ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

HEGEL'S REPUBLICAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: A COMPARISION BETWEEN HEGEL'S IDEA OF FREEDOM AND PETTIT'S FREEDOM AS NON-DOMINATION

M.A. THESIS

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Political Studies M.A. Programme

MAY 2018

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İSTANBUL TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ ★ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

HEGEL'İN CUMHURİYETÇİ ÖZGÜRLÜK ANLAYIŞI: HEGEL'İN ÖZGÜRLÜK İDESİ İLE PETTİT'NİN TAHAKKÜMSÜZLÜK OLARAK ÖZGÜRLÜK YAKLAŞIMLARININ KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI

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To my parents,

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ABBREVIATIONS

PR Hegel, G. W. F. (1991). *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, (A. W. Wood, Ed., & H. B. Nisbet, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambdrige University Press. Cited by paragraph number (§) or by page number where necessary.

PhG Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). *Phenomenology of Spirit*, (A. V. Miller, Trans.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cited by page number.

HEGEL'S REPUBLICAN IDEA OF FREEDOM: A COMPARISON BETWEEN HEGEL'S IDEA OF FREEDOM AND PETTIT'S FREEDOM AS NON-DOMINATION

SUMMARY

In the history of modern political philosophy, Hegel's political thought has been interpreted in many different and incompatible ways. While some have ascribed him the label of totalitarian, others have considered him as a liberal. In this thesis, my aim is to show that Hegel's political philosophy and chiefly, his concept of freedom, has its roots in republican political thought. I compare Hegel's concept of freedom with modern republicanism, especially Philip Pettit's conception of freedom as non-domination. Despite the fact that Pettit and Hegel have different starting points and their theories of freedom are based on different metaphysics, I argue that their understandings of freedom and their emphasis on recognition, do not differ. More precisely, I will argue that the structure of the modern republican idea of freedom as non-domination can be understood as Hegel's 'being-with-oneself-in-an-other'. However, at the same time, we will see that in the application of his modern republican idea of freedom to the institutions of *Sittlichkeit*, Hegel reverts to the classical republicanism and therefore contradicts himself. In order to show all this, I start by taking freedom to be at the center of Hegel's social and political thought. In the second chapter, I position my interpretation among the three main broad readings of Hegel. After briefly discussing totalitarian, metaphysical and non-metaphysical, that is Kantian or 'self-actualization' readings of Hegel, I argue for the latter and offer particular support for Alan Patten's 'civic humanist' interpretation. The third chapter will be entirely concerned with the third possibility of defining freedom that is freedom as non-domination. After elaborating the main points of Pettit's modern republicanism, I compare it with Hegel's understanding of freedom in the fourth chapter. We will see that for Hegel, as well as for Pettit, relations to others, what we can call recognitive relations, are constitutive of freedom. In the last chapter, I will show how Hegel's republican idea of freedom is realized in the ethical institutions of the modern state. While Hegel designs ethical institutions that are determined to be necessary by the structure of freedom itself, we will see that, in contrast to his modern republican idea of freedom, these institutions – family, civil society and the state – expose many to dependency and domination.

HEGEL'İN CUMHURİYETÇİ ÖZGÜRLÜK ANLAYIŞI: HEGEL'İN ÖZGÜRLÜK İDESİ İLE PETTİT'NİN TAHAKKÜMSÜZLÜK OLARAK ÖZGÜRLÜK YAKLAŞIMLARININ KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI

ÖZET

Modern siyaset felsefesi tarihi boyunca, Hegel'in siyasi düşüncesi pek çok farklı şekilde yorumlanmıştır. Bu yorumlar birbiri ile çelişen kanaatlere de ulaşabilmektedir. Kimileri Hegel'i totaliterlik yanlısı olarak tanımlarken kimileri de Onu liberal olarak görmüştür. Bu tezdeki amaç ise Hegel'in siyaset felsefesinin ve özellikle de kullandığı özgürlük kavramının köklerinin cumhuriyetçi siyasal düşünceye uzandığını göstermektir. Tezde Hegel'in özgürlük kavramı modern cumhuriyetçi yaklaşım ve bilhassa Philip Pettit'in tahakkümsüzlük olarak özgürlük kavramları ile karşılaştırılacaktır. Elbette Hegel'in ve Philip Pettit'in teorik olarak çıkış noktaları ve özgürlük mefhumunu ele alırken dayandıkları metafizik zeminler birbirinden çok farklıdır. Ancak yine de bu tezin iddiası odur ki iki yaklaşımın da özgürlük anlayışları benzerdir. Ayrıca her iki düşürün de tanıma kavramanın altını çiziyor olması, yaklaşımlarını ortaklaştırmaktadır. Daha net bir şekilde ortaya koyacak olursak, bu tezde geliştirilen iddiayı şu şekilde özetleyebiliriz: Pettit'in *tahakkümsüzlük olarak özgürlük* şeklinde formüle ettiği modern cumhuriyetçi düşünce, Hegel'de karşımıza çıkan 'ötekinde-kendi-ile-olma' ('being-with-oneself-in-an-other') halinin güncel bir yorumu olarak tanımlanabilir. Fakat diğer taraftan, modern cumhuriyetçi özgürlük düşüncesini Hegelci *etik düzen'*in *(Sittlichkeit)* kurumları ile karşılaştırdığımızda, Hegel'in klasik cumhuriyetçilik sınırlarına geri çekildiğini ve kendisi ile çeliştiğini görürüz.

Yukarıda kısaca özetlenen düşüncenin aktarilabilmesi için öncelikle özgürlük kavramı Hegel'in siyasal ve sosyal düşüncesinin merkezine yerleştirilecek. İkinci kısımda tezin konumlandığı teorik pozisyon, Hegel'in üç temel okuması ele alınarak gösterilecektir. Totaliter okuma, metafizik okuma ve metafizik olmayan yani Kantçı ya da 'kendini gerçekleştirme minvalinde' okuma olarak tarif edebileceğimiz bu üç temel okuma kısaca tartışıldıktan sonra 'kendini gerçekleştirme minvalinde' okumanın makul olduğu savunulacak ve Alan Patten'in 'vatandaşlık temelli humanist' yorumundan yana tutum alınacaktır. Üçüncü kısım, özgürlüğün üçüncü bir tanımı olan 'tahakkümsüzlük olarak özgürlük' yaklaşımına ayrılmıştır. Bu kısımda Pettit'in modern cumhuriyetçi yaklaşımının ana hatları incelenmiştir. Bu incelemeyi takip eden dördüncü kısımda ise Pettit'in teorik yaklaşımı ile Hegel'in özgürlük anlayışları karşılaştırılmıştır. Bu kısımda tanıma ilişkileri olarak adlandırabileceğimiz, diğerleri ile kurulan ilişkilenmenin özgürlüğün kurucu bir ögesi olduğu fikrinin, hem Hegel hem de Pettit açısından geçerli ve önemli olduğu gösterilecektir. Son kısımda ise, Hegel'in cumhuriyetçi özgürlük düşüncesinin, modern devletin etik kurumlarında nasıl hayat bulduğu ele alınacaktır. Hegel kendi tasarladığı etik kurumları özgürlüğün yapısal ihtiyaçları olarak kurgulamıştır, fakat bu kısımda gösterilmeye çalışılacağı üzere, bu etik kurumlar - aile, sivil toplum ve de devlet - kendi cumhuriyetçi özgürlük fikri ile

çelişmekte, ve toplumun pek çok kesiminin tahakküm ve bağımlılık ilişkilerine maruz kalmasına kayıtsız kalmaktadır.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Research Question and The Argument of the Thesis

In the history of modern political philosophy, Hegel's political thought has been interpreted in many different and incompatible ways. While some ascribed him the label of totalitarian, others considered him as a liberal. While some condemned him for justifying the status-quo, others regarded him as the founder of communitarianism. At the same time, political scholars do not have an agreement about whether we should consider Hegel as a republican or not. Despite the fact that there are many themes in Hegel's social and political philosophy which may seem to be in contradiction with republican political thought, in this thesis my aim is to argue that Hegel's idea of freedom is a modern republican conception of liberty.

Firstly, I start by taking the concept of freedom to be the main organizing principle and the core of Hegel's the *Philosophy of Right*. There are some scholars who take other concepts such as spirit, self-consciousness or recognition to be at the foundation of Hegel's social and political thought. However, mainly scholars agree that "there is no more important concept in Hegel's political theory than freedom" (Beiser, 2005, p. 197). It is "the value [he] most greatly admires" (Patten, 1999, p. 4). As Hegel notes in the introductory pages of the *Philosophy of Right*, "the subject-matter of *the philosophical science of right* is the Idea of right … [and] the Idea of right is freedom" (PR, §1; emphasis in original). Moreover, he notes that freedom is the "worthiest and most sacred possession of man" (PR, §215A). Some scholars even argue that it is his understanding of freedom which "makes Hegel the most important political philosopher of the modern post-French Revolution era" (Houlgate, 2005, p. 181). Freedom is the pivotal concept of Hegel's social and political philosophy.

Nevertheless, even if we agree that freedom takes the most important place in Hegel's social and political thought and even if no one refuses that it is the 'worthiest' and 'sacred' value which man possess, we still need to know what it is, man still needs to "know it if it is to have binding force for him" (PR, §215A). To understand what it is

is not an easy task, as Hegel's idea of freedom is not a simple concept and understanding of it has caused many controversies and prejudices among Hegelian or non-Hegelian philosophers. This is because, "there is no concept of Hegel's political theory that is more opaque and contentious" than the concept of freedom (Beiser, 2005, p. 197). Though, this study also realizes how obscure and controversial this concept is, it still takes freedom to be the main organizing principle of Hegel's the *Philosophy of Right*. And in order to assess Hegel's political thought, we need to know what his idea of freedom is. Thus, here is the research question of the following thesis: *How can Hegel's concept of freedom be defined?*

In the following thesis I argue that Hegel's idea of freedom is a modern republican conception of liberty. More precisely, it will be shown that the structure of the modern republican idea of freedom as non-domination can be understood as Hegel's 'being-with-oneself-in-an-other'. For Hegel, as well as for the modern republicans, relations to others, what we can call recognitive relations, are constitutive of freedom. However, while Hegel designs ethical institutions that are determined to be necessary by the structure of freedom itself, we will see that, in contrast to his modern republican idea of freedom, these institutions – family, civil society and the state – expose many to dependency and domination and therefore, are in contradiction with the modern republican conception of liberty.

While talking about the modern republicanism, I have in mind 'civic republicanism', namely, Philip Pettit and his works on republican conception of freedom as non-domination. Especially, "his book, Republicanism (Pettit, 1997) is a landmark work" (Larmore, 2001, p. 229). Pettit, inspired by Q. Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock's works, can be said to be the only contemporary political philosopher who has developed the third possibility of defining freedom and "has given to the republican model of political life a systematic development it has never received before" (Ibid., p. 229). We can say that Pettit is the only scholar, who "has done more than anyone else to develop this republican conception of freedom philosophically" (Lovett, 2017). He has introduced not only the extant and complete definition of the republican idea of freedom, he also elaborated in detail, modern political institutions and arrangements needed for the actualization of such kind of freedom.

In what follows we will see that, "Pettit and Hegel each defend a broad, comprehensive view of freedom" (Larmore, 2001, p. 230). They both, by rethinking the classical forms

of republicanism and overcoming the deficiencies characteristic to them, provide us with "more compelling [modern republican] conception of freedom" (Thompson, 2017, p. 406). And despite the fact that their theories of freedom are based on totally different metaphysics, their understanding of recognative relations which constitute their freedoms do not diverge. However, while Hegel universalizes his idea of freedom as every human being's right, "as the right to freedom of any human being as such", we will see that it is not really accessible for everyone: for women in the family, for poor in the civil society and for many, who are deprived of the right to political participation in the state (Westphal, 2017, p. 597).

The characterization of Hegel's idea of freedom as the modern republican conception of liberty, serves to interpret differently and uncommonly not only Hegel's social and political thought, but also Pettit and generally, neo-republicans as well. This interpretation contributes to the still alive debate about the character of Hegel's social and political thought and once more questions the premature interpretations of him as a totalitarian. Moreover, by arguing that Hegel's idea of freedom is a modern republican conception of liberty, the following work will place Hegel's the *Philosophy of Right* in the modern political and philosophycal debates. And though, Hegel's institutions of *Sittlichkeit* exposes many to dependency and domination, modern republican interpretation shows us that there is still much in his social and political philosophy which needs to be studied and understood.

On the other hand, the following thesis tells us more about the neo-republican conception of freedom as well. Identifying Hegel as a philosophical predecessor allows Philip Pettit to provide more powerful historical and theoretical support to his conception of freedom and to many aspects of his political theory. Due to these purposes and contributions, I believe that this interpretation of Hegel's and Pettit's social and political philosophy is attractive and unconventional, which will establish an independent, alternative way of understanding their social and political thoughts.

1.2 The Methodology

To say a few words about the methodology of this thesis, general focus is made on Hegel's the *Philosophy of Right*, which is his only work exclusively on social and political philosophy. However, due to the purposes of the work and the overall argument, some parts of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* are discussed in the following

thesis as well; namely, the section about the 'master-slave dialectic' is elaborated in the fourth chapter. Focusing mainly on one work of Hegel and not referring to any other work but the *Philosophy of Right,* makes Hegel's social and political thought more understandable, accessible to and less complicated for the modern readers.

On the other hand, while discussing the modern republican idea of freedom I concentrate on Philip Pettit's works. In order to provide an exhaustive interpretation of the modern republican conception of freedom as non-domination and to show its main characteristics, almost all Pettit's earlier or recent articles and books, are discussed and interpreted here. However, mainly his two most famous and important books are thoroughly examined. These are *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* and *On The People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy.*

1.3 The Framework of the Thesis

Overall, the thesis consists of four main chapters and Conclusion part. In the following chapter named as "Hegel's Political Philosophy", I start by reviewing different interpretations of Hegel's social and political thought and especially, his concept of freedom. Three broad currents of Hegelian scholarship are identified in this chapter. These interpretations - totalitarian, metaphysical and non-metaphysical or Kantian reading of Hegel, called 'self-actualization' reading as well - are briefly discussed here. According to the first totalitarian reading, Hegel's social and political philosophy is totalitarian and Hegel himself is labeled as a state-philosopher who justifies and supports status-quo of his time of Prussia. Charles Taylor's works on Hegel, best illustrate the second, metaphysical reading. We will see that, according to this reading, it is argued that to interpret Hegel's social and political philosophy without referring to God or any kind of Cosmic Spirit is against Hegel's own intentions.

According to the third, 'self-actualization' reading, which is most received version of interpreting Hegel's social and political philosophy in the recent scholarship, we can understand Hegel's political thought without the reference to any kind of divine being. We can reconstruct his thought within the frames of the *Philosophy of Right*. The version of this 'self-actualization' interpretation, developed by Alan Patten in his book *Hegel's Idea of Freedom*, which is labeled as 'civic humanists' reading, is supported in this thesis. By labelling his reading as 'civic humanist', Patten makes a clear

reference to the 'civic humanist' tradition or as he calls it also, to the republican political thought. Though, there are several other scholars, who have made reference to the republican elements in Hegel's political thought as well, no one has introduced such systematic work on Hegel as Patten has done and by doing this he has established an alternative way of interpreting Hegel's political philosophy. However, Patten does not make any strong claim about, whether Hegel is influenced by or belongs to this tradition (Patten, 1999, p. 39). He actually avoids claiming that Hegel's idea of freedom itself is republican. Thus, as the following work is indebted to Patten for introducing this new alternative way of interpreting Hegel's social and political philosophy, it tries to take Patten's started job to a sufficient degree and argues that Hegel's idea of freedom is itself republican, more precisely a modern republican conception of liberty.

Before revealing how possibly, Hegel's idea of freedom can be a modern republican conception of liberty, it is necessary to show what this modern republicanism means and how we can define it. In the third chapter, called as "Republican Idea of Freedom", modern republicanism and its concept of freedom as non-domination is elaborated. As mentioned above, while defining freedom in the modern republican way I base on Philip Pettit's works and his definition. Pettit, by introducing the third alternative to Isaiah Berlin's two famous definitions of liberty, asked one of the most important questions: what we can do in a situation when for example, "freedom consists … in an absence of mastery by others" (Pettit, 1997, p. 21)? The answer to this question, according to Pettit is the republican conception of freedom as non-domination.

While identifying the historical background of this conception of freedom, Pettit recourses to the 'Italian-Atlantic tradition' of republicanism. Under this republican conception of freedom, I am free, when I am not dominated by anyone, when no one is my master but myself and when no one has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in my certain choices. However, this is not the whole story. Pettit adds one more important element to this conception of freedom, and this is the element of recognition and intersubjectivity. As Pattit states, domination or non-domination is a matter of 'common knowledge'. There is always a common understanding in a group, in a small community or in a society that there is a domination or non-domination presented. This means that, you enjoy your non-domination with reference to others; if you are free and non-dominated, you should be intersubjectively recognized in your community as

such. You need to be able to look your fellow citizens into the eyes and walk tall. Freedom, in the modern republican way as non-domination "means the absence of domination in the presence of other people" (Pettit, 1997, p. 66). It is this intersubjective dimension of modern republican conception of liberty, which makes it similar to Hegel's idea of freedom.

In the fourth chapter, named as "Hegel's Freedoms", I will try to defend the main argument of this thesis. In this vein, firstly, I define Hegel's conception of freedom. As mentioned above, Hegel's idea of freedom is not an easy concept. In the *Philosophy of Right* at the same time such conceptions of freedom are discussed as 'personal freedom', 'moral freedom', 'substantive freedom' or 'concrete freedom', on the one hand and the ideas of subjective and objective freedoms, on the other. However, we will see that, though distinguishable from each other, these conceptions of freedom conceptually are dependent on one another. To state it very briefly, Hegel's idea of 'concrete freedom' is "the unity of objective freedom … and subjective freedom", that is the unity of the subjective identification on the part of the agent to the social and political institutions to which he belongs and of the objectively rational institutions of the state (PR, §258A).

Now, it may be questioned what is exactly republican about Hegel's idea of freedom. As we have mentioned above, there are many themes in Hegel's political philosophy, which are not consistent with republicanism. However, there is one important element in Hegel's conception of freedom, which needs to be emphasized. According to Hegel, the only way that the agent can affirm himself as free and independent agency (subjectively and objectively) is in a community of mutual recognition. The 'relations of recognition' plays an important role in his idea of freedom. The necessity of the recognative relations is evident on every stage, it is as much important in the Abstract Right, as it is indispensable in the sphere of Morality. For Hegel the successful 'relations of recognition' is evident even in the structure of freedom itself. However, the only sphere where the recognition can be mutual is the sphere of *Sittlichkeit*, sphere of 'substantive freedom', where everyone should be free. It is in this relationship of recognition where for Hegel non-domination is central. Because, we will see that, Hegel's arguments about the Ethical life, as being the sphere of the 'mutual recognition' between the free individuals is only realizable when the capacity to

dominate each other is structurally absent. As the mutual recognition, which is possible only between free individuals, presupposes non-doination.

However, in the fifth chapter, in the "Actualization of Hegel's Republican Idea of Freedom", we will see that ethical institutions do not guarantee the mutual recognition and intersubjective freedom for every citizen of the Hegelian state. While assessing how Hegel's republican idea of freedom is actualized in his institutional order we will see that many in these institutions are exposed to domination and dependency. These institutions of *Sittlichkeit,* the family, the civil society and the state are respectively discussed in this chapter.

Firstly, in the family, which is the immediate ethical institution based on the union of loving partners, women are exposed to domination. Despite some rights, which are granted to them, Hegel positions and restricts women to the sphere of household and thus, exposes them to the dependency and domination. The fact that Hegel is not concerned about this issue is totally in contradiction with his theory of recognition and the idea of freedom. The second institution of *Sittlichkeit*, the civil society is discussed afterwards. We will see that, in this sphere of 'economic activity', where everyone is concerned only with his particular needs, it is realized that people are actually interdependent and it is through this interdependence and recognition of the need of each other, that individuals achieve their subjective freedom. However, as in the sphere of family, despite the smooth functioning of the economy and some state interventions to secure the welfare of its citizens, we face the problem of poverty. This problem of poverty and thus, emergence of the class of 'rabble' in civil society is essential, as it exposes some people to domination and unfreedom. The class of 'rabble' as a whole, lack the statuses of free citizen, they are excluded from the social advantages, are not recognized and as such "lack basic freedoms and have no status whatsoever and thus are literally 'nobodies'" (Bohman, 2010, p. 444).

In the final part of this chapter, the last domain of *Sittlichkeit* - the state is elaborated. In this section, we will see that, Hegel is sceptical about people. He deprives citizens of the state the right to political participation, the right to vote, which heightens the issues of domination and unfreedom. The majority of citizens of his state are denied political statuses. Participation in the political institutions of the state and especially in the legislative power, is circumscribed to only some part of the citizens. In one word,

Hegel denies the universal political status to every citizen. And this is barely in line with his idea of freedom and with non-domination.

2. HEGEL'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Three main broad currents can be identified in the Hegelian scholarship which takes Hegel's political philosophy and namely, his idea of freedom as its subject matter. In the first section of this chapter, these interpretations - totalitarian, metaphysical and non-metaphysical or Kantian reading of Hegel - will be briefly discussed. According to the first reading, which "is common … amongst non-specialists" (Patten, 1999, p. 11), Hegel's political philosophy is totalitarian and based on this totalitarianism Hegel is defined as a state-philosopher who justifies and supports Prussianism. The recent scholarship on Hegel does not endorse this kind of reading, "there is now a virtual consensus among knowledgeable scholars that the earliest images of Hegel, as a philosopher of the reactionary Prussian restoration and forerunner of modern totalitarianism, are simply wrong" (PR, p. ix). The second interpretation, metaphysical reading, is best illustrated in Charles Taylor's famous book *Hegel*. Though, due to the compactness and the range of topics which the book discusses, Taylor has introduced much more condensed and shorter version of this book, *Hegel and Modern Society,* which deals only with Hegel's political philosophy and is more appropriate for our discussion here. The third, 'self-actualization' interpretation, likewise known as 'post-Kantian' reading, is most received version of interpreting Hegel's social and political philosophy in the recent scholarship. It is this 'self-actualization' interpretation which is supported and further developed by Patten in his book *Hegel's Idea of Freedom*, where his version of this reading is by the author labeled as 'civic humanist' (Patten, 1999, p. 38) [1]. In his book Patten introduces different way of interpreting Hegel's idea of freedom to show why it is the foundation of Hegel's social and political thought and why it is that the modern *Sittlichkeit* provides the content for achieving and maintaining such freedom.

