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THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY IN HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

M.A. THESIS

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HUME'UN AHLAK VE SİYASET FELSEFESİNDE DOĞALCILIK YANILGISI

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Dedicated in loving memory of Bruce,
my partner and my best friend

FOREWORD

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ABBREVIATIONS

FD **:** Hume, D. (1995) *Four Dissertations and Essays on Suicide & the Immortality of the Soul.* Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press.

EHU **:** Hume, D. (1975) *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals* edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, (3rd edition revised by P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

EPM **:** Hume, D. (1998) *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* edited by T. L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

T **:** Hume, D. (2004) *A Treatise of Human Nature* edited by D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

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NATURALISTIC FALLACY IN HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY

Notoriously, the naturalistic fallacy amounts to an attempt to infer a prescriptive claim from a descriptive one. It is a common reception that such error in reasoning was first explicitly exposed by Hume. Yet, there exist many conflicting efforts to reconcile Hume's alleged rejection of the inference with his philosophy, for the claim that an 'ought' cannot be derived from an 'is' seems to presuppose a dichotomy of facts and values, and such a dichotomy seems to run contrary to Hume's naturalist account of morality. Therefore, the goal of my thesis is to show that far from banning the inference of ought-statements from is-statements, Hume offers a ground for how such inferences can be made.

In my thesis, I will first present the general scheme of Hume's moral and political philosophy. Then, I will engage the semantic and syntactic issues surrounding the fallacy, and I will distinguish the different versions of the naturalistic fallacy thesis. Afterward, I will offer a systematic classification of the various responses to Hume's take on the naturalistic fallacy. There are two major interpretations: the first states that the inference of ought-statements from is-statements is possible (Sayre-McCord, 1994; 2001; 2006; Pigden, 1991; 2009; 2016; Tullberg and Tullberg, 2001; Arnhart, 1995; Ruse, 1998; Curry, 2006; Searle, 1964) while the second interpretation claims that the logical invalidity bans such inferences (Cohon, 2008; Sobel, 2009; Carnap, 1995; Flew, 1967; 1969; Blackburn, 1996; Snare, 1991; Shafer-Landau2010). Following the evolutionary ethicist interpretation of Hume, and following Sayre-McCord and Pigden's understanding of Hume's morality, I will argue that Hume does not support a distinction between facts and values and that Hume's goal is to overcome the naturalistic fallacy. More specifically, my argument is that Hume's tendency to focus on thick concepts (like *courage* and *generosity*) rather than thin concepts (like *right, permissible* and *good*) indicates that for Hume, these concepts can be used in analytically valid inferences in order to produce prescriptive claims as conclusions. Therefore, although inferences from 'is' to 'ought' are logically invalid, they can be analytically valid.

HUME'UN AHLAK VE SİYASET FELSEFESİNDE DOĞALCILIK YANILGISI

ÖZET

Bilindiği gibi, doğalcılık yanılgısı tanımlatıcı/niteleyici bir iddiadan yönlendirici/buyuran bir iddianın çıkarsanması anlamına gelir. Mantıksal düşüncedeki bu hatanın ilk olarak açıkça Hume tarafından ortaya konduğu yaygın bir algıdır. Fakat, Hume'un bu çıkarsamaları şüpheli reddini, kendi felsefesiyle bağdaştırmaya çalışan pek çok çelişen teşebbüs bulunur; çünkü ahlaksal zorunlulukların dünyayı tarifleyen/tanımlayan iddialardan çıkarsanamayacağı iddiası bulgular ve değerler arasında bir ikilem olduğunu farz eder ve bu tür bir ikilem Hume'un doğalcı ahlak anlatımıyla bir tezat oluşturuyormuş gibi görünür. Dolayısıyla, tezimin ana amacı Hume'un tanımlayıcı/niteleyici iddialardan yönlendirici/buyuran iddiaların çıkarsanmasını yasaklamanın tam aksine, bu tip çıkarsamaları dayatacak bir zemin oluşturduğunu göstermektir.

Tezimde, ilk olarak Hume'un ahlak ve siyaset felsefesiyle ilgili genel bir şema sunacağım. Sonrasında, doğalcılık yanılgısını çevreleyen anlamsal ve sözdizimsel sorunları ele alıp, doğalcılık yanılgızı tezinin değişik versiyonlarını ayrıştıracağım. Bundan sonra, Hume'un doğalcılık yanılgısı konusundaki görüşü üzerine yapılan yorumların sistematik bir sınıflandımasını öne süreceğim. İki ana yorum bulunmaktadır: İlki tanımlayıcı/niteleyici iddialardan yönlendirci/buyuran iddiaların çıkarsanmasının mümkün olduğunu belirtir (Sayre-McCord, 1994; 2001; 2006; Pigden, 1991; 2009; 2016; Tullberg and Tullberg, 2001; Arnhart, 1995; Ruse, 1998; Curry, 2006; Searle, 1964); ikinci yorum ise mantıksal geçersizliğin bu çıkarsamaları yasakladığını iddia eder (Cohon, 2008; Sobel, 2009; Carnap, 1995; Flew, 1967; 1969; Blackburn, 1996; Snare, 1991; Shafer-Landau2010). Evrimsel etikçileri ve Sayre-McCord ve Pigden'ın Hume'un ahlak felsefesini yorumlayışını takip ederek, Hume'un bulgular ve değerler arasında keskin bir farkı desteklemeediğini ve amacının doğalcılık yanılgısının üstesinden gelmek olduğunu tartışacağım. Daha spesifik olarak, argümanım Hume'un (*doğru, müsade-edilebilir, iyi* gibi) seyrek kavramlar yerine (*cesaret* ve *cömertlik* gibi) yoğun kavramlar üzerine odaklanmasının Hume için bu kavramların analitik olarak geçerli çıkarsamalarda yönlendirici/buyurgan iddiaların sonuç olarak üretilmesinde kullanılabileceğini gösterdiğidir. Yani, tanımlayıcı/niteleyici iddialardan yönlendirci/buyuran iddiaların çıkarsanması mantıksal olarak geçersiz olsa da, analitik olarak geçerli olabilirler.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Research Question and the Purpose of This Thesis

The naturalistic fallacy thesis prominently claims that attempts of inferring prescriptive conclusions from purely descriptive premises are instances of fallacious reasoning because there is a logical gap between descriptive and prescriptive statements. It is a common reception that such error of reasoning is first explicitly shown by Hume.

This standard claim that the naturalistic fallacy thesis in the form of no-ought-from-is is rooted in and originates from Hume's philosophy constitutes the heart of many puzzles about Hume's moral theory. Therefore, the main research question of this thesis project is: how is it that Hume rejects every system of ethics which is not founded on fact and observation *and* he claims that we cannot infer value judgments from descriptive statements while maintaining that his explanatory account of morality is still relevant to normative ethics? There are quite a few responses and reconciliation efforts to conform Hume's alleged rejection of the inference with his philosophy. Because the claim that an ought-statements cannot be derived from an is-statements seems to presuppose a dichotomy of facts and values, and such a dichotomy seems to run contrary to Hume's naturalist account of morality. However, none of these efforts can be said to have gained general acceptance.

The goal of my thesis is to show that far from banning the inference of ought-statements from is-statements, Hume offers a ground for how such inferences can be made. The thesis contains both exegetical and theoretical elements. While I interpret Hume's moral philosophy and its connection to his political philosophy in a certain manner, I also attempt to capture how Hume's philosophy is relevant to some theoretical distinctions currently used in philosophical debates.

In order to recapitulate Hume's moral and political philosophy, I analyze Hume's major works in morality: *A Treatise of Human Nature, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and Four Dissertations.* In order to give a neutral summary of the main principles, traits and

elements of Hume's moral philosophy, I give both direct quotations of passages from Hume's and make use of the secondary literature from different interpreters (such as Sayre-McCord, 1994; 2001; 2006; Norton, 2009; Cohon, 2008; Krause, 2008). My aim is to descriptively pin down Hume's metaethical views in order to understand how to situate the no-ought-from-is passage within his philosophy.

The thesis also contains theoretical elements: I attempt to demonstrate the relevance of Hume's metaethical views to some contemporary theoretical distinctions used in current philosophical debates. To this end, I introduce logical vs. analytical validity distinction and the thin vs. thick concepts distinction. The connection between the first distinction and Hume's moral philosophy is thoroughly made by Pigden (2009; 2016). And the connection between the second distinction and Hume's moral philosophy is only briefly mentioned in Sobel (2009). However, to the best of my knowledge, the connection of both of these distinctions and their significance in understanding why Hume does not endorse an is/ought dichotomy has never been exposed. Therefore, in this thesis, I strive to show that this way of understanding Hume not only eliminates the seeming controversies of Hume's account of moral theory, but it also emphasizes how an ahistorical understanding of Hume is possible and how Humean philosophy is relevant in contemporary philosophical discussions (especially the discussions taking place in the context of fact-value dichotomy).

1.2 Chapter Outlines

The second chapter is a recapitulation of Hume's moral and political philosophy. In the first section of Chapter 2, I summarize Hume's main principles of morality which are moral distinctions principle, the two motivation principles, and the artificial/natural distinction principle. I trace these principles back to the passages in Hume's works where these principles are explicitly stated. In the second section, I demonstrate the development of the concept of justice in Hume's political philosophy and its connection to his moral philosophy. Finally, in the third section, I present the two key elements that play crucial roles in understanding Hume's moral and political philosophy: sympathy and the general point of view.

The third chapter analyzes the naturalistic fallacy. In the first section of Chapter 3, I briefly introduce the notion of fallacy and the conditions which leads to the naturalistic fallacy. In the second section, I introduce the different versions of the

naturalistic fallacy thesis that can be come across in the literature and specify which versions are of interest in the thesis. In the last section of Chapter 3, I demonstrate the no-ought-from-is passage that is taken as the origin of the naturalistic fallacy thesis.

The fourth chapter is a literature review on the diverging interpretations of Hume's take on the naturalistic fallacy. The first section of Chapter 4 outlines the interpretations of the moral and political philosophy of Hume in different ethical systems. I present Hume interpreted as an emotivist, a virtue ethicist, a utilitarian, and an evolutionary ethicist respectively. In the second section, I attempt to show a connection between these different interprations and the way they present Hume's take on the is-ought inference. There are seven main approaches that I identify from the literature which I gather under two main branches. The two branches are called 'the inference does not constitute a gap' and 'the inference constitutes a gap.' Respectively, under the first branch, I demonstrate the view of those that claim 'Hume explains the inference,' 'Hume does not demonstrate a gap in the first place,' 'Hume demonstrates a gap but the gap is breachable. In addition, under the second branch, I present the perspective of those that claim 'the connection is by sentiment, not inference,' 'the exlusion of morality from philosophy,' 'Hume is a non-cognitivist and thus, endorses the gap,' and finally 'Hume is a non-naturalist.' Finally, the third section outlines the common features I identify between Hume's moral naturalism and evolutionary ethics.

Chapter 5 is an outline of the discussions of thick concepts in moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism debates. In the first section of the fifth chapter, I introduce the historical preliminaries of thick concepts. In the second section, I analyse how we are to understand the distinction between thick concepts and thin concepts. Finally, in the third section, I demonstrate the disentangling debates that take place in the thick concepts framework.

In Chapter 6, I demonstrate the role thick concepts play in Hume's moral and political philosophy. In the first section, I present my main argument by providing either textual support or ground from secondary literature to each of my premises. In the second section of Chapter 6, I put forward the example of justice in order to demonstrate how Hume moves from 'is' to 'ought'. In the third section, I analyse the cognitivist character of Hume's philosophy in general. Then, in the fourth section, I

specify the kind of anti-realism and explain the inter-subtjective objectivity we can identify in Hume's philosophy. Lastly, I show whether or not the ground Humean approach to morality offers for making inferences from descriptive statements to prescriptive statements entails challanging political consequences.

In Chapter 7, I finish the thesis by providing a conclusion on the main points raised, presented, and outlined in the previous chapters.

2. THE GENERAL OUTLOOK OF HUME'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Because of the diversity of topics Hume has covered, a great deal of effort must be put into reconciling, for example, how to integrate Hume's moral and political philosophy with his general metaphysics and naturalist outlook. Since I cannot undertake the impossible task of summarizing all of Hume's philosophy, this chapter is devoted to present firstly the four main significant points of Hume's moral philosophy, secondly their connection to Hume's political philosophy by presenting how Hume establishes the notion of justice. Finally, I present two key components to adequately understand Hume's moral and political philosophy: sympathy and the general point of view.

Hume's works span most areas of philosophy ranging from metaphysics, the philosophy of science, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind to ethics, and political philosophy. However, at least one major character unifies them: Hume's commitment to the experimental method that relies on experience and observation in order to answer questions from the topics he has written on (Norton, 2009, p. 4). It is important to note that Hume is influenced by empiricists like Locke and Bacon (Livingston, 2002, pp. 569-571) and is strongly opposed to the a priori reasoning of the Cartesians (Norton, 2009, p. 6) when dedicating all his philosophy to the experimental method[1].

The main theme of applying the experimental method is also present in Hume's writings on morality. It is found in his more mature work *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* as well as his earliest *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Norton,

[1] It should be duly noted that by 'experimental method based on observation', Hume means a 'science' based on Newtonian principles (Russell, pp. 5-8). Similar to Newton's thought that 'experimental philoshophy' should not include untestable hypotheses or speculation about the ultimate character of gravitational force, (inspired by not only Newton but also Galieo and Boyle) Hume is saying that we cannot have an abstract science of human nature, and an exprerimental method should take into account experience and observation. Arnhart explains that this element of Hume's methodology is also a criticism of rationalists like Samual Clarke who hold that we can derive moral distinctions from an abstract reasoning about the structures in the universe, completely independent of human nature (p. 389).

2009, pp. 3-7). For instance, the subtitle of the *Treatise* depicts the work as "An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects" (Hume, 2004, p. 1, T, I). In the introduction of this work, Hume argues that the experimental method found in natural philosophy must be used in the moral philosophy and the foundational science of human nature (Norton, p. 4)[2]. This is to say that moral and political philosophy should also make use of the experimental method found in natural sciences.

