 1986, p. 9) in its power.

Noble one is the one whose principle of existence is affirmation while resistance was the activity of negation, and for that reason *affirmative resistance* may seem a kind of oxymoron usage. However, the negative one in the noble morality is always a secondary and a derived result of the existence of the noble (Deleuze, 1986, p. 10). Active forces which are affirming themselves with their difference from the other are not against, but for multitude and plurality. It is not a movement for reaching a transcendent unity. In this sense, all movements that are linked to plurality are the enemies of dialectic and its negative element. Negation stays in dialectic only as a secondary means and a speculative element of the active foundation of the affirmative resistance. In other words, constitutive and primary force and movement are, respectively, active and affirmative. Determinant actions are still aggression (Nietzsche, 2007b, p. 82) and forgetting. Forgetting is completely an active and

positive resistance of the body; there would be no happiness, cheerfulness, hope, pride without it (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 35). Right and wrong, moral good and bad are excluded when we look at the value and meaning of a being in the name of the will to power. Therefore the value and the meaning is determined by the characteristic of power, the will to power (Deleuze, 1986, p. 4). The essence of a force is being in relation with other forces and this indicates a complexity of forces. The meaning in an affirmative resistance is the situation where the active forces are dominant to the reactive ones in plurality. Resistance -in the plurality of the forces which give meaning to this being- is secondary in comparison to affirmation and the constitutive one. The one that determines the essence is the adjective: *affirmative*. The noble one starts with the statement “I am good” (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 20). The noble morality originates from saying “yes” to itself. Active type is identified through its faculty of forgetting and its force of affecting. Affirmation is an excessing creation; it exceeds the boundaries of the reactive forces. Contrary to the slave morality, the noble seeks its opposite, acts and grows spontaneously only in order to say “yes” to itself more thankfully, in order to affirm itself more enthusiastically (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 20). In the search for its opposite, the principle remains as the relation with the different in the case of affirmative resistance; and negation of the difference as contradiction is only a pale representation instead of a determinant element.

Reactive forces constrain from action and the feeling of this constraint is *ressentiment* and revenge against everything affirmative. Ethics is the plane of values that is defined by the active forces and the good and bad is the ethical good and ethical bad on this plane. However, the plane that is defined by reactive forces is morality and the good and evil on this plane is the moral good and moral evil. The perspective of the noble - good and bad- attributes a genetic quality to values, but the perspective of the slave - good and evil- attributes a substantial one. Good and evil are the reversal of good and bad (Deleuze, 1986, p. 122) in degree of forces from active to reactive. For example, the labor union struggles were active forces during the second half of the 19th century and they were in an antagonistic relation with the capital. However, then, they separated from what they can do and are dissolved by the reactive forces of capital. After this stage, they turned into reactive forces and into a form that represents a reconciliatory dialectical relation with the capital. By losing its constitutive force –but in the first stage its opposition which produces the antagonistic contradiction was not

its constitutive force, it was secondary- it became a *backup*, an articulation to the capital. The meaningful thing is *an intrinsic antagonism to foundation* as it was at its first stage. Therefore, not every negation is a practice of nihilism as long as the dominant, the principal force, the principle of being is active and the reactive is only a secondary and resisting one.

The one who is able to go beyond the established values is the one who is active and free. S/he can prompt his/her reactive forces and rule over himself/herself and other forces. S/he makes her/his own laws and thus s/he becomes autonomous (Deleuze, 1986, p. 137). In affirmative resistance, resistance itself becomes a speculation and resistance is defined by the sovereign who is in Power. Power recognizes, but the one who is resisting always avoids from dissolution and immobilization causing by identification. The resister does not enter into a struggle of recognition. Resistance, in this sense, only a side-effect. The one who is establishing his/her own values removes the obstacles and the sovereign is an obstacle, a roughness to be removed, to be exceeded. Resistance is in a situation of non-reconciliation with the sovereign without contradiction. This kind of antagonism indicates the other kind of revolution in order to ward off the effects of the opposite power that diminishes the resister's power of acting. I call this kind of resistance as *active revolution*. Here, there is an extension of meaning for resistance. In this sense, self-defense is a kind of affirmative resistance. Defense necessarily requires a property and an attack: the preservation of a property – it is not necessary to be the property of the one who is resisting- against an attack that is coming from outside. This property or the target may be a commodity or it may be life or rights. In the case of self-defense, the preservation of the thing that belongs to the essence is fundamental. Naturally, such as the animals have preservation mechanisms that they establish by getting together or they express particularly such as claws, incisors, poison, quills, electricity, taxis of protists, etc., humankind have similar mechanisms. However, it is an often repeated fact that humankind is not armed naturally with similar mechanisms like animals for self-defense. Instead of these, it uses its rationality, its tool-making abilities, and its political being. These organizations provide the persistence of life. Therefore, the preservation of life excludes nihilism that is against life. Self-defense is not the preservation of fictional and representation based private property, or the reactive force mechanisms; but the preservation of life, of the desire of life against attacks. A becoming gains its value in

consequence of the active forces' determination of its essence. Otherwise, the situation when the reactive forces form the essence is the production of nothingness. The defense of the self, is both an instinct to survive, and also the defense of the mechanisms that provide gathering and holding power to survive together. The preservation of wo/man as long as it is political is the defense of the political-common property. This situation is the analogousness of *conatus* and the *will to power*. The objective here is the preservation and defense of the active forces.

This preservation should not be taken as an evolutionary process. It is a political activity. Evolutionary interpretation itself is only a passivity to external forces, a full nakedness to affections, a formation according to external effects. The political aspect of activity is the thing that distinguishes human from the other animals, and from itself as an animal. As the affirmation of difference is a characteristic of active forces, the degradation of difference to contradiction and its resolution with negation lead to an opposition of plurality, to a unity, a oneness. Religion and nation-State similarly and practically employ a production of contradiction through attacking on and opposition to the all expressions of different identities. These structures are attacks on the different one, to the active one. Because the nation-State regards difference in two ways: either it degrades difference in itself to identity, or it degrades difference outside of itself to contradiction –contradicting with itself. Each formative element of any kind of difference is absorbed. Difference is degraded in nation-State in all cases. The same is valid also for religion. The superior ones make their reactive aspects turn into activity. They make their active forces dominant. They re-evaluate the established values that make them reactive and they create their own values: This is the essence of self-defense. At this stage, the difference between *the political and common reality* and *the fictional and representational* becomes evident. Here, the forces of self-defense cannot be counted purely as military forces, these forces necessarily provide the re-organization of life at the same time. The forces of self-defense are the forces which creates life by re-interpretation. Thus, except the reactive *defense* characteristic of self-defense, its primary and determinate characteristic which is affirmative comes to light. The emphasis on the *essence* indicates the primacy of (i) *preservation of life* over (ii) *warding off and destroying the attacker* in case of an active revolution and a self-defense (Aquinas, 2004, p. 264). Otherwise, military forces that are alienated from the social life and that do not ground on meeting the social needs will not get rid of being

at the outside of society, and becoming a violent-attack organization which defends the profits of the Power, in other words, they produce nihilism. Their reactive forces turn into primary and dominant forces in their bodies under such a situation. Therefore, self-defense cannot be regarded only as a matter of security. Self-defense as the preservation of the active forces is also the preservation of continuity of creation and transvaluation at the same time.

Self-defense excludes any kind of representation because any organization that grounds on the State-like structures cannot assume the exercise of self-defense of society. It is a form of expression and the warrant of the preservation of the essence. The essence strengthens and employs the will to power -which provides its being in existence- with the mechanisms of self-organization, self-government, self-control which are involved in autonomy. Namely, self-defense is not a reaction on its own, but it is an activity, it is a destructive critique immanent to foundation, negation immanent to affirmation, resistance immanent to life. Self-defense is a unity with self-organization, self-government and self-control in autonomy. They work in accordance. The important thing is the organization of the existence-affirming mechanisms. Of course getting rid of the weight of the established values from your back comes first in order to become a self-defense force.²⁷ Otherwise, self-defense causes small scale States, small scale kingdoms or it expresses nothing more than handing over the Power –namely a representation. Self-defense is an organized attitude against the situations which threaten one’s own life. Each program that will improve life by affirmation, that affirm the self is in the context of self-defense. Namely, self-defense is a constellation of ethical-political strategies, a competence. Ethical-political being requires defense and protection for preservation. A society which is unable to exercise self-defense falls apart from the affirmation of its life. In such situation, either the society has been

²⁷ Penelope’s –who destroys the established values of patriarchy and creates a new world and life for herself with her own values- act of knitting the carpet in the daytime and unravelling at nights is a kind of self-defense. Her creating her own values makes her active forces sovereign by reversing her reactive and passive position. She does not request for recognition anymore. Her husband Odysseus himself requests for recognition from her after his return to homeland. Penelope does not stand on the established values anymore. Such as Penelope’s action’s indirect attack on patriarchal relations, the reflection of self-defense on political structure is an indirect attack on nation-State in the heart of it. The direct is the creation of a new life, an affirmative life. Penelope’s action is out of the norms of the sovereign, the one who is in Power. It is essential to re-evaluate the values in order to clear *resistance* from its established meaninglessness (Cavarero, 1995, pp. 11-12).

colonized and has been rotting or the society is resisting in order to make the active forces superior; its ambition is regaining its ethical-political quality and rising. Self-defense as a process is aimed at the protection of existence and for that reason self-defense does not have mechanisms of domination, exploitation or subjection over beings whether they are from the same sort or not. The mechanisms of domination, exploitation and subjection (Foucault, 1982, p. 781) that destroy self-defense are only developed in human. Self-defense is against all these delusions.

3.4 Results of Resistance

The will to power is not the intent that lies behind an action, but it is -as both the cause and the effect- the qualitative element of the action. The distinction between saying “no” and “yes” refers to the difference between a perpetual will to negation of life, revenge and corruption and a perpetual affirmation to life, a noble forgetting. Here, the basis and quality of saying “no” and “yes” are actually the two qualities of the will to power: negation and affirmation. Forces as the means of the will to power –by requiring the affirmation and the negation as the transcendent will to power to them- spark off the dichotomic separation between nihilism and life. Resistance as a form and an expression of power causes either nihilism or life not as a result, but within a continuous construction of movement depending on its quality. Nihilism and life do not correspond to epistemological categories of right or wrong. Their basic elements are their meanings and their values; they are hierarchically classified as slaves and nobles.

3.4.1 Nihilism

The feelings of revenge and *ressentiment*, in other words the feelings of reactive forces always aim to restrict an action, delay, crumble, ruin it. Reactive forces escape from the effects of active forces. Reactive forces exhibit a complete opposition to active forces and they have characteristics of a strong memory and *ressentiment*. Slave establishes its self-good-being first by means of the determination of its opposite’s bad-being. The founder deed here is therefore negation, its character is also reaction because of its external determination. Thus, dialectic reaches the condition of being the ideology of *ressentiment* (Deleuze, 1986, p. 121). Reactive forces separate active forces from the actions they can do. Even reactive forces themselves are the derivation of active forces that are separated from what they can do. Religion and morality, even

laws are the results of *ressentiment* which are the creations that affirm themselves not by action, but by prohibition of action. They show their inabilities, their negativity as moral one, as the higher values. Morality and religion are the visible or invisible chains of human. In this sense, the creations of reactive forces and *ressentiment* are fictions and speculations that fall apart from the actions what they can do. These restrictive creations of the reactive forces also make active forces become reactive. They try to catch, confine and discipline the active forces which are flowing freely independent from the reactive forces: such like any Power. Disciplining raises the reactive forces, makes them move. Reactive forces which define values become the authority that attribute the values in this stage. The powerless becomes moral, the powerful becomes guilty. Essentially determined *good* and *bad* [good and evil] take the place of *goods* and *bads* [good and bad]. Religion and morality either make unchained people unable to escape or chain people who are able to escape, then make these people valuable. The will to power of reactive forces is nihilism; nihilism or the will to negation or the will to nothingness are the principles that provide triumph for reactive forces. That is because negation –therefore dialectic- produces no value, no meaning. The meaning and value of something does not depend on the speculative and fictional essence that is attributed to it by a specific system of judgment, but the value and the meaning come from the quality of the will to power beyond it whether it is affirmative or negative: The only essential thing is the relations of power. The criteria of evaluation cannot be taken depending on speculative, substantial moral division, but can be taken depending on the concrete and genetic, ethical and hierarchical division of forces. Hierarchically, active forces are superior to reactive forces. This hierarchy also indicates a typological difference.

The two kinds of contradiction signify the two meanings of nihilism. Nihilism is, in its first meaning, denial of life for superior values to life (Deleuze, 1986, p. 147), the fictional values –pseudo- superior to life. This will to negation expresses itself in the negation of life, in the movement for devaluating life. The active one is abolished and the reactive one takes its place as the dominant. Essentialist higher values have a will to negate, a will to destroy the life. This first meaning signifies the antagonistic contradiction which aims to remove the contradiction between itself and the opposition. On the other hand, the second meaning of nihilism the negative movement is maintained in the inner movement of the higher values. Negation becomes

introversive after a degree and it eliminates the negation as the activity of reactive forces. Reactive one wills to stay still and alone. In other words, when the external difference that is read as external contradiction is resolved, the devaluation of the higher values starts. The movement goes on in the finite one. This is the devaluation of higher values themselves (Deleuze, 1986, p. 148). This process can be understood as the movement to resolve the inner contradictions that are belong to the kind of non-antagonistic contradictions. These two kinds are the work of dialectic and negation in the general and the particular differently. Dialectic does not allow multitude. It always strives for to reach the *One* -the highest unity- and it destroys plurality. The boosters of dialectic are contradiction and resolution. Thus, the move to unity operates either by the resolutions of the antagonistic contradictions or by the solutions of the non-antagonistic contradictions. The same distinction of negation can be seen by (i) the reconciliation of wo/men with the god, or (ii) the replacement of god with wo/men in the process for ages (Deleuze, 1986, p. 156) respectively non-antagonistic and antagonistic. Religion, State, or morals have the same aspect: Religion can supersede the empire as it was in Roman Empire, or the nation-State can reconcile with the Church as Hobbes suggested²⁸.