[1] Alan Patten makes a further distinction within the 'post-Kantian' reading: that is between Robert Pippin's interpretation, which he labels as 'historicist' and his own 'civic humanist' reading. However, as both these readings are the different variations of the same - non-metaphysical reading of Hegel, the following thesis takes it to be sufficient to discuss them together under the same umbrella of 'self-actualization' interpretation.

Patten's 'civic humanist' reading will be discussed more in detail in the second section of this chapter. By labelling his reading as 'civic humanist', Patten makes a clear reference to the 'civic humanist' tradition or as he calls it also to the republican political thought. There are some scholars, who have more or less recalled the republican elements in Hegel's political thought and in his idea of freedom before, however, it is only Patten who has introduced the 'civic humanist' account of Hegel's reading systematically and by doing this, he has impulsed to establish an independent, alternative and unconventional way of interpreting Hegel's political philosophy.

Though, despite the fact that he accepts "philosophical affinities between Hegel's idea of freedom and certain themes that are often associated with the civic humanist tradition", Patten does not make any strong claim about, whether Hegel is influenced by or belongs to this tradition (Patten, 1999, p. 39). He avoids this claim which I argue is essential for understanding of Hegel's idea of freedom in the first place. After discussing three general interpretations of Hegel's thought, we will see that this chapter supports Patten's non-metaphysical reading of Hegel's political philosophy; it is indebted to Patten for introducing a new 'civic humanist' way of interpreting Hegel's thought; however, what is the issue of disagreement with him is that, he avoids to support his reading to a sufficient degree. That is, he does not show how Hegel's idea of freedom itself is republican. Thus, the overall argument of this chapter is that, for understanding Hegel's political philosophy and his substantial theory of the modern state, it is important to grasp his idea of freedom which is clearly republican.

2.1 Three Interpretations

Shortly after his death, Hegel's influence as a great philosopher declined. He "was held in quite low esteem during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the [twentieth]" (Wood, 1990, p. 5). Across the scholarship in favor of Hegel or against him, his thought was regarded as suspicious based on his logic and speculative metaphysics; he was attacked for being a state-philosopher and was criticized as a person too. Since 1970's, interest in Hegel's philosophy has been revived, mostly in English-speaking world, though, "not in the field of logical or metaphysical thought, but in the field of political thought" (Cassirer, 1946, p. 31). Today, when almost all the recent commentators on Hegel, acknowledge much broader significance of Hegel's thought and stress that "his social and political philosophy is

alive and well", it is worth mentioning that, his main and actually, the only book about social and political philosophy, the *Philosophy of Right*, could not manage to have any essential influence on the modern political philosophical debates (Beiser, 2005, p. 195). In these debates, Hegel's idea of ethical life, his understanding of society and his idea of freedom, could have taken an important place; but despite the numerous scholarship on significance of Hegel's political thought, "no real attempt has been made...to render Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* fruitful for the discourse of political philosophy" (Honneth, 2010, p. 1). This can be explained by the fact that there are still different and conflicting interpretations of Hegel's social and political thought, without any kind of general agreement at least on its basic concepts. In this section, all three main readings of Hegel's social and political philosophy will be discussed. After which, we will see that, the 'civic humanist' interpretation, has a source within itself to introduce an exhaustive and all encompassing reading of Hegel's political philosophy. It is a reading which introduces not only a different understanding of Hegel's idea of freedom, but also it plausibly explains the connection between this idea of freedom and the *Sittlichkeit* without the reference to any outside concept other than freedom itself.

2.1.1 Totalitarian reading

Hegel's social and political philosophy and precisely, his book the *Philosophy of Right* became a matter of controversy since its publication early in 1821, as "many could see nothing in … [it], expect [Hegel's] attempt to integrate himself with the authorities" (PR, p. viii). Labeled as 'Prussian state philosopher', Hegel was attacked on the ground of being a forerunner of state totalitarianism as well. The tradition of interpreting Hegel's political thought as totalitarian, starts with his contemporary philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who knew him personally and criticized him not only as a philosopher, but also characterized him as a very disagreeable person. There are many passages in Schopenhauer's work, which draw such portraits of Hegel, one of which states that, "in Germany it was possible to proclaim Hegel, a *repulsive* and *dull charlatan* and an *unparalleled scribbler* of *nonsense*, the greatest philosopher of all time" (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 70; emphasis is mine).

Among the contemporary philosophers, Karl Popper proceeds Schopenhauer's path to criticize not only Hegel's philosophy but Hegel as a person too. The chapter named as

'Hegel and the New Tribalism', from *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, "is perhaps the extreme version of this Hegel-as-totalitarian reading" (Lewis, 2005, p. 12). Characterized him as a 'master logician' and as an apologist for Prussianism, Popper argues that Hegel had only one aim "to fight against the open society, and thus to serve his employer, Frederick William of Prussia" (Popper, 1945, p. 30). Popper ascribes to him the doctrine of the 'totalitarian nationalism', and takes it to be his responsibility to fight against Hegel's philosophy. However, the war, which Popper has waged against Hegel, consists of offensive and very abusive remarks about Hegel himself, rather than of an exhaustive philosophical critique of Hegel's concepts and arguments.

The main philosophical criticism, which Popper carried out against Hegel's political philosophy, takes its source from the Preface to *the Philosophy of Right*. It should be mentioned that, largely it is based on the Preface, that, Hegel is categorized as a totalitarian, state-philosopher. There are many passages in this part of the book, which supports the possibility of conservative interpretation of Hegel. The Preface, definitely gives reasons of interpreting him in this way. However, the contemporary commentators agree that the tension between those remarks in the Preface and the idea defended in the rest of the book should be ascribed to the fact that the Preface was afterwards added to the main text as a way of deceiving state censorship. So, "there can be little doubt that in 1820 Hegel intended the Preface to be understood as a pledge of allegiance by the Prussian authorities who employed him" (Wood, 1990, p. 12). The critique of Hegel based on the arguments stated in the Preface is just misinterpretation of his overall social and political philosophy. Close reading of the text and understanding the main idea of the *Philosophy of Right,* shows that had "his critics studied the actual contents of the [book] more closely, … they could not have reconciled them with the idea that Hegel's defense of the state is an apology either for the conservative position or for the Prussian state as it existed in 1820" (PR, p. ix).

To give just one example, Popper and other critics, are mainly referring to the 'double dictum' (the *Doppelsatz*) from the Preface: "what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" (PR, Preface, p. 20). Popper interprets this passage as the claim that everything real is rational, that:

> Everything that is reasonable must be real, and everything that is real must be reasonable and that the development of reality is the same as that of reason. And since there can be no higher standard in existence than the latest development of Reason

> and of the Idea, everything that is now *real* or *actual* exists by necessity, and must be *reasonable* as well as *good* (Popper, 1945, p. 39; emphasis is mine).

The 'double dictum' can really ensue some misunderstandings or confusions in the mind of reader who is unfamiliar with Hegel's ideas. However, now almost every Hegelian scholar acknowledges the "distinction between 'actuality' and 'existence' [mere reality], and avoid[s] the mistake of reading the dictum as an unqualified endorsement of the status quo" (Patten, 1999, p. 12). For Hegel 'actuality' (*Wirklichkeit*) does not mean mere existence, "the 'actual' … includes only those existents that fully express and correspond to their essence" (Wood, 1990, p. 10). This means that according to Hegel, something is not rational just because it exists, rather it is rational because it exists according to its concept, its Idea; and in turn, whatever exists in the world is not necessarily actual, it is actual only when it exists according to its essence, when it is rational. Moreover, there is a little doubt that, for Hegel the Prussian state of that time which 'really existed' "fail[ed] to be wholly rational, because it fail[ed] to be wholly actual" (Ibid., p. 8). It is evident that real understanding of Hegel's claims in the Preface takes away the possibility of interpreting him as a totalitarian, state-philosopher. As we have seen, criticism of Hegel based on the remarks in the Preface can easily be defeated by the real understanding of those remarks themselves, even without referring to any support outside the Preface.

2.1.2 Metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings

Today, when there is a consensus among contemporary scholars that Hegel was not a totalitarian philosopher and "the reactionary interpretation has now so discredited that it has virtually attained the status of a myth" (Beiser, 2005, p. 216), there is still a disagreement about whether we can understand Hegel's social and political philosophy with the reference to his metaphysics or not (see Plant, 1973). Though, some contemporary commentators argue that, reading of Hegel in reference to metaphysics "is not a way in which most of us....can read him seriously at all" (Wood, 1990, p. 8), some claim that "such [non-metaphysical] ... approach is flatly contrary to Hegel's own intentions … [as] it was his ambition to provide a metaphysical foundation for social and political philosophy" (Beiser, 2005, p. 195). Frederick Beiser argues that "whatever the success of Hegel's arguments, it should be clear that his entire account is intelligible and defensible only as a metaphysics" (Ibid., p. 214). As, without the reference to the metaphysics we cannot appreciate the foundation of Hegel's social

and political philosophy. However, on the other hand, some commentators argue that, even if we agree that there is metaphysical dimension in Hegel's writings, it "is unlikely to provide the whole story" (Patten, 1999, p. 27). Today, the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel can be said to be a popular way of interpreting Hegel's political philosophy. This may be understood as a way out of avoiding the criticisms characteristic to Hegel's metaphysics and system. The argument goes that if we understand the *Philosophy of Right* independently from Hegel's logic and his system, we may avoid those shortcomings peculiar to his logic and system.

However, there are still some influential metaphysical readings of Hegel. One of which is introduced by Charles Taylor. Taylor's reading understands Hegel's metaphysics as a response to the historical conditions of the late eighteenth century German Philosophy, namely to two reactionary currents which has been developed against the mainstream Enlightenment Thought: the 'expressivism' and the Kantian 'radical freedom'. The task of Hegel's philosophy, Taylor argues, was to reconcile these two views which he could have managed only by introducing the doctrine of a larger spiritual being that is 'cosmic spirit'. Taylor's metaphysical reading of Hegel's political philosophy is "a story about the self-realization of God as playing a pivotal role in accounting for [the] intersection of freedom and modern *Sittlichkeit*" (Patten, 1999, p. 17). That is, the *Geist*, being a subject, is embodied and the finite spirits, as the only 'vehicles of awareness', are its embodiment; without these finite rational beings *Geist* cannot even exist, but at the same time, it is in opposition with them. Thus, this spiritual being, 'cosmic spirit' unfolds in universe through the conscious minds of men who are 'the indispensable vehicles' of it. Hence, it is the cosmic spirit which provides a concrete content for freedom, as the essence of the human being is to be the vehicle of this larger spiritual order and his freedom consists in realizing this essence. As Taylor note, it is only when,

> [man] in coming to full self-awareness *Geist* has also come to its fullest self-expression, hence freedom. It has shaped its vehicle to a perfect expression of itself. And since the essence of that vehicle, man, is to be the vehicle of *Geist*, he too is and knows himself as fully self-expressed, that is free (Taylor, 1979, p. 28).

In this way, Hegel, on the one hand, endorses Kantian view of freedom as self-actualization and on the other hand, avoids the problems identified with Kant's 'radical freedom'. However, Taylor, after he has devoted the main part of his book to the

discussion of Hegel's metaphysics, ultimately rejects it on the ground of its being 'illusory' and 'incredible' (Taylor, 1979, p. 69; 72; 135). Though, in this case it is a matter of another discussion whether the problem is with Hegel's philosophical conceptions and his metaphysics, or with Taylor's interpretation itself[2].

On the other hand, the non-metaphysical or 'self-actualization' interpretation, or as it is also referred 'post-Kantian' reading takes human agency as its starting point and is based on a very complex understanding of human nature. As Wood notes "Hegel's ethical theory is...founded on a conception of individual human beings and their self-actualization" (Wood, 1990, p. 21). According to this reading, Hegel defends a conception of human self-knowledge, self-understanding, which owns much to Kant's and Fichte's thought. However, some scholars like Beiser totally rejects such reading, when he states, "it would be a serious mistake to conclude that Kant's and Hegel's concepts of freedom are substantially the same. Though they are alike in general respects, Kant and Hegel give them very different, even conflicting interpretations" (Beiser, 2005, p. 200). Putting this issue of disagreement aside, what is peculiar to non-metaphysical reading in contrast to metaphysical understanding of Hegel's idea of freedom is that, this non-metaphysical, self-actualization interpretation exempt Hegelian conceptions and especially his social and political philosophy from the reference to the otherworldly divine being. Robert Pippin argues that Hegel's "freedom does not involve … being the vehicle for the self-realization of Cosmic spirit" (Pippin, 2008, p. 121). Pippin strongly rejects the idea of 'cosmic spirit' as the foundation of Hegel's political thought (see Pippin, 2008, p. 132; 263). In turn his 'profoundly historical' interpretation of Hegel's idea of freedom is concerned how the duties and norms of modern ethical institutions promote the self-realization of human beings; though, according to him, these ethical institutions and all other forms of human existence, are historically and socially determined. According to Pippin, there are no transcendental, universal standards, and "being spiritual beings is a historical achievement of certain animals; not the manifestation of an immaterial or divine

[2] There are some scholars like Jim Kreines for example, who provides less 'incredible' interpretation of Hegel's metaphysics. The metaphysics of Hegel, which Kreines defends is the 'metaphysics of reason'; that is without the reference to any 'cosmic spirit', he argues that, Hegel's metaphysics concerns the 'reason', the 'rational' in the world, "in the form of non-foundationalist metaphysis of reason" (Kreines, 2015, p. 6). Reasoning, according to Kreines, is a spiritual phenomena which is explained by the concept of freedom.

substance" (Ibid., p. 194). Wood defends almost the same idea that Hegel's social and political philosophy is historically specific when he notes: "Hegel ground this conception [of human nature] in his theory of history" (Wood, 1990, p. 17).

Thus, what is the role of metaphysics in Hegel's social and political philosophy is a matter of controversy among the modern Hegelian scholars. However, there are some scholars like Thom Brooks, for example, who does not accept these extreme interpretations, that is, on the one hand, metaphysical and on the other hand, non-metaphysical readings of Hegel. He argues that, the main difference between metaphysical and non-metaphysical readings of Hegel is not whether "the *Philosophy of Right* contains the metaphysical account" or not, but rather, the disagreement and controversy between these interpretations concentrates only on "how strongly metaphysical Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is" (Brook, 2007, p. 2). Moreover, he argues that, while all commentators agree that "the *Philosophy of Right*, as *intended* by Hegel, is to be understood within the wider context of his larger philosophical system ... [they] disagree on how correct Hegel was to have this self-understanding of his own work" (Ibid., p. 4; emphasis in original). However, Brooks is also aware of the fact that, any new attempt to provide a metaphysical reading of Hegel, "should improve upon, not detract from, the many advances to our knowledge of the *Philosophy of Right*, that non-systemic readings have offered us already" (Ibid., p. 6).

The non-metaphysical reading is the main leitmotif of the following thesis, however, it does not question Hegel's own intentions and understanding, that is how correct he was while referring to his system as the foundation of his social and political philosophy. The non-metaphysical reading of this thesis, also does not mean, that we should reject Hegel's systematic thought totally. Actually, this thesis does not deny the role of Hegel's system in his political philosophy, "it is open to the advocate of the 'civic humanist' reading to recognize a very significant metaphysical dimension in Hegel's social philosophy" (Patten, 1999, p. 41). However, it does not give an extreme role to the metaphysical explanations in its argumentations. The main objective of such kind of non-metaphysical reading is the fact that, those commentators, supporting metaphysical reading of Hegel's political philosophy, concentrate mostly on his epistemology and metaphysics, totally neglecting his social and political thought. Secondly, the basic system of Hegel's metaphysics being accepted, non-metaphysical reading argues that, the main arguments stated by Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right*,

can be understood and reconstructed within this work without the reference to anything else outside of it. This kind of reference first of all distracts us from the main issues discussed in the *Philosophy of Right* and secondly, such kind of reading makes Hegel's thought more accessible to and intelligible for the modern political thinkers. As already mentioned above, this study is enthusiastic about the non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel's social and political philosophy, while at the same time, accepts the minimum Hegelian system, which takes Spirit to be not a 'cosmic' *Geist* but rather, "in its ultimate simple truth … consciousness", that is reason which can be explained by the concept of freedom (PhG, p. 157). Among the above discussed non-metaphysical interpretations, it backs Patten's 'civic humanist' reading, though, at the same time, identifies some insufficiencies with it.

2.2 Alan Patten's 'Civic Humanist' Interpretation

Patten in his book, *Hegel's Idea of Freedom*, tries to understand how the institutions and practices of the *Sittlichkeit* "promote or provide, the locus of human self-actualization"; but in contrast to Pippin's or Wood's historicist elements in their interpretations, his 'civic humanist' reading is not appealing to any historical or social condition of a given community (Patten, 1999, p. 34). Patten's interpretation of Hegel's idea of freedom and precisely, his analysis of subjective and objective conditions which are necessary for the establishment and full realization of freedom, has two stages. On the first stage, Patten argues thoroughly and completely for Hegel's Kantian interpretation. According to this interpretation, there is a Kantian element in Hegel's idea of freedom, as for Kant, so for Hegel, freedom and reason are radically opposed to contingently given desires and inclinations; "there is at least some sense in which [Hegel] is committed to an essentially Kantian view of freedom, reason and desire" (Ibid, p. 49). In order to support his argument Patten discusses three distinctive conception of freedom - the distinction, he argues is made by Hegel - natural, reflective and rational (PR, §11, §15, §21). When the agent enjoys natural freedom, his actions are determined by his 'drives, desires and inclinations'. The problem which Hegel identifies with this conception of freedom, is that, agent is acting on something given from outside, as the content of desires and inclinations "are not determined by the agent but by nature" (Patten, 1999, p. 50). Reflective freedom (*Willkür*), on the other hand, contains the element of reflection and deliberation on the part of the agent which

desires and inclinations to follow. However, the problem here, as in case of natural freedom, is that the content about which the agent deliberates is given too. Hegel notes that "if we stop our enquiry at arbitrariness, at the human being's ability to will this or that, this does indeed constitute his freedom; but if we bear firmly in mind that the content of what he wills is a given one, it follows that he is determined by it and is in this very respect no longer free" (PR, §15). In difference from these conceptions of freedom, in the case of rational freedom, there is "a complete abstraction from one's actual desires and inclinations … for not to do so would to stop at something 'given' from 'outside'" (Patten, 1999, p. 51). Patten claims that it is this distinction and Hegel's preference for the conception of rational freedom, - according to which an agent is free only if he bases his determinations on thought and reason and not on contingently given desires - which suggests that Hegel "does endorse the idea of an opposition in free agency between reason and an agent's given wants, desires and inclinations" (Ibid., p. 51).

However, Patten is aware of the fact that, the main threat to this kind of argument is Hegel's own critique of Kant. The most well known criticism which Hegel raises against Kant is about his understanding of morality ('duty for duty's sake') and his famous 'empty formalism' critique (see PR, §§133-5). To summarize his criticism of Kant's morality very briefly, an action cannot be motivated by duty alone, rather according to Hegel, some desires of the agent plays an important role as well. Nevertheless, as Patten claims, what makes those feelings or dispositions significant for Hegel, is "the source of that feeling [which] is not itself some feeling or inclination but thought and reason" (Patten, 1999, p. 56). Thus, in contrast to those commentators, who are convinced that the fundamental disagreement exists between Hegelian and Kantian conception of freedom (see Wood, 1990 p. 44; 49; 70; Beiser, 2005, p. 200-202), Patten claims that, even when Hegel argues against Kant's conception of morality, he acknowledges a sharp opposition between reason and desire.

Moreover, that Hegel endorses some version of Kantian freedom, we can see from the fact that, "the paradigmatic case of unfreedom, for Hegel is acting on the basis of another's authority" (Patten, 1999, p. 36). In the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel states that, "[free] thinking does not stop at what is *given*, whether the latter is supported by the external positive authority of the state or of mutual agreement among human beings, or by the authority of inner feeling and the heart and by the testimony

of the spirit which immediately concurs with this" (PR, Preface, p. 11; emphasis in original). In several other passages from his mature philosophical works as well, Hegel explicitly claims that freedom is incompatible with any kind of authority. By following someone's authoritative will, one may be also fulfilling right actions but without rational consideration about the action itself, he is not free or self-determined. According to this way or reasoning, 'to stop at what is given' means acting on authority, be it state's, religious, someone's or something's authority. Patten adds that, "acting on desire is in some way analogous to, or even a case of, acting on authority" (Patten, 1999, p. 65). Thus, when you are acting according to some desire, which in turn is not based on some rational deliberation means, that you are not free.