Hume's philosophy is interpreted in many ways proportionate to the diversity of his work: surprisingly, his account of ethics is described as belonging to at least five different systems of ethics: a utilitarian, a virtue ethicist, an emotivist, an evolutionary ethicist, and a feminist/care ethicist. I attempt to show a connection between these different readings and how they lead to different assessments or responses to Hume's take on the naturalistic fallacy thesis in the next chapter.

2.1 Hume's Account of Morality

In the following paragraphs, Hume's main significant points of moral philosophy are presented. Although Hume is also famous for his arguments on the problem of induction, the problem of causation, problems with miracles and so on, for the sake of this chapter, the background given here is kept focused, and I present how some of the most significant points led to the very diverse reception of Hume's ethics. There are four main theses asserted by his ethics (Cohon, 2010): 1. reason alone cannot motivate people to act: reason is the slave of the passions, 2. moral distinctions are not derived from reason, 3. moral distinctions are derived from moral sentiments: feelings of approval and disapproval felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or an action. 4. while some virtues and vices are natural, others, including justice, are artificial.

[2] Philosophy had two distinct branches in Hume's time: Natural and moral philosophy. Natural philosophy included the subjects we regard today as natural sciences. Moral philosophy focused on humans and human activities and included the subjects we regard today as branches of philosophy like theory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of religion and the subjects we regard as social sciences such as psychology, political science, economics, and history (Norton, p. 4).

2.1.1 Motivation Principle

According to Hume, intentional actions are not the immediate products of reason. Reason itself alone, would not be a sufficient motive to move people to act in a certain way:

> "Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion [...] It is impossible reason could have the latter effect of preventing volition, but by giving an impulse in a contrary direction to our passion; and that impulse, had it operated alone, would have been able to produce volition […] Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." (Hume, 2004, p. 266/ T, II. III. III. 4).

This is also a critique of the Cartesian view of being equated with the rational faculty, and this is carried to the point of believing that we have full freedom of whether or not to act in conformity not only to the passions but also to the representations of sense (Penelhum, 2009, p. 244). Hume argues that morality is not a matter of indifference and reason is too inactive to motivate people unlike passions and emotions: "Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals." (Hume, 2004, p. 295/ Treatise, III. I. I. 10).

Intentional actions are the product of passions, particularly the product of direct passions, including the instincts: Direct passions are desire, aversion, joy, grief, hope, despair, fear, and security. Among indirect passions, Hume lists humility, pride, ambition, vanity, hatred, love, envy, pity, generosity, and malice (2004, p. 181/ Treatise, II. I. I. 3).

2.1.2 First Moral Distinctions Principle

For Hume, moral distinctions are not derived from reason, and this is one of his main views on morality. Our faculty of reason, according to Hume, is limited and philosophical systems that give it priority fail to notice that i. there is no rational proof to even believe in the existence of an external world, ii. there is no rational proof to believe that there is a causal connection between two things (Norton, 2009, pp. 12-17). Therefore, Hume states that morality cannot be grounded on reason alone.

> "Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable: Laudable or blameable, therefore, are not the same with reasonable or unreasonable. The merit and demerit of actions frequently contradict, and sometimes controul our natural propensities. But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason." (Hume, 2004, p. 295/ Treatise, III. I. I. 9-10).

Hume offers two other main arguments for why moral distinctions are not grounded in reason alone (Sayre-McCord, 2006, p. xvi): 1. As shown in the quotation above, because of the practical nature of morality and because it is not a matter of indifference, it cannot be accounted for by reason alone. 2. Reason approves or condemns something by discovering it to be true or false. Since the difference between two opposite moral evaluations (such as condemning an action and appraising another) is not the same as the difference between truth and falsehood, the difference of the former kind cannot be explained by the difference of the latter.

2.1.3 Second Moral Distinctions Principle

According to Hume, moral distinctions are derived from moral sentiments: feelings of approval and disapproval felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or an action. If moral distinctions cannot be grounded on reason, the only alternative, according to Hume, is that these distinctions are founded on experience. Because the experiences that are significant in the drawing of moral distinctions are experiences impacting behavior regularly and understandably, according to Hume, an explanation of how these distinctions are made can also reveal how they serve in guiding behavior (Sayre-McCord, 2006, p. xviii). So, let us let a look at how moral distinctions are made: Our moral evaluations of people's character and actions emerge from our feelings and sentiments. Virtues are those character traits that produce feelings of approval and vices are those traits that lead to feelings of disapproval by the disinterested contemplation of whether the possessor of the trait or a spectator:

> "Here we cannot remain long in suspense, but must pronounce the impression arising from virtue, to be agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy. Every moment's experience must convince us of this." (Hume, 2004, p. 302/ Treatise, III. I. II. 2).

> "Each of the passions and operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or disagreeable. The first is virtuous, the second vicious.

> This particular feeling constitutes the very nature of the passion; and therefore needs not be accounted for." (Hume, 2004, p. 377/ Treatise, III. III. I. 28).
>
> "The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness." (Hume, 2004, Treatise, p. 194/ II. I. VII. 5).

The moral distinctions are drawn by the emotions by contemplating on an action or a situation without regard to self-interest and from a general perspective that accounts for the pleasure or the pain and uneasiness in the observer's sympathies. Sympathy is very important for drawing a distinction between vices and virtues. We distinguish which traits are virtuous or vicious by the feelings (invoked by sympathy and fellow-feeling) of approval and disapproval toward the traits.

2.1.4 Natural vs. Artificial Virtues and Vices Principle

The fourth main thesis put forth by Hume's morality is that there is a distinction between natural vices and virtues and artificial vices and virtues:

> "I have already hinted, that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural; but that there are some virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind." (Hume, 2004, p. 307/ Treatise, III. II. I. 1).

Natural virtues are expected to be found not only in people belonging to a society but also in those living in small familial groups or tribes as natural virtues are more refined types of human sentiments. Artificial virtues, on the other hand, are useful for impersonal cooperation and cannot be arisen by our partial natural sentiments (or without intervention) (Norton, 2009, pp. 23-24).

The classic moral judgment, according to Hume, is that a character trait like the benevolence or laziness of a certain person is a virtue or a vice. Psychological dispositions (involving the propensity to feel a sentiment that moves their possessor to action) are called character traits and, as explained previously, we arrive at a moral judgment by our feelings of approval or disapproval by contemplating the character trait in a disinterested manner. Moreover, Hume divides virtues and vices into two groups: natural and artificial. Natural virtues are those that do not depend on cultural inventions or cooperatively-made social rules for our approval, while artificial virtues are those that depend on cultural inventions and conventional rules both for

our approval and also for their existence (Sayre-McCord, 2006, pp. xxviii-xxx). Hume puts benevolence, generosity, gratitude, friendship, self-esteem and prudence among the natural virtues, and classifies justice, honesty, faithfulness to promises and contracts, allegiance to the government, conformity to the laws of nations, chastity, modesty, and good manners as artificial virtues.

Norton states that according to Hume, virtues are immediately agreeable either to its possessor or to others, or it is useful and advantageous over the long term to its possessor or to others. Likewise, vices are either immediately disagreeable or disadvantageous either to its possessor or to others. Many traits fall into multiples of these categories (2009, pp. 22-24).

2.2 Hume's Account of Justice

As it has been stated in the preceding section, according to Hume, there are two kinds of vices and virtues: natural and artificial. As Norton explains, natural virtues are inherent qualities of human nature; they are passions that motivate certain human behavior. They are said to produce good on every occasion they motivate behavior and accordingly, they invoke positive feelings of moral approbation in a qualified spectator. On the other hand, although artificial virtues also derive from human nature, these virtues are unknown and unnecessary for humans living in their "rude and more natural condition," and they derive from our natural self-interest as the circumstances and necessities change, and they develop over time in response to the change in circumstances and necessities. Artificial virtues constitute a system of social conventions or rules, and they are necessary for the public good: there may be occasions in which these social rules or conventions require one to act against the individual or public good, and on these occasions, the virtues only invoke weak feelings of approbation. However, once they are established, they are attended naturally from our strong feelings of morals coming from the sympathy with the public interest (Norton, 2009, p. 291-292). So, for people in their uncultivated state —living in small and kinship-based groups— natural virtues are adequate to maintain order. As the society gets larger in number and becomes more complex, circumstances change, and they lead to conflicts natural virtues are not adequate to resolve.

Norton states that Hume's artificial virtues, similar to natural virtues, attempt to account for motives that lead people to act in conformity with the customs and conventions. Moreover, they attempt to explain that there are sentiments of approval or disapproval in conformity with the actions based on whether or not the actions are conforming with the conventions or not (2009, p. 293). Hume's discussion of artificial virtues begins with justice: he tells us that the notion of justice is unintelligible for people living in their uncultivated state:

> "[…] I suppose a person to have lent me a sum of money, on condition that it be restored in a few days; and also suppose, that after the expiration of the term agreed on, he demands the sum: I ask, What reason or motive have I to restore the money? It will, perhaps, be said, that my regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient reasons for me, if I have the least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and obligation. And this answer, no doubt, is just and satisfactory to man in his civilized state, and when trained up according to a certain discipline and education. But [in the more natural and rude condition], this answer would be rejected as perfectly unintelligible and sophistical." (Hume, 2004, p. 308/ T, III. II. I. 9).

So, Hume speculates that at some point, social conventions regulating a new form of order must have arisen and Hume calls these conventions rules or conventions of justice. Justice is an artificial virtue because its development needs social conventions or institutions: although we do have a natural disposition to establish such an artificial virtue as justice, for such a natural disposition to manifest, certain conditions in the world must be met. In the following passages, Hume explains this aspect of justice: why he classifies it as artificial despite it being a natural disposition:

> "Unless, therefore, we will allow, that nature has established a sophistry, and rendered it necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though necessarily from education, and human conventions." (Hume, 2004, p. 310/ T, III. II. I. 17).

> "when I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, natural, only as opposed to artificial. In another sense of the word; as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so no virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought or

> reflection. Though the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary." (Hume, 2004, p. 311/ T, III. II. I. 19).

Justice as a virtue *does* come from human nature like natural virtues, but its existence depends on certain conditions in the world apart from its dependence on human nature. For example, if there were unlimited resources in the world at people's disposal, there would be no need for a concept of justice to arise (EPM 3, 2-4). Hardin further highlights this point: if humans were creatures of utmost beneficence, or if there was a grievous shortage to the point that it prevented any cooperation among humankind, or if people were entirely vicious, there would be no point of justice (2007, p. 141).

> "Here then is a proposition, which, I think, may be regarded as certain, that it is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its origin. If we look backward we shall find, that this proposition bestows an additional force on some of those observations, which we have already made on this subject." (Hume, 2004, p. 318/ T, III. II. II. 18).

So, Hume supposes that virtues including justice are contingent upon two accounts: human nature and circumstances that humans experience in the world. Accordingly, Hume explains that any concept of justice cannot be inferred from reason alone, it cannot simply be abstract, or it cannot come from idealized circumstances (Hardin, 2007, p. 140).

After establishing that justice is an artificial virtue that resolves issues and provides order in society —hence, enable people to live together— Hume continues his examination by looking at the question of why groups of people gather into societies and develop conventions of justice. To do this, he first performs what can be called an imaginative exercise —not unlike his predecessors— and speculates and illuminates on how the complex society as we know it came to be:

> "Of all the animals, with which this globe is peopled, there is none towards whom nature seems, at first sight, to have exercised more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities [...]. In man alone, this unnatural conjunction of infirmity, and of necessity, may be observed in its greatest perfection. Not only the food, which is required for his sustenance, flies his search and approach, or at least requires his labour to be produced, but he must be possessed of cloaths and lodging, to defend him against the injuries of the weather; though to consider him only in himself, he is provided neither with arms, nor force, nor other natural abilities,

> which are in any degree answerable to so many necessities. It is by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them. By society all his infirmities are compensated […]" (Hume, 2004, p. 311/ T, III. II. II. 2).

According to Hume, it is primarily sexual appetite that gathers people together and form families and familial groups (2004, p. 312/ T, III. II. II, 4). So, even in their most uncultivated state, humans were not living as solitary individuals: there were family members and emotional ties among these members which enabled cooperative activities (Cohon, 2008, p. 217). When people are in small and kin-ship based groups —or proto-societies— these are ordered entirely by natural virtues that enable cooperation.

After conflicts arise between proto-societies, for instance, disputes about external goods, these groups gradually adopt conventions or rules —realizing that to do so is in their self-interest— to resolve these conflicts and stabilize the possession of these goods. As Norton highlights, these initial customs of justice are created as a result of a tacit recognition that each party would gain. And this is in contrast with Hobbes' or Locke's account as Hume clearly states that these initial developments of justice are not the result of a social contract or a promise (2009, p. 297).

By picturing the origins of justice, according to Norton, Hume shows that conventions of justice emerged because certain conditions made human survival reliant on them. For example, if there were not a short supply of some material goods, social conventions of property would not be necessary. Had the circumstances been different, justice would alter: the foundation of justice is not ideas or eternal, immutable relations. On the contrary, the ideas of justice and injustice follow after the experience (Norton, 2009, p. 297). So, Hume is partially doing this speculative exercise to explain how the concept of justice is reliant on both human nature and the circumstances in the world, as previously explicated:

> "First, we may conclude from it, that a regard to public interest, or a strong extensive benevolence, is not our first and original motive for the observation of the rules of justice; since it is allowed, that if men were endowed with such a benevolence, these rules would never have been dreamt of. [...] But it is evident, that the only cause, why the extensive generosity of man, and the perfect abundance of every thing, would destroy the very idea of justice, is because they render it useless; and that, on the other hand, his confined benevolence, and his necessitous condition,

> give rise to that virtue, only by making it requisite to the publick interest, and to that of every individual. T'was therefore a concern for our own, and the publick interest, which made us establish the laws of justice; [...] The sense of justice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions. Thirdly, we may farther confirm the foregoing proposition, *that those impressions, which give rise to this sense of justice, are not natural to the mind of man, but arise from artifice and human conventions*." (Hume, 2004, pp. 318-319/ T, III. II. II. 20-21).