3.4.2 Life

I put nihilism as the negation of life and life as the affirmation of life. Negation means a deficiency of the will to power and life itself is the instinct for growth, for the accumulation of force or for power (Nietzsche, 2007a, §6). Nihilism, therefore, is the decrement of the will to power because of the negative aspect of it. In order to understand life against nihilism, and then define affirmative resistance and life as its outcome, it is needed to inquire the characteristics of the one who uses affirmation in his/her actions:

All understandings seeing pity as unavoidable and positive attitude of life and nature are all has depressive effects (Nietzsche, 2007a, §7), and religion also has the same characteristic because of its being the religion of pity, or humanistic morals. Virtue has the same for ancient philosophy because of its decrement of the energy of vital

²⁸ Rousseau says in *The Social Contract* that “Of all Christian authors, the philosopher Hobbes is the only one who has clearly seen the evil and its remedy, and who has dared to propose to unite the two heads of the eagle and to restore political unity, without which no State or government will ever be well constituted” (2007, IV.VIII).

feelings, it is opposite to life and the energy for life. The affirmation of life requires the abolishment of the decayed established values because the affirmation of life and the increment of the energy of life are only possible by getting rid of the mechanisms that produce depressive feelings. Respect and distance between people are the presuppositions of every elevation; and negation is the enemy of these presuppositions (Nietzsche, 2007a, §43). Nihilism reproduces negation, and affirmation tries to avoid from the gravity of nihilism. This gravity makes the distance close, the respect *ressentiment* and hatred.

Life as the plane of affirmation both avoids from and struggles with the negation and established values, and constitutes its noble values. All values depending on the negative will to power are contempts, disapprovals of the natural, disapprovals of the affirmation of life as *sin*, *vice*, or *immoral*. The strongest people, on the other hand, find their happiness where the others would find their downfall; triumph of the others is where the *bad* lies: everything that are resulted from weakness, revenge and jealousy (Nietzsche, 2007a, §7). The triumph of the noble values is achieved by an attack on the established values, by conquering desires, by the transvaluation of all values. The transvaluation of all values is the affirmation of life while established values are the production of nihilism. Renaissance depends on the noble values and it is a whole process of transvaluation of all previous established values of the Church. On the other hand, the Church lives on crisis and avoids from the abolishment of these crisis (Nietzsche, 2007a, §62) in order not to destroy its base. Life seems anomalous to what is an anomaly according to nature and the life as affirmation of life is revaluation of all values –the values which alienate from the natural such as the divine against the natural and therefore religion and morality is the reversal of the reality as a fictional image.

“Yes” of the slaves is not an affirmation, but a complete and continuous passivity, a passive accepting, a subjection to authority. For that reason, “Some men are born posthumously” (Nietzsche, 2007a, preface). For development, masters require death²⁹ because a complete destruction and reestablishment is easier than restoration of the corrupted. Negation is put under the service of affirmation by the transvaluation of the values because these two qualities coexist. The transmission from reactive to active

²⁹ As you know, first, people are born; they die and then they grow up (Canıgüz, 2013, p. 7).

involves a destruction (Deleuze, 1986, p. 174). The movement of the noble is an active destruction. Negation is used as a power of activity and affirmation for the noble one. Aggression of the noble values is an expression of the power of affirmation. Getting rid of the weight of the old established values is a kind of emancipation for freedom, and life is cleared from its drawbacks. Negation is only a means for the noble in order to transvaluate all values, it is not the quality of the noble's constructive power. Affirmation of life is a creation and a natural becoming to set free what lives rather than a nothingness and negation that drives to nihilism (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 185-186). Resistance obviously goes into division as affirmative and negative, and the sets of concepts corresponding to these types are very different from each other (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Concept sets of active and negative types.

Affirmative Type	Negative Type
Noble	Slave
Active forces	Reactive forces
Affirmation	Negation
Life	Nihilism
<i>Potentia</i> [power (to)]	<i>Potestas</i> [Power (over)]
Aggression	<i>Ressentiment</i> and revenge
Expression	Representation
Unconscious	Conscious
Truth	Reality
Forgetting	Memory
Ethics	Morality
Goods and bads [Good and bad]	Goodness and badness [Good and evil]

3.5 Conclusion

Power is an integration of forces³⁰ and forces can be regarded as the singular strings or vectors of power. Reactive forces constitute a negative power and they are produced by negative will to power -for e.g., dialectic always produces reactive forces. On the other hand, active forces constitute an affirmative power and they are produced by affirmative will to power. Will to power gives forces an origin, a genetic quality. While

³⁰ The will to power behind a resistance is similar to an algebraic function. This function draws a line on a plane and its closed area below the x-axis line -horizontal- is the negative part of the power. On the other hand, the closed area above the x-axis line is the affirmative or positive part of the power. The total amount of these partial powers indicates the present actual power. Each closed area consist of infinite forces, active or reactive. So, power is an integration of the will to power function to find the amount of total infinite forces in finite area. Thus, each power has a negative element in it. The value is attributed according to the primary part. If primary side is above the x-axis, it is affirmative; otherwise, it is negative.

the method of negative will to power is negation, affirmative will to power employs affirmation. Affirmation produces noble values and affirms life while negation is a nihilistic movement. Thus, a movement that negates differences by regarding them as contradictions cannot affirm life, but it is swamped with *ressentiment* and revenge. This genetic quality of an action according to the method it employs in power relations gives the action a value, a meaning. When this point is considered, the form of a resistance becomes unimportant for determining its meaning, the important element is its typological attribute, whether it is negative or affirmative.



4. SELECTING THE TRUE THEORY FOR JUSTIFICATION

Up to now, we have looked into a detailed genealogy of resistance. There are two types of resistance that determine the value and meaning of it. However, the justification problem is still unanswered. Justification is about the right to exercise an action. First of all, it should be stated that using the words justification and legitimatization synonymously is a common mistake. While legitimatization appeals to the past, justification is about an end that lies in the future (Arendt, 1970, p. 52). Resistance is an action, and it requires a justification about the future in order to be a right. An action which is not right or ethically wrong may be legitimate, but it is not justified. Many actions of Power evoke this idea. The same case is valid also for resistance. Resistance should be solidly grounded in order to be a right. Thus, resistance is a right as long as it is justified. In this sense, legitimatization and justification will be separated from each other in this chapter, and then an origin and an end will be tried to be attributed to them. Finally, the ethical theories will be classified according to their groundings and their views on the right conduct will be compared in order to determine the most proper way for the justification of resistance.

4.1 Justification vs. Legitimatization

The evaluation of a political action requires some values to measure its validity. A political action cannot be exercised without a will to power behind it. For that reason, an action presupposes some effects on relevant bodies. Doing an action, supporting an action, or staying silent about an action, giving consent to someone's doing an action out of having expectations from her/him are grounded on some values. An action stays free from resistance as long as it has a ground of legitimacy. An action's legitimacy gives it the right to exercise power without being resisted. Power gains the right to be the authority in its relation with legitimacy. In this sense, legitimacy gives Power a moral meaning in the form of authority. Accepting the exercise of power depends on either the legitimacy of Power as an authority or a mere coercive power -however, in case of coercive power, being unable to resist does not mean giving consent to the

exercise of power. So, the elective element of legitimate Power takes consents of the people.

People's giving consent to any Power as authority is rooted in the foundations of a kind of organization such as a polis, an empire, the Church or a State. The authority that gained consent is legitimate because it exercises its Power in accordance with the expectations of the people who gave their consents to it. Authority gains the sources of its authority, therefore its legitimacy, from an external source that transcends its own power (Arendt, 1961, p. 97). In this sense, legitimacy is also a kind of representation and a property of *potestas*. It holds a fictional power that is established by consentient people. Cases of violations of the expectations or the situations that are not proper to the consent giving situations cause legitimate resistance in this sense. Therefore, a legitimate resistance is an attempt to re-establish the foundational values of legitimacy and authority. It is now obvious that the legitimacy of resistance is inherently involved in the legitimacy of authority. The answer to the question what the values are that an authority constitutes its legitimacy on is also the answer to the legitimate ground of resistance. Authority, therefore legitimacy has three different grounds in relation to the forms of organization. An authority may have at least one of the legitimacy grounds that follow: (i) traditional, (ii) rational/legal, or (iii) charismatic (Weber, 1978, p. 215). Violations of these grounds and their immanent values legitimize the resistance. Otherwise, similarly, a power is exercised illegitimately, which means a Power does not have a right to exercise its power. There is a quite close relation between the legitimacy of an action and the right to exercise an action. As can be seen, in the perspective of legitimacy, resistance contributes to Power and authority in order to correct its mistakes and turn it back to the grounds of legitimacy. However, the aim should be abstracting the right of resistance from the determination of the authority that is the opposite of resistance according to the definition of Power, and then giving credit to the nature, which already exists rather than being a fictional establishment. Besides, etymologically, the difference between *justification*³¹ and

³¹ *Legitimate* is derived from Latin *legitimatus* –past participle of *legitimare*– that means “to declare to be lawful”, *legitimus* that means “according to law”; Latin *legi-* is used for *lex*, law (Skeat, 1967). The root *lex* is originally religious and then governmental (Partridge, 1991, p. 344).

*legitimacy*³² is the difference between *just* and *lawful*, *right* and *law*. Whereas legitimization requires an authority and law, justification is a matter of defining rights.

4.1.1 Law

Since Power spreads beyond the frame defined by law, resistance overflows this frame, as well. In other words, the right of resistance does not fit into this frame. While the legitimacy of Power is provided by law, its actions are limited by the same law. The difference between legitimate and illegitimate is an issue of measurement. The acts of an authority are tested by this transcendent law, e.g. God's Commandments or the Platonic ideas or the law of nature (Arendt, 1961, p. 97).³³ The boundaries of the right of resistance were generally drawn in accordance with the law in politics of resistance, but only under the authority of law.

Authority which implies obedience and legitimizes the use of Power finds its source outside *now*, outside the field of Power, and it refers to a transcendence, transcendently established values (Arendt, 1961, pp. 110-111). Unlike Power (*potestas*), authority has its roots in the past (Arendt, 1961, p. 122). Past here indicates a transcendence and representation; it indicates not being the adequate and direct cause of something but compliance. In the traditional aspect of authority, it indicates the temporal past. So, this means, legitimacy is not directly determined by Power or *potestas*, but it refers to law that is fictional. Power exhibits itself in its action, in the effects of its action on other actions. Consent gives legitimacy to every form of Power and legitimacy provides authority by joining Power. The concept of legitimacy brings law to the fore in order to ground something on a transcendent base that is outside its actual power (*potentia*). Natural law theorists had used the terms of *right* and *law* generally in the same meaning³⁴ and they used to mistake *jus* for *lex*; but, *jus* -or *ius*- means *right* and

³² *Justify* is derived from French *justifier* –originally Latin *iūstificāre*- that means “to shew to be just”; Latin *iusti-* for *iustus*, just; *-ficāre*, for *facere*, to make (Skeat, 1967). The root *ius* (*jus*) originally indicates –in a religious sense- the force that comes from law; permission or right; *just* and *justice* also stem from the same root (Partridge, 1991, p. 325).

³³ Traditional authority generally uses divine analogies or commandments that come from the sayings of poets or prophets. Poets were the transporters of nuncupative culture in ancient era, even they are the producers. Precepts of these poets were taken as social moral values and judgments were based on their witnesses (Plato, 1997c, 364c), because they were seen as the class which was rewarded and inspired by gods (Plato, 1997b, 682a). Ancestry has an authority and power of sanction that come from past and go to future via laws in this context (Strauss, 1965, p. 91).

³⁴ See section 4.2.2.

right means *liberty to do* while *lex* is *law* and *law* means *obligation* (Hobbes, 1996, p. 91); a law commands, enjoins (Hobbes, 1996, p. 200).

4.1.2 Right

Greek word *dikê* (*δίκη*), English *right*, Turkish –originally Arabic- *hak* means appropriate to the law, to the morally virtuous; it is the origin of doing right and thinking truly (Peters, 1967, p. 38). Right refers to a system in which an action is evaluated in the limits of law and justice in this sense. Right attributes a value to an action and gives it a moral meaning. Even Aristotle takes justice –doing the right thing- as identical with virtue. The only difference is that justice occurs in relation with others while virtue is found *per se* in a virtuous person (Aristotle, 1984b, 1130a10-15). That is to say, the value of an action to be right or wrong, good or bad, virtuous or vicious completely depends on its being *just* (*dikaios* - *δίκαιος*). This already stems from the root *dikê* which means right and justice. Establishment of the borders of a right and their corresponding laws can be stated if and only if the questions *what I am able to do*, *where do my rights reach to* are answered. It can be intuited in advance that this question manifests a limitation of the power of acting.

On the other hand, it is generally accepted that rights are, in some ways, justified; and a social or institutional recognition is not a must for them in order to be rights (Martin, 1998, pp. 325, 327) while laws require recognition necessarily. This situation differs from the qualities of rights because only rights that are socially constructed and given to people, and determined and secured by law require social recognition. Generally, having a right is having a justification for an action (Martin, 1998, p. 327). This determines the value of an action. Social recognition generally provides a consensus on the value of an action by using the established values that may be customs, laws, certain rules, traditions, etc. and these values refer again to an authority. The determined rights give liberty under a determinative authority to use the particular power of the self. The difference of liberty from obligation gives the right to use one's own power under her/his own authority and the right to protect it. Obedience starts where the right is finished.