Now if we accept that Kantian interpretation of Hegel's idea of freedom is plausible and it can be reconciled with those critiques which Hegel himself has made about Kantian morality, the problem of vacuity of self-realization interpretation remains. In the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel argues that, "however essential it may be to emphasize the pure and unconditional self-determination of the will as the root of duty … to cling on to a merely moral point of view without making the transition to the concept of ethics reduces this gain to an *empty formalism*" (PR, §135; emphasis in original). This means that, according to this kind of reasoning alone, without having some kind of 'particular content' or 'determinate end', "no immanent theory of duties is possible" as it is not clear how, after abstracting from all particulars, an agent could have a reason for acting at all (PR, §135). Thus, in order the danger of '*empty formalism'* to be avoided, an agent who is free and does not depend on any external authority or desire in his determinations, should have at least one reason-for-action. Patten argues that, Hegel manages to provide at least one such kind of 'particular content' or 'determinate end' for the agent, "the end of developing, expressing, and maintaining his own freedom" (Patten, 1999, p. 36). This is the idea which Hegel has in mind when he says "the free will which wills the free will" (PR, §27), that is a determinate reason for action for a free agent is "the end of developing and maintaining his own freedom" (Patten, 1999, p. 100). Therefore, an agent, while abstracting himself from every particularity and still has one reason to act - to maintain and further his own freedom - needs some concrete contents or ends in order to become and after, to remain free.

Identifying the content for action is the second step in Patten's argument about the Hegel's idea of freedom - the step of moving from agent's free self-determination to

the ethical requirements of the community to which the agent belongs. For Hegel, the requirements of morality and duty "are to be found in *Sittlichkeit:* in the customary ends and obligations of the major institutions of the modern community - including the family, civil society and state" (Ibid., p. 83). For Hegel, freedom and ethics are reciprocal concepts that is in performing ethical requirements, the agent is becoming free and then he is maintaining his freedom. However, it is not self-evident, why this is so. Why does acting ethically contribute to the development of someone's freedom? While Patten restates Hegel's thought on this issue, he argues that one reason of this is that "the state belongs to the minimum self-sufficient institutional structure capable of developing and sustaining the capacities and self-understanding associated with free and rational agency" (Ibid., p. 165). That is subjective and objective conditions of freedom is realized and sustained only through participating in the *Hegelian state*. The important assumption of this argument is that, "state is one of the social institutions that is necessary for the development and maintenance of free and rational agency" (Ibid., p. 121). Still why the state? At the heart of Hegel's attempt to reconcile his contemporaries to the ethical institutions of the modern time and to show the necessity of these institutions and practices for the development and maintenance free and rational individual is his theory of recognition.

The basic idea of Hegel's theory of recognition, as Patten argues, is that "an agent can achieve self-certainty, or confirmation of his freedom and independence, only through interaction with his environment ... to establish an identity as free and independent, and agent needs to see that he is actively affecting other things or people" (Ibid., p. 125). Three ways can be identified how an agent interacts with environment and asserts his freedom: the first way is by 'negating' the material objects, in the second case by forcing other human beings to recognize him as free and in the third way, he enjoys the free recognition on the part of other agents. In this third case, "the agent achieves self-certainty by receiving the free recognition of other agents, whom he acknowledges as free in return" (Ibid., p. 128). Thus, according to Hegel, the only way that the agent can affirm himself as free and independent agency is in community of mutual recognition. Nevertheless, from this does not follow that this community should necessarily include the institution of state. The crucial step in Hegel's argument to justify the necessity of state is that the mutual recognition "demands that [individuals] find ways of *expressing* their recognition of the other - something that may require

specific institutions and practices" (Ibid., p. 131; emphasis in original). Thus, in order mutual recognition to be possible some particular arrangements, institutions and practices are required for the mediation.

To summarize Patten's approach, for Hegel, the legitimacy of social and political institutions of the modern world is grounded in human freedom. The capacity for this freedom is developed and sustained through a community of mutual recognition, which in turn is possible only when certain mediating arrangements exists, "it is through these institutions and practices that individuals attract and express recognition" (Ibid., p. 135). In addition, according to Hegel, state is the minimum self-sufficient institutional structure, which mediates the mutual recognition. The main critique which can be raised against Patten's reading and which he himself recognizes as well, concerns the idea of freedom he tried to interpret; namely, the problem relates to "why should we think that … ideals [of freedom and subjectivity] are authoritative" (Ibid., p. 204)? The answer to this question will be discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis, however, now it is sufficient to state that, had Patten proceeded and completed his 'civic humanist' reading in the direction where he could claim that Hegel's idea of freedom itself is 'civic humanist', the problem why freedom is authoritative had not bothered him at all.

2.2.1 Why the label 'civic humanist?

Now, after we have discussed the two-staged argument of Patten and have seen that he has not claimed Hegel's idea of freedom itself to be republican, it is necessary to state, then why he has labeled his interpretation as the 'civic humanist'. Throughout the book, Patten identifies three reasons. Firstly, he states that his interpretation is "clearly 'humanist' one", because it is concerned mainly with the freedom of individual human beings (Patten, 1999, p. 38). Patten tries to understand under what conditions can human beings achieve and maintain the full freedom without recoursing to history, to 'cosmic spirit' or to any other metaphysical ideas of God, as the "agent of, or provider of content for, freedom" (Patten, 1999, p. 166). He argues that Hegel's idea of freedom can be understood without any such kind of reference. The second reason emphasizes 'civic humanist' idea that participating in the life of community along with the other fellow citizens and leading a virtuous life in a community as a good citizen, is the highest good which is also regarded as the highest practical good

by Hegel as well (Ibid., p. 38; p. 166). Practical freedom as for republicans, so for Hegel is only achieved through virtuous and civic actions in a community, where by advancing a good for all, an agent is preserving and developing the conditions of his freedom.

According to Patten, the third and most important reason for using the term 'civic humanist' is that, "there are certain important philosophical and sociological themes that Hegel's position shares in common with thinkers in the civic humanist tradition" (Ibid, p. 38). However, at the same time in Hegel's thought there are number of topics, which are definitely not associated with civic humanist tradition - for example, his skepticism about the active political participation on the part of the ordinary citizen in the life of community - and thus, are in contradiction with 'civic humanism'. Recognizing these kind of differences and acknowledging the complexity of and controversies within the 'civic humanist' tradition itself, Patten argues that it is enough to "suggest a *philosophical affinity* between Hegel's idea of freedom and certain themes that are often associated with civic humanist tradition" (Ibid., p. 39; emphasis in original). He totally abstains from claiming whether Hegel's idea of freedom, is influenced by or belongs to the republican political tradition. What he argues to be the republican element in Hegel's idea of freedom, and more precisely, what is republican about agent's freedom and his participation in ethical community, "rests on the civic humanist thought that a free society is a fragile construction that can be sustained only if certain objective and subjective conditions are met" (Ibid., p. 167). Thus, while Patten argues that he makes a 'civic humanist analysis' of subjective and objective conditions which are necessary for establishing and maintaining agent's freedom, he does not state, whether this freedom itself can be understood in the republican way.

Thus, despite the fact that Patten has introduced the 'civic humanist' reading of Hegel's idea of freedom, I argue that, he has actually missed what was republican in Hegel's understanding of freedom in the first place. Even when he discusses the priority of Hegel's idea of freedom, he "does not do very much, other than showing the extent to which Hegel agrees with Kant in his conception of freedom as rational self-determination" (Wallace, 2001, p. 255). In line of these criticisms, I argue that, before we try to understand the connections between freedom and *Sittlichkeit*, before we discuss the application of the concept of freedom to the modern ethical life, it is important to show why Hegel's freedom is compelling at all and this is possible only

by understanding the republican character of this freedom. Without stating explicitly, whether Hegel's understanding of freedom is republican or not, there seems to be not much left in the 'civic humanist' interpretation of Hegel. Despite these criticisms, however, the thesis supports Patten's attempts to introduce a 'civic humanist' arguments in Hegelian scholarship. And though, there are several other scholars, who have somehow evoked the republican elements in Hegel's political thought and in his idea of freedom too, no one has introduced such systematic work on Hegel's 'civic humanist' reading as Alan Patten has done. It is due to Patten's taxonomy that republican interpretation rightly takes place as an independent reading among the 'post-Kantian' interpretations in Hegelian scholarship. It is due to Petten's easily accessible work which has introduced an alternative to the mainstream readings of Hegel, an alternative which motives us to place Hegel's philosophy not as a rival to republicanism, but rather as a modern form of republicanism itself.

2.3 Conclusion

After identifying freedom to be the foundation of Hegel's social and political philosophy, this chapter firstly has introduced controversies which exist regarding the interpretation of Hegel's political thought and his idea of freedom. The chapter has discussed three main readings of Hegel - totalitarian, metaphysical and non-metaphysical respectively. While metaphysical reading may still have some supporters, those who are fully familiar with Hegel's political ideas totally reject the possibility of his totalitarian interpretation. The larger part of the chapter has dealt with Patten's 'civic humanist' reading of Hegel's idea of freedom. Starting discussion with Patten's 'civic humanist' reading is helpful, as the thesis argues for Hegel's republican idea of freedom. Patten can be said to be the only Hegelian philosopher who has tried to introduce systematically the elements of Hegel's 'civic humanist' thought. The chapter supports this variation of non-metaphysical or 'self-actualization' interpretation of Hegel's political philosophy, which argues that for identifying the determinate end for action we do not need to recourse to any spiritual being like in metaphysical reading or to history like in historicist 'self-actualization' reading. Patten argues that, there is one 'particular content' or 'determinate end' within Hegel's social and political system and this is "the end of developing, expressing, and maintaining [one's] own freedom" (Patten, 1999, p. 36). However, while he has started well, he

had not gone deep enough and has not explicitly argued that Hegel's idea of freedom is republican. The following thesis only tries to take Patten's started job to a sufficient degree and argues that Hegel's idea of freedom is itself republican.

3. REPUBLICAN IDEA OF FREEDOM

As we have seen in the previous chapters, firstly, this thesis took freedom to be the core concept of Hegel's the *Philosophy of Right*. After that, we have seen that among three main interpretations of Hegel, the thesis supported the post-Kantian reading of Hegel's social and political philosophy and namely, it is based on Alan Patten's 'civic humanist' reading. Nevertheless, after discussing Patten's unconventional interpretation of Hegel's political thought, it was argued to be incomplete. In particular, Patten avoided to argue that Hegel's idea of freedom was republican. So, by taking Patten's 'civic humanist' reading to another higher level, this thesis argues that Hegel's idea of freedom is republican, more precisely, it is a modern republican conception of liberty. However, before demonstrating this, we need to know what republicanism implies and what this modern republican conception of freedom means.

In the history of political philosophy, every political thinker concerned with the idea of good or just and equal society, has evoked the concept of freedom in the theories and discussions. Almost everyone has praised the concept of freedom; however, despite these facts, there is no agreement about its definition, rather there exists "more than two hundred senses" of this concept (Berlin, 1969, p. 15). Moreover, whether 'freedom' and 'liberty' are the same thing or there is a substantial difference between these two concepts is a matter of disagreement too. As, this thesis is not directly concerned with these issues, it will not discuss all these disagreements and thus, the terms 'freedom' and 'liberty' here will be used interchangeably. The thesis will not also go deep into the discussion of the historical or definitional issues of freedom, rather it will take the distinction between two conceptions of freedom: 'negative' and 'positive' freedom, made by Isaiah Berlin, as its main point of reference.

The distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' freedoms, Isaiah Berlin made in his famous essay *Two Concepts of Liberty*, first published in 1958. According to the 'negative' conception of liberty: "I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with my activity" (Ibid., p. 15). The sense of the 'positive' liberty, on the other hand, "derives from the wish on the part of the

individual to be his own master" (Ibid., p. 22). From these two definitions of 'negative' and 'positive' liberty it is evident why they are labeled as such; "in the first case liberty seems to be a mere *absence* of something (i.e. of obstacles, barriers, constraints or interference from others), whereas in the second case it seems to require the *presence* of something (i.e. of control, self-mastery, self-determination or self-realization)" (Carter, 2016; emphasis in original). In Berlin's words, we use the negative concept of liberty while answering the question *'How far does government interfere with me?'*, whereas we use the positive concept while answering the question '*Who governs me?'* (Berlin, 1969, p. 22; emphasis is mine). Now it is clear, that the first view is about how many choices are available to the agent, while the second view, is about the making right choices, according to the right, rational reasons.

On the whole, we can say that the main aim of Berlin in his essay was to praise the 'negative' liberty and discredit the 'positive' conception for its being "a specious disguise for brutal tyranny … which is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altars of the great historical ideals" (Ibid., p. 22-29). As Berlin's argument goes, those who believed in freedom as rational self-mastery, presupposed the divided self: the 'real', 'rational', 'autonomous' self on the one hand and the 'empirical', 'irrational', 'lower' self, on the other. And this kind of language made it possible to coerce man in the name of some 'rational' goal, as were they rational they would have themselves pursued the same goal. Thus, when I embrace this kind of view, "I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man … must be identical with his freedom - the free choice of his 'true', albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self" (Ibid., p. 24). Thus, Berlin concludes that the best guard against the dangers of tyranny and authoritarianism identified with the 'positive' freedom is "more truer and more humane ideal", the 'negative' conception of liberty (Ibid., p. 33).

This distinction made by Berlin between 'negative' and 'positive' liberty still dominates in the modern political philosophy and is the point of constant reference by the theorists concerned with the issue freedom. However, there are some thinkers, like Philip Pettit for example, who argues that this kind of distinction "has served us ill in political thought, [as] it has sustained the philosophical illusion that, … there are just two ways of understanding liberty" (Pettit, 1997, p. 18). This distinction has concealed

the third important possibility of defining freedom. As we have seen, according to Berlin's distinction, 'positive' liberty amounts to the self-mastery, while 'negative' liberty to the absence of interference. However, as Pettit notes mastery and interference are not the same thing, what we can say in the situation when for example, "freedom consists in an absence, as the 'negative conceptions' has it, but in an absence of mastery by others, not in an absence of interference" (Ibid., p. 21)? Besides the fact that, this third possibility of defining freedom seems to be a kind of "syntax of Berlin's taxonomy", it is more than this - it is a totally different concept of 'freedom as non-mastery', 'freedom as antipower' or 'freedom as non-domination' - associated with the old republican tradition. Under this republican conception of freedom I am free "to the extent that no one else is my master, even if I lack the will or the wisdom required for achieving self-mastery" (Pettit, 1996, p. 578).

The following chapter is an exposition of this third different possibility of understanding freedom, namely, of the republican conception of liberty. The republican freedom will be discussed and elaborated based on Philip Pettit's books: *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government; On the People's Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy* and on his other articles. The reason of why Pettit, is very simple. Pettit is the only contemporary political philosopher who "has given to the republican model of political life a systematic development it has never received before" (Larmore, 2001, p. 229). He has introduced not only the extant and complete definition of the republican idea of freedom, he has also elaborated in detail, all the modern political institutions and arrangements needed for the actualization of such kind of freedom. As in his critical review Maloy notes, Pettit's works are "encouraging, then, in its aspiration to bridge the gap between theoretical reflection and institutional design by articulating a down-to-earth ethic of 'freedom as non-domination'" (Maloy, 2014, p. 229).

The first section of this chapter will briefly summarize the historical background of the republicanism with which Pettit identifies his concept of freedom and also it will be shown why this concept was lost in modernity and why it took so long freedom as non-domination to be elaborated again almost at the end of twentieth century. The second part introduces the definition of this republican conception of freedom and contrasts it with 'negative' and 'positive' conceptions of liberty. The third section discusses the republican freedom understood as a social and political ideal. In the last

section the shortcomings and criticism raised against the republican conceptualization of freedom will be discussed and the answers to them will be elaborated.

3.1 Which Republicanism? – Historical Background

Philip Pettit introduces the third, republican way of understanding freedom as an available alternative to the negative-positive distinction of freedom, an alternative which actually has a very long historical background. Before understanding what this third alternative means, it is important to make clear, what Pettit understands by republicanism. As we have seen in the previous chapter, one main reason why Alan Patten avoided to claim that Hegel belonged or was influenced by republican political thought was the complexities and controversies characteristic to this tradition.

It is definitely true that the republican thought is a very broad church as the tradition has a very long history. The term‘republicanism’ can be understood in two different ways. On the one hand, republicanism is identified with the tradition in the western philosophy with its roots in the classical Rome, which “first gave life and recognition to the key republican ideas” and includes such writers as Machiavelli, Milton, Harrington, Montesquieu and Blackstone, Jefferson and Madison (Pettit, 2012, p. 6). The main characteristic of this tradition is their emphasis on such common ideas “as the importance of civic virtue and political participation, the dangers of corruption, the benefits of a mixed constitution and the rule of law, etc.” (Lovett, 2017). In political thought, this kind of republicanism is called ‘classical republican’ or ‘neo-roman’ tradition. On the other hand, in the broad church of republican political thought there is a second strand of ‘civic humanism’. It is a different “variant of republicanism indicating active, participatory, patriotic citizenship as well as the ethos and educational ideal that goes with it” (Ibid., 2017). As we have seen in the previous chapter, Alan Patten has used the terms ‘civic humanism’ and ‘republicanism’ interchangeably, making no further difference or specification between and within these traditions. However, the following thesis takes the distinction between them as important starting point and concentrates only on the ‘neo-roman’ tradition of republicanism and mainly, its contemporary variant of ‘civic republicanism’.

In the modern contemporary political philosophy, the interpretation of the ‘classical republican’ tradition is associated with the names and works of Quentin Skinner, John G. A. Pocock and Philip Pettit. Pettit while talking of republicanism, has in mind this

'classical republicanism' or the 'Italian-Atlantic tradition' as he labels it. He concentrates on such scholars and philosophers, as Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Montesquieu and de Tocqueville; such republican political acts as the English Civil War, American and French Revolutions; such works as *Cato's Letters* (Trenchard & Gordon, 1995) and the *Federalist Papers* (Madison, Jay & Hamilton, 2001), the first one identified with the commonwealthmen tradition of the period of English Revolution and the second one associated with the ideology of American revolution. For Pettit, it is this 'Italian-Atlantic tradition' of republicanism that "constitutes a firm reality that endured across classical, medieval and modern times" (Pettit, 2012, p. 8).

However, on the other hand Pettit distances himself from the continental, 'neo-Athenian' form of republicanism or 'civic humanism' which he identifies with the name of Rousseau and labels as communitarianism. Pettit argues that, Rousseau too, has "espoused a version of freedom as non-domination or non-dependency … but while he remained faithful to 'Italian-Atlantic' republicanism in this respect, he broke dramatically with it in arguing against the mixed constitution and the contestatory image of the citizenry" (Ibid., p. 12). The version of republicanism which he has introduced has betrayed the 'Italian-Atlantic' republicanism, he has "betrayed the earlier tradition of republicanism in this conception of popular sovereignty" (Ibid., p. 14). The only aspect in which Rousseau remained faithful to the tradition was thus, his understanding of freedom as non-domination. Though, this not being sufficient, Pettit sets aside this strand of republicanism and distances his theory from it.

Thus, despite the fact that republicanism is a very long tradition with complexities and controversies within it, Pettit argues that, what is characteristic to all republicans throughout the history of this political thought, is its definition and understanding of liberty. As he notes, republicanism

> is unified across time, partly by a deference to the same textual authorities, partly by a shared enthusiasm for the ideals and the lessons of republican Rome, partly by an emphasis on the importance of having certain institutions in place ... [but] the most important unifier of this tradition, in the end, may be the habit of conceptualizing liberty in a distinctive fashion (Pettit, 1997, p 20).

What was distinctive about the republican conception of liberty? Two grounds can be identified to show that all the republicans despite their disagreement about other issues or despite the time distance between them, praised a distinctive conception of freedom.

According to the first ground 'liberty-versus-slavery theme', "republican tradition is unanimous in casting freedom as the opposite to slavery, and in seeing exposure to the arbitrary will of another, or living at the mercy of another, as the great evil" (Ibid., p. 31). In the long republican tradition, *liber* and *servus* were always contrasted concepts. *Liber* was someone, who contrary to a slave, had a status of free citizen and thus, was not subject to an arbitrary domination (see Wirszubski, 1968). Contrasting freedom with slavery, according to Pettit "is a sure sign of taking liberty [on the part of the republican tradition] to consist in non-domination" (Ibid., p. 32).

The second ground - 'law-and-liberty theme' - on the other hand, defends the idea that, liberty may not be lost even when there is an actual interference. According to this understanding, the interference is not arbitrary and there is no domination, "when it is controlled by the interests and opinions of those affected, being required to serve those interests in a way that conforms with those opinions" (Ibid., p. 35). In the long republican tradition, it was unanimously acknowledged that, such kind of non-arbitrary interferer was the properly constituted law. This meant that, law which was directed to people's interests, while it was actually interfering in their lives was not dominating them. Thus, even though law "represents a form of interference, it does not compromise people's liberty", it just conditions it (Ibid., p. 35). Furthermore, throughout the republican doctrines, all accepted idea was that, the proper law actually constituted liberty of the people, "laws of suitable state, in particular the laws of republic, create freedom enjoyed by citizens" (Ibid., p. 36). How citizenship and freedom are represented by republicanism as just two sides of the same coin will be discussed in detail in the last chapter of this thesis. For now it will be sufficient to mention that, according to the republican tradition, despite the fact that law may be understood as necessarily coercive and it actually interferes with people's lives, this interference is not arbitrary, if the law is properly constituted. Moreover, good laws save people from domination and make them free.

Let's assume that these two grounds prove that the republican tradition really represented the concept of freedom as non-domination as its ideal, the question remains, how it disappeared from the political scene, how it was lost? The responsibility for challenging the republican idea of freedom and instead introducing the concept of freedom as non-interference, Pettit puts on Thomas Hobbes, a seventeenth century thinker who understood all law as an invasion in people's freedom

and thus, the positive connection between the law and freedom impossible. However, till the end of the eighteenth century, in the commonwealthman tradition law still was seen as a source of liberty and the republican tradition was still unanimous about the issues of liberty and authority. As Sir William Blackstone noted in 1760s: "laws, when prudently framed, are by no means subversive but rather introductive of liberty" (Blackstone cited in Pettit, 1997, p. 41).