Hume believes to have shown why people have attained an effective motive to create the conventions of justice which humans in an uncultivated state lacked. What Hume depicts as the original uncultivated state in which there are only kinship based familial groups is the first stage of development of justice. During the first transition, social conventions regulating disputes about possessions arise, and this enables people to gather into (pre-civil) societies. So, in the second stage, conventions defining and regulating property rights are already developed, people in this stage already have concepts of justice, and injustice: "After this convention, concerning abstinence from the possessions of others, is entered into, and every one has acquired a stability in his possessions, there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice; as also those of property, right, and obligation." (Hume, 2004, p.315/ T, III. II. II. 11).

So, in the second stage in the development of justice, individuals can understand that being just means conforming behavior to the conventions or rules of justice and they can also understand that it is in their best interest to demonstrate conforming behavior. Moreover, as Norton puts it, these individuals in the second stage experience a pattern of approval when their actions conform with these conventions, and of disapproval when their actions do not conform with these conventions (2009, p. 299). However, the question of why just or unjust actions invoke feelings of approval or disapproval still remains. A regard for others coming from sympathy and looking from a general point of view is an essential part of our moral judgments, but as we see, the initial motive for justice is merely self-interest.

Hume carries on pointing out why the absence or presence of the conventions of justice is regarded as a moral matter and the question of how just actions invoke moral approval is explained by the second transition and the third stage of development of justice: slowly and cumulatively, societies (which are enabled to form by conventions of justice) become larger in number and get more complex. It

gets difficult for individuals to see how these conventions are serving their self-interest, so, some members start to disregard them and act unjustly (perhaps without realizing). On the other hand, other individuals notice these unjust actions even if they are remote and they disapprove of these unjust actions even if they are not themselves harmed by them:

> "After men have found by experience, that their selfishness and confined generosity, acting at their liberty, totally incapacitate them for society; and at the same time have observed, that society is necessary to the satisfaction of those very passions, they are naturally induced to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules, as may render their commerce more safe and commodious. […] when society has become numerous, and has encreased to a tribe or nation, this interest is more remote; nor do men so readily perceive, that disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules, as in a more narrow and contracted society. But though in our own actions we may frequently lose sight of that interest, [...] when the injustice is so distant from us, as no way to affect our interest, it still displeases us; because we consider it as prejudicial to human society, and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy; [...] which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is called Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue [...]" (Hume, 2004, pp. 320-321 /T, III. II. II. 23-24).

While the conventions of justice are maintained by a concern for self-interest in the second stage, in the final third stage, being in conformity with the conventions of justice becomes a matter of moral concern regarding others by *sympathy*. Norton states that according to Hume, two components of human nature enable the moral character of justice: the human tendency for making general rules, and sympathy. Sympathy as the inherent principle of communication makes a continuous commitment to the system of justice or conventions of justice possible because without it, people would not have a sufficient motive to maintain this commitment (2009, p. 301). So, a spectator feels the pleasures or pains of others caused by just or unjust actions regardless of whether it directly affects the spectator or not (which is the general point of view criteria for making true moral judgments).

Even if it is from the self-interested concern for survival and sustenance that familial groups gather into proto-societies, and then to large societies, the self-interest remains as the original motive: "self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the

moral approbation, which attends that virtue." (Hume, 2004, p. 320/ T, III. II. II. 23). Once the conventions of justice are established, our sympathy with public interest arises and makes the distinction between justice and injustice a moral issue.

The original motive of self-interest for justice is now —in the final third stage— placed within the main principles of Hume's morality: the distinction between justice and injustice is drawn by moral sentiments of approval and disapproval felt by a spectator who contemplates a character trait or an action. For instance, my observation that the unjust actions of a person hurt and caused pain to another — by a process of sympathy— leads me to feel both the pain of the latter person and the disapprobation the latter person feels towards the former. Thus, once the conventions of justice are established, and we have reached the third stage, we *naturally* feel a strong sentiment of approbation and disapprobation towards acts of justice and injustice:

> "Upon the whole, then, we are to consider this distinction betwixt justice and injustice, as having two different foundations, viz, that of interest, when men observe, that it is impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and that of morality, when this interest is once observed and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. [...] After that interest is once established and acknowledged, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows *naturally*, and of itself; [...]" (Hume, 2004, p. 342/T, III. II. VI. 11

As Cohon summarizes, human transition Hume envisions from the uncultivated state to a governed society takes place in two distinct steps which makes Hume's account differ from those of Hobbes and Locke. In their original state, people live in familial groups and there are no rules for those outside the family. During the first transition, people gather into a society regulated by voluntary and informal customs that Hume calls 'justice' but this is a pre-civil society. After this stage, society may proceed to the condition of being governed by rules. So, there is the development of society without a government and afterward the development of governments. According to Hume, to develop into a society without a government is necessary for all humans whereas not all societies need government (Cohon, 2008, p. 216).

On this point, Hardin states that this is a case of a society so small that everyone knows one another and monitors each other's behavior, so norms and monitoring of all by all is sufficient to maintain cooperation and regulation of society (2007, p.

135). To create a pre-governmental society, people voluntarily but gradually maintain customs of ownership, transfer of goods by consent and fidelity to promises or contracts. The second case is the final third stage of society which is a large society in which formal institutions are required for maintenance of order and regulation. As Hardin notes, the function of justice in such a large society, according to Hume is to primarily protect ownership of property and fidelity to contracts or premises (2007, p. 136).

2.3 Sympathy and the General Point of View

Sympathy in Hume enables us to communicate the sentiments of other people by leading us to feel others' pleasures and pains and our moral judgments are based on this communication. Our judgments mirror more than our private responses to the world because of this social nature of moral sentiments. As stated in the preceding sections, our moral judgments, according to Hume, have a basis in our feelings of approval and disapproval towards certain actions and characters and this element of approval and disapproval refutes that our judgments are pure individual judgments. In other words, our praise or blame, esteem or disesteem forms our moral judgments. This foundation of moral judgments in affective modes of consciousness or moral sentiments usually leads to a 'subjectivist' understanding of morality. Hume, to eliminate this line of response, invokes the notion of sympathy and the general point of view and highlights that it enables one to achieve impartiality. So, our moral judgments —though certainly ontologically subjective— need not be epistemically subjective. In this light, firstly, an outline of what sympathy is and secondly, what the general point of view means in Hume's philosophy is presented.

2.3.1 Sympathy in Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy

According to Hume, sympathy plays a key role in morality: it is a faculty of mind that operates automatically similar to imagination or memory; so, sympathy is distinct from passions and desires and is not a motive to action. First of all, sympathy does not have to involve a concern for the well-being of the person we sympathize with: "My sympathy with another may give me the sentiment of pain and disapprobation, when any object is presented, that has a tendency to give him uneasiness; though I may not be willing to sacrifice any thing of my own interest, or cross any of my passions, for his satisfaction." (Hume, 2004, p. 374/ T, III. III. I. 23).

Krause identifies two different modes of sympathy in Hume: first is the primary sense of sympathy which has an informational function and is a faculty of mind as described above. It enables us to resonate with the experiences of others, feel their pains and pleasures, and be touched by others' sentiments. The second sense of sympathy is itself a passion; it is much like benevolence or pity as it involves caring for another person; it involves concern and care about other's well-being (2008, p. 80).

As Krause explains, the two kinds of sympathy naturally come together: for instance, when I sympathize (as a faculty of mind) with a victim of racial discrimination, I empathetically experience the pain and the unpleasantness that victim experiences and this generates a feeling of disapproval for the racist character of the perpetrator or the practice of discrimination in general. This is different from the second mode of sympathy because my moral sentiment of disapproval does not necessarily entail a worry for the well-being of the victim personally. However, the second mode of sympathy can facilitate the first when it comes to sympathizing with people that I know and care about (Krause, 2008, pp. 80-81). So, the stronger one experiences the pains an pleasures of others; the more likely one is to care about them. However, even for the cases in which the impact of sympathy is too feeble to motivate concern for the well-being of others, the ground for judgment is still provided by the sentiments conveyed.

Sympathy —through multi-layered echoes of sentiments— gives rise to value judgments or evaluations that are intersubjective. For example, Hume states:

> "Thus the pleasure, which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem; which sentiments again, being perceived and sympathized with, encrease the pleasure of the possessor; and being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder." (Hume, 2004, p. 236/ T, II. II. V. 21).

To begin with, the wealth is pleasurable for the rich man as it provides him security and goods. When someone contemplates this man, it gives him/her pleasure through sympathy, and the pleasure and esteem others feel by sympathizing with him gives the rich man further pleasure knowing how much wealth is generally valued. So, through a process of sympathy, intersubjective value judgments arise.

The intersubjective nature of our judgments, though, does not mean our moral judgments are a matter of following the social norms blindly. As Krause explains, according to Hume, the popularity of bigotry or false opinion in any specific era does not justify its moral mistakes such as the prevalence of slavery among ancient societies. To avoid making such mistakes, or resisting the popularity of such social conventions, social groups must be 'in conversation' with other social groups and with a wider range of people. Krause points out that this conversation may be metaphorical, that it can happen through reading literature and history (2008, p. 82). As explained the in the previous section, humans, by their nature, live communicative, cooperative, and interdependent social lives. Thus, the standards of morality, or in general value, are arrived at inter-subjectively.

The fact that through sympathy and moral sentiments, we inter-subjectively arrive at moral judgments does not entail that there is no space for individual judgment in Hume's philosophy. When asked to evaluate or judge a particular case, although my judgment might reflect my inter-subjective background of moral sentiments, I —as an individual— judge or evaluate and it is individuals that carry responsibility for moral judgments and decisions.

Although sympathy is one of the two key components when arriving at moral judgments, it is not sufficient by itself to grant impartiality even though it means that moral judgments are more than personal likes and dislikes. To be impartial, according to Hume, one must have a general point of view.

2.3.2 The General Point of View in Hume

Even though moral judgments are grounded on sentiments, Hume makes it clear that there is a criterion for making reliable moral judgments:

> "The good qualities of an enemy are hurtful to us; but may still command our esteem and respect. It is only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil." (Hume, 2004, p. 303/ T, III. I. II. 4).

Only the feelings arising from a general point of view can establish virtues and vices accurately. This perspective must be detached from self-interest and enabled by the mechanism of sympathy which —with an exercise of imagination— leads one to experience the pains and pleasures that a certain character trait generates for the possessor of the trait or for those around the possessor.

The shift to the general point of view changes the moral significance of the feelings of approval or disapproval: it aids us to move from the self-interest claims to inter-subjective claims. For example, personal perspective directs one to disapprove of being treated cruelly or approve of being treated generously whereas the general point of view leads one to hold that cruel treatment vicious or that generous treatment is virtuous. So, the general point of view draws a line between idiosyncratic moral judgments and reliable moral judgments by introducing impartiality.

As Krause introduces, the correction taking place by moving from a self-interested point of view to a general perspective is similar to our habitual corrections of impressions of our physical senses. We automatically correct our perceptual judgments: although observing that houses *seem* to be same the size of ants from an airplane, we know that, in fact, they are not (2008, p. 83). Likewise, Sayre-McCord states that we can judge the color of an object correctly even in the absence of adequate light based on a standard of correctness which is how things would appear to a normal observer in day-light. In a similar fashion, the general point of view plays the role of the standard of correctness in our moral judgments (1994, p. 211)[3]: " […] the appearance of objects in daylight, to the eye of a man in health, is denominated their true and real color, even while color is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses" (Hume, 1995/ FD, p. 215).

The pressure of living together with others in either kinship-based groups, proto-societies or societies also leads to the development of correction of judgment and the adoption of impartiality:

> "When we form our judgments of persons, merely from the tendency of their characters to our own benefit, or to that of our friends, we find so many contradictions to our sentiments in society and conversation, and such an uncertainty from the incessant changes of our situation, that we seek some other standard of merit and demerit, which may not admit of so great variation." (Hume, 2004, pp. 372-373/ Treatise, III. III. I. 18).

[3] Not every scholar agress on this point as there are different interpretations of Hume's moral philosophy. Different interpretations are furhter presented and classified in the following chapter. However, it can be noted that there are those that oppose to an analogy between secondary properties and moral properties in interpreting Hume; and that this analogy is further explained in the following chapters.

Judgments made with limited sympathy based on personal interest makes poor guides because they turn out to be in conflict with others' judgments and we cannot interdependently live together in such state of conflict. To achieve the social coordination and cooperation for people to reliably interact (as required by our nature to satisfy our most basic needs), we need common moral standards. Such fluctuation in the evaluative standards would even cause one's own moral judgments to conflict over time. Thus, our moral judgments are usually guided by how we would feel if we took a general point of view rather than by how we individually feel at any given time.

The sentiments giving rise to moral judgments from a general point of view corresponds to the perception of usefulness or agreeableness of a character trait to the possessor or to those around. As Krause explains, by introducing usefulness or agreeableness, Hume emphasizes that evaluations of character traits are made based on their general effects rather than particular effects. Because we respond to the general effects of characters or actions, in making moral judgments for particular cases, we need not be familiar with the people involved personally (2008, p. 85):

> "Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment of his moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be serviceable and useful within his sphere, we approve of his character, and love his person, by a sympathy with the sentiments of those, who have a more particular connexion with him." (Hume, 2004, p. 384/ T, III. III. III. 2)

This emphasizes another important aspect of the general point of view Hume highlights: it is crucial not to mistake such view with an ideal observer's point of view. Sayre-McCord draws details the basic qualities of an ideal observer as one that is fully-informed about the actual effects of the character or action or practice being evaluated on everyone, free from prejudice, proportionately sympathetic to all humanity and responds to everyone equi-sympathetically. Hume's standard of a general point of view is not beyond what can be expected of human nature neither in scope nor in accessibility in practice. According to Hume, taking the general point of view is to leave aside personal interest, control or ignorance and adjust perspective biases (1994, pp. 203-204). It is accessible by people, and this accessibility plays an important role in our practical life.