Legal rights are the limited laws that are determined to regulate actions in social life and laws come first in this sense. They attribute a moral value to the actions such as *right* or *wrong*, *guilty* or *innocent*, *good* or *bad*. These words can only be used within

the norms of a legal or a moral system (Benn, 1972, p. 197). While this consensual system provides the legitimacy of an action, the origin of an action gives justification to it. The methods of justification arise from two situations: (i) an individual act depending on one's right and (ii) one's resisting against someone else's interference in her/his life (Benn, 1972, p. 198). Just like the tension between obligation and freedom, there is a tension between acting and protecting here. Methods of justification try to determine the orders of actions and meaning of rights in a plausible way in order to balance the tension between individuals who are necessarily in relation with each other in time and space. The idea of right is very related to the idea of *duty*. Duties are correlative with rights because each wo/man tries to establish the conditions for her/his actualization best.

As a result, we can say that theories of justification depend on the regulations and organizations between right and duty. These two properties are attributed to the moral person. Law, on the other hand, is the institutionalized version of the static regulations between rights and duties in social realm. Its existence requires consents and an authority.

4.2 Theories of Justification

Justification is an attempt to make the actions and the relations of people rightful. In this sense, different methods are employed and many of them take one of the grounding bases of either universe (*kosmos*), human beings or the God (Özlem, 2004, p. 24). These bases ascribe an origin and a value to an action. In other words, they give a measurement to actions and relations. *Cosmological justification* refers to ancient morals that depends on *kosmos* and behaviors in accordance with the universe. *Religious and teleological justification* corresponds to the divine command theory and natural law theories especially by Cicero and Aquinas who assert that human being as a rational being teleologically should follow the orders and commands of the God. In the modern era, two approaches that base their ethical theories on human subject take the human to the core in accordance with its natural and rational faculties, without isolating it from nature: one of the two is the idea that an individual naturally seeks for her/his own utility. These theories are utilitarianism, and natural right theory –the state of nature. The second approach gives priority to transcendental subjectivity of human

beings rather than her/his attribution to natural rights -physical world. So, the second approach directs us to Kant's deontology.

It seems the last debate is going to be between natural right theory and utilitarianism. Because natural right theory says that -different from natural law theory- humankind naturally has both reason and appetite. So, any human being strives for her/his own existence through both of these features. Contrary to utilitarianism, individual utility is in the core of this theory and to say it in advance, the right of resistance is employed in this state.

4.2.1 Cosmological Justification

The effort to adjust human actions to the universal order lies at the core of cosmological justification. An action is in accordance with the universal movement laws and the ultimate end to the extent that morality directs it to be right, therefore just. This idea was the mainstream approach to ethics in ancient philosophy.

Virtue ethics

The question of the limits of rights that were defined in terms of being able to do whatever one could, was not revealed to be a radical question until the ancient philosophers started to investigate nature. The investigation of nature caused people to see nature is *regular* -in empiricism it is *uniform*-, and then caused a need to assign an order to -in other words, understanding and theorizing this regularity. Laws were no more than conventional precepts³⁵, *a way of life* at the beginning (Strauss, 1965, p. 84). The source of knowledge as *logos* (λόγος) and its law system *nomoi* (sing. *nomos*) gained a precise victory over *mythos* and *thesmoi* (Peters, 1967, p. 120), philosophy over poetry and it came to a conclusion with the statement *rights are determined by laws*.

The effort to derive the criteria for evaluating human life from the order of the universe led philosophers to investigate nature and put laws of nature in the place of divine and

³⁵ See Footnote 33. By this way, poets -whose witnesses are taken as the source of knowledge- sometimes tell about different issues differently and sometimes contradictory, but people affirm priority of their own traditions rather than arguing about the truth of stories in a variety of myths. Ancestry has an authority and power of sanction that come from past and go to future via laws in this context (Strauss, 1965, p. 91). Possibly this state of *the lack of investigation and inquisition* is the main reason of an unborn philosophy. For example, Socrates' Euthyphro dialogue is a philosophical break with tradition in determining the just and unjust actions (Plato, 1997a, 7b).

arbitrary laws in order to explain the order of *kosmos* and they suggested *arkhe* as the constituent of *kosmos* and everything else (Ağaoğulları, 2013, pp. 56, 58). Then, these philosophers observed the universe and concluded that the principles of the universe were the laws of nature. This view caused a break in the concept of right. They tried to give a meaning to this order and the limits of rights not depending on customs, godlike commands, myths or *nomoi* which are the creations by human beings, but depending on the laws of nature –thus *kosmos*. Placing natural construction opposite to social construction of values necessitates a conceptualization of *law* that includes the difference from the previous conceptualization of *law*: natural law³⁶. Thus, *positive law* is put opposite to *natural law*, *civil right* is put opposite *natural right*.³⁷ Generally, laws are seen as the restrictions of the rights because here law is not a *limit*, but a *border*. However, there are also different approaches to rights.³⁸ There are two propositions on rights: Rights are either determined in accordance with the laws of nature and their powers, or they are restricted by the human -or civil- law. These two types of law give rise to two types of rights: Natural one is valid everywhere and under every condition, while civil –legal- one is valid until the wo/men renounce the rights and transgress the laws they are agreed on, the laws that are the products of convention. Nature’s being attributed to the universe and the affirmation of universal or cosmological movement as the truth led philosophers to find the ways to behave in accordance with *kosmos*. It was also the employment of *logos* in ethics (Ağaoğulları, 2013, p. 64). Human beings and their society were the parts of the universe and a life was deemed good and justified as long as it was in accordance with the order of *kosmos*. Accordingly, science aims to reach the universal, therefore the general. This

³⁶ There is a difference between *the natural law* and *the laws of nature*. While laws of nature are the laws that process in nature itself, and they are the generalizations of the relationships between matters, natural law is the moral law that is derived basing upon nature. We see laws of nature as scientific, physical laws, and natural law in a political-legal sense. However, this distinction is a modern distinction. In ancient era both derive from *physis* what means *nature*.

³⁷ Aristotle’s discrimination bases upon the argument on justice and he reminds that justice means the true and good -and good is the correspondence to its end- usage of rights. He indicates that justice politically goes into division in two and one of them is *natural justice* and the other is *legal justice* (Aristotle, 1984b, 1134b15-25).

³⁸ In algebra, limit is the place where a function is able to go depending on its constants, variables and degree. Therefore, it is where the power of a function can reach. In some constructions of knowledge that we are going to see later, law does not draw the line where the right is restricted by the same law, but it expresses an infinitely greyed line. Limit is the end point that activates right, where the force can reach and where the force is greyed.

happens only by means of reason, which is in the area of metaphysics, and this offers a natural way to live.

Matching universal order (*makrokosmos*) with human beings (*mikrokosmos*) (Özlem, 2004, pp. 24-25) seems reasonable because the essentialist view was dominant in ancient philosophy. The existence of a being has a fixed essence and this essence determines the actions and the end of this being according to this view. Therefore, virtue ethics actually focuses on the virtues of character rather than the actions themselves. So, it differs from the ethics of conduct. Handling slavery as a natural fact by Plato and Aristotle is the result of this essential hierarchy in universal order.³⁹ Being in accordance with universal order leads to human flourishing, therefore *eudaimonia* that means intrinsic value. Virtues, in this sense, are instrumental characteristics to reach happiness.

4.2.2 Religious/Teleological Justification

Both divine command theory and the natural law theory refer to the God's commands. However, while divine command theory takes behaviors as obligations and the ways of action which God wills, it does not employ reason or other human faculties and initiatives. Every religion only gives the rules to be obeyed, and then defines good or duty and sin –such as Decalogue (Spinoza, 2002d, pp. 430-431). Any sinful deed is also unjust, immoral and not right. What the God permits is right. It is not a philosophical view because its dogmatism makes it closed to philosophical investigation. On the other hand, natural law theory employs reason in order to find the right conduct. Reason here is the instrument to acknowledge the commands of God because reason that is granted to humankind is a part of God and the connection with God. God's commands are still absolute and supreme, but human beings try to understand them and their justifications –because they have already been justified by the Power of God unquestionably- via reason. All natural references are actually the references to a nature that belongs to the God and his laws. The intrinsic value of existence and actions is the contemplation on God (Qur'an, 2005, XX:28, LI:56).

³⁹ Plato's *noble lie* is an implication of this view (Plato, 1997c, 415a-c).

Natural law theory

Classical natural right theory is the right and law theory that is theorized in ancient and medieval philosophies. In this sense, there was an understanding as to the truth of nature that was surrounded by essence. Wise man's or philosopher's duty was reaching the truth and doing what it required. The natural law theory finds its roots in ancient philosophy and the prominent thinkers of this theory are Cicero and Aquinas. Cicero was very influenced by the Stoic philosophers who stated that the created system by the material god was *Nature*, everything in the Nature was conditional and the laws of nature were the same for all everywhere. It is not possible to avoid the law of nature because the law of nature determines every condition. Thus, physics is the most excellent science because it investigates the Nature that is identified with the god (Kenny, 2004, pp. 97-98). *Physis* becomes identical to *logos* in Stoic philosophy with this identification (Peters, 1967, p. 159). This truth determines the law and the action in accordance with the law is the right attitude. As in the necessary conditions of natural law theory in ancient philosophy, Cicero observes that there are unchanging and absolute laws in nature which are common for all human beings (*ius*⁴⁰ *naturale*). Laws come from nature; they are in the mind and reason of a prudent wo/man and they determine just and unjust depending on Gods (Cicero, 1999b, Book I, §17-§27).

During Christian era in Europe that was stuck in Platonic precepts, Aristotelean precepts became popular despite the Church's pressure. Thomas Aquinas synthesized Aristotelean and Christian precepts together and also defined a theory of law, morality, and politics alongside a theory of religion in the 13th century. Law (*lex* in Latin) is essentially a rule and measurement of acts and its agent is reason while we are acting through our ends (Aquinas, 2002, p. 11). In a nutshell, law belongs to reason; commanding and forbidding are attributed to it; and it is a border of actions. Law also requires another property: regarding common good (Aquinas, 2002, p. 13), because God takes care of her/his creatures. It is very similar to the highest end of human that is happiness -*eudaimonia* in Aristotle. If the reason seeks for an end in an action, every action corresponding to a law should have an end that leads to this highest end immanently. If a human being is naturally *zōon politikon*, s/he finds happiness not

⁴⁰ *Ius* has a range of meaning here: *law, justice, right, rights, procedures of justice, just behavior, court, regulations, power, authority* (Cicero, 1999a, p. xi).

alone, but in general, in a political community. Natural law is constituted by reason (Aquinas, 2002, p. 41) and is derived from eternal law; both consist of abstract principles.⁴¹ Here is again a *nature-reason* relation because of a human being's being rational by nature. *Jus* or *ius* means in Latin *right* and *law* at the same time. Right comes from law –law is the cause of right; right is determined by law- and natural right makes people equivalent by their nature (Aquinas, 2002, p. 100). And again for Aquinas also, the concepts of *law*, *right*, *just* and *justice* are closely related: Right is what is just and just is the object of justice (Aquinas, 2002, pp. 98-99).

From these explanations, we can obviously see there are some features of classical natural law theory: (i) A thing/being is defined by its essence. The essence of a human being is being rational and this is its final cause or *telos*. A human being is necessarily rational (*zōon logon echon*) and social (*zōon politikon*). For that reason, natural right is the thing that is proper to the essence of human being. (ii) State of nature is not a pre-social situation because society is a pre-condition also for natural law and therefore classical natural right theory if human beings are social by nature. If the society comes first and natural law lies in there, (iii) a human being has duties: The duty comes from natural law and we have rights to the extent that we have duties. Behaving according to natural law is our duty, and our duty is obeying the rules of reason in the first stage. (iv) The source of knowledge, *epistēmē*, justice and virtue are in nature -in relation to God in a sense- and for that reason only a wise person who can use her/his reason in a more proper way is able to express the natural law (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 258-259). Wise wo/man's -the one who has the knowledge- relation to truth generates authority.

Authority, provides its legitimacy with consent. Transition from power to authority is possible by transition from coercion to consent. The one who can reach the divine truth with her/his reason becomes the authority on the laws. Also resistance is evaluated in the context of truth. The right of resistance is entitled against the ones who are falling apart from the truth and who are falling apart from the virtues and governance that is appropriate to the truth. This plane forms the base of institutional Christianity because this myth of the necessity of compliance to the laws forms a morality. There are three forces that bind the consciences of rebels for happiness: miracle, mystery, and

⁴¹ Aquinas proposes four kinds of law: Eternal, natural, human, and divine. While eternal law is subjected to God directly, natural law is the mode of rational creatures' sharing eternal law (Aquinas, 2002, p. 18).

authority (Dostoevsky, 2008, p. 320). Mystery is the divine knowledge and the Church has the power to determine the laws because it has the knowledge. The Church establishes its authority by gaining consents of the people. It is the philosopher-king figure of Ancient Greek, *Princeps* of Rome. In a sense, the legitimacy of all resistances and the right of resistance are determined by their level of closeness to the truth and its actualization on earth. The right of resistance requires preserving the essence because, at the same time, it is a law and a duty. The wo/man is directly the collocutor of the divine law, in other words natural law because of her/his faculty to be a rational animal according to her/his essence. The limits s/he can reach –and also her/his goal– are the limits of her/his reason and this is the knowledge of the universal law. The person who wants to actualize her/his essence should necessarily obey the rules without any attack or resistance to the authority. Thus, any attack on the knowledge or authority of these representational institutions is going to legitimize the right of resistance.