It was only at the end of the eighteenth century when the republican conception of freedom began to disappear and Hobbesian conception of freedom replaced it. At that time freedom as non-interference became a very convenient concept for some thinkers, who being "opposed to the cause of American independence and, in particular, to the republican rhetoric in which that cause was articulated", have an interest to endorse this new 'negative' conception of freedom (Pettit, 1997, p. 42). Pettit argues that, Hobbes' notion of freedom did an 'ideological work' and his new definition of liberty achieved its triumph in Bentham's philosophy, who being against the American Revolution, was "even the one who did most to establish ['negative' freedom] as the modernist notion" (Ibid., p. 45).

To the question of why this new conception of freedom has managed to be so successful, it can be answered that, the ideal of freedom as non-domination, might have seemed to be a problem to the thinkers like Bentham, Paley and other modern liberals, who were endorsing the ideal of equality, that all human beings (even women and servants) are equal. In contrast, republicanism traditionally restricted "the citizenry ... to mainstream, usually propertied, males" (Pettit, 2012, p. 8). Being aware of this problematic, Pettit argues that it is understandable why, under the 'elite citizenry' of males, the republican ideal of freedom lost its attractive side; moreover, it seemed impossible the ideal of freedom as non-domination to be secured for every citizen as it became difficult and "less realistic to stick with the rich old ideal of freedom as non-domination" (Pettit, 1997, p. 49). And thus, the new conception of freedom as non-interference "not only did ... replace the republican idea … it had even become invisible to the historians of political thought" (Ibid., p. 50).

Freedom as non-interference, identified with the liberal school and under the influence of Berlin, labeled as 'negative' freedom is recently the most popular and most invoked conception of freedom in political philosophy. Now defining liberalism and the 'liberal school' is not an easy task as well. In this broad church, 'right-of-centre', or classical

liberals or libertarians can be identified. On the other hand, it is a home of 'left-of-centre' liberals too. As Pettit argues "no matter which form liberalism takes, it contrasts with republicanism on how to understand freedom, a value to which each approach gives a prominent place" (Pettit, 2012, p.10). By this argument Pettit sets an opposition between republicanism and the liberal school and he "himself imagines that he stands outside the liberal framework" (Larmore, 2001, p. 239). This kind of reasoning embraced by Pettit is a matter of controversy; it is a matter of controversy how should we or can separate republicans and liberals? For example, it is difficult to imagine in which strand John Locke should take place. One of the founding fathers of the liberal tradition Locke clearly did not equate freedom with the absence of interference, on the contrary, "he insisted on the role played by law in the very constitution of freedom which is a corollary of the republican concern with non-domination" (Ibid., p. 235). Moreover, it is much more difficult to circumscribe John Stuart Mill's political philosophy to just liberal strand. Mill influenced by Jeremy Bentham was the most influential English language philosopher of the nineteenth century utilitarian, liberal school. However, on the other hand, it should be mentioned that Mill's political theory did not carried the antirepublican character. His understanding of freedom was in line with Machiavelli and other republicans that citizens should keep an eye on political rulers "to protect their freedom from the ongoing risk of domination by the strongest - be it the one, the few or the many" (Urbinati, 2002, p. 32). This chapter will not discuss whether republicanism belongs to a liberal tradition or there is really an insurmountable division between these two theoretical approaches. It also will not go deep and exemine which classical political thinker belongs to which tradition. For us it is more important at this stage to understand what Pettit's neo-republican conception of freedom means and if it really differs from the other two 'negative' and 'positive' concepts of liberty.

3.2 Republican Freedom as Non-domination

How we can define the republican idea of freedom as non-domination? When we say that there is a domination, means that, "someone has dominating power over another, someone dominates or subjugates another, to the extent that: (1) they have the capacity to interfere (2) on an arbitrary basis (3) in certain choices that the other is in a position to make" (Pettit, 1997, p. 52). What the first clause means? What it means to interfere?

What it means to have the capacity to interfere? - interference here understood means intentional interference by other which eventually worsens the situation of the interfered person. Interference can take the form of coercion or manipulation, but "all interfering behaviours … are intended by the interferer to worsen the agent's choice situation by changing the range of options, or by assuming control over what outcomes will result from which options and what actual payoffs, therefore, will materialize" (Ibid., p. 53). When we say that there is a capacity for interference this means that there is an actual capacity, capacity which is ready to be realized.

Regarding the second clause, what makes an act arbitrary, what makes an interference to be arbitrary - is a decision made at the pleasure of the interferer, a decision which is not controlled by the person interfered; it is "chosen or rejected without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of those affected" (Ibid., p. 55). As the domination is linked with the issue of power, arbitrary interference therefore, may be more or less intense depending on that power. There can be for example, an absolute arbitrary interference like in the case of relationship between master and his slaves. The source of power or the resources of domination may vary too: it may be the physical strength, the financial situation, and so on; moreover, it may involve the status of being someone, for example, the doctor or the police.

The last clause in the definition of domination implies that, the capacity or actual arbitrary interference may occur in the certain, not in all choices. This is an important clause as it makes evident that "someone may dominate another in a certain domain of choices, in a certain sphere or aspect or period of life, without doing it in all" (Ibid., p. 58). For example, the employer can dominate the employee in the workplace but not in other spheres of his life. The definition of the domination thus, emphasises two main aspects "it may vary in extent as well as in intensity" (Ibid., p. 58).

How freedom as non-domination differs from, on the hand, 'positive' and on the other hand, the 'negative' liberty? It may seem difficult at first sight to make a clear distinction how mastery may be different from interference, how there can be a difference between freedom as non-domination and freedom as non-interference. Two main basic differences can be identified between these conceptions of freedom. Imagine, for example, a situation in which a slave who is dominated in his choices by his master is not actually interfered by him. It just occurs that his master is a kind person or it may be also the case that the servant is cunning enough to please his master

and get away with whatever he likes. In this kind of extreme case, domination is presented but without an actual interference. Moreover, even if there is no slightest possibility of interference on the part of the master in the choices of his servant, important thing is that he has a capacity to interfere, he may interfere anytime on the arbitrary basis. Thus, the servant is dependent on the good will of the master. This observation highlights the fact that in the case of 'negative' conception of freedom, which denominates as evil only the actual interference, slavery and freedom as non-interference are consistent with each other; as the master who does not actually interfere with his servant, just because he is a saintly benevolent person, makes 'negative' freedom realizable.

On the other hand, in contrast to the freedom as non-interference, the idea of non-domination is consistent with the agent being actually interfered, though without being dominated. As Pattit notes "interference can occur without domination" (Pettit, 1997, p. 23). The example of such kind of interference without domination may be the law; the law interferes in our lives on a regular basis but without dominating us. The republican freedom maintains that "it is only domination that fits the bill" (Pettit, 2012, p. 50). When for example, a police officer is interfering with someone's choice, though there is an actual interference, it is not an arbitrary interference. Of course, there are cases when a specific police officer may involve in someone's choice at his will, but under normal conditions, when police officers interfere under constitutionally determined conditions, the act is not an interference on an arbitrary basis. As in the long tradition of republicanism, Pettit also is defending the idea that, when non dominating and non discriminatory laws are presented, "not only will they inhibit potential dominators and reduce unfreedom, they will do so without representing a form of domination in their own right" (Pettit, 1997, p. 66). Here may arise the question about the discriminatory character of the law itself under which the above mentioned police officers may be operating. To object this kind of possibility will take us to a different direction, what is important about this argument here is that "the law need not itself represent a form of domination" (Ibid., p. 66). Thus, while devotees of freedom as non-interference see legal and state interference as a coercion, as bad in itself - no matter how well constituted and controlled it is - the supporters of freedom as non-domination, and the tradition of republicanism, view coercion under the well constituted law, "as something that is not so potentially objectionable, being on a par

with obstruction by natural obstacles rather than with coercion by arbitrary powers" (Ibid., p. 84). So, like natural obstacles, the interference by the suitable form of law may condition an agent's freedom but it does not compromise it.

Thus, the republican conception of freedom understands as evil not only the actual interference, but also the capacity on the part of the master to interfere arbitrarily in the choices of the servant, because the capacity of arbitrary interference is "uncontrolled interference: that is, interference that is exercised at the will or discretion of the interferer; interference that is uncontrolled by the person on the receiving end" (Pettit, 2012, p. 59). In contrast to the freedom as non-interference, it emphasises the part of law in the constitution of the personal freedom as well. On the whole, the main differences between 'negative' and republican conceptions of freedom are the emphasises in the case of the second ideal, on the capacity of the arbitrary interference and the importance of law. These differences between 'negative' and republican freedoms are summed up more clearly by Pettit in the following terms:

> Those who are attached to the ideal of non-interference value the fact of having choice - the fact of non-interference - whether the choice is dominated or not; those who embrace the ideal of non-domination value the fact of having undominated choice, but not necessarily the fact of having choice as such. They do not mind the lack of choice that results from non-arbitrary interference and they may despise the sort of choice that you enjoy by grace of your own cunning or charms or ingratiation, seeing it as a demeaning and despicable bequest. The first group focus on the quantity of choice available, no matter what kind of choice is involved; the second are interested only in choice of the right, undominated quality (Pettit, 1997, p.25).

While drawing a distinction between the 'negative' conception of liberty as non-interference and republican idea of freedom as non-domination is not an easy task, on the other hand, how it differs from the 'positive' liberty is not so much confusing, as "the absence of mastery of others clearly does not guarantee the achievement of self-mastery" (Ibid., p. 22). So, Pettit knowing how dangerous and thin line exists between the 'negative' and republican conceptions of freedom, exclusively contrasts his ideal of freedom with 'negative' liberty, to prove that they are different ideals. Moreover, he tries to prove, how his conception of freedom as non-domination is not at all concerned with the freedom in the positive sense. For example, while he tries to argue against the reading of republicanism according to which, it "praises positive liberty above all", Pettit emphasis that actually republicanism was about "the importance of

avoiding interference" (Ibid., p. 29). Thus, Pettit totally distances from the 'positive' conception of liberty and concentrates mainly on the 'negative' one. Pettit explains his move as follows: in case we equate 'positive' freedom with the self-mastery, and personal autonomy, it comes out to be "a richer ideal than that of freedom as non-domination" (Ibid., p. 81). This is obvious as, if there is a domination, we certainly cannot talk about personal autonomy, while on the other hand, there can be a non-domination without a self-mastery. Pettit understands the relationship between the republican freedom and 'positive' liberty as two staged issue - firstly, we need freedom as non-domination to be realized and only after that it will be easier to achieve an autonomy, a self-mastery of individual. This means that in contrast to 'negative' freedom, Pettit sees 'positive' freedom to be consistent with the republican understanding of liberty. And this stand also saves him from claiming that state should take an "explicit responsibility for promoting people's personal self-mastery … people can be trusted to look after their own autonomy, given that they live under a dispensation where they are protected from domination by others" (Ibid., p. 82). Moreover, the devices designed for controlling the state by the side of people saves Pettit also from the dangers of 'positive' liberty ascribed to it by the defenders of the conception of 'negative' liberty.

Before finishing this chapter, it is essential to emphasise one more important aspect in the definition of freedom as non-domination, the point that domination is a matter of 'common knowledge'. Pettit argues that when the all above-mentioned conditions of domination are fulfilled, one additional point also is realized, that domination becomes a matter of common knowledge. There is always a common consciousness in a group or in a society that there is a domination presented. Thus, "domination is ... going to involve the awareness of control on the part of the powerful, the awareness of vulnerability on the part of the powerless, and the mutual awareness - indeed, common awareness among all the parties to the relationship" (Ibid., p. 60). As in the case of domination, it is a matter of common knowledge when there is a non-dominating relationship between the different parties presented. As it is understood in the republican tradition, the ideal of non-domination "means the absence of domination in the presence of other people … it is a status associated with the civil role of the *liber* (Ibid., p. 66). This social dimension unravels an intersubjective element of republican freedom. When you are free in a sociaty, you need to be recognized by your fellow

citizens as such. Therefore, enjoyment of freedom as non-domination implies intersubjective recognition by other people in the society. This means that, "the enjoyment of non-domination in relation to another agent … goes with being able to look the other in the eye, confident in the shared knowledge that … you pursue [your] choices, as of publicly recognized right … you are somebody, not a nobody" (Ibid., p. 71). By this definition, freedom as non-domination is a civil liberty; it cannot be realized in isolation. Now, when it is more or less clear what Pettit understands by freedom as non-domination and how he distinguishes it from the 'negative' conception of freedom, it is important to see whether his understanding of republican freedom can serve as a social and political ideal. After we have seen how personal freedom as non-domination is achieved, we will see how freedom as non-domination as political ideal can be realized.

3.3 Republican Freedom as Social and Political Ideal

It is essential to understand that modern republican conception of freedom is not only a personal good, but at the same time, it can serve as a social and political ideal. As Pettit argues, republican freedom is a distinctive concept - with a range of distinctive answers to the many problems of social and political philosophy - which is not only a personal ideal, but also an ideal of political institutions. According to him, freedom as non-domination, "identifies a complaint that is meant to be at once personally motivating and politically feasible" (Pettit, 2012, p. 1). Being at once personal good and main goal of political institutions, allows philosophers to avoid additional supplement values in their theories of freedom, as "it already requires institutions that perform well in regard to values like equality and welfare; thus, those values do not have to be introduced as distinct desiderata" (Pettit., 1997, p. 81). However, it should not be understood as if freedom as non-domination belittles other values like justice, equality or welfare. On the contrary, it argues that in order, the republican freedom to be achieved, we need a community, where social justice is distributed and citizens enjoy equality. Social justice and equality are necessary conditions in order, freedom as non-domination to be realized and at the same time, it gives us the possibility not to seek for independent theories of justice and equality. Let's discuss in detail how Pettit sees freedom as non-domination to be a personal, social and political ideal.

Republican freedom as a personal ideal is characterized by Pettit as an instrumental good, that is "a good that generates other benefits for the individual who enjoys it" (Ibid., p. 82). The main benefit for the individual, which he enjoys under the freedom as non-domination, is the undominated array of choices, choices that are not affected by an arbitrary intentional interferences. Pettit argues that, it is impossible for anyone to stay 'indifferent' to the following benefits which republican freedom presupposes: "to be able to live your life without uncertainty about the interference you will have to endure; to be able to live without having to stay on your toes in dealing with the powerful; and … without subordination to others" (Ibid., p. 90). The relationship of non-domination which individuals and groups enjoy towards one another, Pettit introduces as the ideal of social justice.

The republican theory of social justice argues that the state should establish an equal relationship of non-domination for its citizens in relation to one another, "arguing that this can only mean equality in the enjoyment of certain fundamental choices, the basic liberties" (Pettit, 2012, p. 77). That is, whatever benefits the state provides within the frame of social justice to its citizens, they are provided "in an expressively egalitarian way" (Ibid., p. 78). Freedom, which is the goal and main good of the republican justice, should be promoted "under the expressively egalitarian constraint of treating those citizens as equals" - '*each is to count for one, none for more than one*' - this the neo-republican principle of equality defended by Pettit (Ibid., p. 82).

The egalitarianism here should not be understood as treating people necessarily equally, rather the main idea is that they should be treated *as equals*. Which also means that "without necessarily having to embrace a material egalitarianism, republican consequentialism is required to support what we can describe as structural egalitarianism", that is 'expressive egalitarianism' (Pettit, 1997, p. 113). Though, sometimes promotion of the intensity of freedom as non-domination may require reduction in the material inequalities, "connection between maximizing non-domination and ensuring material equality" is not tight (Ibid., p. 118). Even when we assume that the state can distribute the material holdings between peoples in a way that is not in itself dominating, "they may well have the effects of imposing more limits than they remove" (Ibid., p. 118). Of course, very huge differences in wealth may threaten to the freedom as non-domination of the less well-off people, however, "assuming that they are not allowed to have this effect, they are consistent with the

status of a free citizen being available to all, richer and poorer alike" (Pettit, 2012, p. 85). What is more important according to the social justice of freedom as non-domination is to secure the expressive egalitarianism mentioned above. As Pettit argues,

> people should securely enjoy resources and protections to the point where they satisfy what we might call the eyeball test. They can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this regard with the best (Ibid., p. 85).

In identifying what will be the sufficient resourcing and protection in order the eyeball test to be satisfied, Pettit follows (as he himself also notes) approach introduced by Amartya Sen (1983) "in the development of his criterion of functioning capability" (Pettit, 2012, p. 87). According to Sen's capability approach, "to be poor - to lack a basic functioning capability in your society - is closely related … to being unable to live without shame amongst your fellows"; the line taken here by Pettit is that satisfying the eyeball test requires the absence of the capacity of anyone else to interfere arbitrarily in the choices of an agent, who in turn requires having the sufficient resources and power to avoid such kind of possible arbitrary interferences (Ibid., p. 87). In case of social justice, where people will need sufficient resources in order to avoid domination, "the approach can be cast as sufficientarian" (Ibid., p. 88).

This line of argumentation allows Pettit to support even the basic income policy as necessary step toward the increasing the intensity of freedom as non-domination. Pettit argues that, "republicanism makes room for justifying something like a right to basic income" (Pettit, 2007, p. 1). He claims that, republicanism can make more persuasive case for a basic income that utilitarian or liberal alternatives can do which is caused by the very fact that republicans define freedom in terms of non-domination. The republican argument for the basic income is straightforward "if I am not assured a basic income, there will be many areas where the wealthier could interfere with me at tolerable cost" (Ibid., p. 5). Such right would mean that people will be able to function adequately in a given society without the fear of being dominated by better-off ones. Such kind of basic income right should be unconditionally distributed and therefore, it may avoid the criticism mostly waged against the luck egalitarianism - criticism of

'shameful revelation' and subjectivism[3]. As Pettit argues "universal right … mean[s] that those who rely on the basic income...[do] not have to assert their right on the ground of being a class apart … [it] symbolizes the fundamental equality of all in relation to the collective provisions of government" (Ibid., p. 6).

To introduce the republican freedom as non-domination as a political ideal, the idea of political legitimacy should be emphasized, which devices the policies against the state's domination above its citizens. Thus, the theory of political legitimacy puts forward how freedom as non-domination can be achieved in the relation of citizens with the state. That republican freedom should be understood as a political ideal is evident from a fact that, private individuals cannot satisfactorily pursue it by their private means like friendship; on the other hand, this ideal is successfully and effectively carried out by the state. Pettit rightly argues that "it is generally going to be bad for the cause of non-domination to rely on people's having reciprocal powers sufficient to check one another's interference … the strategy of constitutional provision … is much more promising" (Pettit, 1997, p. 93). Thus, in order to get political, public freedom we need to have a system under which we the people control the very law that gives us individual, personal freedom as non-domination.

Moreover, republican freedom can be understood as Pettit argues, as a communitarian ideal too, as "it is a social good and a common good" at the same time (Ibid., p. 121). Freedom as non-domination is a social good as long as it cannot be enjoyed alone, in the absence of other people. As we have already seen above, republican liberty requires the legal and political arrangements and it presupposes existence of other people and society. This ideal is a common good - "a common good from the point of view of each vulnerability class" (Ibid., p. 124). If your class, or ethnic group is exposed to the interference on the arbitrary basis by powerful onesand as such is dominated, even if you may not be actually dominated - because you are just lucky one - as you belong to the dominated class you are dominated as well. For example, "to the extent that any women can be abused on an arbitrary basis by her husband, womanhood is a badge of vulnerability; … it is a badge of vulnerability that you, fortunate though you are, must bear in common with other" (Ibid., p. 123). For Pettit and for new republicanism as

[3] See Wolf, J. (1998). Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 97-122, Wiley Publication.

such, the observation that freedom as non-domination is a communitarian good is very important, as it gives us reason to identity freedom as social and common good and thus, connects us with other people and state.

3.4 Different Conception of Freedom?

Several objections can be identified with Pettit's republican conception of freedom as non-domination. The first widely supported objection, which was even waged against the classical republican tradition is the 'means-end objection', according to which freedom as non-domination "describes not so much liberty itself, as the safeguards and preservations of liberty" (Paley, 1825, p. 359). Pettit rejects such kind of criticism on the ground that, republicans do not try to secure freedom from arbitrary interference "by no matter what means", it is due to the fact that they value liberty itself, that republicans try to 'secure' freedom, "the point is not just to make arbitrary interference improbable; the point is to make it inaccessible" (Pettit, 1997, p. 74).

According to the second 'traditional' objection, the ideal of republican freedom is 'too demanding', that it is 'too hard' and it may "inflame expectations that can never be gratified, and disturb the public content with complaints, which no wisdom or benevolence of government can remove" (Paley, 1825, p. 359). The counter question which Pettit states to this kind of criticism is stated as follows: "does this [fact] ... give good ground for rejecting the republican approach and for embracing instead the modernist, liberal ideal of freedom as non-interference" (Pettit, 1997, p. 78)? The whole theoretical work of Pettit is to support the idea that it does not.

The most rigorous criticism raised against the modern republican conception of freedom and against Pettit is done by the contemporary political scholars. Starting with the definition of freedom as non-domination and to refer to Berlin's distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, it is possible to say that, Pettit's neo-republican idea of freedom is a 'negative', not a 'positive' conception of liberty. Republican freedom is distinct from the 'positive' conception of liberty so much as "freedom from domination by others is not equivalent to being one's own master"(Larmore, 2001, p. 230). Moreover, "the republican concept of freedom cannot lead to anything like the oppressive consequences feared by Berlin, because it has a commitment to non-domination and to liberal-democratic institutions already built into it" (Carter, 2016). Thus, freedom as non-domination definitely is not a 'positve'

conception of liberty, though has the capacity within itself to embrace this understanding of freedom as well.