Hume not only identifies morality as what enables people to live together in communities and *explains* that sympathy and the impartiality generated from taking up the general point of view establish common moral standards required by our inter-dependent social nature, but he also *approves* of the contribution such moral principles make in our personal and social lives.

After introducing the main points of Hume's moral philosophy and their connection to his political philosophy —the development of the virtue of justice— an emphasis is in order before proceeding with the next chapter: one of the main assertions attributed to Hume's morality has been intentionally skipped in this chapter, No-Ought-From-Is (NOFI) thesis. The passage of concern is presented in Chapter 3 after an introduction to fallacies, and different versions of naturalistic fallacies are given.

3 INTRODUCTION TO THE NATURALISTIC FALLACIES

In the previous chapter, firstly the four main significant points of Hume's moral philosophy are presented, and secondly their connection to Hume's political philosophy is shown by presenting how Hume establishes the notion of justice and lastly, I present two key elements of Hume's moral and political philosophy which are sympathy and the general point of view. This chapter aims to present, first of all, the naturalistic fallacy as a formal fallacy. Secondly, the many formulations of the naturalistic fallacy thesis and which ones are of focus for this project is presented. The connection of the formulations of interest, namely dichotomy of facts and values and no-ought-from-is (NOFI) thesis is explained. Finally, how NOFI thesis is universally traced back to a passage found in Hume is presented. This passage constitutes the center of many discussions of how to understand Hume's philosophy and leads to the common reception that the naturalistic fallacy thesis originates from Hume and endorsed by him.

3.1 Introduction to Fallacies

In most general terms, in an argument, a concluding statement must be provided with support by a set of premises, either implicit or explicit because an argument is distinct from an opinion or a personal belief. Though the conclusion of the argument is an opinion, it is not mere opinion: it is backed up by the premises which can be of different kinds: they can be the conclusions of other premises, definitions, observations, principles, and whichever is necessary to support the relevant assertion. (Damer, 2005, p. 11-12). Presenting opinions by means of arguments creates the only ground to come to an agreement for holders of opposing beliefs. In a case in which a person detects a fault in her opponent's argument, she can convince the opponent that the argument is unworthy of acceptance. Consider the following example:

All birds fly. (Premise)
Penguins are birds. (Premise)
Therefore, penguins fly. (Conclusion)

To convince an opponent who argues in this fashion that penguins, in fact, do not fly, we need to show: either that the conclusion does not follow from the premises and that the argument is invalid or that one of the premises or both of them are wrong.

A fallacy is the opposite of a good argument; it is an occasion of bad reasoning that might originate from the structure or the content of an argument. As Caldwell and Reiss state, we can identify two types of fallacies: logical/formal or extra-logical/informal fallacies (2006, p. 367). Fallacies emerge from i. structural flaw which makes an argument invalid, ii. premises are not relevant to the conclusion, iii. one of the premises is not acceptable, iv. premises are not sufficient to establish the conclusion, and v. argument fails to effectively defend the conclusion against substantial challenges (Damer, 2005, p. 43).

In this binary classification of fallacies, the naturalistic fallacy can be classified among the first or the second group by addition of an extra premise (Caldwell and Reiss, 2006, pp. 367-369). Let us take a paradigmatic example of the naturalistic fallacy:

i. Seeking revenge is natural.
ii. Therefore, seeking revenge is moral.

In this form, it is a formal fallacy: the conclusion does not follow from the premises because the argument is invalid; there is a structural flaw. There are no premises about morality, yet the conclusion is about morality. However, it is possible to demonstrate the same argument as a deductively valid argument:

iii. Seeking revenge is natural.
iv. Whatever is natural is also moral.
v. Therefore, seeking revenge is moral.

In this form, the naturalistic fallacy is an informal fallacy: the argument is made valid by making the background assumption explicit, yet the argument is still an example of bad reasoning because of the unacceptability of the premise(s).

The common way of demonstrating the naturalistic fallacy is in the first form: that there is something *logically* wrong with the argument; or that there is a *gap* between the conclusions of such fallacies and their premises. And this is the form I shall presuppose in this thesis. From the point of view of logic, these gap claims are about conservativeness: if there are no premises about pineapples in an argument, then

there can be no conclusions about pineapples. However, as Pigden explains, we could easily undermine this by introducing an *or-conjunction* following Prior's challenge (2016, p. 404):

vi. Seeking revenge is natural.

vii. Therefore, seeking revenge is natural or pineapples are delicious or seeking revenge is moral.

This argument is logically valid: there is no structural flaw. The conclusion follows from the premise, and it is impossible for the premise to be true and the conclusion to be false although the argument is not conservative: the conclusion is about pineapples and morality when there are no pineapples or morality in the premises. However, as Pigden points out, this conclusion is only *vacuously* true: its truth does not grant us *new* information (2016, p. 404). Pigden calls this *inference-relative vacuity* which is to say that there are non-logical words in the conclusion of a valid inference that does not appear in the premises (2016, p. 404). So, the challenge for those who wish to derive prescriptive statements from descriptive statements is to do it non-vacuously. There remains one more logical issue to be pointed out, and this will be very relevant for the discussions in the following chapters. So, let us look at another argument:

viii. Tom is a bachelor.

ix. Therefore, Tom does not have a wife.

This argument is *logically* invalid which is to say that structurally, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. However, the inference is *analytically* valid because the premise analytically entails the conclusion: given the meaning of 'bachelor,' it is impossible for the premise to be true and the conclusion to be false.

To sum up, the naturalistic fallacy is regarded as a fallacy in which the conclusion(s) contains a moral statement(s) whereas the premise(s) consists of a non-moral statement(s). In such cases, the argument is logically invalid, there are no analytical bridges to grant the truth of the conclusion from the premises, and there is a *non-vacuous* statement about morality in the conclusion (not just by using an inclusive-or).

Since there is not only one type of naturalistic fallacy, an important clarification is in order. Different versions of naturalistic fallacy found in the literature are presented in the next section.

3.2 Naturalistic Fallacy Thesis

Stumbled upon in the literature under many different names and diverging discussions, naturalistic fallacy and the related discussions are not easy to put together or make sense of. While most of the discussions are connected and intertwined, some of them are overlapping, and others seem to be completely separate and take place in different platforms such as in the context of legal theories, evolutionary psychology and metaethical discussions in philosophy. Moreover, a clarification is required as there is also wide range of terminology in use: the is-ought gap, the is-ought fallacy, the No-Ought-From-Is (NOFI) thesis, the naturalistic fallacy, identifying good with its object, natural law theory, the fact-value gap, the fact and value dichotomy, the descriptive fallacy, Hume's Law, and Hume's fallacy are some of the names by which discussions related to naturalistic fallacy take place. There are many different depictions of the naturalistic fallacy thesis (NFT) as well: While some opponents of the fallacy state that we cannot take the operation of the nature as an example of how things should be because we, as humans, have the power to intervene (Evans and Zarate, 1999, p. 163), it is sometimes described as the fallacious assumption that because something is the practice now, it ought to be the practice or that because something is not the practice now, it ought not to be the practice (Buss, 1994, p. 16). Other examples of these formulations can be: 'There is a fundamental difference between factual statements and value statements.', 'Moral conclusions cannot be arrived at by non-moral premises.', 'Moral terms cannot be defined in non-moral terms, because they correspond to nothing in the world.', 'Because an action has a non-moral property and we know that to be true, we cannot conclude that it also has a moral property.', 'Something cannot be good or right simply because it is natural or bad or wrong simply because it is unnatural.' A thorough literature review reveals why the discussions on the topic of NFT have been difficult to make and complex to understand. According to Curry, there are at least eight methods that carry the label of NFT (2006, p. 236):

1. Moving from is to ought: This method is shown and discussed as Hume's Law, Hume's fallacy, is-ought gap, and is-ought fallacy (Dennett, 1995, p. 467). Here is an example of this version:

x. Jane is homosexual.

xi. Therefore, Jane ought to be homosexual.

2. Moving from facts to values: This is found in the discussions in the literature as the fact/value dichotomy, the fact/value gap and the descriptive/prescriptive gap (Singer, 1981, p. 74). An example of this version of the NFT is given below:

xii. Capital punishment is a powerful deterrent.

xiii. Therefore, capital punishment is morally good.

3. Identifying good with its object is G. E. Moore's version of NFT and is found in the related discussions (Pigden, 2009, p. 426, Moore, 1988, p. 13). It is important to note that Moore's version of NFT is entirely different from the first two versions. This form of NFT claims that 'good' cannot be defined in natural terms or in supernatural terms; 'good' simply cannot be defined as anything but itself. Here is an example of this kind of fallacy:

xiv. To have a good life means to have a happy life.

4. Claiming that good is a natural property: This form of the fallacy is brought to light by those that argue there is an intrinsic difference between ethical concepts and natural concepts (Blackburn, 1996, p. 255).

5. Going 'in the direction of evolution': This is the outdated misconception of (evolution directs towards 'better') how the theory of evolution prescribes moral agents to follow the direction of evolution (Wright, p. 330). This is also found in Moore's criticism of Spencer (1988, p. 12-20).

6. Assuming what is natural is good: This is a version of NFT that frequently gets formulated and criticized (Evans and Zarate, 1999, p. 163, Shafer-Landau, 2010, p. 81). Here is an example:

xv. Polygamy is natural.

xvi. Therefore, polygamy is morally permissible.

7. Assuming what currently exists, ought to exist: This is the textbook definition of NFT (Damer, 2005, p. 127) and it consists in the assumption that because

something is the practice now, it ought to be the practice or that because something is not the practice now, it ought not to be the practice (Buss, 1994, p. 16). An example of this version of NFT is given below:

xvii. Smoking marijuana is illegal.

xviii. Therefore, smoking marijuana is wrong.

8. Substituting explanation for justification: The naturalistic fallacy is also said to be committed when causal explanations are confused/substituted with justifying reasons (Rottschaefer and Martinsen, 1990, p. 164).

It is worth noting here that although these versions of the fallacy are connected, and some discussions take place intertwining multiple of these forms, one does not need to endorse all of these forms to argue that one or some certain versions of the naturalistic fallacy are, in fact, not fallacies. Likewise, one does not need to address all forms of the fallacy to assert that one or a few of these versions are fallacies. They may be connected, but they are separate accounts.

So, there are two points at stake here: the logical point that inference of an ought-statement from premises consisting purely of is-statements constituting a fallacy and the meta-ethical point that facts alone cannot provide a basis for evaluative statements, and more generally, morality. Often, this gap between facts and values is held to indicate a fundamental distinction between ethical discussions and matters of fact. In other words, it became 'common sense' that morally evaluative judgments or values are intrinsically different from observations and facts and that there is a major difference of character between facts and values. So, the problem of how to infer an ought-statement from an is-statement cannot be separate from the problem of how to overcome the gap between facts and values. To regard one of them as a problem boils down to accepting two distinct realms: facts with no value attached and values derived from principles or premises quite separate from facts. This has led many philosophers to claim that ethics is autonomous, and science does not get a say when it comes to drawing evaluative conclusions (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999, Flew, 1967, Singer, 2002, Woolcock, 1999, Shafer-Landau, 2010).

The status of the naturalistic fallacy is, however, still controversial. There are those that rigorously support NFT claiming value statements are different in character, and they cannot be inferred from fact statements alone and those that believe NFT does not make any sense unless one also accepts a strict fact-value distinction and they

argue that there is no such a fact-value dichotomy. A classical outlook of the first position is that there are descriptive/empirical/factual statements and normative/prescriptive/evaluative/value statements. The former kind is objective and value-free while the latter is subjective and value-laden. The second position is known to claim that this classical outlook does not represent the reality in which descriptive/empirical/factual statements are made by people; hence, they carry subjectivity and cannot be value-free. Moreover, value/evaluative/prescriptive statements do not have to be normative; there are different kinds of values outside the scope of ethics too. In other words, values are not merely 'the business' of a secluded realm of morality, and that fact and value statements are being simultaneously made in the world; thus, the dichotomy implied by NFT does not exist.

In the next section, Hume's passage that is commonly accepted to demonstrate NFT and is taken as the historical origin of NFT is presented.

3.3 The Naturalistic Fallacy in Hume

After debating about what fallacies are and different types of fallacies and identifying how we can come across the naturalistic fallacy thesis in many different forms in the first two sections, in this third section, I turn to how it has become so common to trace the origin of the naturalistic fallacy thesis to Hume[4]. In rest of this chapter, I offer a superficial reading of Hume's account of the naturalistic fallacy thesis. A lengthy discussion on how this passage is received is provided in the next chapter.

It has become a tradition to trace the origins of the naturalistic fallacy back to Hume to a passage of *A Treatise of Human Nature,* in which he warns us against an *is-ought* breach. Hume's remarks are demonstrated as an afterthought of the first section entitled *Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason* in the third book *Of Morals*. It is also known as Hume's Law or No-Ought-From-Is thesis and is stated as follows:

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[4] Hume's version of the fallacy became popular after *naturalistic fallacy* itself became popular with Moore in the beginning of the twentieth century. There is a more detailed histrocial presentation on this issue in Chapter 5.

> "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it … [I] am persuaded, that a small attention [to this deduction] wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason." (Hume, 2004, p. 302/ T, III. I. I. 27).

Almost in every introductory metaethics book, even in books focusing on the logical side of fallacies, explanation of naturalistic fallacy starts with an introduction to Hume. There are numerous examples for this, and some of them are: According to Shafer-Landau, the naturalistic fallacy is traced back to Hume's Treatise in which he skillfully argues that truths are of two sorts: conceptual truths and empirical truths. Shafer-Landau argues that Hume, as a skeptic, believes moral claims were neither conceptual nor empirical claims. Accordingly, we can never have moral truth according to Hume (2009). Ruse shows how the fact-value dichotomy is almost always traced back to Hume in his *Taking Darwin Seriously* (1998). Tullberg (2001) points out that Hume has universally been taken as the origin of the naturalistic fallacy and a sharp fact/value distinction (2001). Putnam explains that the fact-value dichotomy originated from Hume and received support from different philosophical sides including positivist circles (2002). Kitcher, P. (2006) describes Hume's naturalistic fallacy as a barrier against evolutionary ethics.