4.2.3 Anthropological Justification

The rise of subject based method of thinking eliminated both cosmological and theological methods (Özlem, 2004, p. 27). In this sense, it can be asserted that the rise of anthropological justification methods is related to the rise of secularism. Former methods approached nature –also human– not in a scientific attitude, but either depending on cosmological order or depending on a transcendent god. Thus we can conclude that the nature itself is not an empirical actuality, it is a fiction and established by contemplation, or the god's orders are tried to be applied to nature as in Galilei's case against the Church –the church advocates a geocentric cosmology in Galilei's case. This is the difference between these methods although all of them are giving a reference to nature in some way. However, anthropological method emphasizes the objectivity and the capability of human reason while judging and acting. On the other hand, this method excludes all groundings that refer to supreme beings transcendent to human subject. Humans are only subjected to rational and natural laws. These are the categories that determine the relations of an individual with her/his environment and that evaluate the rightness of her/his actions. As can be observed, there is a division between nature and reason in the anthropological understanding. This difference gives rise to the distinction between transcendental and natural anthropological justifications.

4.2.3.1 Transcendental anthropological justification

Transcendental anthropological method is based upon the idea regarding the perfection of the human subject and its rational faculties. Human is a rational and spatial being and the laws of nature have inevitable effects on humans. Any human is subjected to these laws, but the determinism that this actuality brings forth does not leave any room for freedom. So, philosophers appeal to the transcendental faculties of humans that are superior to the necessities of nature. By using her/his rational faculties, a person can be autonomous and free in her/his actions. Kant's deontology is the proponent theory of this method.

Deontology

*Deontology*⁴² means *science of duty* and this moral theory focuses on the duties rather than characteristics of agents or the consequences of an action. Owing to the fact that deontology necessitates duties, the consequences of an action are excluded from attributing value to this action. The necessary determinism in nature makes the will of a human being in her/his actions problematic. In this sense, Kant holds a kind of dualism in order to avoid the empirical necessity of human in its relation with nature: natural law and moral law. The wo/man who is naturally half sensual and half rational (Walsh, 1972, p. 317) can comprehend the moral laws that are universal and independent from empirical things: a moral law, a moral obligation and duty (Kant, 2006, p. 2). The thing that makes a person a moral being and that makes her/him different from an animal is her/his reason. Reason gives her/him the conditions for comprehending moral law. Thus, moral aspect suggests a realm of freedom because a body that is subjected only to the laws of nature in time and space can only have passions and this subjects the body that is a slave and full of passions to an obligation. However, deontology tries to find and establish *the supreme principle of morality* (Kant, 2006, p. 5) and thus it makes room for freedom in morals.

Whatever the consequences of an action are, they are not important for morality, they have no moral value. A person may act *in conformity with duty* but this does not mean s/he is acting *from duty* (Kant, 2006, p. 11). This means a person can act according to her/his utility, in order to make a profit and this motivation can be in the core of her/his

⁴² Greek word *deon* means *one must, duty* (Olson, 1972, p. 343; McNaughton, 1998, p. 890).

action. However, this action is not a moral action because s/he is not acting from duty; instead s/he acts following her/his desires. An action, for that reason, can only be judged considering its intention, rather than its outcomes. Humans have duties to follow in their actions since they have reason and they are moral beings. The subjective principles -maxims- that a person follows while acting are a transformation of the objective principles under the conditions of subject –time and space- into phenomena (Kant, 2006, p. 31). Thus, Kant suggests a transcendental comprehension of morality. A person determines the true maxim of an action by considering the categorical imperative: whether one could will that maxim should become a universal law, and act in accordance with that maxim (Kant, 2006, p. 31). So, an action is good only if it is willed due to its accordance with the law. Here, reason is the judge that determines the value of an action through maxims. Deontology's transcendental *anthropologism* comes from this view.

Where there is law and will, there should be duty. Duty is the necessity of an action that comes from respect for *law*⁴³ (Kant, 2006, p. 13). Respect for law is the condition of being rational, therefore moral. Duty should take natural inclination's place in morality. Otherwise, an action will not have any moral value. So, if a person has will and intention, s/he voluntarily and consciously can resist her/his desires, can suppress them and can act from duty. In the place where rights are determined by law, everyone has the same right -they have equal rights- because everyone's subjected to the same law –moral law- through reason. Duties are divided into two as *duties of right (Recht)* –*perfect duties*- and *duties of virtue –imperfect duties-*; each of them are also divided as *towards oneself* and *towards others* (Guyer, 1998, p. 190). The laws that form the State arise from here and the rights are determined by these laws. These duties of right are declared by legislation. Coercion is only justified only under the terms of the duties of right when it is against a hindrance to freedom (Guyer, 1998, p. 191) and in this case, coercion is a means to freedom because freedom is actually the chief value and coercion is permitted to be employed only as the coercive legal enforcement for freedom. However, duties of virtue cannot be enforced by coercion. The application of the moral law provides freedom that is established by being in accordance with the

⁴³ Practical law that indicates the objective principle, *a priori* law which is noumenal.

universal law. Duty is respect for law and an action's intrinsic value is about its being in accordance with the duty. So, the intrinsic value for deontology is only duty.

Severing the natural side of human from the conditions of freedom disaccords with the nature of political freedom. Thoughts also have a reality and this is parallel to the presence of the spatial becomings. Thus, a rational freedom is possible only with a natural freedom. The materiality of the reality affects both the spatial and the intellectual –or spiritual. In this sense, what constructs freedom in mind will be the spatial and changeable power relations. The historical processes and their constitutive powers are not included proximately in Kant's strict rational ethics. For that reason, the couple consisting of sensation and emotion should be involved in ethical theory because of their actuality.

4.2.3.2 Natural anthropological justification

Observations on nature and scientific development gave rise to empiricism in philosophy. Empiricism argues that our knowledge comes from our experiences. Our experiences are subjected to the natural connections of our body, our sensations. Thus, any idea that occurs in mind depends on a spatial presence in nature. Humans' being natural agents in every aspect makes that necessary to investigate and regard them in accordance with the nature. Naturally, humans care about their own well-being and therefore, look out for utility. In this sense, we can call the theories that are based on natural anthropological justification utility based theories. Two of the prominent theories among them are utilitarianism and natural right theory.

Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is promoted especially by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. They both stake Epicurean claim of pleasure (Mill, 2001, p. 6). However, pleasure is not only a bodily delight according to them, it also has an intellectual aspect. In this sense, happiness is an intended pleasure and the absence of pain; desire works in order to gain pleasure inherently or gain the means for pleasure instrumentally (Mill, 2001, p. 7), therefore in order to promote happiness. Happiness is the only thing desirable as an end (Mill, 2001, p. 39). So, the intrinsic value for utilitarianism is happiness. However, striving for pleasure seems to have a pejorative meaning and for that reason Mill comes up with the concept *utility*. Everyone desires her/his own happiness and therefore happiness is good; other people's happiness is also good for both themselves and

anyone who sees happiness as the greatest good; and the general happiness which includes the greatest amount of happiness is also good (Mill, 2001, p. 35). *The greatest happiness principle* refers to utility differently from individually referencing pleasure (Mill, 2001, p. 7).

Actions are evaluated according to the degree they promote happiness. The amount of utility and happiness that an action reveals proves the rightness of it. So, utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of an action rather than the motivation or the rules which the agent acts according to, but the proof is something sensible and clear (Mill, 2001, p. 35). In other words, utilitarianism is the moral theory that states the rightness and wrongness of an action via the goodness and badness of the consequences of these actions (Smart, 1972, p. 206). Besides, a right action does not necessarily require a virtuous character (Mill, 2001, p. 20). The consequences of an action may differ according to the features of happiness such as intensity, likelihood, duration or fruitfulness. So, the greatest amount of calculated utility will be the most rightful action and the happiness at the end is the criterion of morality, even in society, in political actions. Impartiality and equality elements of utilitarianism (Chappell & Crisp, 1998, p. 552) result in social and legal egalitarianism. It produces equality among the people and their happiness, and for that reason it differs from egoism. It loads responsibility on the legislators and the citizens in order to look out for the utility of the greatest amount of people. This way, even self-sacrifice is justified if it serves to this greatest utility. Thus, self-sacrifice itself is good this way (Mill, 2001, pp. 16-17). And when the social arrangements or law provide the greatest happiness, it will not be just and right to oppose them. Any individual is an equally important part of the whole. For that reason, having a right is the duty of the society to defend its part for the sake of the general utility (Mill, 2001, p. 54).

Considering each person's happiness and utility is equal to that of another one causes equality among individuals. Thus, utilitarianism reaches total utility by adding the equal utility of each person together. However, different people's happinesses that occur through satisfying a need are not equal to each other naturally. Utilitarianism fails to recognize the distinction among persons and it takes them as one fictional man and thus, different desires are ignored (Rawls, 1999, pp. 163-164). The calculation of utility does not seem sensible. That is because the net utility requires an impartial observer and no observer who is responsible for judging the net utility can be impartial

because it is not an impersonal position by nature (Rawls, 1999, p. 166). The calculation of utility does not seem sensible. The equality of emotions and happiness requires the equality of rights and a justification *beyond* the establishment of the social. However, this kind of equality does not have a justified ground and it seems fictional because “*unequal* rights are the condition of any rights at all” (Nietzsche, 2007a, §57). *Equal rights* are only a juridical term. In this sense, self-sacrifice for whatever the objective is or any imposition to do that is not compatible with one’s own nature. Nor is there any transcendent establishment which renders this action an obligation or duty for the irrelevant other.

Natural right theory

A radical change has occurred with the discrimination between right and law. As we seen before, ancient philosophers used two terms very related to each other because a human has a right as long as s/he is rational and rationality defines the law. Essence was defined by *telos* and being rational and social was the highest end for a human being. So, we can mention an absolute value for measuring behaviors. A teleological and essentialist view on human nature gave its place to the idea of *the state of nature* in modernity and what we call social contract theories caused the view that a political society is established after taking the consents of people. The aim of these theoreticians was to preserve the natural rights in civil state.

In modern theory, right is no more a problem of knowledge. Henceforth, it is turned into a problem of power and existence. Hobbes takes security, Locke takes property, and Rousseau takes liberty as the origin of the rights which support existence and power, then they construct their political theories on these values. They try to reconcile natural law with natural rights for the sake of a political organization.

Hobbes defines natural right (*jus naturale*) as power. Any person has the right to do anything s/he is able to in order to preserve its nature, therefore its life. Natural right is the liberty to do anything for the preservation of one’s own life. Contrary to this, law is a precept or a general rule that is reached through reason (Hobbes, 1996, p. 91) which serves to the preservation of life. The first two laws of nature lead people to avoid the state of nature: (i) *seek peace as far as you can, otherwise use all means in order to preserve your being*, and (ii) *contract in way of peace* (Hobbes, 1996, p. 92). People transfer their whole natural rights to a sovereign to get security in return. The

word of the sovereign is the representation of its subjects and this is obliged by contract. So, the third law of nature is for the civil state and it says (iii) subjects in principle do not have a right to resist the commands of the sovereign because they covenant this at the beginning.

A Hobbesian absolute monarchy makes Locke uncomfortable and he emphasises the necessity for a civil society. Locke suggests a society whose all members are subjected to the same law on condition that their natural rights are not alienated or transferred to an absolute *subject* like the sovereign. Therefore, usage of the transferred power arbitrarily and excessively and abuses of this power are prevented. In a situation like this, liberty of a wo/man in society is ensured under the legislative power through consents of the people in the state of nature instead of the laws of nature -which means natural liberty (Locke, 2003b, §22). Two natural rights, (i) *doing anything in order to preserve himself and the rest of mankind*, and (ii) *power of punishment* are given up to the civil society. The inalienable rights regarding life, liberty and estate are preserved and not transferred. Locke, this way, puts forward the rights of individuals and the members of the society rather than the sovereign, because rights cannot be transferred in return for worse conditions. Rights and natural liberty are given up for the common good, not for the advantage of a sovereign.

However, as long as we do not know the natural man, we will be unable to know the natural law. Still, a law is something we are naturally and necessarily inclined to (Rousseau, 1997, pp. 126-127). We can see two main principles in human nature that is prior to reason: the first one is (i) *the striving for well-being and self-preservation*, and the other is (ii) *being disturbed when we see a suffering living-being*, especially human being. These principles can easily be acquired without referring to any kind of sociability and rationality principles. These two principles are also the ground for all natural laws, Rousseau thinks. Locke can be criticized for not giving the reasons behind the inalienable natural rights: He does not give clear explanations as to why they are respectable; Rousseau's second principle grounds the respect for natural rights as *pity* (Rousseau, 1997, pp. 153-154) which is a natural sentiment; therefore it is in accordance with the human nature. All these theories appeal to a state of nature and a natural state of human being. The rights of an individual are determined according to his/her common and unavoidable natural characteristics with all people.

Modern natural right theory gives us four common features in itself but different from the classical view –from natural law theory. (i) Natural right becomes a theory that is related to the power of a body, there is no more teleological understanding, it is organized by the initial motion given to humans by appetite. So, an individual is determined by its power. Power identifies the essence of a being. (ii) Reason gives no privilege to wo/man before law. Laws are the same for all as seen in Hobbes: Everyone is equal to each other in the state of nature; or as seen in Rousseau: The natural rights should be independent from the development of reason. Therefore, the state of nature comes before the civil state. Nobody is born social and reasonable –that is not consistent with the Christian tradition drawing upon the perfect Adam myth and the idea of innate rational and political being in classical theory. (iii) If rights come first, duties are secondary and duties depend on rights. Duties only limit the rights in society. Rights are the constitutors here opposite to the classical natural right theory –or the natural law theory. Power is actual now rather than teleological and determined. (iv) No one has an authority on my rights and has the authority to decide what my rights are. Nobody can judge what is good and what is bad for me until I give my consent (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 259-260). Modern theory sees the identity of power and right in the state of nature –that makes life unbearable-, then the right determines Power in civil state via contract and taking consent.