On the other hand, despite being the 'negative' conception of liberty, it should be proved that freedom as non-domination is different from 'negative' freedom as non-interference. It is a matter of debates whether the republican concept of freedom is really distinguishable from the 'negative' conception of freedom understood as the absence of obstacles, or whether republican writers on freedom have not simply provided good arguments to the effect that 'negative' freedom is best promoted through certain kinds of political institutions rather than others. Much of the most recent literature on political and social freedom has concentrated on this debate over the differences between the republican and liberal ('negative') conceptions of freedom. Ian Carter (1999, 2008), Matthew H. Kramer (2003, 2008), and Robert Goodin and Frank Jackson (2007) have argued, that republican policies are best defended empirically on the basis of the standard 'negative' ideal of freedom, rather than on the basis of a conceptual challenge to that ideal. As Carter noted "this liberal conception of freedom is not, as is often supposed, ultimately distinguishable either from traditionally socialist conceptions or from the republican conception recently proposed by Philip Pettit" (Carter, 1999, ch. 8). An important premise in this kind of reasoning is that, the extent of a person's 'negative' freedom is a function not simply of how many single actions are prevented, but of how many different *act-combinations* are prevented. On this basis, people who can achieve their goals only by bowing and scraping to their masters must be seen as less free than people who can achieve those goals unconditionally. Another important premise is that the extent degree to which a person is negatively free depends, in part on the *probability* with which an agent will be constrained from performing future acts or act-combinations. People who are subject to arbitrary power can be seen as less free in the negative sense even if they do not actually suffer interference, because the probability of their suffering constraints is always greater, than it would be if they were not subject to that arbitrary power. Perhaps this probability is sufficient to explain the sense of exposure and precariousness of the 'dominated'.

However, as we have seen above, Pettit is always insisting that what matters for the neo-republican conception of freedom is the impossibility of others interfering with impunity, not the improbability of their doing so. Moreover, it is the emphasis on the

capacity of arbitrary interference which makes a huge difference between the freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination. Republican freedom is not that kind of 'negative' freedom which equates freedom only with the absence of the actual interference. Contemporary republicans, and namely Pettit "claim that their view of freedom is quite distinct from the negative view of freedom", the view which concentrates only to the absences of obstacles (Carter, 2016).

As identified above, there is two main ground on which these two conceptions of 'negative' freedom differ from each other. Firstly, according to Pettit, domination may be presented without any actual interference; and secondly, every act of actual interference needs not to be considered as domination "only arbitrary power is inimical to freedom, not power as such" (Ibid., 2016). And it is the positioning of well constituted law not as an arbitrary interferer which distinguishes republican idea of freedom; it is precisely on this second ground "that the two 'negative' conceptions of freedom differ most tellingly" (Larmore, 2001, p. 231).

Not only the conception of freedom as non-domination is a subject of severe criticism, republican freedom as social and political ideal is criticized too. Neo-republican account of social justice is criticized on the three following basis: (a) that it fails to account for certain values such as substantive fairness; (b) that it represents an uncomfortable hybrid of egalitarianism and sufficientarianism; and (c) it fails Pettit's own 'eyeball test' (Southwood, 2015, p. 669). From these, the essential one is the third criticism that freedom as non-domination fails the 'eyeball test'. It is essential as it is at the heart of the intersubjective character of the modern republican conception of liberty. Based on this 'eyeball test' individuals recognize each others as free and undominated and are able to look each other into the eyes.

About the 'eyeball test' Southward argues that meeting this test is not necessary meeting the threshold of undominated choice. For example, if we are both under that threshold and dominated by others in different spheres, "we might say that, we are indeed able to look one another in the eye - not from a lofty position but from an equally subordinated one" (Ibid., p. 674). To Southwood's criticism Pettit answers that, people were they equally dominated in a set of choices may satisfy the 'eyeball test', but he puts aside this possibility on the ground that, "it is extremely hard to see how the system imagined could be implemented" (Pettit, 2012, p. 92). He argues that, his theory "is consistent with some citizens having more resources and more choices

than others; equal freedom of movement may allow the rich to drive but the poor only to walk", though, such discrepancies do not mean a departure from the egalitarian standard of strict equality; "the only discrepancies allowed … are those that are consistent with each having the ability to look others in the eye without reason for fear or deference; and equal undominated status consists precisely in the equal enjoyment of that ability" (Pettit, 2015, p. 693).

3.5 Conclusion

For our thesis the most important critique raised against republicanism is that the idea of freedom as non-domination does not embrace a distinctive conception of freedom at all, rather eventually it falls into the 'negative' conception of liberty as non-interference and thus, is undistinctive. As we have seen this criticism is subsequently very well defended by Pettit. He and other defenders of this ideal managed to "shown how its contours differ significantly from those of non-interference and self-rule" (Larmore, 2001, p. 234).

The proponents of the neo-republican ideal of freedom as non-domination, are representing this freedom to be an important value which may take a significant place in the modern political theorizing. Pettit's analysis of freedom has inspired a number of recent works by political theorists sympathetic to the republican tradition. Frank Lovett has developed an account of domination as a descriptive concept, and of justice as the minimization of domination (Lovett, 2010). Several other authors have made use of the concept of domination in addressing more specific problems in normative political theory, such as disability rights, workplace democracy, social equality, and education policy (De Wispelaere and Casassas, 2014; Breen and McBride, 2015).

On the whole, it can be said that freedom as non-domination can be implemented as a social and political ideal. It is an intersubjective, communitarian and egalitarian ideal. This new republican ideal of freedom is distinctive concept with an array of distinctive answers to the major modern political problems. It is an ideal having at once personal, social and political spirit. It is an ideal which is not afraid of the rule of law. Ideal, which appreciates the role of community in the life of an individual and ideal, which concentrates on the status of a citizen who can walk tall and look others in the eye without the fear of domination. This ideal is reach and maybe hard to implement in the political life of a community but which at least deserves to be heard of and appreciated.

4. HEGEL'S FREEDOMS

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the modern republican idea of freedom as non-domination is a distinct and rich concept of liberty. After we have elaborated, defined, discussed and emphasised the main features of it, now it is time to understand what Hegel's idea of freedom implies and how it is the modern republican conception of liberty. Hegel's idea of freedom, which takes a pivotal role in his social and political philosophy, as mentioned in the first chapter, is not an easy concept. At the same time, Hegel's conception of freedom can be said to be "something different" (Wood, 1990, p. 37). At the center of this difficulty and difference is the fact that, not just one simple concept of freedom is discussed in Hegel's political thought and especially, in his *Philosophy of Right*. It is not an easy task to identify all conceptions of freedom elaborated, supported or criticized by Hegel in this book. In what follows, we will discuss 'personal freedom', 'moral freedom', Hegel's concept of 'substantive freedom' or 'concrete freedom', on the one hand, and the ideas of subjective and objective freedoms, on the other. However, we will see that, though distinguishable from each other, these conceptions of freedom conceptually are dependent on one another. The first and second sections of this chapter will deal with Hegel's subjective and objective conceptions of freedoms respectively. In the third section, we will see how Hegel's idea of freedom is based on the togetherness of these two important aspects of freedom and especially, on the concept of recognition. In the fourth section, it will be argued that, Hegel's idea of freedom is actually a neo-republican conception of liberty, that the structure of freedom as non-domination and Hegel's idea of freedom are the same, which in turn should be the foundation of the three main institutions of *Sittlichkeit.* The issue of how this idea of freedom is actualized in these institutions will be discussed in the last chapter of this thesis. At this moment, our task is to identify how different Hegel's idea of freedom itself is and argue for its being republican.

As indicated in the second chapter, the interpretation of Hegel's idea of freedom in this thesis, takes 'self-determination' to be the foundation of his concept of liberty. According to this 'self-determination' thesis, an agent is free "when it is determined by itself - when it is the source of its determinations, or properties - rather than

determined by 'other' (that is, by something alien or external to itself)" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 18). The *Philosophy of Right* starts with an abstract, undeveloped and incomplete will, which is eventually transformed into the developed, concrete and complete will. It starts with the will, characterized with the ability to withdraw from any kind of determinacy, "*absolute possibility* of *abstracting* from every determination in which I find myself" (PR, §5R; emphasis in original). This is the doctrine of 'being-with-oneself', where the will is independent, unlimited, and 'self-sufficient'. However, here comes Hegel's another fundamental doctrine, according to which "every being acquires its determinacy - every being is what it is - only through its relations to some other" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 19). Thus, for Hegel, true freedom does not consists in negating others, but "instead in choosing one's determinacy, actively identifying oneself with them" (Wood, 1990, p. 48). For him essential independence, 'substantial freedom' cannot be achieved by abolishing the other, but rather by "doing away with ('negating') the otherness, or alien character, of the other" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 19). Freedom is a state of condition, which is best represented as the process of overcoming this otherness, "a kind of mediated identity between ourselves and the world" (Matarrese, 2010, p. 107). This, according to Hegel, is the proper "self-determination of the I, positing oneself in a negative of oneself, that is, positing oneself as determined, limited, and remaining with oneself (*bei sich*)" (PR, §7). Thus, for Hegel freedom is defined not just as 'being-with-oneself', but also as 'being-with-oneself-in-an-other' (*Beisichselbstsain in einem Anderen*) (PR, §§5-7A).

This structure of the free will is the base of all concepts of freedoms, which are discussed in the *Philosophy of Right*. We will see that this two staged process - firstly, a being, who possesses a self-determining will and who knows itself as 'free' and second, this free will which is actualized into the world, not by abolishing the other, but rather by recognizing, by incorporating this other into his understanding of self - is the main foundation of Hegel's idea of freedom which is precisely what makes it republican. However, let us before discuss Hegel's idea of freedom and start firstly, with his differentiation between 'subjective' and 'objective' freedoms. We will see that, it is only through the unity of these objective and subjective freedoms that we can achieve the true 'concrete freedom'. These two components "objective and subjective moments of *Sittlichkeit"* (PR, §144, 146), where the first refers to concrete laws and

institutions of the state and the second to the disposition of the members of that state, will be discussed separately in the next two subchapters.

4.1 Subjective Freedom

Subjective freedom is only one component of Hegel's overall idea of freedom. It involves the subjective identification on the part of the agent to the social and political institutions to which he belongs. It means that, those individuals who enjoy the 'substantial' freedom, should "stand in a subjective relation to their social institutions … this subjective relation … 'subjective disposition' … can be thought of as a 'frame of mind', or a conscious attitude individuals have toward the social institutions to which they belong" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 85). This disposition is characterized by Hegel as follows: the laws and institutions of the concrete state "are not something *alien* to the subject; on the contrary, the subject bears the *spiritual witness* to them as to *its own essence*, in which it possesses its *self*-awareness [*Selbstgefühl*]" (PR, §147; emphasis in original). Why should this subjective disposition be called as freedom? We can say that, it involves freedom in the sense that, individuals experience belonging and conformity to the social institutions and laws of their state only by their own free activity and choice. As subjective freedom "requires that one identify with one's actions and ends, and this will typically involve some feeling of independence, self-directedness and autonomy" (Matarrese, 2010, p. 106).

The development of the conception of subjective freedom has a specific historical location and time. As Hegel stresses, it was emerged in Western Europe at the beginning of Christianity, "the principle of the *self-sufficient and inherently infinite personality* of the individual, the principle of subjective freedom, ... arose in an 'inward' form in the *Christian* religion and in an external form (which was therefore linked with abstract universality) in the Roman world" (PR, §185R; emphasis in original). In its 'inward' form of subjective freedom, individual's "inner world achieved recognition" (James, 2012, p. 44). This inward form we can identify with the second part of the *Philosophy of Right* - 'Morality' (*Moralität*). On the other hand, the 'external' form of subjective freedom is discussed in Hegel's 'Abstract Right' (the first part of his *Philosophy of Right*) and is associated with the Roman Empire, where the equal status of the citizens was lawfully recognized. Thus, for Hegel, that freedom which individuals attain through their subjective disposition is an activity which "is

expressive of individuals' particular identities and a substantial source of their status as selves of recognized value, or standing" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 110). Let us discuss these two important parts of the *Philosophy of Right* - 'Abstract right' and 'Morality' and their foundations: the personal and moral freedoms respectively.

4.1.1 Personal freedom

The personal freedom is discussed in the first section of the *Philosophy of Right*, in the Abstract right and is the freedom of personhood. It refers to the external form of subjective freedom, that is to the equal statuses of citizens. At this stage, persons have universal immediate equal rights, simply because they are persons, that is "[they] are conscious that [they] are free and that freedom must be respected" (Houlgate, 2005, p. 186). It is from this equation of personal freedom with individual rights that the first imperative of Abstract right is derived: "Be a person and respect others as persons" (PR, §36). Rights which are immediately given to persons, are rights to property, to exchange or sell goods, to conclude contracts, and a right to own your body.

Persons at this stage, have the capability to self-determine themselves. Firstly, by abstracting themselves totally from the particular determinations and then, this "completely abstract 'I'" (PR, §35) can re-identify with the particular determinations chosen according to his desire. Though, being motivated by given drives and desires the persons have the capacity to choose among these given drives and desires. Hegel calls this will 'arbitrary will' (*Willkür*), "in order to emphasize that such a will qualifies as self-determined simply by virtue of its having chosen which ends to act upon, regardless of the reasons for having chosen as it did" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 24). Arbitrary will, that is freedom just to choose among the given alternatives, is not an actual free will, however, it is an essential part of the 'substantial' freedom.

Now the question arises of how, these persons, who understand themselves to be self-determined - even in the sense of 'arbitrary will' - can actualize their conceptions of selfs in the world? A person actualizes its self-conception "by having at his disposal a portion of the external world, made up of will-less entities, or 'things' (*Sachen*)" (Ibid., p. 25). In this domain, the 'arbitrary will' has an exclusive sovereignty and all other wills are excluded. Thus, it is "by appropriating external natural objects as his property, [that] the person transforms them from potential limits on his freedom into expressions of it, and so affords himself a way of giving his freedom an external, objective form

which other must recognize and respect" (Houlgate, 2005, p.186). Having an exclusive, external domain of action over the 'things', over their lives and their bodies, allow persons to enjoy a certain kind of freedom, a being-with-oneself- in-an-other.

However, in the sphere of Abstract right, the immediate rights which we have does not guarantee that the immediate rights of other persons are respected too, "one might actually violate those rights even though one knows that one must respect them" (Ibid., p. 189). Indeed, any society, where the persons have right to own private property, is always endangered that those rights may be infringed. The sphere of Abstract right as well, is full of such threat and "it must always be thought together with the possibility of [rights'] violation" (Ibid., p. 189). Moreover, in this sphere, "the determinations who is right, and who is wrong, who is to be redresses and who is to be punished, cannot be carried out … there is no intelligible way to talk about the set of social conventions and moral obligations" (Matarrese, 2010, p.103). When we start to understand what is right, what is good or evil, look for some conventions or general obligations; when we grasp the free will, which not only understands freedom to be something that should be respected, but rather something which should be guarded against the possible violations and contingencies too, means that the sphere of Abstract right is already left behind and we have entered into the new sphere of Morality.

4.1.2 Moral freedom

In the moral sphere, which is discussed in the second part of the *Philosophy of Right,* in contrast to persons, moral subjects who are self-determining in the sense that they can choose "which among the given desires they want to take as ends for action; they also have the capacity to determine their wills, … in accord with their own principles or, more precisely, in accord with their own understanding of what is (morally) good" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 25). As Hegel tells us, "the *right of the subjective will* is that whatever it is to recognize as valid should be *perceived* by it *as good*, and should be held responsible for an action - as its aim translated into external objectivity - as right or wrong, good or evil" (PR, §132; emphasis in original). Thus, the moral subject is bound to will what is good; however, it must also be remembered that "the moral will is not constrained by any outside force to will what is good, but is a will that knows itself to be freely self-determining" (Houlgate, 2000, p. 191). Hegel defines the concept of good as the unity of right and welfare, that is, it includes not only what is

right, but also, for it the moral subject's well being and subjective satisfaction is important.

Now, how this conception of the self should be actualized into the world is a complex matter, as one's will is determined according one's own normative principles. There is no objective idea of good for every member of society. The moral subjects are free, when they act according to their own idea of good, when they "determine their ends in accord with it, and successfully realize that vision in the world by bringing about the good through their own actions … such actions count as the subject's own … because they follow from normative principles that the subject itself rationally endorses" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 26). So, the agent actualizes his own idea of good into the world by his action and as in this realm agents are mainly concerned with their own subjective freedom they know what they will and that they will good. However, at the same time, subject cannot make an objective distinction between right and good; he cannot know why there is a conflict between right and good, and moral subject cannot resolve this conflict, as "what I see as good is not necessarily what is right and there will be instances of conflict that seem irresolvable"; he cannot resolve this conflict because what is good is universal and it should be applicable to every member of the 'ethical life' (Rose, 2007, p. 86). The moral reflections about one's principles, motives or actions are crucial, but "Hegel held that moral reflection alone can neither generate nor justify a set of substantive moral principles" (Kenneth, 1993, p. 250).

This can be said to be a deficient side of the sphere of morality. The problem is not that the moral subject may do a morally wrong action, rather "the evil ... lies in being conceived that one is doing good because one's sacred, inviolable conscience tells one so" (Houlgate, 2005, p. 194). Thus, in the sphere of morality, there is always a "possibility of turning at any moment to evil", as any moral subject can conceive that his particular idea of good is universal good (PR, §139). As it is already evident, one basic reason of this possibility is the fact, that there are no objective system of principles, institutions, duties and laws; as "without any shared content for moral reasoning, we are left with a society characterized by tension, and a chaotically diverse set of views about what is right, good, justice … this is why 'ethical life' is needed" (Matarrese, 2010, p. 104).

We have seen that, personal and moral freedoms have deficiencies which require the sphere of Ethical life, discussed in the third part of the *Philosophy of Right*. As

Neuhouser notes, the necessity of Ethical life, "is that the solution of both these problems [problems of personal and moral freedoms] lies in an account of good (or rational) social institutions" (Neuhouser, 2000, p. 32). In turn, these rational social institutions enable individuals to develop their "subjective capacities required to realize the freedoms of personhood and moral subjectivity" (Ibid., p. 32). Thus, while, being insufficient concepts when they stand alone independently, the personal and moral freedoms are important parts of Hegel's overall idea of freedom. On the one hand, there is a subjective relation on the part of the individuals to their social institutions, while, on the other hand, these institutions objectively make the realization of personal and moral freedoms of individuals possible.

4.2 Objective Freedom

From the above analysis of Hegel's different conceptions of subjective freedom, we have seen that, genuine 'substantial' freedom cannot be just immediate, arbitrary will. It should take the form of subjective moral will too. However, as we have also seen, this is not enough as well. While, on the one hand, personal and moral freedoms are necessary conditions for Hegel's idea of freedom, on the other hand, they are not sufficient. As Hegel notes "the sphere of right and that of morality cannot exist independently [*für sich*]; they must have the ethical as their support and foundation" (PR, §141A). This means that, while subjective freedom requires the subjective identification (inward or external) on the part of the individuals to their actions, social roles, institutions and laws, it is never complete without the objective freedom. In the paragraph §153, Hegel notes that "the *rights of individuals* to their *subjective determinations to freedom* is fulfilled in so far as they belong to ethical actuality; for their *certainty* of their own freedom has its *truth* in such objectivity" (PR, §153; emphasis in original). Thus, Hegel' idea of freedom demands objective freedom.

Like subjective freedom, we can say that objective freedom is also some kind of "disposition towards civility … of being open to the values of laws, customs and institutions and of knowing how to trust them and find freedom is them" (Houlgate, 2005, p. 196). This means that, in order social members to identify with the social and political institutions subjectively, these institutions "must also be objectively *worthy* of that identification … they must meet the criteria Hegel sets out for *rational* social institutions" (Ibid., 115; emphasis is original); they must represent that they are

"rational in and for itself" (PR, §258). And, in the Ethical life we have genuinely objective and universal freedom, because here individuals do not have to search for what is good or what are their "immediate 'natural' rights ... but must find it in the objective world" (Hardimon, 2005, p. 195). Thus, the elements which gave ethical sphere the objective content and which "exalted above subjective opinions and preferences: *are laws and institutions which have being in and for themselves*" (PR, §144; emphasis in original).

What it means that the social institutions are 'rational in and for themselves? Here arises the problem of 'unquestionable obedience' on the part of the citizen to the laws and institutions of his state and as we have seen in the second chapter this idea is always emphasized in the totalitarian reading of Hegel's social and political theory. However, the close reading of the *Philosophy of Right* makes it clear that, Hegel's objective conception of freedom is not the condition of unfreedom or doing only that what the state dictates; "*Sittlichkeit* involves no servitude or loss of freedom, because the laws and customs which set out the duties of ethical consciousness do not constitute an alien authority to which consciousness must submit itself" (Houlgate, 2005, p. 195). On the contrary, it is through these institutions and customs as the subjective freedom is realized. It does not mean that in this sphere uncritical or unreflective obedience to these laws is presupposed. It does not mean as well that obedience to the objectified institutions should be understood as the "submission to the status quo"; rather 'ethical life' is "indeed to include rather than exclude individual moral reflection ... [it] is a special kind of critical reflection on social life, not a prohibition against reflection" (Wood, 1990, p. 195).

Indeed, being 'rational it and for themselves' implies that social and political institutions make it possible for the individuals to realize their subjective forms of freedom, associated with personhood and moral subjectivity. As we have mentioned above, Hegel notes that "the subject bears *spiritual witness* to them as to *its own essence,* in which it has its *self-awareness* [*Selbstgefühl*] and lives as in its element which is not distinct from itself" (PR, §147; emphasis in original). We should not forget this important condition identified by Hegel, "if ethical civility is to constitute a form of genuine freedom and not just open the door to tyranny, the laws and institutions in which trust is placed must merit this trust by guaranteeing the rights of personal inviolability, property and moral responsibility" (Houlgate, 2005, p.

196). Thus, according to Hegel, genuine objective freedom should incorporate other subjective conceptions of freedoms too, which makes totalitarian interpretation simply wrong. As Hegel notes, individuals "have duties towards the state to the same extent as they also have rights" (PR, §261). While, the individual recognizes that in the society his own particular moral good may not be the good for the rest of individuals of that society and when he obeys the demands of objective right, in turn the social and political institutions should guarantee the individual rights and secure his subjective freedom.