The common reading of Hume's metaethics suggests that the *is-ought* passage quoted above entails a logical fact/value gap: Prescriptive judgments cannot be deduced from a set of descriptive premises. And moving on from this logical point, a further meta-ethical point is deduced: ethics is not a matter of facts. This is to say that a careless passage from an is-statement to an ought-statement can give the status of morally evaluative judgments to any description about the world. By this superficial reading, we are led to believe that in order to avoid regarding

observations about how the world works as guiding us towards *good*, we need to assume a fundamental distinction between facts and values. I would like to point out that although there are at least eight formulations of the naturalistic fallacy thesis in the literature, for the sake of this thesis project I am only concerned with the first two:

1. Moving from is to ought: This method is shown and discussed as Hume's Law, Hume's fallacy, the is-ought gap, and the is-ought fallacy (Dennett, p. 467).
2. Moving from facts to values: This is found in the discussions in the literature as the fact-value dichotomy, the fact-value gap and the descriptive/prescriptive gap (Singer, 1981, p. 74).

The remaining formulations are not of interest because these are the versions of the naturalistic fallacy thesis that I believe to be baselessly attributed to Hume, and because the other versions are not explicitly identified as originating from Hume. It might also be useful to repeat that the problem of how to infer an ought-statement from an is-statement cannot be separately examined from the problem of how to overcome the gap between facts and values. To regard one of them as a problem boils down to accepting two distinct realms: facts with no value attached and values derived from principles or premises quite separate from facts and observations in the world.

I believe that the common reading of this passage runs contrary to Hume's moral and political philosophy in general. However, as briefly mentioned earlier, there is not a general agreement in interpreting Hume's moral and political philosophy. There are diverging interpretations that classify Hume in different ethical systems. These differing interpretations will be presented in the following chapter. Before starting a discussion on the contrast of NOFI thesis and Hume's moral and political philosophy, in the next chapter, I present diverging interpretations of Hume's morality and offer a classification for how these different interpretations lead to different views on Hume's take on NOFI thesis as there is a connection between these.

4 DIVERGING INTERPRETATIONS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO THE PUTATIVE IS-OUGHT GAP IN HUME

In the previous chapter, a general outline of Hume's moral and political philosophy and the main themes of sympathy and the general point of view are presented as neutrally as possible. However, as mentioned before, there are quite a few different ways of understanding Hume's moral and political philosophy. Accordingly, in this chapter, firstly, I attempt to show how these main points and themes have led to the interpretations in different ethical systems. In the second part of the chapter, I attempt to show a connection between these different readings and how they lead to different assessments or responses to Hume's take on the naturalistic fallacy thesis. To achieve this, I present a classification of how Hume's is-ought passage is received and of how different responses and reconciliation attempts have been made. His main theses on moral and political philosophy and how diversely he is interpreted will also be very relevant to the discussions of the following chapters.

4.1 Different Interpretations of Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy

Hume is interpreted as belonging to more than a few ethical systems. He is interpreted as an emotivist, as a virtue ethicist, as a utilitarian and finally as an evolutionary ethicist[5]. These interpretations and how they are criticized by other interpretations are presented in this order.

4.1.1 Hume as an Emotivist

By putting Hume's emphasis on passions, feelings, emotions, sentiments in the center, and especially based on the two theses of Hume (Motivation Principle and the First Moral Distinctions Principle as shown in Chapter 2), Flew (1969), Blackburn (1996), and Snare (1991) attribute Hume a form of non-cognitivism, specifically emotivism. According to this view, moral judgments are expressions of our desires.

[5] For Hume as an emotivist, see (Satris, 1987; Flew, 1969; Blackburn, 1996; Snare, 1991). For Hume as a virtue ethicist, see (Sobel, 2009; Cohon, 2008; Swanton, 2009). For Hume as feminist or care ethicist, see (Sugunasiri, 1996; Jacobson, 2000). For Hume as a utilitarian, see (Driver, 2014; Rosen (2003); Hardin (2007)). For Hume as an evolutionary ethicist, see (Tullberg, 2001; Curry, 2006; Ruse, 1998; Walter, 2006).

So, moral statements are not genuine beliefs, they are expressions of emotions, and the judgments that express them are not genuine propositions. The naturalistic fallacy thesis commonly attributed to Hume (NOFI thesis) and understood in the common fashion, provides confirmation for the interpretation of Hume as an emotivist because a non-cognitivist account of morality entails NOFI thesis.

To recall, Motivation Principle states that reason alone cannot motivate people to act, and the First Moral Distinctions Principle states that moral distinctions are not derived from reason. For instance, Snare argues that these two principles are best interpreted as arguments for non-cognitivism. Whereas Flew, for example, holds that according to Hume, a *failed* Newtonian, values are not properties of things in themselves, they are rather a kind of projection of our needs and desires on our surroundings (1967, p. 39) which Flew believes makes Hume a non-cognitivist, specifically, an emotivist. The non-cognitivist interpretation of Hume is further detailed in the next section.

According to the common reading (non-cognitivist interpretation), Hume's is-ought passage is one of the three positions that Hume is known for being committed to. The three positions are 1. Hume believes that mere reason cannot motivate moral agents to action, there must be a feeling component (desire, passion, etc.). 2. Moral judgments are feelings (or expressions of feelings) and thus, are not truth-evaluable. 3. An inference from descriptive statements to evaluative judgments is logically impermissible.

Cohon suggests that the first two positions the common reading attributes to Hume find confirmation in the third: If moral judgments were factual assertions, then they would be true or false. They are not truth-evaluable; thus, they are feelings or expressions of feelings and cannot be motivated by deductive processes which also finds confirmation in the assertion that there is logical fact-value (or is-ought) gap that cannot be overcome (Cohon, 2008, pp. 11-29). The common reading concludes that Hume criticizes the is-ought transition because he believes that these arguments are pseudo-justifications of moral judgments. Moreover, we can have no moral knowledge according to Hume.

A critical response to this interpretation is that Hume allows for beliefs to excite passions and actions (alone or otherwise). It would make no sense for Hume to consequently suggest that since moral judgments can influence the passions on their

own, they cannot be cognitive (i. e. beliefs) (Sandis, 2009, p. 147, Pigden, 2009, pp. 81-88).

While it is impossible to reject that passions or feelings and emotions play a key role in the ethics of Hume, because they motivate us to act in a way that reason cannot, however, an emotivist interpretation of Hume puts one in a difficult spot: If moral statements only expressions of feelings and are not genuine of moral judgments (thus lacking a truth value), how can Hume believe his experimental method based on observation is relevant to moral philosophy as well? Sayre-McCord presses a similar point: How can observations about the moral nature of humans be crucial to a non-cognitivist ethicist? (2006, p. xv). Furthermore, one the important features of Hume's moral judgments is the general point of view which does not isolate reason altogether.

4.1.2 Hume as a Virtue Ethicist

Sobel (2009), Cohon (2008), and Swanton (2009) all state that Hume is primarily concerned with virtues and vices, and with character and motives. Unlike the Aristotelian virtue ethics, Hume focuses on the nature of virtue and vice rather than what makes a life happy. How virtues create feelings of approval and vices of disapproval regardless of whether they are natural or artificial is the main focus of this interpretation as well as how Hume distinguishes natural and artificial virtues and vices. As explicated in the preceding chapter, Hume believes that when one judges a certain character to be a virtue, upon an informed and impartial view, almost everyone would approve sympathetically of that certain character. This element is taken to suggest that the passage from is-statements to ought-statements is made perhaps by *feelings* rather than *inference*. Sobel and Cohon are among these interpreters, and they endorse a cognitivist virtue ethicist Hume. Their take on Hume's is-ought passage is further explained in the next section.

There are reservations about this interpretation, and the relevant discussions mainly revolve around virtue ethics as a distinct approach to theorizing about ethics as an alternative to Kantian, utilitarian, and contractarian moral theories. Nussbaum states that almost all of the scholars that engage in research and discussions about issues in morality and ethics has a theory about virtue. For instance, Kant did not exclude the character formation and the training of passions in his account of morality. Neither did utilitarians or contractarians refrain from offering detailed theories and accounts

of virtue. So, it is a misconception to think that a virtue theory is exclusive to ancient Greeks and specifically to Aristotle (1999, pp. 165-195). A more specific criticism is that the relationship between moral judgment and character drawn by two claims in classical virtue ethics does not hold according to Hume's theory of virtue. Claims such as a good moral sense (the ability and willingness to be virtuous) being requisite for making accurate moral judgments and for possessing any virtue is incompatible with Hume's account of natural virtues: they are nothing but innate dispositions to act on certain nonmoral affections or passions (Abramson, 2015, pp. 353-354)[6].

4.1.3 Hume as a Utilitarian

Driver (2014) and Rosen (2003) argue that the notion of utility plays a central role in Hume's moral philosophy, especially in his later work (*the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*). They further argue that the same notion of utility is later taken by Bentham and Mill and that Hume's thought was a precursor to these scholars. They also point to 'pain' and 'pleasure' as motivating forces in Hume and how similar this view is to that of Bentham's.

Taking a different view, Hardin (2007) claims that morals are explained by psychology in Hume's philosophy, and at the level of the individual, people's psychology will not allow them to evaluate distant stranger's utility as being equal to the utility of their close associates. However, Hume constantly mentions 'absence of pain,' 'well-being,' 'interests,' 'pleasure,' and finally 'utility.' Taking into account that all of Hume's policy recommendations are at the level of government, the market, political parties and so on, Hardin believes Hume is an institutionalist utilitarian, even though he certainly rules out any possibility of Hume being an act-utilitarian or rule-utilitarian (2007, p. 162-166).

There are many criticisms of this interpretation. For example, Haakonssen argues that the word 'utility' has a different meaning for Hume than what it has for Bentham and Mill (1981, p. 6-8). On another criticism, Mackie asserts that although Hume does put emphasis on utility, there is too much difference between the position of Hume in *the Enquiry* and the position of the utilitarian's: there is no incorporation of an idea like maximizing utility by some calculus to target the greatest happiness for

[6] It should be noted that Abramson, in this book chapter, attempts to offer a solution to this inconsistency, rather than criticize a virtue ethicist reading of Hume.

the greatest number. There is not even the conception of measurement of utility, and Hume is always more concerned with motives and characters than with rightness or wrongness of actions (1980, p. 151-154). Moreover, Sayre-McCord criticizes this interpretation by stating that Hume's employment of the notion of utility is not compatible with the rule, act, or motive utilitarianism (2001, p. 483).

4.1.4 Hume as an Evolutionary Ethicist

Certain main points of Hume's moral philosophy, such as moral distinctions deriving from moral emotions and how we owe our moral nature to these emotions and our sympathetic nature makes room for an evolutionary ethicist interpretation of Hume. There are also passages in Hume that provide further support for an evolutionary interpretation: "A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where everything else is equal. Hence arise our common measures of duty, in preferring one to the other. Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions." (Hume, 2004, Treatise, III. II. I. 18, p. 311).

Most evolutionary ethicists (Tullberg, 2001; Curry, 2006; Walter, 2006, Ruse, 1998, Arnhart, 1995) state that according to Hume, moral values are the projections of desires that aim at the common good of society, and that most important of all, morality comes from a passionate human nature, thus, an evolutionary version of Hume's ethical naturalism makes sense. Curry explains that recent developments in evolutionary biology, animal behavior, neuroscience, and psychology indicate why humans have such desires, for example, "Evolutionary theory leads us to expect that animal organisms will be social, cooperative and even altruistic under some circumstances. […] [It accounts for] kin altruism, coordination, reciprocity and conflict resolution, […] explain[s] why and how some organisms care for their offspring, […] work in teams, practice a division of labor, communicate, […] trade favors, build alliances, punish cheats, […] respect property" (p. 235). So, Hume was right to argue that humans have natural dispositions to act for the common good, inter-subjective coordination, and cooperation. Arnhart argues that Hume's entire moral philosophy is an attempt to show how to ground moral judgments in certain facts about human nature (1995, p. 389-391).

Tullberg, Curry, Walter, and Ruse attempt to offer Darwinian updates of Hume and they deal with the naturalistic fallacy thesis in detail. Although there is no consensus

on whether naturalistic fallacy is presently a problem for evolutionary ethics or not (Ruse, 2017, p. 89-90), their take on Hume is very similar and is further explained in the next section.

The most prominent criticisms made for evolutionary ethics is that it is, and *must* remain, descriptive. It does not engage in normative ethics, and there is a big obstacle on that route: the naturalistic fallacy. Kitcher, for example, voices the puzzle this creates: while Hume's naturalistic outlook, his emphasis on fellow-feeling and the explanatory account found in Hume of how morality enables people to live together in communities inspire evolutionary ethicist, the block to such endeavor also come from Hume by NOFI (2006, pp. 164-165). The next section is an attempt to demonstrate that it is not so commonly accepted a fact that Hume endorses NOFI as it seems from the non-cognitivist or non-naturalist interpretations.

4.2 Classification of the Responses to NOFI

After identifying how we can come across the naturalistic fallacy thesis in many different forms and examining the general outline of Hume's moral and political philosophy in the preceding chapters, in this section, I turn to how the identification of the origin of the naturalistic fallacy thesis in Hume's morality has become so common. The passage of debate (also referred to as NOFI) is already presented in Chapter 3. So, here I offer a classification of how it is received.