The right of resistance was resistance against an irrational action in classical natural right theory. Otherwise, it cannot be counted as a right and conceptually legitimate. In order to be conceptualized, it should require the proper conditions of truth. This means resistance is a right and a concept if and only if it is the movement of true reason: Here, right is a permission. The right of resistance is formed according to the degree of power in modern theory or modern natural right theory. The one to resist is the one who holds the Political power in her/his hand and who violates the contract. Resistance is natural as a right and it is legitimate in case of an attack on the person himself, but if the sovereign violates the law, this justifies and leaves room for resistance against the one who violates the contract. This way, we can argue whether the right of resistance exists primarily and under which circumstances it is justified. For instance, it is not legitimate to resist the laws and the enforcements of the sovereign in the scope of the contract. Resistance originates from the fact that it's an expression of power and a right to resist in the state of nature, but it is bound and limited by the laws in civil state.

So, natural right theory differs from the natural law theory basically in its definition of human essence, and it does not refer to a divine order that comes from theological view apparent especially in Aquinas. Besides, it differs from utilitarianism because it does not only focus on consequences. Utilities cannot be regarded equal for everyone although it focuses on consequences. Consequences are important for any person in order to increase her/his power, but, the knowledge of natural law drives us to find the true ways of having contact with other beings. Human is composed of both the sensual and the rational. Virtue, or the guidance of the understanding (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 99) is also employed to preserve itself in accordance with nature. Virtue becomes a means for power and there is only power that determines rights because there is nothing else moving and forming in nature.

4.3 Conclusion

I understand from *law* any law other than natural law. Law is nothing short of human law (Akai, 2010, p. 164). When law itself can be the object of a scientific inquiry, it is inferior to science. Natural sciences have no volition because they -e.g., physics, chemistry, etc.- are nomothetic⁴⁴ (Engle, 2008, pp. 32-33). So, there are two kinds of law: (i) *natural law* that no individual can avoid in the extent of her/his power, and (ii) *man-made law* that individuals normatively obey. While the former is a “consequent imperative”, the latter is actually a “hierarchically harmonious set of norms” –which corresponds to *nomos* (Engle, 2008, pp. 31-32). It would be more proper to situate these two kinds of law according to their positions to natural right. While man-made law is the borders –bold weighted lines- of the restricted natural right, natural law is signified by the powers of the becomings, individuals. It is a greyed limit to the extent of their natural powers. Natural right is equal to natural law in this context. However, a choice between them means taking a stand between freedom and obedience as Hobbes pointed out to be a political attitude. The distinction between justification and legitimacy actually has two aspects: etymological and genealogical. Etymological difference refers to the difference between *ius* and *lex*. And the genealogical aspect is

⁴⁴ The term *nomothetic* -which is derived from *nomos* and *nomothétês* (legislator)- is used for laws of natural sciences, it would be better to relate it to *physis* rather than *nomos*. *Nomos* means rather “a custom, a convention, constitutional or arbitrary law” (Peters, 1967, p. 131).

the dependence of legitimacy on authority –like the difference between *physis* and *nomos*.⁴⁵ Everything is, at first, justified, then distorted by legitimization.

The difference between (i) preservation of rights –rights as life and liberty, and (ii) preservation itself as a right is critical. Locke lists life, liberty and estate as inalienable natural rights of a person but he does not give any plausible justification for this idea. I think Rousseau firmly states the justification of this respect and natural grounding of life by using *pity* in the second natural right of wo/men. Pity and empathy make me respectful to the right of the others and makes the rights holy. But, pity is more harmful than any vice because it is the pure state of weakness; it diminishes the power, it has a depressive effect, it derives from the method of negation and it is the practice of nihilism (Nietzsche, 2007a, pp. 4, 6-7). “[P]ity is only a virtue for decadents” (Nietzsche, 2007b, p. 79). Here, Bentham’s claim is still valid: Nature does not offer life or liberty as a right. However, it gives me power so that I preserve it. No one is obliged to respect my life or my freedom, but it is my right to preserve them and protect myself from the attacks as much as I can as the extent of my power allows. This argument concerns natural rights, but not in the sense that Bentham interpreted Locke and the others. Natural rights are not rhetorical statements and fictions. If the only actuality is power and power relations, the natural right is the power every individual has. Thus, resistance, when it is outside the juridical determinations, is a bare expression of power for self-preservation. The individual or collective body acts parallel with his/her reason and tries to be in accordance with the natural law.

Natural rights are simply the rights that are given to individuals as they are natural. So, the natural rights are only limited by the natural law. In this sense, essentially respectable rights such as life, liberty or estate are not natural rights, but they are only the applications of an individual’s natural right. Natural right of a wo/man is the right which includes everything that one desires and is able to obtain in actuality. So, property rights of anyone is only the application of the natural power of him/her if s/he is able to have any property. This is also the exclusion of human rights such as the ones that state every human being has a right to reach food, shelter, clothing, etc. This

⁴⁵ This genetic difference refers to the discussion between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I (Plato, Republic, 1997c). This discussion over *justice* is established on the plane of the division between *physis* and *nomos*; and here *justice* (*dikaion* - *δίκαιον*) means *right*. Socrates takes a stand on law (*nomos*) while Thrasymachus takes a stand on the natural rights through basing upon *physis*.

idea conceals the material conditions of Power and resistance, and puts everyone under the category of the same substantial subject. The myth of equality is the same, as well. Resistance is regarded on this plane when the Power overflows the frame defined by *law* –that is positive law.

Natural rights are not fictions, but regarding natural rights as life, liberty or estate is a fiction because they are the results of the application of natural rights, not themselves. Fiction is attributing these all to all humankind without exception and aggrandizing them. A Lockean account of natural rights is something like Plato's *noble lie*.

No one is obliged to respect my life or my freedom, but it is my right to preserve them and protect myself from the attacks as much as I can to the extent of my power. This argument holds the natural right, but not in a sense that Bentham interpreted Locke and the others. Natural rights are not rhetorical statements and fictions. If the only actuality is power and power relations, the natural right is the power every individual has. Thus, resistance, when it is outside of juridical determinations, is a bare expression of power for self-preservation. The individual or collective body acts parallel with his/her reason and tries to be in accordance with the natural law.



5. JUSTIFICATION OF RESISTANCE

We have seen that resistance is a kind of action and it should be evaluated within power relations because the meaning and value of any kind of action are based on the will to power behind this action. Resistance is an action but an action against an action, therefore it is a reaction. Resistance involves a negative element in itself and this is not proper for the well-being of the individual. However, resistance seems inevitable in some cases. For that reason, resistance and rights should be situated in a good order. Affirmative resistance involves resistance in a way that affirms its power as we have seen up to now. The negative element stays secondary and derivative. On the other hand, negative resistance involves resistance and its constitutive element –negation- as the primary element that drives into nihilism. The question is which resistance is in accordance with the nature and rights. This question implicitly contains the question of the justification of resistance. In order to answer this, the rights will be resituated and then the affections of a body in power relations will be stated in this chapter. The conditions of the affirmation of the power of acting and the conditions of the increment of immanent power (*potentia* or power of acting) are the same. In this sense, how the increment of this power can be a right and an aim, and how the political can be used as a perpetual means –political as an end encircles the means at the same time- for this task will be put forward. As a result, the pure form -occurrence- of the justification of resistance, in other words exercise of the right of resistance will be asserted under the title of *Politics of Conatus*.

Classical philosophers tried to cover up and ignore the resistances among society in order to establish a State free from conflicts. They tried to deal with the society as if it was a static and a stable matter which the resistances were excluded from. However, it can be clearly seen that conflicts and differences exist among society. These differences within them are even the constituent that forms societies. Politics as the science of *polis* and ethics as the science of the relations of an individual in society, inevitably involve resistance. It is not a normative statement, but an actuality. The aim should not be seeing resistances as exceptions to politics, but handling them as the

actuality and necessity of politics, and then situating them in the organization of political life. If something is inevitable, it should be used as an instrument for the sake of a political aim.

For ancients, the right of resistance had a core doctrine that can be summarized as protecting and establishing the transcendent moral State. That was a striving for an ideal organization which corresponds to an essence. The purpose of the right of resistance was to legitimize and preserve the existing Power, and thus, the right of resistance becomes a right –civil- and a duty in law to restore the sovereign Power (Del Lucchese, 2009, p. 50). In this sense, it is a legal concept and coexists with institutions in modern theory. However, Power does not get exercised through centralized institutional agents or just individuals, but it spreads among the whole society. Since Power spreads beyond the frame defined by law, the right of resistance overflows this frame (Fontana & Bertani, 2003, pp. 280-281).

Any kind of contract theory cannot be employed if resistance overflows the frame defined by law. The constructive power of the social, therefore an implicit or explicit contract among persons can be asserted, but this idea only works in case of an *agonism*; not *antagonism*. That is because there is no contract between enemies. A contract gives rights, but in a *positive* sense. So, in a case of war, there will be a resistance with a high probability. However, this resistance and its rightness cannot be determined by a contract. The expansion in the meaning and the area of activity of a resistance drives us to a prior source of rights. These rights can be based on a cosmological plane, theological plane or anthropological plane.

The cosmological plane offers us a universal analogy. However, the problem with this plane is that a perfect order refers to a divine designer, and harmony cannot explain the resistances in society. The political is independent from the circular order of the universe. The supporters of natural law and positivists share a common ground when it comes to the search for a creator in the origin of laws and the search for a source means establishing a legal relation between the source and what this source is being searched for and so, the meaning and the value of a right is based on the meaning and the value of its referring source: a transcending operation (Akal, 2010, p. 152). A transcending operation simply involves the subject issue. The founder subject is a speculation in an event and a becoming as we discussed earlier. If there is no transcending subject of a unity neither internal nor external to give a meaning and a

cause to a determination (Akal, 2010, p. 152), the determination excludes cosmological or teleological approaches. This means there is an over-determination outside what is *determined*. The over-determination is immanence and linked to a non-hierarchical whole that is not transcendent. God, transcendental subject or an ideal essence corresponds to a transcending subject. This subject can also be a class or a party. Individuals are physically formed not in a form corresponding to an absolute and abstract subject, but in an infinite interaction and motion. However, this infinity depends on material conditions.⁴⁶ Aforementioned infinite interaction comes from the immanent power that every individual has. The immanent power of each individual is always active and the action is realized according to his/her natural right and under the conditions of the encounters with other modes that determine the individual (Deleuze, 1998, p. 102).

Overcoming the problem of reference to transcendence necessitates regarding a becoming as what it actually is (Akal, 2010, pp. 157-158). An immanent theory of law is the effort for explaining right with the right itself. Thus, right is determined without giving reference to any sort of sources and by rejecting this understanding of reference (Akal, 2010, p. 156), with the power of an individual. Thus, the concept of right only corresponds to an actuality, therefore an activity (Balibar, 2008, p. 60). The political is based on power relations in fact rather than a constitutive subject whether it is transcendent or transcendental. Therefore, the source of the rights is what is given and real in material conditions: nature. So, the source seems to be what is given and what is itself. Thus, a theoretical opinion of rights and the myth of equal rights become nonsense.⁴⁷ On the other hand, the natural understanding of rights in question –this immanent understanding of rights- rejects the two approaches to rights clearly: (i) that links rights to a transcendent objective law that precedes the civil organization of human beings, and (ii) that links rights to subjective rights which arise from the liberty of individuals and expresses a universal property of human beings (Balibar, 2008, p. 60) –“the absolute conception of the individual foundation and the absolute conception

⁴⁶ The idea of human rights and Lockean inalienable natural rights –that are common for all humankind and that make them equal- are not the true source of rights, but they are the results of something natural because these are obtained only because every individual has the power to preserve them.

⁴⁷ “No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause” (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 282). “The force [vis] whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes” (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 324).

of the contractual passage” (Negri, 1991, p. 109). As a result of this double refutation, it becomes obvious that the concept of right cannot be defined by a relation to the concept of duty at the beginning (Balibar, 2008, p. 60). Naturally, each being has a right within the extent of its power to do. This immanent power of each individual, each existing mode, defines this individual’s rights in any case; this power is the first foundation, the first mover, but not a final cause and therefore does not refer to any consideration of duties (Deleuze, 1998, p. 102). This is also a plane of resistance outside the positive law. This approach to natural rights is an immanent critique of juridical forms. The cover of legitimacy is removed and power relations in politics are revealed. This approach to rights is both naturalistic and materialistic (Negri, 1991, p. 109). For that reason, this theory of rights can be understood as a theory of natural right *beyond the “accident” of natural right* –the conception of natural right that is rationalistic and idealistic (Negri, 1991, p. 108). It is a must for political philosophy to resituate and define the right of resistance under these circumstances.