From these discussions of Hegel's subjective and objective aspects of freedom, it is clear how different and distinct conception of freedom he has. It is also evident that Hegel's idea of freedom is not just 'positive' conception of freedom, though it contains the element of self-determination and autonomy, which is essential element of his freedom. It became also clear that Hegel's freedom is something more than the conception of 'negative' freedom as well. Thus, Hegel's freedom is broader conception, than 'negative' freedom and it does not fit the borders of 'positive' freedom either. Moreover, we can say that, actually, "it tries to capture features of both; the conditions for Hegelian freedom are established in a matrix of social relations that allow for some degree of non-interference as well as relations of positive identification" (Matarrese, 2010, p. 107). It is the relationship of subjective and objective conditions of freedom that makes Hegel's idea of freedom distinctive and something more than just 'positive' or 'negative' conceptions of freedoms. It is precisely this element, which opens the door to the possibility to argue that it is actually modern republican conception of liberty.

4.3 Hegel's Republican Idea of Freedom

At first sight it may be questioned what is exactly republican about Hegel's idea of freedom. As we have mentioned in the previous chapters, there are many themes in Hegel's political philosophy, which are not consistent with republicanism. Moreover, after discussing the republicanism, systematically revived recently by Pettit, we became aware of the fact that republican freedom is 'negative' conception of liberty, though conceptually different from the 'negative' freedom as non-interference. We also understood that, actually "what in the Hegelian approach is a constituent or a precondition of positive social freedom, is for Pettit not an issue of freedom at all"

(Laitinen, 2015, p. 3). On the other hand, we know that Hegel's conception of freedom is more than just 'negative' or 'positive' conceptions of liberty; it does not fit these borders and encompasses some aspects of both. However, despite these evident differences between republicanism and Hegel's idea of freedom and in view of the fact that Hegel rejects and criticises some classical conceptions of republicanism, we will see that, "he does so not in opposition to republicanism itself, but … he recognizes that republicanism must be refashioned to accommodate the realities of the modern world" (Buchwalter, 1993, p. 1). Thus, this thesis argues, that at the heart of Hegel's idea of freedom is located republican understanding of freedom, more precisely, modern republicanism. As Bohman notes, "along the lines of the contemporary republican revival of Pettit and Skinner, Hegel could easily be taken to be a close republican cousin rather than a distant conservative relative" (Bohman, 2010, p. 436).

Let us see in detail how at the heart of Hegel's idea of freedom rests republicanism. To start with the two main republican premises elaborated in the previous chapter: first, 'liberty-versus-slavery theme' and second, 'law-and-liberty theme', we will see that the core ideas of Hegel about freedom has republican features. According to the first theme of republicanism - 'liberty-versus-slavery' theme - to be subordinated to the will of others, is the condition of being unfree. Slavery is just the opposite of freedom. We have seen that the classical republicanism, as well as Pettit's modern republican political thought, see exposure to the arbitrary will of another or living at the mercy of another as the conditions of not being free. Hegel agrees with this republican theme. According to him, "if we firmly hold to the view that the human being in and for himself is free, we thereby condemn slavery" (PR, §57A). This means that, Hegel also contradicts freedom with slavery. Historically the justification of slavery and the right of lordship, according to him, "depend[ed] on regarding the human being simply as a *natural being* [*Naturwesen*] whose *existence* [*Existez*] … [was] not in conformity with his concept" (PR, §57R). This *natural being*, did not know himself to be free, "who has not yet worked out that he is a person" (Knowles, 2000, p. 121). However, in the modern area, when personality is understood and accepted to be an universal right, possessing one's life and body is seen as the universal right of self-ownership, which is in turn, in direct connection to one's freedom. In this case, when the slavery exists it means that slave does not have his own will and his "actions are guided by an alien authority ... [it is a slave] which has not yet completed

its infinitive return into itself as objective" (PR, §26A). It is only when human being is apprehended as in and for himself, that slavery or any subordination of the will of alien authority is contrary to freedom "the truly free person cannot be the belonging to another" (Knowles, 2000, p. 121).

At the heart of condemnation of slavery and understanding any kind of alien authority as the restriction of one's freedom is the idea of self-certainty, that is, the idea of recognition. The idea of recognition will be more in detail discussed in the following subchapter, at this stage it will be sufficient to state, that, if someone is a slave or anyhow subordinated by the will of other its self-understanding is not self-sufficient: "its essence is life or being for another" *(PhG,* p. 167). The slave cannot claim "validity for his particular self" and therefore, is not free (Wood, 1990, p. 87).

To proceed with the second equation, 'law-and-liberty theme', for republicanism, individual freedom and law do not stand in opposition with one another. According to this line of republican thought, we have seen that the state or any political institution in itself does not lessen the individual freedom. On the contrary, these are precisely those institutions, which secure freedom from domination and it is only under the property constituted law that individuals enjoy equal freedom. According to this tradition, despite the fact that law or any political institution, which may be understood as coercive and which actually may interfere with people's lives, do not decrease the individual freedom, if these interferences are not arbitrary, if the law is properly constituted and if the political institutions are the result of objective right. This kind of equation, of course, will be unconvincing for liberals who associate freedom only to non-interference and understand law in itself to be coercive. However, in contrast to them, "Hegel would agree with the republicans that law as such does not constitute an impediment to individual freedom, nor to the very sphere of freedom" (Korda, 2017). What does law mean for Hegel? As he explains, "when what is right *in itself* is *posited* in its objective existence [*Dasein*] - i.e. determined by thought for consciousness and *known* [*bekannt*] as what is right and valid - it becomes law" (PR, §211; emphasis in original). Thus, according to Hegel, when 'right in their universality' is 'known by thought', it becomes law and has the binding force. That is, only rationally constituted system of laws demonstrate the "objective actuality of right", the sphere of objective freedom (PR, §210). So, what is objectively right becomes legal. Moreover, Hegel claims that, "good laws will cause the state to flourish" (PR, §229A). According to

him, the best way of educating a person in ethical issues, is making him to be "citizen of a state with good laws" (PR, §153).

However, even if agree that at the heart of Hegel's idea of freedom is this republican understanding of freedom-law connection, actually it is clear that, Hegel's freedom is more than this. Hegel's understanding of freedom, as we have seen, includes subjective part of this conception - subjective freedom which emphasis the fact that any law, which may constrain the individual, is actually the result of his freedom itself. These two sides of freedom, subjective and objective parts, individual freedom and state institutions are interconnected, they are just determined by each other; "on that account one should not seek protection against the law as such because this would actually mean seeking protection against one's freedom" (Korda, 2017). These discussed themes of republicanism are just two main general aspects, which resembles Hegel's freedom to republican understanding of liberty; however, this is not the whole story. Now, we need to proceed by elaborating the main aspects of subjective and especially, objective freedom to see the main republican character in Hegel's idea of freedom. This aspect, necessary for the idea of freedom is the concept of recognition, the idea of 'common knowledge' as Petitt names it and the statuses of free persons.

4.4 Mutual Recognition and Status

Alongside with the above-discussed familiarities between the two main themes of republicanism and the corresponding understanding of them by Hegel, the most important aspect, according to which we can argue that at the heart of Hegel's idea of freedom rests republicanism, is his concept of freedom itself. Despite the fact that Hegel does not use the term 'republicanism' in his characterization of freedom and despite the fact that modern republicans do not identify Hegel as their philosophical antecedent, the main similarity exists between their conceptions of freedom. Not only make, both Hegel and modern republicans, freedom as their central concept of political philosophy, they both have the same understanding of freedom as well; they both understood it as the unity of subjective disposition with the objective conditions. In case of Hegel, while, on the one hand, there is a subjective relation on the part of the individuals to their social institutions, on the other hand, these institutions objectively make the realization of personal and moral freedoms of individuals possible. In addition, at the heart of this relation and Hegel's attempt to show the necessity of these

institutions and practices for the development and maintenance of free and rational individual is his theory of recognition. According to Hegel, the only way that the agent can affirm himself as free and independent agency (subjectively and objectively) is in a community of mutual recognition. In case of Pettit's republican idea of freedom, firstly, we have personal freedom as non-domination, which is achieved and secured by the legitimate state institutions and rule of law; these institutions and law in turn are the result of political freedom of the citizens to control and put in place the objective conditions for their personal freedom. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Pettit argues that when the conditions necessary for freedom as non-domination are fulfilled one additional aspect also needs to be realized, that non-domination should be a matter of 'common knowledge'.

As for Hegel, so for the neo-republicans too, freedom is the result of recognition, it is a status achieved in the society of other, without the possibility of exposure to the control of another. They both, Hegel and republicans hold that recognative relations constitute freedom. This is the main similarity between Hegel's idea of freedom and modern republican conception of liberty. To appreciate this core similarity between republicans and Hegel, we need to know what this 'relations of recognition' means for Hegel and for republicans. According to Pettit, there is always a common consciousness in a group or in a society that there is a domination or non-domination presented. The condition of domination or non-domination involves "the mutual awareness - indeed, common awareness among all the parties to the relationship" (Pettit, 1997, p. 60). In consequence, as it is understood in the republican tradition, the ideal of non-domination "means the absence of domination in the presence of other people" (Ibid., p. 66). And it is this social dimension that unravels an intersubjective element of republican freedom. Moreover, in the republican tradition, freedom from domination requires constitutionally guaranteed and secured statuses of free individuals, "it is a status associated with the civil role of the *liber*" (Ibid., p. 66); "statuses that are necessary for overcoming … vulnerability to domination" (Bohman, 2010, p. 439). It is because of this intersubjective element of republican conception of freedom and its equation with statuses of free person, that "the enjoyment of non-domination in relation to another agent ... goes with being able to look the other in the eye, confident in the shared knowledge that ... you pursue [your] choices, as of publicly recognized right ... you are somebody, not a nobody" (Pettit, 1997, p. 71).

For Hegel too, the 'relations of recognition' play an important role in his idea of freedom. Hegel's conception of 'struggle for recognition' is one of the famous themes in his philosophy. However, in the modern state, in the modern political life, which is the main concern of the *Philosophy of right*, "relations of mutual recognition already exist and so there is no need for anyone to relive the struggle for recognition in the sense of the master-slave dialectic" (Matarrese, 2010, p. 110). Though, it may be helpful for our argument to mention the idea of master-slave dialectic in a just few sentences. The idea of the 'struggle for recognition' is about how the self achieves its self-consciousness, self-recognition, through the recognition of another and through the recognition of himself by this another that is through the mutual recognition. We can say that, for Hegel, "the relationship between self and otherness is the fundamental defining characteristic of human awareness and activity" (Duquette, IEP). The other with which the self encounters is firstly seen as an obstacle which prevents the self to achieve the condition of freedom; "however, that otherness cannot be abolished or destroyed, without destroying oneself, and so, ideally there must be reconciliation between self and other such that consciousness can "universalize" itself through the other" (Ibid., IEP). In the case of master and slave, that is in the case of relations of dominations, the recognition is not complete. The genuine recognition between two consciousnesses must be mutual; "I can have an adequate consciousness of myself only if I am recognized by others and recognition can be adequate only if it is fully mutual" (Wood, 1990, p. 78). Thus, recognition "cannot be one-sided, it cannot be afforded to persons by non-persons, as it cannot be afforded to masters by slaves" (Knowles, 2002, p. 102). That is why according to Hegel only in the sphere of *Sittlichkeit* recognition can be mutual, as it is the sphere of 'substantive' freedom, where everyone should be free.

Generally, for Hegel the successful 'relations of recognition' is evident in the structure of freedom itself. As we have seen above, Hegel defines freedom as "to will something determinate, yet to be with oneself [*bei sich*]" in the other (PR, §7A). The intuitive idea of this 'relation of recognition' is evident even in the sphere of Abstract right, where subjects' consciousness of themselves is completely abstract; it is "completely abstract 'I' in which all concrete limitation and validity are negated and invalidated" (PR, §35R). The person in Abstract right "is the individuality of freedom in pure being-for-itself" (PR, §35A). However, the necessity for recognition is straightforwardly

evident even in this abstract sphere "since the concept of the person has minimal substantial content and is entirely constituted by practices of recognition" (Knowles, 2002, p. 105). Intersubjective recognition is a demand of personal freedom to be realized in Abstract right, demand that each must "be a person and respect others as persons" (PR, §36). Because, if we claim that, Abstract right is a sphere of personal freedom, "the demand for equality raises its head: you, too, are a person" (Rose, 2007, p. 60), as I cannot claim to be a person but at the same time, do not recognize others as such too.

To see myself as distinct person, my distinctiveness should be recognizable by others, and this is possible only when my personality is expressed externally by possessing of private property. David Rose even characterizes the necessity of private property as a way of communication, the objectification of freedom, which "allows free beings to mark out their distinctiveness and to bring them to an understanding of themselves" (Ibid., p. 69). In general, in the sphere of Abstract right, particular persons, in order to understand themselves and to be recognizable as free persons by others, possess property and in order, their particularities to be secured this property must necessarily be privately held. Private property should not be understood as a necessary condition for personal freedom, it is not means by which we attain freedom, rather "property is necessary for the self-consciousness and thereby mutual recognition that is integral to freedom" (Knowles, 2002, p. 117).

How the sphere of Morality, on the other hand, can incorporate the theory of recognition? The main idea here, as we have seen above, is that the reflections of the subject and its own understanding of good "are never merely 'subjective'; they always reach out into the objective world" (Wood, 1990, p. 135) by action. According to Hegel, "the expression of the will as *subjective* or *moral* is *action"* (PR, §113; emphasis in original). As in the case of Abstract right personal freedom was expressed by taking into the possession an external property, Morality as well "involves the will's giving 'existence' to itself or 'being with itself in another'" by action (Wood, 1990, p. 135). The intention of particular will, which was externalized by action was recognized by others; actually it required the recognition by others, it needed to "be validated by the other" (Rose, 2007, p. 82). This requirement shows that in Morality there is an opposition, though I am presented as an individual will who knows "what is good … his judgements are constrained by the interpretation of the other" (Rose, 2007, p. 83).

Thus, Morality is a domain of subjective freedom, where particularity is celebrated, and where freedom is understood as "individual achievement...though that will is constrained by the recognition of other persons as bearers of rights and other moral subjects as entitled to welfare" (Knowles, 2002, p. 191). Therefore, from moral point of view, the intersubjective, communal understanding of what is good, "the shared expectations, values and mores of a society are necessary for and supplement moral freedom in that they make the recognition of a subject's intention certain for both the self and the other" (Rose, 2007, p. 86). This is already the demand of the right of objectivity, demand that the intentions of a moral subject and his understanding of his action should be harmonized "with the other's interpretation of the act" (Ibid., p. 84).

Those deficiencies which are characteristic to these spheres of Abstract right and Morality and which were the main reason of why they have been *aufgehoben*, shows how Ethical life should be the sphere of actual mutual recognition. Hegel characterizes the domain of Ethical life as a sphere of "freedom, or the will which has being in and for itself as objectivity, as a circle of necessity whose moments are the *ethical powers* which govern the lives of individuals' (PR, §145). Ethical life provides those standards of objectivity, which was not possible in Morality, by identifying objective laws or customs of society. On the other hand, it enables individuals to realize their subjective particularities as well. We can say that, Ethical life "incorporates the subjective and objective elements of freedom in the actualization of those categories, values and meanings which make human freedom possible" (Rose, 2007, p.106). In Ethical life the objective conditions, that are rational institutions and rule of law and subjective conditions, that is the personal disposition toward the institutions and society they belong, are united. As Hegel notes: "the state is the actuality of concrete freedom" (PR, §260). Ethical life is based on the idea of recognition between self and other; "the ethical life theory is an account of successful recognition" (Ibid., p. 184). As Honneth notes, "throughout the book Hegel maintains that the freedom of individuals ultimately only begins once they take part in institutions whose normative practices ensure mutual recognition" (Honneth, 2014, p. 46). The institutions of Ethical life family, civil society and state represent the "embodiments of different forms of reciprocal recognition", where the unity of self and other is evident (Honneth, 2012, p. 30). Of course, recognition across these three domains is not same but overall, Ethical life can be characterized "as the stabilized and institutionally supported system of pure

recognition in the domains of the family, civil society and the state" (Matarrese, 2010, p. 110). They "supply an identity, a sense of self in which the agent is certain of recognition by others without surrendering any of his particularity" (Rose, 2007, p. 113). If the institutions and political arrangements, which Hegel endorses in his Ethical life, are plausible or not and how they actualize the Hegel's idea of freedom, will be discussed in the following chapter. Now, for us it is important to emphasise that the theory of recognition is the key at every stage of Hegel's idea of freedom; it is the key in the realization of the idea of concrete freedom for Hegel, as "freedom ... understood by Hegel [is] to involve a certain sort of self-relation and a certain sort of relation to others" (Pippin, 2008, p. 186).

In each domain, from the Abstract right to Morality and Ethical life, dependence on the other is not a limitation of one's freedom or one's independence. On the contrary, "Hegel stresses that one can be truly free in the presence of others, even while being dependent on them" (Laitinen, 2015, p. 9). As in any kind of society, we always encounter others, the only way we can attain the true freedom is when these others affirm and approve our freedom, that is when we are free in relation with these others; "what is needed is not absence of others, but a freedom-friendly relationship to the other" (Ibid., p. 9). The 'other' here can be not only other individuals, it can not be only the community, government and social institutions to which the agent belongs, the 'other' is also our motivations, desires and drives, our state of mind. However, dependence does not presuppose that domination will prevail. On the contrary, the genuine mutual recognition is a guarantee that, through the relations of the dependence individuals achieve their freedoms. Thus, we can say that while, Hegel is aware of the fact that "human dependence, whether biological or psychological, on others cannot be eradicated ... domination by or subordination to the will of other individuals can" (Ibid., p. 10). It is precisely in the mutual recognition between free individuals and their dependence on each other for their freedoms, that domination has a key role. If we have a mutual recognition, domination should be automatically impossible. It is in this relationship of recognition that non-domination is central.

As we have seen in the second chapter the main 'civic humanist' or republican argument, which Patten employed in his book was the thought that "free society is a fragile construction that can be sustained only if certain objective and subjective conditions are met" (Patten, 1999, p. 167). He has not emphasised the main condition

of ‘mutual recognition’ in which “individuals can recognize one another as free and rational agents and thereby solidify the self-understanding that are integral to *being free* and rational” to be Hegel’s main republican idea of freedom (Ibid., p. 177; emphasis in original). However, as we have seen Hegel’s arguments about the Ethical life as being the sphere of the ‘mutual recognition’ and the realization of the substantial freedom, “only make sense if it fulfills the central republican demand: that the capacity of others to dominate is not just currently absent, but structurally impossible” (Bohmen, 2010, p. 440). Hegel’s subjective conception of freedom plays the crucial role here; subjective freedom cannot be realized while an agent is dependent on the arbitrary will of another. This will mean, “to lack those recognitive statuses that others share when they are not dominated” (Ibid., p. 440). That is, in a society, I can only be free when other members of that society are free too. For republicans, as well as for Hegel, “independence is a kind of dependence (Pippin, 208, p. 25). The structure of freedom, as for Hegel, so for republicans is the same: you are free though others.

This kind of conception of freedom, which is based on the ‘relations of recognition’, on the mutual recognition, “requires institutionally defined statuses” (Bohman, 2010, p. 438). As we have seen in the previous chapter, Pettit equated this kind of liberty with the role of citizen: “non-domination is status associated with the civil role” (Pettit, 1999, p. 69). As the citizen of a state not only should I be secured from the interference I should be guaranteed that no one has the power to interfere arbitrarily in my will, because as I am rightful citizen of my state, I am powerful as well and this is “the power to prevent certain ills from happening” (Ibid., p. 69). Thus, republican understanding of freedom “requires the shared capacity and statuses that are necessary for overcoming such vulnerability to domination” (Bohman, 2010, p. 439). This is only possible in a society, where freedom is shared, where freedom is the result of ‘mutual recognition’, where freedom has an ‘intersubjective’ character. With this account of non-domination and statuses, we see that “to be dominated is to fail to be recognized as independent in the presence of others and indeed fail to have a will at all; it is precisely not to have the statuses and powers of citizens” (Ibid., p. 440). This central dimension of the conception of republican freedom is essential for Hegel’s idea of freedom as well. The statuses, which individuals develop and acquire in Hegel’s Ethical life “do in fact achieve freedom as non-domination (Ibid., p. 440). These statuses developed in the domains of Ethical life will be discussed in the following

chapter; at this point, it becomes clear that, Hegel's idea of freedom is an intersubjective, 'social' concept of republican freedom.

4.5 Conclusion

As we have argued, Hegel's idea of freedom and the theory of recognition, which is at the heart of his freedom, shares Pettit's and in general modern republican emphasis of the relationship of independence through the dependence and its "stress on non-domination" (Laitinen, 2015, p. 9). Though, from the above detailed discussion of Hegel's freedom it became evident, that "more things get to be called freedom by Hegel than by Pettit, who sees non-domination as a form of negative freedom" (Ibid., p. 9). However, this fact does not make the similarity between these two conceptions of freedom less important. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous chapter Pettit leaves the room in his 'negative' conception of freedom as non-domination for 'positive' understanding of freedom as self-autonomy. On the other hand, we have discussed in this chapter, how Hegel's idea of freedom is the unity of subjective and objective freedoms, how it encompasses both 'negative' and 'positive' conceptions of liberty. Despite of all differences, "Pettit's ideal of 'non-domination' captures a crucial aspect of Hegel's understanding of the structure of 'being at one with oneself in another' (Ibid., p. 20). The structure of freedom, as for Hegel, so for republicans is the same: you are free though others. It is in this relationship of recognition between the self and other, that the conception of freedom as non-domination is central. For both Pettit and Hegel, freedom is the result of subjective and objective conditions and of intersubjective recognition. For both of the freedom is more than just 'negative' or 'positive' liberties. They both are a kind of 'social freedom' to use Axel Honneth's taxonomy. As Honneth notes, "the intersubjective concept of freedom expands … into a 'social' concept of freedom" (Honneth, 2014, p. 45). It is this relationship of subjective and objective freedom, this social conception of liberty, which makes their ideas of freedom richer, modern and at the same time difficult to be actualized.