The standard claim that the naturalistic fallacy thesis in the form of NOFI is rooted in and originates from Hume's philosophy is at the heart of many puzzles about Hume's moral theory. And this constitutes the research question of this thesis project: How is it that Hume rejects every system of ethics which is not founded on fact and observation *and* he claims that we cannot infer value judgments from descriptive statements while maintaining that his explanatory account of morality is still relevant to morality? There are several responses and reconciliation efforts to this question, but none of these can be said to have gained general acceptance. However, a general scheme of how 'Hume's Law' is received by different parties is very useful to identify the current debates.

While there is no one single view that can claim wide-spread acceptance, most Hume specialists agree that Hume should not be treated solely as a skeptic. The fact that Hume never mentions the *is-ought* gap anywhere in *the Treatise* other than the key

passage of NOFI and the fact that he insistently grounds his philosophy on experience leaves room for different interpretations. I demonstrate each reception under a different heading in the remainder of this chapter. I also attempt to show a connection between how some of these views of Hume's take on the naturalistic fallacy thesis are connected to the diverging interpretations of Hume presented in the previous section.



Figure 3.1 : Different interpretations of Hume's take on the is-ought inference.

4.2.1 Hume Explains the Inference

Based on Hume's dedication to the experimental method, it is possible to believe that he tries to explain the derivation of an *ought* from an *is*. For instance, Sayre-McCord's view is that Hume explains how we can make moral judgments in the light of non-moral judgments. Moral judgments are genuine judgments, not just expressions of feelings, and the inference is explained by our acceptance of moral principles, the acceptance of which is initially explained by appeal, in part, to our passionate natures. Moreover, Hume's positive aims in his development of a systematic account of morality are very evident: He rejects every system of ethics which is not founded on fact and observation, and he emphasizes experience, explanation, and observation instead of justification. He considers the results of this observatory inquiry to be still relevant to ethics although he —of all people— is aware of the *is-ought* distinction (2006, pp. xviii-xxv). For Hume, the discovery of what it takes for something to be regarded as a virtue is to determine the nature of that virtue and thus, how things should be: the articulation of the criteria for virtue and vice. In applying the experimental method of reasoning to morality, he aims to answer two questions: 1. What specifically are we thinking of people when we think

what they have done is virtuous or vicious? 2. Why do we think in the terms that we do? By responding to these questions, we can be freed from argument i-ii and move to argument iii-iv:

i. Someone thinks A is a virtue.
ii. Therefore, A is a virtue.
iii. A satisfies the relevant criteria for being a virtue.
iv. Therefore, A is a virtue.

According to this view, there is no sharp distinction between facts and values and Hume does not ban the derivation of an *ought*-statement from an *is*-statement. On the contrary, he explains how the inference can be made. This enables us to make moral judgments in light of non-moral statements, and these moral judgments have truth values although they do not correspond to objects in the world.

Hume's entire effort, as reported by this reception, is to show that morality *initially* starts with passions. Our actions are motivated by these passions and emotions, but we make use of the explanatory account of morality by the formation of *justificatory criteria*. Thus, this view renders that, according to Hume, intentional actions are not arbitrary, they have regular patterns, and we can evaluate them based on these patterns. For instance, although our moral feelings to those that are in our inner circle are stronger than those that we do not see and/or interact with as much, and the strength of these feelings may be said to be arbitrary, when we gather enough evidence that this is the way most people feel, it ceases to be arbitrary. By this non-arbitrary fact, we can deduce that people tend to make biased judgments when it comes to their inner circles; thus, the criteria of the general point of view arises. So, according to Sayre-McCord not only does Hume believe that description is relevant to morality, but he also offers a way of passage from description to ethics.

As Norton puts it, all of Hume's work attempts to primarily explain something that people presently believe or feel and think or do and to account for the state of affairs concerning people, whether mental, moral, or political. Therefore, Hume makes observations of what people do, how people's minds work, and how people's political institutions have arisen. These are different types of historical observations (2009, p. 31). So, when we make observations about human behavior, especially about some specific character trait and how it is regarded, our observations are

basically about human values. Therefore, this view suggests that not all is-statements need not be value-free in the first place although being descriptions of reality.

4.2.2 Hume Does Not Demonstrate a Gap in the First Place

There are at least two perspectives that state what is known as "Hume's Law" does not constitute an is-ought gap in Hume's philosophy (the first is the one explicated above). These two views agree that Hume does not endorse a fact-value dichotomy and he derives ought-statements from is-statements although their account differs: the former argues Hume highlights a distinction and provides a way to overcome that distinction while the latter contends that the point of the NOFI passage is not to highlight anything new or significant at all. So, according to this second perspective, there is no gap pointed out by Hume in the first place.

Tullberg and Tullberg state that there is no logical gap between *is* and *ought* according to Hume. They are, of course, different, but not entirely isolated and not without connection; thus, they argue that Hume neither endorses nor introduces a fact-value dichotomy. Keeping Hume's naturalistic account of ethics in mind makes it highly questionable that he would make such a gap claim at all. Although Hume does tell us that *is* and *ought* are not synonymous, he is a naturalistic ethicist, and his statement about the *is-ought* inference can be mainly explained as a part of his general skepticism. According to Tullbergs, Hume's passage about the difference of is and ought-statements can be regarded to be very similar to Hume's position of causality: According to him, we have no logical explanation to infer one is-statement from another is-statement. However, Tullbergs explain that Hume continues his inquiries acting and arguing as if there is causality. Similarly, regardless of Hume's is-ought passage, he creates his account of ethics as if the inference can be made (2001, pp. 166-169). Hume does not demonstrate either the inexplicability of the is-ought inference or the absolute dichotomy of facts and values; he simply tells us that they are different in some ways. I would like to add one note on this last point: in Hume's philosophy, justification of causation, or justification of inductive reasoning boils down to human customs and habits. This might form a ground to state that for Hume, even the observations about how people reason when they do (on matters not directly concerned with morality) are observations about human values and these facts are really not value-free.

Curry states that Hume's aim in the is-ought passage is to assert that in case that any passions, desires or ends are lacked, reason itself cannot tell us what we should do (2006, p. 237). So, Hume neither offers a means of blocking the way of naturalistic ethics nor draws a fact-value dichotomy by NOFI.

Arnhart states Hume offers an explicit way to base morality on human nature. Though Hume denies that moral judgments can have *cosmic objectivity* by which they conform to structures that exist totally independently of human beings, they are certainly not expressions of pure personal feelings. So, according to Arnhart, Hume does not give an account of *emotive subjectivism*. Instead, moral judgments have *intersubjective objectivity* (this element of Hume's morality is explicated in Chapter 2) because "they are factual judgments about the species-typical pattern of moral sentiments in specified circumstances (1995, pp. 389-390). Arnhart states that (similar to Sayre-McCord), once the criteria or conditions are established (which Hume attempts to), moral judgments are capable of being true or false. The dichotomy *falsely* attributed to Hume is, in fact, first formulated by Kant who used this dichotomy against the kind of ethical naturalism developed by Hume. He also claims that most of the critics of evolutionary any kind of ethical naturalism are Kantians whereas almost all of the proponents of Darwinian naturalism are Humeans (1995, pp. 390-391).

Ruse's view is that Hume is merely noting that many assume without argument that *ought* follows from *is*. This is not to say that Hume draws attention to a logical gap between "is-language" and "ought-language" (1998, p. 87). Hume simply mentions in afterthought that there does seem to be a difference of meaning between factual and moral claims, though he never denies that there is a connection and this connection is presumably deductive[7]. These three views constitute the responses of those who interpret Hume as an evolutionary ethicist. But there are others belonging to this group.

According to Pidgen, Hume does not argue that non-moral premises cannot entail moral judgments. It is not Hume's aim in NOFI to show that there is a logical gap

[7] Although Ruse is one of the evolutionary ethicists who endorses that evolutionary ethics must find a way to get around the fallacy rather than to face it and find ways to overcome it. To this aim, he argues that there exists in our genes a natural disposition to believe morality is objective as a result of the evolutionary process (Ruse, 2017).

between *is* and *ought* or that the inference of the latter from the former is logically impermissible. Hume explains that reason cannot be a motivation for actions through NOFI: only passions can be a true motivation for our actions (2009, p. 5-6). He draws attention to the fact that NOFI constitutes the last paragraph to a section entitled *Moral Distinctions Not Deriv'd from Reason*. So, by giving the is-ought passage, Hume simply aims to show that reason by itself cannot be the foundation of moral distinctions complementary to the purpose of the rest of this section. Rather than claiming that facts cannot be the basis of moral judgments, Hume's aim is to demonstrate that reason alone cannot motivate people to act in a certain way.

4.2.3 Hume Demonstrates a Gap but the Gap Is Breachable

In *How to Derive "Ought" from "Is",* Searle presents a counterexample to refute the philosophical thesis that he believes to have originated from Hume: Evaluative statements cannot be inferred from descriptive statements. Searle presents five propositions starting from an observation and each concluding the next proposition (1964, p. 5):

v. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
vi. Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
vii. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
viii. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
ix. Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

Upon the observation of a hypothetical Jones uttering the sentence in the quotation to a hypothetical Smith, v is stated. There are two assumptions under this statement: Uttering the words in quotation marks in v is the act of making a promise. Under certain conditions, anyone who utters these specific words involving 'promise,' makes a promise. The second assumption is that conditions necessary for the promise are obtained: Conditions such as both speakers speaking English, both being conscious and in each other's presence, being serious and intentional, and so on. With these two assumptions, vi is inferred from v.

Taking that promising is, by definition, an act of placing oneself under an obligation to perform some future course of action, vii is deduced from vi. If one has placed oneself under an obligation, then, other things being equal, one is under an

obligation. Thereby, we deduce viii. As Jones placed himself under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars, Jones is under an obligation. Assuming that if one is under an obligation to do something, one ought to do that something, ix is inferred from viii.

Regardless of the strength of Searle's argument and the discussions revolving around it, it presents a different point of view to Hume's *is-ought* passage. Although Searle renders that Hume is the source of the naturalistic fallacy thesis, he believes that it can be shown to be invalid by the counterexample v-ix. It should be noted that there are, however, efforts to show that such formal passages from is-statements to ought-statements cannot be made and these efforts usually come from a desire to declare ethics as being autonomous (see Guavera, 2008).

4.2.4 Connection Is by Sentiment, Not Inference

Cohon asserts that Hume has a tendency to come to moral conclusions from factual observations about human sentiments. This is revealed, for example, in an argument that justice is a virtue because although it is artificial, it produces approbation by sympathy. These positive efforts of Hume do not need to be inconsistent with the Hume' law: First, he only states that is-relations are different from ought-relations and accordingly, they do not entail —by inference— ought-relations. However, by no means does Hume make the claim that we cannot arrive at evaluative conclusions from factual premises: He neither use the term 'factual' nor claim that moral sentences cannot also be factual sentences (2008, p. 25-29). The relationship between is and ought is thus built not by *sentiment*, not *inference*: How can we claim that murder is a vice? According to Cohon, Hume answers this by means of a feeling of disapproval: "Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason." (2008, p. 93). Thus, for Hume, specific matters of facts related to morality is discovered by feeling not by inference. There is no logical gap between facts and values but a gap between non-moral and moral statements. When moral good and evil are discovered, this gap is overcome by a process of feeling (2008, p. 93-95).

Wright presents a similar position stating that Hume merely draws a distinction between descriptive statements and evaluative statements. He claims that according to Hume, there is a logical gap between *what is the case* and *what ought to be the case* just as there is a logical gap between *past regularities* and *what will exist in the future* (2009, p. 255). The gap in case of the latter inference is filled by custom or habit while the former gap is filled by a projection of sentiments or feelings.

Wright's position is different from Cohon's because he believes that there is a logical gap between facts and values. However, they both believe that according to Hume's philosophy, the connection between is-statements and ought-statements are made by a process of sentiments.

Sobel's stance is very similar to Cohon's as they both argue Hume is a virtue ethicist, and they both believe that the connection of moral and non-moral statements are made by feelings of approval and disapproval. Moreover, they both put some effort in showing that Hume's morality is not a form of non-cognitivism: For example, Sobel claims that the same statement 'Considerateness is a virtue' can both be a moral judgment and a factual judgment; the latter can be evaluated as true or false. The former is derived from the latter statement not logically, but by invoking approval that includes advocacy and recommendation (2009, pp. 73-75).

4.2.5 Exclusion of Morality from Philosophy

The general acceptance arising from the common non-cognitivist reading of Hume entails that he adequately shows the fallacy of the *is-ought* inference, for some, means that morality does not belong to the discussions of philosophy. So, this fourth camp constitutes a different reception: a reaction coming from the acceptance of the non-cognitivist interpretation rather than a reconciliation effort. Carnap, for instance, employs this kind of reasoning: Statements belonging to ethics have the defect of being unverifiable, unscientific, and luck cognitive meaning. They do not correspond to anything in the world, and we cannot reach a consensus about their truth and falsity: ethical statements are expressions of feelings. Therefore, ethical statements do not belong to the realm of rational discourse. Ethical problems are nonscientific and thus pseudo-problems (1995, p. 26-27).

This response, in order to keep philosophy within the scope of rational debate, says that we must follow Hume's Law: the inference of an ought-statement from an is-statement is logically impermissible and that there is a sharp distinction between the two kinds of statements. Thus, as Putnam summarizes, positivist prescription suggests that philosophy should engage with the latter: what is verifiable. Since ethics is not verifiable, and a universal agreement about ethical issues does not seem to be possible, it is highly questionable whether ethical utterances are anything more than 'arbitrarily compounded series of words' or whether they are worthy of philosophical attention (2002, pp. 18-24).

The positivist response of excluding ethics from philosophy is the other 'pole' that celebrates a sharp is/ought or fact/value dichotomy on the basis that it provides autonomy to ethics. So, there are two sides that are happy with this dichotomy: the positivist response that tosses out ethics to the bin and those that hold ethics is autonomous (non-cognitivists and non-naturalists).