5.1 Resituating Rights

Resituating the rights requires an examination of law depending on the close relation and determination between laws and rights. The word law, in its absolute sense, means each individual’s -whether they are the same kind or not- acting in the same pre-determined and fixed way (Spinoza, 2002d, p. 426). Here individual signifies each mode of nature. Law, in this sense, is divided into two as (i) natural law and (ii) human law. Natural law is the law that is at work in nature. It is universal and a necessity. It is the law of movement and affection of modes. Natural law represents the highest level of knowledge: the necessary rules between things, individuals, or modes of nature. Every mode inevitably acts according to the necessities of natural law. A wo/man’s being unable to fly without wings is a law of nature, a necessity, but not his/her choice. These laws physically limit the actions of an individual and an individual does not have knowledge of these laws when it was first born; s/he comprehends them in time by experience. On the other hand, human law is the commands which are invented by humans in order to restrict human acts and power and which a human being can either obey or disobey (Spinoza, 2002d, p. 427). Specifically, human law is invented in order to determine the way of life for an end which is considered appropriate. Human law is seen especially in social life. They are

used for the preservation of the human or the political organization. In other words, it is an instrumental law. Human power can exceed human law, but cannot exceed natural law. Natural law signifies the line where human power can just reach. For that reason, human law represents a subset of natural laws with the aim of limiting the unpredictable and unwanted actions of individuals. People use human law instrumentally in order to govern, in order to rein in individuals as they search for the effect of intention in actions, commands or morality on deeds.

As for the relation between rights and law, it can be said that rights are determined by law. The right of nature reaches as far as its power reaches (Spinoza, 2002d, p. 527). Individual things are the modes of nature and the compound of the powers of all individuals –not only human beings- forms the power of nature. So, naturally, the right of an individual is its power insofar as it participates in nature. Thus, individuals get more rights by uniting the powers they have. Nature is managed by infinite numbers of other laws; the order and the right of nature do not forbid anything with an exception of those things that no one desires and no one can do (Spinoza, 2002d, p. 428). In the state of nature, there is no sin or no immorality. However, a sin is the action which cannot be done lawfully (Spinoza, 2002e, II.§18). In this sense, right and duty are not identical, but completely different. Human law shrinks the natural right by prohibiting and labeling it as sin, immoral, unjust, illegal; in other words, by opposing itself against rights from a position of Power and authority. This system processes by commands whose specific feature is having obscure causes that are basically arbitrary orders of an authority. Then, a wo/man is autonomous and the judge of himself in the state of nature, but in a civil state, the judge becomes the human law and representational institutions and authorities. The prohibition of the natural right is not only caused by the human law, but also the apparatuses of the State (*imperium*) that are the compositions of representation, control and administration (Balibar, 2008, p. 120). Even so, the natural right is still preserved in civil state (Spinoza, 2002e, III.§3) because it is not possible to lay down natural rights physically. Therefore, transfer of rights seems to be a speculative process and the human law is obeyed as long as it corresponds to the utility of the individual depending on the preserved natural right.

5.2 Individual as Political Being

Individuals strive for their utilities but it is not certain whether they achieve them or not. Natural right is not a duty but it is the expression of the power of a body. For that reason, an individual does not act solely according to its reason. Besides, appetite is also a constituent of power, therefore natural right by its nature. Natural right cannot be handled only by depending on reason just like classical natural right theoreticians did. A wo/man can act according to reason –wisely- or blind desires –ignorantly- by nature (Spinoza, 2002e, II.§5). Natural right of an individual is a compound of these two aspects of desires. This way, we leave Cicero and Aquinas who defined natural right in terms of true reason. Passions -the desires that do not arise from reason- will not be suppressed, instead, rights will be defined considering the passions. Thus, an individual is handled naturally and all constituent powers of an individual are seen obviously.

Emotions are generally despised by philosophers for the sake of morality most of the time. However, an ethics can only be established by taking human as what it is and an applicable political theory can only be asserted this way (Spinoza, 2002e, I.§1). Source of an individual's opinion is an external cause (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 39) and these external causes have effects on the human body. In this sense, these external causes and ideas reveal emotions through the affections on the body (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 278). There is a mechanism of emotion in an individual's relationship with the world. Body is a mode of nature and is an extended thing. Each mode is limited by another mode because the power of nature is superior to all modes and the modes of the same attribute are able to enter into relations. In this extension, bodies interact with each other and they have affections on the others. Depending on the laws of nature, their affections either increase or diminish the body's power of acting. Therefore, relation becomes prior to the essence of a thing because the power of a body is the same as its essence and the power is determined in its relation with other bodies, by its affections. The priority of relation over essence of a body indicates that finite modes are not static, but they are dynamic (Del Lucchese, 2009, p. 52). While relatedness determines socialization, power determines politicization. Social and politic is very different from

each other in this sense and should not substitute each other.⁴⁸ Sociability is an inferior becoming (Arendt, 1998, pp. 23-24) and does not have the power and privileges of being political. Sociability becomes immanent to being political when an individual affirms the affections on her/him actively and this way s/he reaches the realization of her/his power.

Individuals hardly desire the same thing because thoughts of two or more people can only be the same if their experiences are the same. This means desiring the same thing is possible only by being in the same position spatially and temporally. However, this is not possible naturally and physically. So, there are differences between the ideas of people by necessity. The theories excluding the emotional part of humans are deficient to define the political being. Being political involves being both rational and emotional. Therefore, *difference* seems actual and necessary. Any theory that is trying to make the ideas and inclinations of the people the same, or a State that is against the manifestation of different views among its subjects expresses a force against the natural. Seeing these differences as contradictions –which is an unnatural situation– triggers a natural inclination of resistance. What a body cannot stand engenders reaction and uprising (Balibar, 2008, p. 28).

5.3 Freedom and Slavery

The law of nature is an imperative. Therefore, the relations in nature are not contingent and the power of nature is not the same as the human power of a king (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 245). Bodies interact with each other in plurality. The relationship of a body with another causes an affection. This affection either increases or diminishes the body's power of acting. An encounter may have an effect that dissolves the connections of the body. These rules of effects are involved in the natural law. In ethics, we can name the things that reveal emotions that increase the power of acting *good*, and the reverse *bad*. In other words, what is in harmony with my nature is good, and what dissolves my connections is bad (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 322). The essences of two bodies can be harmonized with each other or can dissolve the connections of the body. All the results of these interactions are determined by natural law. However, human law does not

⁴⁸ See Arendt (1998), especially chapter II.4: *Man: A Social or a Political Animal*, for an insightful analysis of this difference.

know these causes and intentionally tries to generalize them under titles such as *moral, good, just, or legal*. The value of a relation, therefore, is determined according to its utility for the individual. This can be known by comprehending the principles of natural law by reason. Otherwise, it will be a blind desire that is not aware of causes. This kind of knowledge is *knowledge from random experience* unlike *reason* that is another kind of knowledge and another kind of apprehension of the essence of a thing (Nadler, 2013). An individual is free to the extent that s/he has the power to exist and acts according to the laws of nature; the one who uses her/his reason the most, the one who prefers the good to the bad is the freest (Spinoza, 2002e, II.§7). A wo/man who acts according to her/his reason can comprehend the adequate reasons of her/his own nature. This way, s/he can act in accordance with her/his utility and s/he becomes the source of her/his actions, therefore s/he is active: The causes will not be external this way, s/he will not be passive (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 279). So, freedom manifests the necessity of an action. The one who follows the laws of her/his own nature is the master of himself. Freedom is not a contingency, but necessity and thus, freedom is the ability to organize relations of utility for one's body.

Obedience to an authority is lack of adequate causes such as the difference between natural law and human law.⁴⁹ In a situation in which life is surrounded by Power mechanisms, causes come from outside –external causes. An individual becomes a slave to the extent that s/he moves away from her/his values and judgment (Spinoza, 2002e, VII.§4). Being against the laws of nature diminishes the body's power of acting and this situation is equal to slavery. Being far apart from reason is a passive situation and this way, the individual acts according to her/his passions. This situation is the opposite of freedom and diminishes the body's power of acting. Similarly, all Power's being in somebody else's hand is also slavery (Spinoza, 2002e, VI.§4) because in this case (i) an individual transferred her/his power to the sovereign and diminished her/his own power –because of this transfer's being speculative, actually, the subject promises not to use her/his right that comes from her/his nature-, or (ii) s/he obeys human law rather than natural law, therefore s/he is unable to know adequate causes. The Power

⁴⁹ “Consequently, Adam perceived this revelation not as an eternal and necessary truth but as a law, that is to say, an enactment from which good or ill consequence would ensue not from the intrinsic nature of deed performed but only from the will and absolute power of some ruler. Therefore, that revelation, solely in relation to Adam and solely because of the limitations of his knowledge, was a law, and God was a kind of lawgiver or ruler” (Spinoza, 2002d, p. 430).

produces slavery to the extent that it makes the individual passive by detracting the individual from activity. Passion diminishes the power to act and it causes slavery. Therefore, freedom as the highest good and utility signifies the core element of resistance: the desire for freedom. Life, in this sense, is an active strategic resistance against external forces (Del Lucchese, 2009, p. 42). As a result, freedom is the ability to organize the encounters in a way that is in accordance with one's own nature. An individual is strong to the extent s/he is free and weak to the extent s/he is a slave (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 382).

5.4 Striving or *Conatus*

An individual seeks for her/his own utility and avoids the encounters which can dissolve her/his bodily connections in both state of nature and civil state. Every being, including the individual and the body, occurs as a plurality of forces. Nature is the origin of all these forces by its infinite power. However, no mode of this substance can form all the forces of another mode. So, no mode has an infinite right and power over another mode. In this sense, natural rights are preserved also in civil state (Spinoza, 2002f, p. 891). This right comes from *conatus*, which is defined as the natural endeavor of each thing to persist in its own being according to its actual essence (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 283). *Conatus* is an individual's source of motivation to search for her/his utility. An individual becomes stronger to the extent that s/he searches for her/his utility and tries to preserve her/his own being (Spinoza, 2002c, pp. 331-332). For that reason, depending on the natural right of *conatus*, depending on the inevitable actuality of *conatus*, nobody can harm herself/himself or give up her/his utility, even in civil state. S/he has right and power to refuse to obey the contract depending on her/his natural right when it turns against the utility of the individual (Spinoza, 2002d, p. 529). For that reason, the transfer of a right is impossible physically and stays speculative and discursive.

Conatus is an association of reasonable acts and ignorant acts. Depending on his/her right springing from *conatus*, an individual defends himself, tries to preserve in being and tries to organize the encounters in a way that serve her/his utility. *Conatus* can include lust –motive force of the ignorance of causes- and reason –motive force of the comprehension of adequate causes. As long as an individual does not have all of the

adequate ideas of her/his nature, these two aspects are involved in her/him.⁵⁰ Thus, it's one thing to defend oneself, preserve oneself and make a judgment depending on a right; it is another thing to do these actions in the best possible way (Spinoza, 2002e, V.§1). So, doing the best is doing the good things in order to preserve our being. Thus, we search for the good encounters, the good affections on our body, and good emotions in us. In other words, *conatus* seeks good affections. An individual becomes free in the extent that s/he is freed from bad emotions. As long as an individual comprehends the causes of bad emotions in him, s/he tries to destroy the cause of these emotions. If the source of bad emotions which diminishes the body's power of acting is not the individual itself—otherwise these feelings are overdetermined and this situation drives to a nihilism-, *conatus* makes the individual strive for getting rid of these bad emotions. *Conatus* -that is the natural right of every individual- relates the individual to the external world to defend herself/himself against annihilating causes in two ways (Del Lucchese, 2009, p. 56):

- (i) *Alliance* is a relation of *conatus* to other becomings in order to organize the bodies and affections in a way to increase the power of acting. Alliance establishes sociability through getting harmonized bodies together by combining their rights, therefore increasing their power together. The affirmative movement of *conatus* to get together with the good increases immanent power through allying with others. Here, difference is not seen as contradiction and the principal method is not negation of the other.
- (ii) *Resistance* is a relation of *conatus* to other becomings in order to avoid or overcome⁵¹ the bad affections of an external cause which diminishes the body's power of acting. Resistance is exercised against the bad and its movement is negation. This aspect of resistance arises only when *conatus* does not have adequate causes and there is a source of bad affections on body. Everything that diminishes the power of a body, every application that separates the individual apart from her/his rights

⁵⁰ "In every human mind, some of its ideas are adequate, others are fragmentary and confused" (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 279).

⁵¹ "The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them" (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 355).

is bad and *conatus* has a natural right to resist it. Reaction is increased to the extent where the constraints upon individual freedom become more violent and destructive (Balibar, 2008, p. 28).

However, resistance and negation are not the constituent power of a wise wo/man. It stays as a secondary power. On the other hand, the ignorant, because of not having the adequate causes, (i) uses negation and resistance blindly and as a result s/he cannot increase her/his power of acting and cannot direct her/his action to a true target, or (ii) uses affirmation to wrong causes and cannot increase the power of acting, but this makes her/him a slave with full obedience, makes her/him have a passive body. *Conatus* is the active and resistant immanent power that is opposite to the external conditions of imposed limits and this can be called *potentia*. This external power is different from the ontology of *conatus* and we can name it *potestas*. *Potentia* and *potestas* have contrary natures. The fact that Power is an action on the actions of others originates from here.

5.5 Ethics of Resistance in Brief

The oppositions and contradictions of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeoisie against aristocracy, or the slave against the master, or society against the State are not contrasts due to being essences or the necessities of these speculative essences. However, they are opposed to each other and conceptualized as such because of the opposite positions of the forces they are representing. For that reason, it is possible that proletariat can involve bourgeoisie in itself, or whole society can involve the State in itself. The speculative reduction of difference to contradiction in this manner means either that the determination of the two modes of the same attribute are going to reconcile and unite, or that one of them is going to dissolve in the other. This is the function of negation. *Subject* is employed by the thought of law which does not involve the knowledge of causes. A dialectical relationship is not possible on the horizon of freedom and it is a must to discharge dialectics and everything that is produced by it (Negri, 1991, p. 167) as in Nietzsche's transvaluation of all values. Another point is affirmation is affirming the different one under the guidance of reason by preserving its difference and by being free from bad emotions so as to increase the power of acting. This function is employed by the knowledge of necessary relations – adequate causes. We have more power when we understand the thing itself more than

the time we understand its rule. That is because the rule of a thing states a fixity in its relation with the external conditions. However, external conditions are effective in the overdetermination of the thing. Therefore, the thing itself invokes the external conditions. A rule cannot invoke the adequate causes and a rule is a phenomenon. The explanation of any phenomenon lies in the power relations that establish it in the last instance. Negation arises from ignorance, lack of knowledge, being unable to recognize the necessity. So, a rational individual is the one who includes negation as little as possible in her/his connections.