5. ACTUALIZATION OF HEGEL'S REPUBLICAN IDEA OF FREEDOM

In the last chapter of this thesis I turn to the last domain of the *Philosophy of Right*, and more precisely, to the institutions of the ethical life in order to understand whether Hegel's republican idea of freedom is duly actualized in his institutional order. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Hegel's idea of freedom shares republican emphasis on the relationship of independence through dependence. We have seen that the main objective of Hegel's idea of freedom, as well as of republicanism was the theory of recognition, theory of intersubjective dependence, according to which, you are free though others. It was in this recognitive relationships between the self and other that the conception of freedom as non-domination was central. Now it is time to see how much these recognitive relationships are realized and achieved in the institutions of *Sittlichkeit,* in the family, civil society and state. Our central issue here is to capture, how much Hegel's devotion to the concept of non-domination and to the shared freedom is realized for every citizen of his state.

In what follows, we will discuss three main ethical institutions separately. In the first section, institution of the family, the immediate ethical institution, will be elaborated. We will see that, despite the mutual recognition - based on the feeling of love - between partners, by which they achieve freedom in this union, the institution of family is exposed to some form of dependence and domination. The second institution of *Sittlichkeit,* civil society will be discussed in the second section of this chapter. We will see that, in this sphere of 'economic activity', where everyone is concerned only with his particular needs, it is realized that in economic system everyone is actually interdependent and it is through this interdependence and recognition of the need of each other that they achieve their subjective freedom. However, as in the sphere of family, despite the smooth functioning of economy and some interventions on the side of the state institutions to guarantee the welfare of its citizens, we face the problem of poverty. This problem of poverty and consequently, the emergence of the class of 'rabble', which seems to be the structural problem is civil society, raises some issues of domination and dependence. The emergence of this class of 'rabble' then, questions how truly the Hegel's idea of freedom is presented and actualized in this sphere.

The final section of the chapter will elaborate the last domain of *Sittlichkeit* - the state. In this last section, two main moments of the state will be discussed: first is the decree, legislation and execution of law; second concerns the disposition of the citizens towards the state and their participation. We will see that, because of Hegel's scepticism towards people - as he deprives citizens of the state the right to political participation, the right to vote - the issues of domination and dependence may arise. And this is barely in line with his idea of freedom, with the non-domination and shared freedom. Even if we do not support democracy and do not praise the rule of majority, being accountable to the citizens, giving the power of control to people is one of the ways in which we can protect freedom as non-domination. Thus, the overall argument of this chapter is that, despite the fact that Hegel's idea of freedom is modern republican conception of liberty, his ethical institutions do not make domination and dependence structurally impossible. In the ethical institutions we can say that Hegel contradict himself. However, as important as this is, it may not pose any substantial threat to his republican idea of freedom. We can find resources within his thought to respond these problems, but, this is already the topic of another paper, at this moment what is interesting for us is the fact that, the institutional norms, which Hegel offers us in his ethical life are against his idea of freedom itself.

5.1 Family – Subjugation of Women

The sphere of family is the first domain of Ethical life, where Hegel's idea of freedom should be actualized. It is the first sphere of Ethical life where the subject should liberate himself by fulfilling his duties to his family. Generally, Hegel's account of family is a modern, nuclear family which is based on the feeling of love. It is because of the fact that love is a feeling, that family is "ethical life in its natural form" (PR, §158); we will see later that the foundation of the state is not feeling, rather in the case of state we have already objective rational laws and institutions which citizen understands and knows. However, in the domain of family, love is the most important element, "love is a paradigmatic account of how I can overcome my separation and find myself *at home* in the other" (Rose, 2007, p. 114). Firstly, I as an independent person, do not want to be alone, because this makes me incomplete and it is through this feeling of love, that "I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person [*daβ ich in ihr gelte*], who in turn gains recognition in me" (PR, §158A). Love

is the feeling by which the intersubjective union of the family is established, where 'I' becomes 'We'. It is in the family life, where the self is united with the other based on the feeling of love; two totally independent particular persons come and establish the unity of 'we'; and according to Hegel, it is precisely this kind of unity, which is liberation "from personal isolation through love … [w]e enrich ourselves when we lose ourselves through the love of another" (Knowles, 2002, p. 246).

Actually, we can understand the account of love as a right of a particular individual; as a right to love someone. As Hegel notes, the origin of marriage lays in "the free consent of the persons concerned, and in particular [in] their consent *to constitute a single person* and to give up their natural and individual personalities within this union" (PR, §162; emphasis in original). That is, while there may be different origins of marriage and it may depend on many different particular things, the main origin should necessarily be the feeling of love and the free consent of the individuals who are in love with each other. According to Hegel, in these modern times, "the subjective origin [of marriage], the *state of being in love,* is regarded as the only important factor (PR, §162A; emphasis in original). Even in the case when parents arrange marriages, the persons who should get married must have an inclination towards each other. The right to love, is the right of subjectivity and is associated with the subjective freedom, "this is associated with the subjective principle of the modern world" (PR, §162R).

Another right, which is associated with family life is the right to divorce. In case of divorce the members of the family become again independent, self-sufficient individuals. This right to divorce is associated with the subjective freedom as well and precisely to the foundation of marriage itself, that is to the feeling of love. As the foundation of marriage is the feeling, naturally it is 'unstable', you may not love the person anymore who you loved once and who you have married. We can say that because of this instability of feeling, family "has within it the possibility of dissolution" (PR, §163A). Moreover, just as the individuals have right to marry only those people with whom they are connected with the feeling of love and there should be no force to marry those people who are not in love with each other, there cannot be also any "legal [*rechtliches*] or positive bond which could keep the partners together once their dispositions and actions have become antagonistic and hostile" (PR, §176). The partners have right to divorce, when the 'total estrangement' occurs and there is no feeling of love in the family left anymore.

Based on these two important rights derived from the subjective conception of freedom, we can say that Hegel's modern family avoids the domination and subjugation in two respects: firstly, by being against the arranged marriages, which is contrary to the right to love and secondly, despite the possible divorce, each member of the family has the equal share in and claim to the family resources. In the first case, arranging the marriages arbitrarily shows a disrespectful attitude towards women. As Hegel notes, "among those peoples who hold the female sex in little respect, the parents arrange marriages arbitrarily, without consulting the individuals concerned; the latter accepts this arrangement, since the particularity of feeling [*Empfindung*] makes no claim for itself as yet" (PR, §162). In this kind of arranged marriages, there is no subjective part of freedom presented and the marriage is just seen 'as a mean to other ends', like just finding a husband, to become wealthy, to achieve some political or other kind of connection and etc. On the other hand, when the genuine and ethical base of marriage is love, the feeling which is the expression of subjective freedom and as you are totally committed to the person you are in love with, makes family duties, not the restriction, not the burden for partners involved, but rather are "in fact their liberation" (PR, §162). Marriage is an ethical relationship and it is because of this kind of understanding, that Hegel discredits understanding of marriage as a contract relationship. He labels the contractual understanding as 'disgraceful', because as in the arranged marriages there is no subjective element evident here as well and this kind of understanding, "entitl[es] the parties concerned to use one another' (PR, §162A). Thus, Hegel's answer to the justification of arranged marriages (or understanding of marriage just as a contractual relationship), which have "susceptibility to dominations [is] the modern idea of marriage based on love", where the subjective conception of particular freedom has its say (Bohman, 2010, p. 443).

The second case of how Hegel avoids the domination in the sphere of family is by giving to each family member the equal claim to and share in the family resources. Family as independent, universal person, which stands in relation to other such independent, universal persons in the society, not only can have its own property, actually it needs private property and resources in order to be recognized as independent and free entity (we will discuss in detail the importance of the private ownership for Hegel in the next section). Despite the fact that (as we will see below), Hegel denominates husband as the 'head' of family, who represents it in the external

relationships, is responsible for the family resources and etc, these resources which is the private property of the family is the common property of each family member. As Hegel notes "no member of the family has particular property, although each has a right to what is held in common" (PR, §171). In this respect, he criticises the Roman law, according to which, the wife has more closer binding relationship to her father's family, than to his husband and children. In contrast to this understanding, as the modern family is based on the 'ethical love', the "new family is more essential, than wider context of blood relationships and the marriage partners and children form the proper nucleus" (PR, §172A). It is exactly due to this fact that, the resources of the family belongs to every member of it. And it is due to the "the common ownership by the partners", that is case of the dissolution of the family, by natural causes, when the 'head' of the family dies or the marriage ends by divorce, the wife and the children receive their share; "the share of various members of the family in the common property will be preserved" (PR, §172R). Any kind of arbitrary inheritance or bequest of the family resources infringes ethical relations. Moreover, Hegel argues that the law which '*favors sons over daughters'* and totally excludes them from inheritance, "depends on an arbitrariness which in and for itself has no right to recognition", as 'equality of inheritance' is the main idea of Ethical life and family (PR, §180R).

Despite these rights given to women in the sphere of family and despite the attempts to avoid the domination within it, Hegel represents a very objectionable account of women and their position within the family and within the *Sittlichkeit* in general. Despite the fact that Hegel accepts the right of women to love and to choose their partners according to their subjective opinion and disposition, despite having the rightful claim to the family property and having the right to divorce, Hegel characterizes women as 'passive' and 'subjective'. His characterization of women and their position is controversial to his criticism itself, which he raises against the Roman law. He discredits Roman law for its being unethical, because according to it, a woman who was entering into the relationship of marriage, was actually "entering a state of slavery", and she was also "debarred from inheriting the resources of those who *were actually her family*" (PR, §180R; emphasis in original). However, despite all of these, in contrast to men who have the "knowledge and volition of *free universality*" and who are the important members of the *Sittlichkeit* by taking active role in the civil society's and state's life, women, on the other hand, according to Hegel have their "substantial

vocation [*Bestimmung*] in the family" (PR, §166; emphasis in original). The only place and position for women, according to Hegel is 'marital relationship'. As Bohman notes, Hegel's "concern with domination does not extend to restriction of women to the domestic sphere" (Bohman, 2010, p. 443). Moreover, despite the fact that women may be well educated, they "are not made for the higher sciences, for philosophy and certain artistic productions which require a universal element" (PR, §166A). Hegel does not stop at this, he proceeds that "when women are in charge of government the state is in danger", and all of these, because women do not act according to the universal idea, but rather mostly depend on their feelings, inclinations and mere particular opinions (PR, §166A).

This rather terrifying account of sexual division was and still is the object of criticism of Hegel, not only by the feminists, but by every reasonable person who believes in the idea of equality and justice. From the above discussion of the family rights and from Hegel's general idea of freedom discussed in the previous chapter, we see that, Hegel's treatment of women is totally in contradiction with his theory of recognition and the idea of freedom. As Rose notes, Hegel's "indefensible division of sexual labour" runs counter to "the demand for recognition [which] becomes asymmetrical and hence contradictory for subjective freedom" (Rose, 2007, p. 116). Even Hegel's own simple demand in marriage that it should be monogamy is contrary to the positioning of women in just the sphere of household. The only argument of Hegel to demand monogamy was that, marriage "is personality or immediate exclusive individuality [*Einzelheit*] which enters into and surrenders itself to this relationship, whose truth and *inwardness* (*the subjective form of substantiality*) consequently arise only out of the mutual and undivided surrender of this personality" (PR, §167; emphasis in original). And this kind of mutual surrender is possible only between the two *free, self-sufficient and independent person*. If these persons are not equally free, if they do not have equal rights as persons, then according to Hegel, there can not be any possible genuine recognition between them. This is the structural problem for Hegel, as this kind of "distribution of normative powers and statuses in the family leads inevitably to the possibility of domination" (Bohman, 2010, p. 443).

Though, in contrast to this kind of reasoning, it is also argued, that these kind of shortcomings characteristic to the Hegel's account of the family life, this gender based division of roles between men and women, can be adjusted to the modern contours. It

is argued also that, we should not let these details distort the main idea of the family. What is important about the general idea of the family is that, partners who are going to marry to each other are two independent, different selves, who in the family establish the unity and they are more free than when they are alone. However, in line with Bohman's criticism, Hegel in characterizing the role and position of women in the family, is contradicting his own idea of freedom, the main demand for recognition, the conception of shared freedom, independence through dependence. He actually opens the door for arbitrary domination, which is in contrast to his freedom. By his claim about the authority of husband and subordination of women, "Hegel is unconcerned about the lack of any status for the wife outside the family, leaving her without any standing in public practices of mutuality and even without commutative status as interlocutor or deliberator" (Ibid., p. 443). And, while this kind of reasoning would not be the problem for the classical republican understanding, according to which "the state could aspire to realize the ideal only for a small elite of males: the property-holding, and indeed mainstream, males who made up the citizenry" (Pettit, 1997, p. 48), this is definitely wrong for the modern, neo-republican way of reasoning. As Petitt claims, "any ideal of government would have to present itself as a universal ideal, not just as an ideal for an elite citizenry" (Ibid., p.49). The institutions designed to further the modern republican conception of freedom as non-domination should accomodate women's voices as well as men's.

5.2 Civil Society – Wrong Done to Poor

Though its formation is linked with the modern world and its full development presupposes the existence of the state, in Hegel's system civil society is a stage between family and state. Civil society is a domain of difference, a unity of different 'particular persons', where the principle of subjective freedom, of self-sufficient particularity is most praised. In this sphere, every concrete, particular person is concerned with his welfare, with the satisfaction of his particular needs and thus, acts according to his arbitrary will. Hegel's civil society provides the possibility to its each member to "best express [their] individuality through the selection and satisfaction of particular wants and needs" (Rose, 2007, p. 120). Though, taking care of the particular needs and acting on the arbitrary basis may be the source of 'boundless extravagance' and it is because of these, that "civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and

misery as well as of the physical and ethical corruption common to both" (PR, §185). Given these negative sides of particularity, some may think, that we would be better-off without the principle of subjective freedom. Hegel rejects this kind of reasoning. He is aware of the fact that, "the modern world is stuck with the principle of subjective freedom", that it should be respected, however, "must be contained, channelled, [and] controlled" (Knowles, 2002, p. 263). It is crucial element of modern freedom that persons should pursue their particular ends from which they can derive their satisfaction and that this private ends should be respected.

The fact that, in this realm everyone uses the other as a means to their ends, that every concrete person is concerned only with his own welfare, with the satisfaction of his particular needs, does not mean that universality is entirely rejected. Still, the civil society is a domain where the relations of particular persons with each other is an "exclusive *mediation*, of the form of *universality*" (PR, §182; emphasis in original). Particular persons while satisfying their particular needs are doing this with the reference to others, they "gain satisfaction by simultaneously satisfying the welfare of other" (PR, §182A). In Hegel words, "in furthering my end, I further the universal, and this in turn furthers my end" (PR, §184A). It is thus, through this 'system of all-round interdependence', that in civil society we have some form of universality; though universality here has only the external constraint and that's why civil society is an 'external state', 'state of necessity' in the sense that, the universal norms applied in this domain are imposed on the particular persons only externally. However, what is important and essential in these interdependent economical relationships is that the individuals are interconnected, as "I acquire my means of satisfaction from others, [in turn] I am compelled to produce means whereby others can be satisfied" (PR, §192A). So, despite the fact that civil society is the 'state of necessity', through the promotion of particular needs, it promotes inter-personality. This interconnectedness and interdependence involves equality and '*quality of being recognized*'. As Rose notes, "the social will generated by the satisfaction of needs is one of cooperation with others, recognizing them as persons who will consent to aid one if one is equally open to aiding them" (Rose, 2007, p. 119). So, despite the fact that in civil society, universal and particular may seem to be separated, they are actually interconnected and condition each other.

In civil society, in order to take part in these economical relationships, in order to be recognized as equal, every particular person "must be somebody [*etwas*]" (PR, §207A). Particular persons can only be somebody when they belong to the estates. As Hegel notes "a human being with no estates is merely a private person and does not possess actual universality" (PR, §207A). Membership of an estate is an expression of the subjective freedom, as every particular person chooses the estate according to his 'subjective opinion' and 'particular arbitrary will', though, sometimes, other factors such as birth or other external circumstances may have a huge influence as well. At the same time, it is due to the membership of the estates, that the subjective particular will is mediated with the universal, due to the membership that he "gain[s] *recognition* in his own eyes [*Vorstellung*] and in the eyes of others" (PR, §207; emphasis in original), and it is due to the membership of the estates, that they are recognized as free person. So, at the level of civil society, to be a member of an estate, that is to be 'somebody', means that "an act of pure recognition, in which we see the other as an individual with a free will and an alienable property" is established (Matarrese, 2010, p. 111). Therefore, it can be said that in civil society, while the individual is satisfying his own particular needs, exchanges property, labor or money for the things the other owns, enters into the contract relationships and etc. he needs to recognize the others in the society and he needs to be recognized by others as well.

As civil society is an 'universal family' for each particular individual and as in civil society particular persons are equals, "the individual [*Individuum*] becomes a son of civil society" and they have equal rights (PR, §238). One of the important rights of particular individuals is that, civil society should secure their welfare, "*particular welfare* should be *treated as a right* and duly actualized" (PR, §230; emphasis in original). Individuals have "the right to demand livelihood from society" (PR, §240A). However, as mentioned above, the resources in civil society is depended on particularities, such as physical or mental strength, individual particular will, skill, capital and etc. That's why civil society is full of contingencies. For example, by the work and labor society creates wealth, universal and permanent resources in which particular individuals have the opportunity to share. But the share which everyone has in this resources depends on their skill and capital, on how much they contribute to this wealth of society. This is very dangerous condition, as it may be the source of "*inequalities in the resources and skills* of individuals" (PR, §200; emphasis in

original). Though there is an authority of Police, which should secure the welfare of individuals and which must avoid such inequalities or should penalize the wrong and contingencies presented in civil society; and even though, the "correct relationship [between consumers and producers] re-establishes itself automatically", here still remains one major problem in civil society (PR, §236). This is the problem of 'rabble' [*Pöbel*].

5.2.1 Private property

Before proceeding with discussing the problem of 'rabble', it is important to discuss and elaborate Hegel's understanding of property and how much it is in line with his republican idea of freedom. The discussion of property in the *Philosophy of Right* takes place in the Abstract right. However, as it is also connected with the sphere of civil society and the subjective conception of freedom, it seems proper to discuss it at length here. According to Hegel, the ownership of property should not be understood just as the means for satisfaction of our subjective arbitrary wills, rather property should be understood as "first *existence* [*Dasein*] of freedom … an essential and for itself" (PR, §45R; emphasis in original). This means that, it is through the ownership of property that the person expresses his freedom, he expresses that he is an independent, free person; "not until he has property does the person exist as person" (PR, §41A). Because, it is only through the possession of these things [*Sachen*], which are 'unfree', 'impersonal' and 'without rights', that the personal freedom becomes objectified.

We know that the possession of property may be private or common. For Hegel, ownership of only private property is the 'rational moment'. According to Hegel, it is required for persons to own property in private. As he notes, common property or "a ban on the principle of private property may easily suggest itself to that disposition which misjudges the nature of the freedom of spirit and right" (PR §46R). This kind of reasoning misjudges and misunderstoods the idea of freedom itself, as the private ownership of property is the expression of my 'specific' personal will; "I give my will existence [*Dasein*] through property, property must also have the determination of being this specific entity of being mine" (PR, §46A). It seems that Hegel does not provide us with something new in his discussion of property. As many his predecessors, he also connects the ownership of private property with freedom. According to this old and quite reasonable thesis "private property expands the liberty

of the individual property-holder by removing certain obstacles to the realization of his ends and/or by providing him a medium in which to express himself and to pursue his conception of the good life" (Patten, 1999, p. 139). So, Hegel too understands that private property is necessary for the development of personal freedom. As Patten elaborates Hegel's attempts to justify the private ownership of property, he states that "private property helps to develop personality because it gives the individual a concrete perception of his independence, a perception that confirms the sense of himself as independent that is an essential part of being a person" (Ibid., p. 149). However, this does not show that a person could not develop the same perception and development with reference to the common property. This kind of argument only shows that private property is sufficient but not necessary condition for developing one's personality and perception of one's being free. If this is the stage where the Hegel's argument about private property can bring us, then it is incomplete and not justified. However, there is also one element in Hegel's account of private property which should be emphasized.

So, why exactly the ownership of property should be private and not common? Why, according to Hegel it is the necessary condition for developing and understanding oneself as free? The main element which should be emphasized here is the connection between private ownership of property and mutual recognition. As Houlgate notes, "by appropriating external natural objects as his property, the person transforms them from potential limits on his freedom into expressions of it, and … [gives to] his freedom an external, objective form which others must recognize and respect" (Houlgate, 2005, p. 186). Hegel's justification of private ownership is directly connected to his theory of recognition, as when I place my will in an external thing and state that it is mine, other persons notice it; it "includes the ability to be recognized by others" (PR, §51). Holding the private propert for Hegel is important "primarily because of the way in which private property mediates the recognition of others - a recognition that is essential to the development of the capacities and self-understandings that are integral to free personality" (Patten, 1999, p. 159).

In *the Philosophy of Right* this connection between the private ownership of property and recognition is not so evident. It is almost two passages where Hegel emphasizes this connection, the one mentioned above and in the other he states that: "a person, in distinguishing himself from himself, relates himself to *another person*, and indeed it

is only as owners of property that the two have existence [*Dasein*] for each other" (PR, §40; emphasis in original). Thus, according to Hegel property is a 'medium' by which our personality, that we are free individuals are discerned and recognized not only be me, but by other persons too. This means that, private property should not be understood as a necessary condition for personal freedom, it is not means by which we attain freedom, rather "property is necessary for the … mutual recognition that is integral to freedom" (Knowles, 2002, p. 117). It is through the property that we as equally free individuals manifest our will, our particularity and differences to the world; it is through my private property that, I declare myself as a person, a person who "become[s] *actually* different by appropriating what *is* different" (Ibid., p. 113; emphasis in original).