4.2.6 Non-Cognitivist Reading of Hume

A different reception of NOFI is explicitly expressed in Hume's interpretation as an ethical non-cognitivist. Flew claims that the is-ought passage should be understood as commonly read: there is a serious distinction between is-statements and ought-statements, facts and values. This entirely meshes in with the emotivist interpretation that moral judgments are not reducible to logical necessities or facts about natural world independent of human interest. So, statements like, 'This is wrong.' or 'He ought to resign.' do not say anything other than venting emotions and uttering commands (1969, p. 67).

Blackburn states that according to Hume, passions which motivate moral agents to act are outside the scope of reason, so moral judgments are merely expressions of desires (1996, p. 180). While descriptive statements can be true or false according to the physical world, evaluative statements are not genuine statements, propositions or beliefs, so they lack a truth value. Therefore, moral statements are non-propositional even though they are handled syntactically and conversationally as if they were capable of having a truth value[8].

More support can be found in 'Hume's law' for this emotivist interpretation. Blackburn believes that his position is compatible with the view that there is an absolute distinction between the nature of moral statements and factual statements and one cannot be inferred from the other. While we can speak of the truth or the falsity of the latter kind, the former has no reality based on which we could assign truth values. According to Blackburn, this is more or less the view Hume expresses in the *Treatise* (1996, p. 180).

[8] Blackburn coins the term *quasi-realism* to explain how we deal with evaluative statements as if they were genuine propositions. This view is not further detailed here.

4.2.7 Non-Naturalist Reading of Hume

According to Shafer-Landau, the naturalistic fallacy is traced back to Hume's *Treatise* in which he skillfully argues that truths are of two sorts: conceptual truths and empirical truths. Shafer-Landau argues that Hume, as a skeptic, believed moral claims were neither conceptual nor empirical claims. Accordingly, we can never have moral truth.

We have no doubts when answering questions like 'Are bachelors unmarried?' or 'Are spheres cubes?'. However, we can still wonder if a moral claim is true or false even if we completely understand it. Shafer-Landau claims that this is why moral claims are not conceptual claims; they are not independently true or false from the world. However, Shafer-Landau argues that moral claims are not empirical claims either, as we do not observe the rightness or wrongness of an action the same way we observe facts. Moreover, he believes that Hume offers further support for his non-naturalist position: the famous is-ought passage (NOFI). While describing the world, we speak of what *is* the case; however, morality speaks of what *ought* to be the case. Thus, Shafer-Landau contends that according to Hume, knowing the way the world is does not enable us to find out how it ought to be, and the gap between what *is* and what *ought* to be can never be crossed (2010, pp. 73-75).

The utilitarian interpretation's take on Hume's is-ought passage cannot be placed in the scheme presented above as I am yet to find a conclusive commentary on this. However, I can offer a speculation of what would it be like: based on Hardin's take on the is-ought issue (his account states Hume is an institutional utilitarianism and not a utilitarian at the level of individuals, so his take may not be representative of this general interpretation). Hardin acknowledges that there is a gap between is and ought-statements, and the inference of the latter from the former is a fallacy (2007, pp. 8-13). So, we may as well assume the utilitarian interpretation takes Hume to endorse that there is a fact/value dichotomy.

4.3 Common Features of Hume's Naturalistic Morality and Evolutionary Ethics

Acknowledging the common grounds of Hume's morality and evolutionary ethics and acknowledging that Humean naturalistic ethics is best understood within the framework of evolutionary ethics, and following the footsteps of those named above, I endorse an evolutionary interpretation of Hume's ethics. Though Hume is not an

evolutionary ethicist himself, I believe the reasons listed below are sufficient to argue that he belongs to this framework: that they are both naturalistic, secular, empirical, and a posteriori accounts of morality and that essentially, they both study moral emotions.

For instance, Hume examines pride and humility in animals. He declares that this examination will be useful for understanding the human propensity to pride because of this character's uniform nature: just as anatomists draw conclusions about human muscular motion, blood circulation and location of organs by performing experiments on animals, Hume expects to learn something about human nature by examining the character traits pride and humility in animals (Hume, 2004, Treatise, II. I. XII. 2, p. 211-2) and makes observations on the sentiment of pride in animals:

> "'Tis plain, that almost in every species of creatures, […] there are many evident marks of pride and humility. The very port and gait of a swan, or turkey, or peacock show the high idea he has entertained of himself, and his contempt of all others. This is the more remarkable, that in the two last species of animals, the pride always attends the beauty, and is discover'd in the male only. The vanity and emulation of nightingales in singing have been commonly remark'd; as likewise that of horses in swiftness, of hounds in sagacity and smell, of the bull and cock in strength, and of every other animal in his particular excellency." (Hume, 2004, p. 212/ T, II. I. XII. 4).

Hume goes further and states that motives that move us to feel the sentiments of pride and humility are common to all animals, so humans are not the only ones that demonstrate (moral) sentiments:

> "There are also instances of the relation of impressions, sufficient to convince us, that there is an union of certain affections with each other in the inferior species of creatures as well as in the superior, and that their minds are frequently convey'd thro' a series of connected emotions. A dog, when elevated with joy, runs naturally into love and kindness, whether of his master or of the sex [or] [...] when full of pain and sorrow, he becomes quarrelsome and ill-natured; and that passion; which at first was grief, is by the smallest occasion converted into anger. Thus all the internal principles, that are necessary in us to produce either pride or humility, are common to all creatures [...]" (Hume, 2004, p. 213/ T, II. I. XII. 8-9).

What is the most striking about character traits like pride, and virtues in general, is that they enable people to live together in communities according to Hume. This

conclusion is shared by evolutionary ethics: that certain moral emotions enable groups to live in large groups (James, 2011, p. 91).

There are also arguments pointing out a connection between Hume's and Darwin's naturalism. Apart from the accounts given in the previous chapter, for example, Huntley argues that Hume was one of the known figures for Darwin and read by him frequently in the process of the emergence of evolutionary theory. Huntley even presents a note from Darwin on a section from *Treatise, of the Reason of Animals* (1972, p. 458). As Russell explains, Hume discusses the similarities between humans and animals in this section: their resemblance with respect to passions, reason, and action is so close that the analogy from one to the other constitutes a strong argument (2008, pp. 200-201).

Another point worthy of note is that Hume's account of morality denies the existence of a supernatural being; so, Hume endorses a certain kind of naturalism: atheistic naturalism. As Russell asserts, for Hume, nature is self-existent, self-moving, and self-ordering and natural order does not promise a future state where the vicious is punished and the virtuous rewarded (2008, p. 53). It is often said that Hume –with his arguments against the design argument and creationism (Sober, 2000, pp. 33-36) and with cases he made against miracles (Huntley, 1972, p. 465)— prepared the succeeding century for Darwin's final blow.

Up to this point, common characteristics of Hume's morality and evolutionary ethics can be summarized as i. They are both naturalists in the sense that they reject supernatural accounts of morality. ii. They are both descriptive in analyzing human transactions empirically and arguing to get results relevant to morality. iii. They are both naturalists in the sense that they both believe (at least some) character traits to be innate dispositions for human cooperation and living in groups. Furthermore, reading passages from Darwin on how the 'altruistic' nature of humans is promoted by natural selection, one can see these similarities:

> "It must not be forgotten that, although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an advancement in the standard of morality and an increase in the number of well-endowed men will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice

> themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection " (Darwin, p. 166).

There are differing degrees of naturalism evolutionary ethicist are committed to: some state that nature can explain moral psychology; others go further and claim that nature can help constrain or expand our moral principles while another group argue that we can derive moral principles from observing at the way nature works (James, 2011, p. 2). Although Hume lacks an evolutionary account, his moral philosophy is an example of the strongest form of naturalism.

There is an important point to be mentioned before proceeding with the next chapter: it is not prerequisite for a moral theory which gives sentiments a central part to be non-cognitivist or relativist about moral judgments: for example, James discovers other options for evolutionary ethicists: response dependency, naturalized virtue ethics, and moral constructivism (2011, pp. 191-203). Likewise, Richards offers his own version of cognitive/objective/realist evolutionary ethics (2017). It is necessary to appreciate the existence of these options as I believe Hume takes a similar route when it comes to the justification of morality (this is to say that Hume has two ambitions when it comes to morality: first is to give an explanatory account and the second is to give a justificatory account). [9]

Despite all of the similarities presented, it is crucial to note that I do not claim Hume to be an evolutionary ethicist. Hume neither gives an account of evolutionary theory nor engages in related discussions: he is a century behind from any versions of evolutionary theory. However, my point is that his morality is better understood in an evolutionary ethics framework because of all the common qualities aforementioned. It is not necessary to accept this interpretation, on the other hand, to appreciate my main thesis. So long as it is acknowledged that virtues and vices/character traits are central features of Hume's moral inquiry (regardless of the way it is interpreted), my argument that Hume does not endorse a fact-value dichotomy stands valid.

As it can be seen from this chapter, there is a lot of on-going debate, and there are different interpretations of Hume characterizing him in different ethical systems. And when it comes to his famous is-ought passage, it gets even more complex. On the

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[9] Hume's cognitivist account of morality is further discussed and presented in Chapter 5. However, as they are not central to the discussions of the thesis, I do not present here the non-cognitive options for evolutionary ethics. To read more on this, see James, 2011; Richards, 2017.

bright side, there is an increasing agreement in the literature among different interpretations, too. For example, Hume is no longer portrayed as the *mere skeptic* who claims that one cannot reasonably believe in the existence of the reality, or that one cannot reasonably believe that one thing causes another, or that one cannot reasonably use inductive reasoning and so on. So, there is an increasing agreement[10] on the question of whether Hume is more of a skeptic who defends that from empirical premises, standard claims to knowledge are untenable, or more of a naturalist with positive aims and ambitions to advance human knowledge with his 'science of man.' So, perhaps, despite this openness to interpretation, it is possible that the literature will also converge on the point that Hume's famously quoted is-ought passage is not a motto or a representation of his general philosophy at all.

Before following and expanding on the discussions presented in this chapter and presenting my thesis on Hume's take on the is-ought gap, in the following chapter, I present thick concepts because a general understanding of thick concepts is necessary for my argument to be intelligible.

[10] To read further on this, see (Norton, p. 12), (Russell, pp.3-11)

5 AN OUTLINE OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THICK CONCEPTS AND NON-COGNITIVISM

There are many concepts to describe the actions and characters of people: we can describe a person as good, bad, right, wrong or as courageous, tactful, selfish, boorish, cruel. All of these concepts say something in general about the character of the person in question. Yet, some of them enable us to draw a far more specific picture; as in, not only do they give us a description, but also some sort of evaluation. This leads to a conceptual division between these concepts: the thin and the thick (Kirchin, 2013, p. 2, Värynen, 2013, p. 35). In a nutshell, thick concepts are a branch that includes epistemic concepts such as *reliable*, *gullible, open-minded*, and *observant*; aesthetic concepts such as *sublime, gracious*, *banal*, and *grotesque*; practical concepts such as *shrewd*, *mesmerizing*, *folksy*, *corny imprudent*, *idiotic*,; and virtue and vice concepts such as *generous*, *compassionate*, *discreet, selfish*, *industrious*, *just*, *generous*, *considerate, brutal*, *deceitful* (Kirchin, 2013, pp. 1-3, Värynen, 2016, Putnam, 2002, p. 34). As thick concepts are considered to be significant for metaethics, they historically and philosophically take part in cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism debates in the context of fact-value dichotomy. In the first part of this chapter, I offer a historical overview of cognitivist-non-cognitivist debates relating thick concepts and the fact-value dichotomy. Afterward, I present the main problems associated with the thin and thick distinction.

5.1 Historical Preliminaries of Thick Concepts

Bernard Williams is the first to coin the name 'thick concept' in his book *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. In this book, Williams first presents the fact-value dichotomy and Moore's version of the naturalistic fallacy and how it connects to Hume's version. Although Moore's naturalistic fallacy is not of main interest for my project, it might be helpful to give a historical context to understand why 'Hume's Law' is also known as the naturalistic fallacy in the first place. This historical context also clarifies why Hume's is-ought passage became popular starting with the beginning of the twentieth century. As briefly presented in Chapter 3, Moore's

naturalistic fallacy thesis claims that *good* cannot be defined in natural terms. As Williams explains, although this ban also is taken to apply to supernatural terms (such as anything commanded by God) which means *good* cannot be defined in natural or in supernatural terms. It amounts to a ban to *define* good in terms of anything, and indeed this was Moore's position. However, Moore was prepared to define, for example, *right* in terms of *good*. So, others, following this strategy, took one of the alternative reductive routes while preserving this ban on the naturalistic fallacy. Accordingly, Moore's naturalistic fallacy ceased to be a fallacy about defining *good*. The fallacy, now, was about defining good in non-evaluative terms. If definitions are made using merely non-evaluative terms, the fallacy is said to take place. Therefore, Moore's version of the naturalistic fallacy turned out to ban any deduction of an evaluation from entirely non-evaluative premises in which definition is merely a special case (since there is a two-way implication). And Williams rightly points out that once put in this way; people realized that Moore's version of the fallacy looks pretty similar to 'Hume's Law' (2006, pp. 120-122). Hence, NOFI thesis gained popularity in the twentieth-century cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism debates.

Although Williams does not give a verdict about Hume's take on the fact-value dichotomy, he explains that such a distinction is certainly not found in our ethical language. He claims that if there is such a dichotomy, it is not a universal characteristic of the humanity to recognize such a dichotomy (2006, p. 129). So, we have no reason to suppose that language *already* presents us the distinction. Williams argue that either there is such a distinction and language does not disguise it, or linguistic theorists have found a way to unravel the disguise: however, neither is the case. What these theorists have found is a lot of thick concepts that express a union of fact and value. So, those who want to defend the fact-value dichotomy treated them as a conjunction of a factual and an evaluative element that in principle, can be separated from one another (this point will be explicated in later sections of this chapter) (2006, pp. 129-130). It should be noted that Williams never uses the word 'thin' rather calls such concepts abstract concepts. His account of the distinction will be detailed in Section II.