Individuals fall apart and they oppose to each other insofar as they are assailed by anger, envy, or any emotion deriving from hatred (Spinoza, 2002e, II.§14). This contrariness or opposition is one of the constituent elements of resistance and therefore it can be said that these are the emotions of negation. Any individual tries to ward off an effect that is harmful or that is not in accordance with its connections with her/him. This inclination is *hatred* (Spinoza, 2002a, p. 70). Hatred leads to *sorrow*, sorrow diminishes the power of acting and we label the object of sorrow as bad for it diminishes our power of acting (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 335). Here a determination of bad is employed as in slave morality. Bad emotions and hatred are the emotions of negation. We miss the utility of a thing when we ward it off from us through hatred. Yet, when we use our reason properly, we do not feel emotions like hatred or aversion⁵². Hatred ensues from opinions, not from true reasoning. It is impossible for an individual who acts according to true reason to feel hatred or aversion against anyone, because the reasonable one converts relations into a better position that is good for her/him. As it is seen, hatred arises from the opinions that are caused by the other's actions that are done without considering their nature, and aversion arises from the opinions that the nature of the other is not in accordance with. Both are the results of ignorance, lack of knowledge of the adequate causes. An individual that lives by the guidance of reason strives for answering hatred with love and nobility (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 345) which increase the power of acting and thus arises *joy*. This way life is affirmed and nihilism is excluded through emotions. Negation and the negative is eliminated via the critique of all passions that derive from sorrow, in practice (Deleuze, 1998, p.

⁵² While *hatred* arises from opinion –that corresponds to *doxa* in a sense- against a thing because of its actions and affections on us -from idea of an external cause-, *aversion* is the emotion against a thing that we consider it arises from the nature of the thing -from the idea of a thing that is indirectly the cause of the pain (Spinoza, 2002a, pp. 70-71; Spinoza, 2002c, p. 313).

97). So, affirmation depends on the knowledge of the adequate causes of the relations that are in accordance with the connections of the self; and negation springs from ignorance and being unable to convert effects to be compatible with one's own utility or in favor of the self. Every being strives for affirming its existence as long as it exists and *opposes to* other modes which are threatening it with dissolving its connections (Deleuze, 1998, pp. 95-96), and increases or diminishes its power of acting according to the affections of its connections. Every negation arises from ignorance. Dialectics, besides, is the movement of essentially determined oppositions in the forms of contradictions through negation. Forces may oppose to each other and if I have the knowledge of adequate causes, I affirm and add what was different from me to my power. Determination also fixes the directions of the relations of power and the necessary movement in contradiction becomes negation, therefore dialectics is employed. "In short, every privation is a negation, and negation is nothing" (Deleuze, 1998, p. 96).

Last but not least, aggression is not an emotion, but an attitude of the noble to preserve itself and a way to affirm its being by warding off the threats on her/him. It is *conatus'* striving for removing the obstacles in front of the increment of the power of acting (*potentia*). Opposition stays speculative and secondary in case of aggression of the noble. Although opposition requires bad emotions, they are not constituent, but temporary. *Conatus* tends to actualize itself in adequacy and modality, and expresses itself as *potentia* by means of *conatus* theory (Negri, 1991, p. 146).

5.6 Politics of *Conatus*: Self-Organization and Self-Defense

While ethics is the science of the emotions and relations of emotions with the affections on body and mind, politics is the science for organizing the encounters and relations so as to increase the power of acting through emotions and affections: While ethics is the knowledge of relations, politics is the oriented construction of a system through this knowledge; the same goes for the relationship between physics and engineering. People have to act together in order to live in security and well (Spinoza, 2002d, p. 528). An individual needs other individuals for the preservation of his/her being in the scope of alliance aspect of *conatus*. That is because rights, therefore power, that come from the participation in nature are increased to the extent that the number of people sharing their powers increases (Spinoza, 2002e, II.§13). Right is the

power that is determined by the bodily *conatus*.⁵³ Humans have the characteristic of comprehending the adequate causes via reason. Human nature necessitates sociability to increase the utility. People live in peace as long as they live within the bounds of their reason –precisely in agreement with their nature (Spinoza, 2002d, pp. 530-531). This togetherness also brings freedom to society. Sociability provides a civil state but nobody can transfer her/his rights to another individual or an institution because this is not in accordance with the principles of reason. Transferring the natural rights, therefore power, is the loss of the constituent element of the political aspect of the individual. An individual is a political being to the degree that s/he renders her/his power common in society. Society is the structure that is formed by individuals who are in contact and that involves countless relations they set up with each other. Therefore, we can infer that a political being is established by freedom and participation of the individuals in the social structure. For that reason, slaves are the ones who are outside politics in history. If you have less power, you have fewer words to say in society and you are less free. The transfer of the right to govern decreases both the power in politics, and the power of the self. A good contract, thus, can only be made by the encounter of according individuals not in defiance of natural law in order to make the individuals preserve and increase their power and freedom. Variety and differences are preserved and new areas are opened for differentiations this way. Political being is independent from legitimacy because the authority element and law are removed from society. The political being is established by the particular, but not isolated powers of each individual. This organization provides the widest area for expression and politics; the characteristics and differences of individuals are not obstacles for the Power (*potestas*) (Balibar, 2008, pp. 30-31), but an active element of the power (*potentia*) of the community or political being because fictional representative institutions are removed from politics. This way, the government of the multitude -we can call it democracy- becomes the freedom of political being. This unity can be called self-organization. This unity does not renounce its autonomy and power.

Individuals cannot survive and live long without helping each other, because natural right can be hardly thought outside the situations where people have common rights,

⁵³ The question about the priority of power or *conatus* is absurd. *Conatus* is the will to power in its actual given form. Both power and *conatus* are given *now* by nature.

common land to live and flourish in accordance with the judgment of the entire community, they protect themselves; in other words, they cannot do these without self-organization (Spinoza, 2002e, II.§15). Self-organization requires self-defense in order to preserve the acts of *conatus*. Self-defense involves the strategies and relations in order to defend the essence. Opposition to the society or the sovereign is usually harmful and destructive for an individual even if the individual thinks and acts in accordance with her/his reason. For the sake of choosing the least harmful, it is suggested that the individual should obey the rules of the sovereign: the lesser of two evils (Spinoza, 2002e, III.§6). However, this despair can be overcome by self-organization and threats to that common *conatus* are fended off or annihilated by the mechanisms of self-defense pursuant to the natural right of each individual -that is *conatus*. Because each individual has an inclination to be in accordance with natural law, an army should consist of the citizens of the country (Spinoza, 2002e, VI.§10). The army's being a citizen force for self-defense shows that the requirement for the right to defense is being a citizen, therefore being involved in the political life. A citizen desires to defend the self-organization in the degree of her/his involvement in politics. In democracy, as long as the involvement is equal and comply with the degree of the individuals' natural rights⁵⁴, the army is people's army. This force for self-defense is also people's defense forces and the power of the multitude. The army of the citizens is an instrument for self-defense, not self-defense itself; it is an instrument for freedom and for the resistance against the Power. In this context, individuals may resist by violence alone in case of the invasions of rights and freedom by violence (Spinoza, 2002e, VII.§30). So, violence is validated to defend the self-being from an attack. However, violence cannot be a constituent instrument because a government that depends on violence cannot be long continued (Spinoza, 2002d, p. 438) and this contradicts with the aim of *polis* and its *conatus*.

The abolishment of the difference and opposition between the State and society requires standing against not only *potestas* employed by the State, but also *potestas* exercised by society. For that reason, Power is involved in every relation among society and for that reason every resistance is not emancipatory. It is a general idea

⁵⁴ This involvement does not depend on a representation. Representation is a kind of transfer of rights - right to govern, right to speech, right to act, right to be political being, etc.- coming from the natural right. Even Spinoza sees the soldier as a citizen in the *forum* where is a place for discussing the subjects about the city in Rome. Similarly, the soldier should be a citizen in the *agora* of *polis*.

that civil resistance against the State is an emancipatory one depending on the contradictory determinations of the essences of the State and society, but society also may be able to produce *potestas* in itself. *Potentia* should also resist to this immanent *potestatic* tendency. Raising power against Power, or *potentia* against *potestas* is an attempt to substitute freedom for Power and as a result, Power yields to freedom (Negri, 1991, pp. 20, 191). Taking sovereignty as identical with freedom is an error that is taken for granted by both political and philosophical thought and it is contradictory to the condition of plurality (Arendt, 1998, p. 234) because freedom is the power to act when sovereignty is the limitation of powers to act or it is the power exercising over actions and the restriction on them. *Potestas* is given as a virtual *potentia* (Negri, 1991, p. 191), but “[n]othing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow” (Spinoza, 2002c, p. 238). *Potestas* stays speculative because no effect comes from its nature and it does not have an actuality in nature. *Potestas* can only be rendered operational by subjecting it to *potentia*. In this sense, utility can be provided in society only by subjecting *potestas* to the social power (*potentia*) of the plurality (multitude or *multitudo*) (Negri, 1991, p. 202). This determination of *potestas* as an instrument abolishes the transcendence of the State and gives the power of constitution to the political organization of multitude –that is self-organization. This power of constitution is identical with the *potentia* of the multitude and the *conatus* of the multitude is the effort for preserving and increasing this *potential*, self-defense, through organizing the encounters. Self-organization feeds self-defense and self-defense feeds self-organization.

5.7 Conclusion

After determining the plane of thought as power relations and natural law, the task becomes the justification of resistance depending on these material conditions. Rights are the abilities of any individual that they can do. The exclusion of these straggling rights does not fit to the actuality of the given conditions, but they should be organized in order to avoid bad effects. So, first, rights are resituated according to the natural reality. Then, the individual conditions of any person in the process of an action are given as the emotional and the mental states. The same conditions are effectual even in society and politics. The conditions of freedom and slavery within the action of this social individual are indicated and the aim is determined by the immanent effort to

stay in being, which is *conatus*. So, the movement force of a body becomes the natural *conatus*. Then, the affections of *conatus* are offered in relation to external causes. Finally, the political reflections of *conatus* are given in this chapter. The basic natural effort is given for the grounding of any kind of resistance. Like an individual that has a natural aim to preserve its being as long as possible whether it refers to conscious processes or unconscious processes, a political organization has the same effort. These conditions are determined in accordance with the natural right of any being.





6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Every stable process may encounter “exceptions” according to stability’s interpretation and this makes stability turn into instability. The effects of these encounters either come from outside, or from inside. These events are named as resistances and they are tried to be removed by means of negation: resolution of inner contradictions and outer contradictions. These instabilities are named as contradictions and they are tried to be resolved because differences are threats for stability and should be excluded from the process. Therefore, resistances were seen as pathological occurrences for -pseudo- stable systems. As it is seen in Chapter 1, resistances are generally seen as the breaking points in the course of history. Many cases of resistance make us think of and philosophize on them because of their spatiotemporal presence. Regarding history and politics as power relations urges us to think that wars, national resistance movements, or mass disobediences are not the only forms of resistances. These events and entitling them as resistances cause misunderstandings.

There is not a threshold level to turn particular events into resistances. Whatever the dimension is, micro or macro, power relations hold a potential for resistances. In this sense, both power relations and resistances spread into all the relations in history and society. The power relations are not regarded as the relationships between states or classes anymore. This view subjects power to the *subjects* and makes them the subjects of history. These views are mentioned in the first chapter, too (1.1.2 Resistance as a concept) together with another aspect of resistance as an event (1.1.1 Resistance as an event). However, power relations are being exercised through institutions, language, individuals, societies, States, classes, sciences, etc. While juridical laws are elements of the regulation of the relations between the sovereign and its subjects, power is also conceptualized in this relation. In a similar vein, the civil right of resistance against the sovereign is also conceptualized in the framework of law. The overflow of Power and power relations from this juridical framework necessitates an exceeding movement by resistance also. This situation requires the re-handling of both rights and resistance in its opposition to Power in power relations.

In order to accomplish this task, an analysis of the concept of resistance is presented in Chapter 2. Many views are analyzed and the conceptions of resistance are inferred (2.1 Conceptions of Resistance). A conception is mostly influenced by the existing social and historical conditions that the philosopher who makes the conception lived in, because external impressions have effects on the ideas in mind. These conceptions are divided into two different camps as identity based approaches and power based approaches. There is not a mutual exclusion; the relationship between the two is not ignored, either. The point behind the disagreement between them is about giving priority to either identity or power and having either one of them as the constitutive element. Subjective approach prerequisites the presence of a conscious, rational subject that is an individual or a State or a class. So, the conditions of resistance are actualized only within the presence of the conscious subject and under its conditions. On the other hand, contrary to identity based approach, power based approach says that the reality is established in power relations. That means, independent from a conscious subject, the reality exists and processes. The idea of the reality independent from the fiction of a constitutive subject is an intervention to phenomenological views at the same time. Power based approach does not exclude subjective features of resistance, but does not see them as necessary and constitutive. Power relations are present despite the absence of a subject.