While elaborating the institution of the private property, there is no demand for Hegel to own the equal property. On the contrary, possessing of the property equally is for him just the "characteristic of the empty understanding" (PR, §200R). For him, "the formal equality of persons has no implications for the different amounts of property that individual persons may own" (Wood, 1990, p. 106). We know that as persons, we are equal and have equal rights. Thus, as person everyone has right to own the property, and everyone should own one, however, "what and how much I possess" is contingent as it is wholly dependent on particularity (PR, §50). Therefore, demand for the equal possession of property is contrary to the principle of particularity itself. If we compare these two issues about the property with the claims of modern republicanism, we see that in the institution of private property, Hegel's idea of freedom is really realized in the republican way. Philip Pettit also argues for the private ownership of property and he like Hegel too, is against the material equality for the sake of republican freedom itself. Though sometimes promotion of the intensity of freedom as non-domination may require the reduction of the material inequalities, but according to Pettit, the "connection between maximizing non-domination and ensuring material equality" is not tight (Pettit, 1997, p. 118). The republican idea is that it is not necessary to treat people equally, rather the main idea is that they should be treated as equals. As equals they all have right to own private property.

5.2.2 Corporation and problem of rabble

The most important problem, the main danger posed to the civil society is the problem of 'rabble' [*Pöbel*]. What are the conditions under which the class of rabble may arise? There are many reasons which can reduce the individuals to the state of rabble, this may be their own arbitrary behaviour, their 'extravagance', their physical or mental factors, skills, capital and etc. But mainly, according to Hegel, when the poor is not able to enjoy freedom and other advantages of civil society anymore and when it "sinks below the level of certain standard of living", rabble is created (PR, §244). However, here it should be emphasised that the 'poor' and the 'rabble' are not the same phenomenon. As Hegel notes, "poverty itself does not reduce people to a rabble; rabble is created only by the disposition associated with poverty", when individuals become 'frivolous' and 'lazy' and when they demand livelihood without themselves working and contributing to the universal resources of the civil society (PR, §244A). When someone becomes a rabble, "that feeling of right, integrity [*Rechtlichkeit*], and honour which comes from supporting oneself by one's own activity and work is lost" (PR, §244). Hegel is aware that, the emergence of this class is endemic to the capitalist system itself. However, while being aware of this fact, he anyway supports free market economy as the source of realization of subjective conception of freedom. As David Rose notes, it is not the 'systematic efficiency' that makes Hegel an apologist for the capitalist economy, rather "capitalism may well deliver what individuals want better than other systems...it allows individuals to decide for themselves what they want" (Rose, 2007, 120). As we have seen, this system allows the particular individuals to pursue their own particular needs and ends according to their arbitrary will.

While, on the one hand, Hegel admits that the emergence of rabble is 'wrong' done to this or that class and if there is a rabble it is the result of the existent economical system, on the other hand, he tends to claim that rabble does not have right to receive from the society any free support, because in this case the livelihood of the needy would be ensured without the mediation of work; and this "would be contrary to the principle of civil society and the feeling of self-sufficiency and honor among its individual members" (PR, §245). He presents several other possible solutions how this class should be supported, but none of them eliminates the problem. For example, you can make the rabble work, but this will lead to over-accumulation of capital and labour which was actually the initial problem of poverty itself. Another remedy may be

colonization. Though, this remedy will exhaust itself as spatio-temporal expansion will encompass the whole world. One further and more plausible remedy may seem to be the membership of corporations. Actually, corporation is not so much remedy for poverty, but rather it is the institution which should prevent the emergence of the rabble in the first place.

Hegel, being aware of the dangers which the emergence of rabble may pose to the nation as a whole, in civil society introduces ethical institutions which should protect "livelihood and welfare of individuals" (PR, §230). Especially, corporations play an important role in this case. They provide all social or economic support for their members and protect them against any kind of contingency. Corporations which look only for their "own interests within its enclosed sphere" in civil society, "protect its members against particular contingencies and educate others so as to make them eligible for membership...to assume the role of second family for its members" (PR, §252). Moreover, as the 'second family', corporations have obligations toward its members. They are obliged to guarantee the livelihood and other economic or social advantages of its individuals. It is only in the corporation that the help and support which the poor may receive "loses its contingent and unjustly humiliating character" (PR, §253R). However, the membership of the corporation itself has certain deficiencies, which expose some individuals to the poverty and the condition of rabble. For example, in order to become a member of corporation, you should have an appropriate 'particular skill', you should have a particular capability, mental or physical and more importantly, you should have capital in order to develop these capabilities. Thus, it seems that even the institution of corporation could not deal entirely with the problem of rabble, as there may remain some particular individuals in the civil society outside the corporations, as they may not have capabilities, capital or skills necessary for the membership and thus, they may be depraived of the possibility to become 'somebody' and are exposed to poverty and dependence.

Identifying the problem of the capitalist economic system, without providing any substantial remedy to it, is often considered as a defect of Hegel's political theory. For some scholars, Hegel's attitude towards the rabble posits problems to his whole political thought. Despite the fact that he did not overlook the problem of poverty and its serious consequences "he did not look into them as deeply as one would expect, given what he claimed for his philosophy" (Teichgraeber, 1997, p.14). Though, there

are some scholars who do not give too much importance to this problem, such as Knowles, who says that the rabble is not the problem only for Hegel as "he is in roughly the same position as the liberal in the modern world" (Knowles, 20002, p. 292). Actually, we can say that no one in our modern world could provide proper solutions to this problem of rabble, but what is at stake here is that "one can very properly ask Hegel, on the basis of his own grand claims, to give us more than he does" (Teichgraeber, 1997, p.14). Because, as we have seen above, the main justification for the introduction of the civil society as a distinct and independent stage between family and the state and its capitalist system, was the right to the subjective freedom, which is the main component of Hegel's idea of freedom. And his main objective throughout the *Philosophy of Right* was the proper actualization of this idea of freedom with its subjective principle for every particular citizen of the rational state. However, if the source of the realization of the subjective freedom, that is the civil society and namely, free market system, cannot avoid to produce the class of rabble, moreover, "if civil society systematically produces a class whose existence violates" the principle of individual equality and freedom, even with the support of the state and deprives the right to freedom to the whole class, at least questions the institutions of civil society itself, as being no proper institutions for his idea of freedom (Wood, 1990, p.255).

The problem of rabble in civil society is essential, as it fails to guarantee status equality of free citizens for everyone and thus, exposes some individuals to domination and unfreedom. Bohman argues that, "in order for freedom to be actualized in the republican sense of shared freedom, everyone must be able to be someone; if this is not true then they lack the proper social dependences that come from being a member of civil society" (Bohman, 2010, p. 444). And as we have seen in the previous chapter, the conception of shared freedom, the conception of intersubjective recognition, which is also essential element for Hegel's idea of freedom, in order to avoid domination and to achieve the proper recognition and in order to pursue the healthy economic relationships in the civil society, demands that everyone should be '*etwas'*. However, in our case, the class of rabble as a whole lack the statuses of free citizen, they lack the recognition and they are excluded from the social advantages, they are not recognized as someone and as such "lack basic freedoms and have no status whatsoever and thus are literally 'nobodies'" (Ibid., p. 444). This problem of rabble thus, opens the door to the domination and in this context rabble can be understood as the limitation for

Hegel's political philosophy and his idea of freedom. Because, if the rabble cannot find a concrete place in Hegel's state and as we have seen, it cannot, this contradicts Hegel's own theory of freedom. As in the case of family, the existence of the class of rabble, might be seen as a normal condition by classical republicanism; however, for the modern republicans and for Pettit, this is not the proper condition when we aspire for freedom as non-domination. While being against the material equality, Pettit argues that, in a society where we are concerned with the freedom as non-domination, sufficient resources for everyone should be secured in order to avoid any possible arbitrary interference and domination; "if I am not assured a basic income, there will be many areas where the wealthier could interfere with me at tolerable cost" (Pettit, 2007, p. 5). According to Pettit, in order the intensity of non-domination to be increased the possibility of exploation, manipulation or intimidation of some by others should be eliminated by providing the basic capabilitites necessary for functioning in the society. Moreover, if the state is committed to advance freedom as non-domination among its citizens, it must promote their economic independence.

5.3 State – No Right to Vote

The last domain of the Ethical life, is state. According to Hegel, state is "interpenetration of universality and particularity", as it is not only the domain of objective freedom, but it has the space for subjective freedom as well (PR, §258R). This means that, while state allows the conception of subjective freedom to be fully actualized, at the same time, this subjective principle is brought *"back to substantial unity*" (PR, §260; emphasis in original). It is precisely through this unity of universality and particularity, that the duties which citizens have towards the state are not felt as a burden over them, rather "duty and right are united within the state i*n one and same relation* [*Beziehung*]" (PR, §261R; emphasis in original). Not only have the citizens duties towards their state, they have also rights, rights to their particularity, which are harmonized with universal. Thus, we can say that state is the domain of 'substantial freedom' or 'concrete freedom'. However, when we read the part of the *Philosophy of Right* about state, it may seem that there is nothing new about it; in Hegel's articulation of state, everything what he says seems as if it is already known and evident. Here is everything what he has said about the Ethical life overall. However, two main moments of state the one of the universality and the other about particularity should

be studied carefully. The first we can identify with the law, the legislation and execution of it; the second moment is the disposition of the citizens towards the state and their role in the political activity.

While discussing the first moment - law, Hegel introduces the institutional apparatus of the state. There is three interconnected political powers in Hegel's state - executive, legislative and sovereign - which have "their corresponding tasks and functions, through which the universal continually produces itself" (PR, §269). Though, it may seem that these powers are totally independent, they should not be understood as self-sufficient entities. On the contrary, they are interconnected and constitute 'a single individual whole', which "contain[s] the other moment within it" (PR, §272A). And, despite the fact that, there may be some possibilities of one power being more powerful or may have more authority over the other two, "the *necessary division* [*Teilung*] *of powers* within the state … is a highly important determination which, if understood in its true sense, could rightly be regarded as the guarantee of public freedom" (PR, §272R; emphasis in original). However, what is more interesting about Hegel's state and its powers is how they actualize Hegel's republican idea of freedom.

Thus, Hegel's state comprises of the executive, legislative and sovereign powers. As Hegel notes, "the monarch is *one* [individual]; *several* participate in the executive power and the *many* at large participate in the legislative power" (PR, §273; emphasis in original). The monarch signs all laws and they enter into the effect. While rejecting the traditional forms of government like aristocracy and democracy, the sovereign according to Hegel is a hereditary constitutional monarch. Why Monarchy? What are the main characteristic of the constitutional monarch, which makes it proper to Hegel's idea of freedom? The power of the sovereign, according to Hegel is "the moment of individuality" (PR, §275A). It is in the person of the monarch that the element of subjectivity is evident; "*one* individual, the *monarch"* is the expression of "the personality of the state" (PR, §279; 279R). It may seem that monarchism is somehow contrary to the Hegel's republican idea of freedom, as many also understood republicanism itself to be contrary to monarchism. However, it should be mentioned that republicans, classical as well as modern ones, have problems with monarchism "only so far as they considered that monarch would inevitably seek absolute power and would offend against the sort of liberty they praised" (Pettit, 1997, p. 20). When it is controlled and contained by another two powers, executive and legislative,

republicans, like Hegel, are happy with constitutional monarchism. Constitutional monarchism itself is not contrary to the Hegel's idea of freedom.

Hegel's executive power, consists of ministries and civil servant who take care of the administration and execution of the laws. This power includes the institutions of the judiciary and the police as well. The main objective of the executive power is to deal with the particular cases and work as intermediate between the monarch and the people. And finally, the legislative power covers "those internal concerns of the state whose content is wholly universal", it is concerned with making laws (PR, §298). It introduces and creates laws, makes amendments and changes them when necessary. In general, Hegel's parliament consist of two houses: the one is represented by the agricultural estate, "that of the landed aristocracy" and the second which represents the commercial estate consists of the members of corporations, "representation [here is] achieved through corporations" (Knowles, 2002, p. 332-334). However, here arises the problem of the second moment, that of particularity and namely, the problem of political participation. While, according to the second moment the citizens should identify with the institutions of the state to which they belong and while their disposition towards the state should be that of 'patriotism', which for Hegel is "the disposition … of *trust* or the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of an other [state], and in the latter's relation to me as an individual" (PR, §268; emphasis in original), these citizens of his state are denied to the political participation and the political status. Participation in the political institutions of state, and especially in the legislative power is circumscribed to only some part of the citizens. In one word, Hegel denies the universal political status to every citizen. As Hegel notes:

> the idea [*Vorstellung*] that *all* individuals ought to participate in deliberations and decisions on the universal concerns of the state – on grounds that they are all members of the state and that the concerns of the state are the concerns of *everyone*, so that everyone has a *right* to share in them with his own knowledge and volition – seeks to implant in the state a *democratic* element *devoid of rational form*, although it is only by virtue of its rational form that the state is an organism (PR, §308R; emphasis in original).

Despite the fact, how bad we may feel about the democracy and how bad it actually is, Hegel's "constitutional apparatus ... designed to exclude the mass of citizens from the

status of being political participators", is against to his own idea of freedom and exposes more than the half of its citizens to the domination and dependence (Knowles, 2010, p. 335). For him freedom and citizenship does not seem to be actually two sides of the same coin for all citizens of his state. If this kind of reasoning is denying people to have right to participate in the political processes of their state, then, this is a serious weakness of Hegel's constitution. However, on the other hand, Hegel himself notes that "the forms of all political constitutions [monarchy or democracy] are one-sided if they cannot sustain within themselves the principle of free subjectivity and are unable to conform to fully developed reason" (PR, §273A). It is the principle of subjective freedom which should be developed and realized in the state. For republicanism, democratic control is important, as it is understood "as a safeguard of liberty, [though] not its defining core" (Pettit, 1997, p. 30). Republicans as well as Hegel are aware of the fact that "*by itself* voting does not guarantee freedom", and the rule of majority may be the source of domination over the minority (Houlgate, 2005, p. 209). However, in contrast to Hegel, republicans still give importance to the participation, especially to "the possibility of contestation [and to] the right of resistance" (Pettit, 1997, p. 185; 202). According to republicans, in order to get the robust freedom, public freedom we need to have a system under which people can control the very law that gives us the individual freedom.

5.4 Conclusion

As we have mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis, for Hegel the legitimacy of social and political institutions of the Ethical life is founded in the human freedom. If these institutions realize freedom for all, then they are legitimate. From the above discussion of the institutional order of *Sittlichkeit*, it became evident that, Hegel's commitment to the concept of non-domination and to the shared freedom is not realized for every citizen of his state. It is not realized for women in the family, for the class of rabble in the civil society and for a very substantial part of the citizens in the state, who are deprived of right to political participation. We have seen that, in family when, on the one hand, women have the right to choose to whom marry and marry them with love; women who have right to divorce and have equal share in the family property, on the other hand, these women do not have right to become rightful active citizens of the state. In civil society, while the economic system which is best in

promotion of the subjective particularity, structurally cannot avoid to produce a class for which it cannot find any remedy. The only remedy suggested by Hegel is "to leave the poor to their fate", which is the main source of domination and unfreedom (PR, §245R). And finally, in the domain of state, the main aspect characteristic to the institutional powers, and especially, to the legislative power, as it was in the case of the family and civil society, was contrary to Hegel's idea of freedom. When your main objective is to achieve a condition of freedom for every citizen in the state, when they are independent only through dependence and when they recognize each other and themselves as free persons, giving some of them right to political participation and to deprive to many the right to vote, at least exposes them to domination and condition of unfreedom. And all these, while Hegel provides rights to the particular individuals in order to achieve the intersubjective recognition and freedom in the state, while he argues that in order 'substantial' freedom to be achieved, everyone should be free and intersubjectively recognized as such. In line with this reasoning, Hegel's conception of modern institutions seem to be incomplete and fails to actualize his idea of freedom.

6. CONCLUSION

Is Hegel a republican or not? My purpose in this thesis was to compare Hegel's social and political philosophy with the modern republicanism. In particular, I have argued that Hegel's idea of freedom is the modern republican conception of liberty; that for them both, the relationship of recognition is at the heart of their structures of freedom.

Having this purpose in mind, firstly I started by identifying freedom to be the foundation of Hegel's social and political philosophy. We have seen that due to the fact that Hegel's idea of freedom is not an easy concept, it has caused many controversies among scholars. The second chapter has discussed three different readings on Hegel's social and political philosophy and in particular, his idea of freedom - totalitarian, metaphysical and non-metaphysical respectively. We have seen that while metaphysical reading may still have supporters among scholars, those who are fully familiar with Hegel's political ideas totally reject the totalitarian interpretation. The larger part of the chapter has dealt with Patten's 'civic humanist' reading of Hegel's idea of freedom. Founding the thesis on Patten's 'civic humanist' reading was essential, as it argues for Hegel's modern republican conception of liberty and Patten can be said to be the only Hegelian philosopher who has tried to introduce systematically the elements of Hegel's 'civic humanist' thought. The chapter supported his variation of non-metaphysical or 'self-actualization' interpretation of Hegel's political philosophy, according to which, for identifying the determinate end for action we do not need to recourse to any spiritual being like in metaphysical reading or to history like in historicist 'self-actualization' reading. Patten argued that, there is one 'particular content' or 'determinate end', within Hegel's social and political system, this is "the end of developing, expressing, and maintaining [one's] own freedom" (Patten, 1999, p. 36). However, as I have argued, while he has started well, he has not explicitly argued that Hegel's idea of freedom itself is republican. The following thesis tried to take Patten's started job to a higher level and argued that Hegel's idea of freedom itself is republican.

Before elaborating Hegel's idea of freedom, I have discussed the modern conception of freedom as non-domination. I have recoursed to Philip Pettit's works. As the representative of the modern republican school he has much contributed to the development of this conception of freedom. For our thesis the most important issue was the critique raised against modern republicanism and its ideal of freedom as non-domination, that it does not embrace a different conception of liberty at all, rather eventually falls into the 'negative' conception of freedom as non-interference. As we have seen this criticism was subsequently very well defended by Pettit. He has managed to show that the ideal of freedom as non-domination, has different 'contours' (Larmore, 2001, p. 234). The proponents of the modern republican idea of freedom as non-domination represented it to be an important value, which may take a significant place in the modern political theorizing. It was argued to be an intersubjective, communitarian and egalitarian ideal. This neo-republican ideal of freedom was claimed to be a distinctive concept with an array of distinctive answers to the major modern political problems.

After elaborating the modern republican conception of liberty, I concentrated on Hegel's idea of freedom. As we have seen, Hegel's idea of freedom and the theory of recognition which is at the heart of his freedom shares Pettit's and in general republican emphasis on the relationship of independence through the dependence and its "stress on non-domination" (Laitinen, 2015, p. 9). Though, from the detailed discussion of Hegel's freedom, it became evident, that "more things get to be called freedom by Hegel than by Pettit, who sees non-domination as a form of negative freedom" (Ibid., p. 9). However, this fact does not make the similarity between these two conceptions of freedom less important. Moreover, as we have seen Pettit has left the room in his 'negative' conception of freedom as non-domination for 'positive' understanding of freedom as self-autonomy. It is this element of self-determination which actually makes Hegel's idea of freedom modern and which 'allow[s] for [republicanism's] proper realization', by avoiding the total submission on the part of the individuals to the laws and institutions of their state. It is this relationship of subjective and objective freedom, which makes Hegel's idea of freedom richer, modern and at the same time difficult to be actualized. But despite of these differences, "Pettit's ideal of 'non-domination' captures a crucial aspect of Hegel's understanding of the structure of 'being at one with oneself in another' (Ibid., p. 20). The structure of

freedom, as for Hegel, so for republicans is the same: you are free though others. It is in this relationship of recognition between the self and other, that the conception of freedom as non-domination is central.

In the last chapter, the institutional order of *Sittlichkeit* was discussed. The three main institutions of Ethical life – the family, civil society and the state – were separately elaborated in order to see whether Hegel's modern republican idea of freedom was duly actualized for everyone of his state. However, it became evident that, Hegel's commitment to the concept of non-domination and to the shared freedom was not realized for every citizen. It was not realized for women in the family, for the class of rabble in the civil society and for a very substantial part of the citizens in the state, being deprived of the right to political participation. We have seen that, in family when, on the one hand, women have the right to choose to whom to marry and marry them with love, have right to divorce and have equal share in the family property, on the other hand, these women do not have right to become rightful citizens of the state. In civil society, while, the economic system, which best promote the subjective particularity structurally could not avoid to produce a class and for it could not find any remedy as well. The only remedy suggested by Hegel was actually "to leave the poor to their fate" (PR, §245R). And finally, in the domain of state, the main aspect characteristic to the institutional powers and especially, to the legislative power, as it was in the case of the family and civil society, was contrary to Hegel's idea of freedom. When your main objective is to achieve a condition of freedom for every citizen in the state, when they are independent only through dependence and when they recognize each other and themselves as free persons, giving some of them right to political participation and deprive many the right to vote, at least exposes them to domination and condition of unfreedom. And all these, while Hegel provides rights to the particular individuals in order to achieve the intersubjective recognition and freedom in the state, while he argues that in order substantial freedom to be achieved, everyone should be free and intersubjectively recognized as such. In line with this reasoning, Hegel's institutional orders fail to actualize his idea of freedom.

Thus, while based on Hegel's conception of freedom we can say that Hegel is a modern republican; however, having in mind his institutions of *Sittlichkeit*, we can say that Hegel recourses back to the traditional view of these institutions. So, even if Hegel does not completely embrace the modern version of republicanism, supported and

developed by Philip Pettit, he shares with the modern republicans the idea of freedom, according to which my freedom depends on the freedom of others.

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

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