The presence of an outside reality causes the division of subjective and objective features of resistance that actually come from the prominent features of identity based approach and power based approach (2.2 The Analysis of Resistance). The features that presuppose a subject are the subjective features of resistance and they are recognition and intention. These features are speculative due to the fact that they find the origin of reality in the processes of consciousness. The constitutive property of the unconscious is ignored. Consciousness can only be a threshold level, not a capability on its own. Thus, consciousness becomes optional, because it is an illusion and dependent on the subject. The objective features of resistance express themselves in power relations. They are the prominent features of power based approach to resistance. Their arising from power relations makes them physical actualities and the concepts of *power relations* and *resistance* evoke four close concepts: relation, power, action and opposition. These are the *prima facie* conditions of resistance. However, it can be rightfully said that only the concept of *power* involves all the others in itself.

(i) Power gives a motion, therefore an action to a body. (ii) Power naturally and essentially exists in relation with other powers; power itself is a relational becoming. (iii) In order for a resistance to take place, there should be an oppositional situation of movements and actions. (iv) Resistance always positions against Power. Here we divide the general concept of power necessarily because one aspect refers to the intrinsic power of *power to (potentia)* and the other is the power of *power over (potestas)* which the opposition and resistance are caused by: Resistance is against this kind of power. In short, resistance originates from the tension between these two types of power. This element is necessary for every resistance whether there is a conscious subject or not.

Resistances are not pathological becomings in stable processes because no process is actually stable, but they are always in the state of becoming. So, resistances do not only come from outside, but there are resistances inside, as well. Beyond consciousness, there are resistances among the elements of unconsciousness (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 35). These resistances and battles are inevitable as actualities of power relations. Consciousness sees these resistances and battles as contradictions. “[O]rgans work with [...] each other” are regarded as insiders or from us, while “organs work [...] against each other” are regarded as outsiders (Nietzsche, 1994, p. 35). The latter is the negation of difference and the announcement of difference as an outsider by consciousness. These relations of forces work within becomings from micro to macro, and this is what establishes the reality. The relations of these forces and the types of resistance are studied in the third chapter (3. On the Forms and Types of Resistance). The genetic quality of these forces determines the types of resistances. First of all, the difference between forms and types are stated and it is said that forms are the quantity or context-dependent classifications of resistances (3.2 Forms of Resistance).

Another point we should note is that types are the original qualities of resistances and they differ according to the character of their constitutive forces whether these forces are active or reactive (3.3 Types of Resistance). Resistance is an expression of power; its origin and original quality come from the will to power behind it. A will to power can employ either negation or affirmation as its method. While reactive forces arise from negative will to power, active forces arise from affirmative will to power. The type of primary forces determines the type of power because power is the integration

of its forces. That is to say, there are two types of resistance: negative and affirmative. Because resistance's a *standing against something*, the main quality of the resistant action is reaction. However, while negative resistance is a complete opposition and negation movement –therefore its constitutive method is negation, plus dialectics results in a kind of negative resistance owing to employing negation as the principal method-, affirmative one employs negation only as a secondary method, like a side effect –because its principal method is affirmation. The dominant forces in its power are the active ones. These negative and affirmative resistances result in nihilism and life respectively. Nihilism is nothingness and weakness. It produces insignificance, *ressentiment* and revenge. On the other hand, life is the affirmation of life and transvaluation of all conventional and established values for the sake of nobility and strength. The will to power behind a resistance gives it a meaning and a value in this sense.

Resistance should be justified –requires justification- if it is going to be classified under the category of rights. Resistance, as an action, can be justified drawing upon different theories of justification. In the fourth chapter, these theories are mentioned briefly (4. Justification Theories). The method of justification also provides a ground to an action for its future execution. Justification differs from legitimatization here (4.1 Justification vs. Legitimatization). While legitimacy refers to law, thus obligation, justification refers to rights, thus liberty. Besides, justification can only be provided by contemplation and philosophical investigation, not by consents of people or a ruler's arbitrary statements and orders.

Ethics is the plane of thought which is about the values of actions. So, *right* is the rightness of an action –either it is consequentialist, context-based, character-based, deontological, or teleological. Thus, rights are directly linked to ethics. Ethical theories give actions a ground to be right and there are three main grounds for the theories of justification: cosmological, religious/teleological, and anthropological (4.2 Theories of Justification). The first two involve theories like virtue ethics, divine command theory and natural law theory. The criticisms for these two sorts of approaches are given in related sections. Anthropological justifications, on the other hand, regard humans as the base and they are either natural or transcendental. Transcendental anthropological justification corresponds to Kantian deontology and the natural one corresponds to natural theories –which take human being in its nature as the ground to

build on- are the theories like utilitarianism and natural right theory. All other rights are actually limited by a law other than the natural one except for natural right theory, which asserts an individual's right spreads to the extent where her/his power actually reaches. Universal order, god's commandments, reason as the godlike/spiritual part of humans, pure rational categories, even the natural rights views -which advocates these rights such as life, liberty and estate have to be respected - are fictions, because they are not touching on the actuality of power relations. The justification of resistance, thus, should be attributed to the material world that the power relations lie in. Independent from law and limitations, everything is the individual's right within the boundaries of her/his own power of acting (*potentia*). This is the true way to handle natural rights and resistance. This is the human nature and her/his power immanent to her/his nature. The ethical problem renders organization of this power in accordance with the nature of human being.

The conditions of power and resistance have been presented so far. In the last chapter (5. Justification of Resistance) the question "How resistance can be exercised in accordance with the human nature?" is discussed. When it is concluded that resistance is a natural becoming of life and politics, the aim should not be to exclude it from the plane of thought because it is pointless. The effort should be about organizing and regulating the resistance in a positive way. For that reason, powers also must be taken in their actuality and reality. A human being is a composition of powers; s/he is not a utopic character or it does not have a transcending essence. A political thinker can only have what is given. Even, that is what the reality of nature imposes.

Justification refers to rights and rights matches with their corresponding laws. There are two sorts of law: natural law and human law. While natural one is the inevitable law that is valid for any individual, human law appeals to humankind in society. Human law can be conventions, precepts, codes, religious commandments, or customs. This sort of law binds action with morals, and classifies an action as right or wrong. On the other hand, natural law is free from social restrictions which are actually fictions. The right of an individual spreads to the extent where her/his power reaches and the essence of an individual is her/his power. Nature does not put any obstacles to an individual's right except physical impossibilities. Human law's prohibitions are only claims on the other side. Thus, a resistance act can depend only on nature when it exceeds the limitations of the socially constructed laws, such as the juridical one (5.1

Resituating Rights). Actually, the right of resistance depends on the nature even within the boundaries of juridical law.

Each being tries to stay in being naturally and for that reason it pursues its utility in its actions. An individual, therefore, chooses the good –good is what increases *potentia* and bad is what diminishes it- encounters to the extent of her/his knowledge on the connections of her/his own body. Otherwise, ignorant knowledge affects her/him badly because actions arising from ignorance are not in accordance with the natural striving for persisting in being: *conatus*. The freer an individual is, the more knowledge s/he has of what is determined by natural law. Knowledge on necessary connections increases the competence of an individual to choose good encounters for himself and therefore this increases her/his power of acting. The opposite of this situation is slavery; ignorance causes slavery and random bad affections on body-and-mind that diminish the power of acting. Decrement in power of acting, which is the immanent power to act, is bad and it is far from serving the utility of the individual. This is also incompatible with the nature of wo/man.

An individual is related with the other bodies in two ways in order to serve her/his *conatus* because of the activity of *conatus*: either alliance or resistance. *Conatus* aims to be in connection with the bodies which can increase its power of acting. This association is alliance and wise people always choose alliance because they are able to find and organize good encounters. The principal method of alliance is affirmation. On the other hand, resistance is warding off the bad affections when a relation of alliance cannot be established. Although resistance is employed in order to increase the power of acting, it may either increase or diminish it. Alliance behaves that way, too. That is to say that *conatus* is either in a relation of alliance or in a relation of resistance with other bodies. Both of them are the modes of relationship which are aimed to increase the power of acting, but this depends on the quality of the will to power behind these actions. An ignorant alliance may be harmful like an ignorant resistance –that is negative resistance- because they both may diminish the power of acting. Although reaction and negative forces underpin the nature of resistance, an affirmative resistance –affirmative is the quality of the will to power- increases the power of acting if resistance or bad affections are inevitable.

The fruit that Adam –the prophet- ate has the same effect on his body as a poison dissolving the connections of a body (Spinoza, 2002f, p. 820). This is actually a natural

law: the effect of a poison on the body. Adam ate the fruit because he was ignorant of this fact. As an alternative scenario, Adam does not want to be poisoned by any fruit which is the natural attitude of any wo/man. According to the same scenario, Adam has the knowledge that God ordered not to eat the fruit because it is going to dissolve his bodily connections. So, he avoids an encounter with the poison as long as possible because he does not want his power of acting to be diminished. However, in case of an encounter, he should be capable of turning it into an element of his own power in order not to be filled with hatred even if he suffered from it for a while. This is the virtue of the noble. Wise person converts resistance into an occasion for affirming herself/himself more enthusiastically. A person who is able to choose the correct solutions in bad situations is absolutely the opposite of decadent, the opposite of the slave because a slave always chooses the harmful instruments for himself (Nietzsche, 2007b, p. 76). This arises from the ignorance of the slave. Individuals not having the adequate knowledge of the connections act ignorantly and these individuals are unable to organize their encounters and leave them up to chance, leave them to passivity of their bodies. The constitutive movement of the ignorant cannot be affirmation. His affirmation produces a complete passion and passivity through the affirmation of any exterior cause ignorantly whether it is in accordance with her/his bodily connections or not. This *yes* to everything –a random and ignorant *yes-* is the *yes* of an ass (Nietzsche, 2006, pp. 253-255). It is loaded with lots of burden, but still agrees. This attitude produces sorrow and tacit consent.

Reasonable and noble one who employs affirmation as the primary method chooses the encounters in accordance with her/his bodily connections. S/he reacts only when the encounter with an exterior effect is unavoidable, but s/he turns reactivity and exterior cause into an element of her/his active forces: The essence of the affirmative resistance is this. Thus, an individual becomes noble, powerful and free as long as what does not kill, does not abolish her/his bodily connections infinitely increases hers/his power of acting (Nietzsche, 2007b, p. 77). Encountering this is a result of a particular ignorance.

This right way of affirmation is affirming only the relations that support me and contribute to my power. This is not a tolerance because I resist against inappropriate relations. Negation is secondary and derivative here due to having the adequate knowledge of the harm. Each body –individual or collective like *polis* or community-

allies with the relation that increases their power, therefore freedom in the case of a political organization because coming together and joining powers give more power and more rights (Spinoza, 2002e, II.§13). Each spatial being involves the potentiality of alliance to the extent of their knowledge on adequate causes. After the relation of *conatus* with the world is scrutinized well enough, the only thing left to be inquired is its politics (5.6 Politics of Conatus). Self-organization in politics is the correspondence of individual alliance. Similarly, resistance -the other aspect of *conatus*- is self-defense. These two aspects ensure self-governance and autonomy for a political being. The political being becomes the judge of its own case by natural right this way (Spinoza, 2002e, II.§13). Alliance is employed to the one increasing our power of acting and resistance is employed to the other that does the opposite. Any form of domination and *potestas* diminish subjects' power of acting and it seems it is not sensible to ally with the powerless. Everyone aims to choose the powerful as their ally naturally because they do not want to be powerless instead of being powerful. Representation –that is also the transfer of rights, therefore transfer of power- is something that diminishes power and separates an individual from what s/he can do. Resistance should be employed against domination and representation in order to prevent the decrement of power. Political being is something about power even if it is individual. Without participation, there is no political being. Neither is it right to renounce power (*potentia*), therefore rights, in return for conformity; nor expect utility from weakness. *Potentia* is positioned against *potestas* here. Resistances are formed against the forms of Power such as forms of domination, forms of exploitation, or forms of subjection (Foucault, 1982, p. 781). All these forms of Power that the resistance is against refer to *potestas* which separates the individual from what s/he can do and diminishes her/his power of acting or her/his *potentia*. Thus, alliance with the good and resistance against the bad is justified naturally.

In the stage of political life, every alliance should increase the power of acting because this is the purpose of coming together and organizing. When civil laws are required, they should be in accordance with the natural law because their corresponding rights should harmonize with each other: Natural rights are always preserved. The plane of civil rights can only be established in a way outside representation. A political being (i) does not want to diminish the power of its members, thus it does not impose any form of representation, and (ii) wants their members to be powerful, thus includes them

among political processes directly by affirming their differences which leads to democracy. These autonomous individuals in collective groups participate both in production and management processes. As a result, they are free and powerful in direct proportion to their participations in political community. This mode of organization determines their civil rights in accordance with their natural rights. Any attack on this political being is warded off by self-defense forces. Thus, resistance is exercised depending on the individuals' natural right of self-defense which arises from *conatus*. The same *conatus* is active also in civil state both to preserve -resistance- and increase -alliance- its power because natural rights are not transferred to anyone even in civil state. If a covenant starts to be a threat to my utilities, or the utilities of the political community which I gain my power in, both me –as an individual- and the political being have the right to disobey and resist the covenant. The individual also naturally has the right to organize for a resistance if it is necessary.

In short, when power exceeds the juridical forms, resistance also exceeds this frame, it may even be against the juridical forms. In such a case, the justification of resistance arises from the natural right to strive for staying in being and increasing the power of acting, which is *conatus*. Of course a resistance or alliance is not in accordance with the natural law when its primary method is negation and therefore it produces nihilism, sorrow and slave-like values. A resistance is not justified in this case because it arises from ignorance and produces bad emotions. As for the forms of affirmative resistance, its formation is within the scope of the participators' creativeness, which can be a further study on resistance.



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