As the non-cognitivist accounts of ethics have become popular in the midst of the twentieth century, including different varieties like prescriptivism, emotivism or

expressivism (and their relative error theory, slightly different from these) and so on, so did the fact-value dichotomy. In a nutshell, moral non-cognitivism claims that moral judgments/propositions are not genuine judgments/propositions because they do not express genuine beliefs. Thus they are not truth-apt. The non-cognitivist accounts are also united in thinking that we live in a *natural* and *nonmoral* world so when we characterize people, actions, practices and so on, we have a person or an action non-morally characterized with a bare attitude added to it (Kirchin, 2013, p. 7). The non-cognitivist stance on disentangling thick concepts is explicated in Section III. However, there is still much to be shown about the relationship of non-cognitivism and the fact-value dichotomy here.

Non-cognitivism itself implies a fact-value dichotomy: while it is a fact that the puppy exists and is peeing all over the carpet, for someone to say that the puppy is disgusting or bad would be an expression of values. So, non-cognitivists assume, while facts can be studied or measured by empirical sciences, values cannot be, because there is a fundamental distinction between facts and values which according to these accounts should make us doubt whether values *really* exist. The implication of the fact-value dichotomy of non-cognitivism is crucial for the non-cognitivist interpretation of Hume: as presented in Chapter 4, non-cognitivists take Hume to endorse no-ought-from-is (NOFI).

The non-cognitivist implication of the fact-value dichotomy started to be challenged, as Kirchin notes, in an Oxford seminar by Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch. Kirchin also notes that Williams developed his ideas about thick concepts from the Foot-Murdoch seminar (2013, pp. 7-8). The idea of thick concepts was used to directly question the dichotomy: when we say that someone is rude, is it a statement of fact or an expression of value? Even if we accept that it is an expression of value, it is not so clear why cannot think of it as a statement of fact. This makes one pause and question whether there is such an absolute and decisive distinction between facts and values (2013, p. 8).

5.2 How to Understand the Distinction: Difference in Kind or Degree

The prima facie smooth distinction between thin and thick concepts is, however, very complex. There are numerous problems and controversies about how to divide them.

Among these are: how to understand the distinction, how to separate thick concepts from the thin, whether or not the content of thick concepts can be disentangled.

As Kirchin explains, thin concepts are regarded to not to have much of a descriptive content or, alternatively, they are characterized as wholly evaluative (2013, p. 2). These two alternative ways of characterization are keys in how to understand the distinction between the thin and the thick. Defining thick concepts as both describing and evaluating leaves it open as for how to describe thin concepts: either completely evaluative or primarily evaluative.

A difference of degree entails that thin concepts are mainly evaluative not denying that some thin concepts are more descriptive than others. So, both thin and thick concepts are placed in a spectrum where thin concepts like *good* and *pro* constitute one pole, thick concepts like *compassionate* and *sympathetic* covers the other, although there is no dividing line in the middle which is to say that concepts like *thoughtful* are in the middle of the spectrum (Kirchin, 2013, p. 3). Moreover, some concepts such as *just* or *knowledgeable* are thicker than the exemplary thin concepts (Kirchin, 2013, p. 3). As the difference is in degree, there is no basis for making a distinction.

There are some scholars who attempt to draw a distinction in kind, like Williams (2006)[11]. According to him, while thick concepts are both *action-guiding* and *world-guided* thin concepts are merely *action-guiding*. A thick concept such as *honest* is more directly connected to our social world in such a way that makes it distinct from a thin concept like *good* because when we describe someone or some action or some practice as honest, the object of description becomes understandable and categorizable to us. A thin concept fails to be world-guided or descriptive because they can be derived and understood away from the objects of evaluation. However, Kirchin presents that there are those that criticize this distinction, so Williams' distinction does not have a general acceptance (2006, p. 4).

There is a second way of indicating a distinction in kind, as Kirchin reports: while thin concepts like *good* and *bad* indicates pro or con evaluations, thick concepts like

[11] Williams attempts to explain how the distinction is to be made in same book referred to above, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.* However, it should be noted that although Williams mention there are diverging interpretations of Hume's moral philosophy, he never cites Hume as a frequent user thick concepts.

considerate and *inconsiderate* —in addition to the fact that it is viewed positively or negatively— tell us something directly about the object of evaluation (2013, p. 5).

5.3 Disentangling the Thick

Kirchin notes that much of the time, the issue of disentangling is raised between cognitivists and non-cognitivists. As it has been previously explained, for the non-cognitivists, when we characterize people or actions, what we have is a person or an action non-morally characterized and a bare attitude added to the characterization. Non-cognitivists approach the thick concepts similarly: they say we can separate the content of thick concepts, such as *honest*, into parts of a bare attitude and a descriptive conceptual content. They say what distinguishes *honest* from *brave* or *rude* is the latter sort of content and the bare attitude can be portrayed as expressions of emotions, or prescriptions and demands (2013, p. 8). So, cognitivists demonstrate what Kirchin calls a "separationist" attitude: to suppose that thick concepts can be separated into distinct and independently intelligible constituents. It is important, however, to notice that it is possible to be a cognitivist and a separationist: so long as the evaluative content amounts to more than a bare attitude, like a representing concept (such as pro or good) (Kirchin, 2013, p. 8). Väyrynen formulates the inseparability and the separability theses as follows:

> "**Inseparability**: Thick terms and concepts are or represent irreducible fusions of evaluation and non-evaluative description; these aspects cannot be disentangled from one another" (2013, p. 12).

> "**Separability**: The evaluative and non-evaluative aspects of thick terms and concepts are distinct components that can at least in principle be disentangled from one another" (2013, p. 12).

Among the non-separationists, Putnam argues that thick concepts function as counterexamples to the fact-value dichotomy and that they refute the dichotomy (2002). He explains that each of the statements given below can be considered as true descriptions in the most positivistic sense:

i. "John is a very inconsiderate man,"
ii. "John thinks about nobody but himself,"
iii. "John would do practically anything for money."

Putnam explains that when these statements are uttered in conjunction, it necessarily follows that "John is not a very good person" (1981, pp. 138-139). Putnam advocates a non-cognitivist interpretation of Hume and writes "Not *even* David Hume would be willing to classify, for example, 'generous', 'elegant', 'skillful', 'strong', 'gauche', 'weak', or 'vulgar' as concepts to which no 'fact' corresponds" (2002, p. 35). *He would not be, indeed*. As this point will be cleared in the following chapter, now we shall focus on another attempt of abolishing the fact-value dichotomy.

Foot[12] offers another attempt to arrive at a thin evaluative conclusion from a non-evaluative description: She argues that, for example, for the concept *rude*, there are some non-evaluative conditions such as "causing offense" and whatever satisfies this condition falls under the concept *rude*. Moreover, anything (an action, a person, or a practice) falling under *rude* is to be disapproved of or is bad. So, Foot seems to offer that for each thick concept; there are non-evaluative criteria (without using the thick concept in question) that make actions or people *analytically* fall under the thick concept. Moreover, once something satisfies the relevant non-evaluative conditions, and analytically falls under the thick concept in question, the thick concept also *analytically* implies thin evaluation (1958, pp. 507-508). It can be shown as follows:

iv. If something causes offense, it is rude.

v. If something is rude, then it is bad.

For both of these attempts, however, there are criticisms. For instance, Väyrynen claims that for Putnam's challenge to be effectual inseparability thesis and inherently evaluative thesis must be true (2013). The inherently evaluative thesis is given below:

> "**Inherently Evaluative:** The meanings of thick terms and concepts somehow or other contain global evaluation" (Väyrynen, 2013, p. 255).

Väyrynen analyses that Foot's challenge is valid regardless of whether separability thesis is true or not. However, to refute the fact-value dichotomy (which she attempts to do), Väyrynen claims that inherently evaluative thesis must be true (2013).

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[12] Foot also adopts a non-cognitivist interpretation of Hume, and attempts to refute Hume's and Moore's fallacies against ethical naturalism by using thick concepts. She also makes no reference that Hume's virtues are themselves thick concepts, but criticizes Hume's account of virtue elsewhere on the basis that Hume fails to distinguish virtues, skills and talents (2002).

There are also opposing stands in the literature to Väyrynen's criticisms[13]. I do not further present these debates here. However, for the purposes of the following chapter, it is worth noting that Väyrynen acknowledges that a considerable portion of thick concepts such as *discreet, cautious, industrious, assiduous, frugal, prudent, treacherous* are owed to Hume (2013, p. 1).

In the next chapter, after Hume's standard moral judgments are presented, I will show how his usage of virtue and vice words or thick concepts are very relevant in understanding whether Hume endorses NOFI thesis or not.

[13] See Kirchin, S. (2013) Thick Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

6. THE ROLE OF THICK CONCEPTS IN THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID HUME

As presented in the previous chapter, Hume's morality is interpreted in many distinct ways and systems. While it is hard to pin down his metaethical views, as Joyce points out, it seems that a careful selection of different sets of passages from Hume put in a certain order enables different interpretations (2009, p. 30). However, overlooking the possibility that Hume is hopelessly confused[14], we can say that he cannot both endorse and not endorse a fact-value dichotomy or (a very related discussion) he cannot be both a moral cognitivist and a moral non-cognitivist.

In this chapter, I wish to take a stand in these discussions and offer an argument. My main thesis is that in contrast to the common reception[15] of Hume's is-ought passage, by using thick concepts, Hume —to his own satisfaction, at any rate— manages to overcome the is-ought gap which he himself highlights. To appropriately demonstrate this conclusion, we need to understand: 1. Hume's ethics proceeds in a very descriptive fashion; 2. he hardly makes emphasis on thin concepts like rightness, goodness, duty, badness and his inquiry is rather on the character traits/virtues or vices like chastity, honesty, generosity, gratitude, cruelty, bloody-mindedness and so on; 3. these character traits can be classified under what is known today as 'thick concepts'. 4. thick concepts provide an analytical bridge to the putative is-ought gap. All the points that I raise find a basis in the existing literature, and I cite them here, yet, to the best of my knowledge, they have not been assembled and presented in this way to arrive at this conclusion.

6.1 Presentation of the Main Thesis

As it has been noted several times in the previous chapter, inspired by the success of Newton and his predecessors, Hume uses an experimental method of reasoning based

[14] This is an assumption that Flew calls a baseless 'infallibility assumption' (1969, p. 65). My point is merely that if there is a way we can reconcile Hume's philosophy without attributing him series of contradictions, then that's the way Hume should be understood.

[15] By common reception, mainly non-cognitivist readings of Hume are addressed; they can be checked from the previous chapter.

on experience and observation as opposed to systems of ethics based on general abstract principles extended into a variety of inferences and conclusions (Hume, 1998, p. 76-77/EPM). Above all, he attempts to explain and make sense of our capacity to think in moral terms, so it is suitable to say that he attempts to do a 'science of morality,' and that puts together a naturalistic account of moral psychology. By using this method and he makes observations on human transactions:

> "By means of this guide [the principles of human nature], we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives, from their actions, expressions, and even gestures, and again, descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general observations, treasured up by a course of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies." (Hume, 1975, p. 84-85/ EHU).

Hume endeavors to assemble principles of morals from particular instances, an activity which is different from creating an abstract system of morals. Therefore, Hume's moral philosophy is not prescriptive but is primarily descriptive (Cohen, 2000, p. 110). Likewise, Alanen and Sayre-McCord state that by using an anti-metaphysical naturalism and empiricism, Hume introduces a radically new empiricist account of belief formation in which human nature's regularities are given a central role (2006, p. 182; 2006, p. xiv). By making empirical observations on human affairs, Hume claims to have discovered what makes people agree about moral issues, and which circumstances give rise to moral conflicts. Hume's descriptive recipe leads him to the discovery of the principle of morals: the usefulness and the agreeableness of a character or an action causes moral sentiments, feelings of approval or disapproval in a qualified spectator: "The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness." (Hume, 2004, p. 194/ T, II. I. VII. 5).

As explained above, Hume's primary ambition is to explain morality: to offer an account of the origin of morality, to assemble principles of morality and how it enables inter-dependent social life which Hume deems necessary for human survival. The origin of morality is the natural sentiments of approbation and disapprobation; so, morality initially arises from feelings (Hume, 1998, p. 160/ EPM).

As Pigden, Sayre-McCord, and Cohon argue, Hume distinguishes between two kinds of beliefs: product-of-reason beliefs and perceptual beliefs. And moral beliefs, according to Hume are like perceptual beliefs (Pigden, pp. 5-6; Sayre-McCord, p. xxiv-xxvii; Cohon, pp. 107-108):

> "Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind […]" (Hume, 2004, p. 301-302/ T, III. I. I. 26).

This casts a different light on one of Hume's four main points (as presented in Chapter 2) that morality is clearly not the product of reason alone: Hume denies that moral beliefs can be arrived by logical inference but does not deny that they are genuine beliefs. So, moral judgments are like perceptual judgments such as color judgments.

As Sayre-McCord states, we can judge an object to be blue without having a color experience at all, some objects might give the experience of seeing blue without in fact being blue, or some objects might, in fact, be blue without giving the experience of seeing blue. But, an object is genuinely blue only if it has the influence of producing a specific *perceptual* experience under standard circumstances (2006, p. xxv). So, my belief that 'My pen is red' is true only if certain conditions are provided: that I have appropriate perceptual capacities (I am not color blind, or do not suffer from any other visual impairment, or wear sunglasses), there is appropriate light (for instance, I am not in poor light a different colored light), I am at an appropriate distance (not too far away or far too close). Likewise, a character trait is genuinely a virtue only if it has the influence of producing a specific *affective* experience under standard circumstances. The particular circumstance in the latter case is that we take up a general point of view instead of an individual point of view and evaluate whether the character trait in question would create feelings of approval or disapproval and one needs to have sympathetic capacities in good order to be able to take up such view (Sayre-McCord, 2006, p. xxv). Therefore, just as my judgment 'My pen is red' is true only if I have appropriate perceptual capacities, there is appropriate light, and I am at an appropriate distance; my judgment 'Cruelty is

vicious' is true only if my sympathetic capacities are in good order, and I take up a general point of view.

While my belief that 'My pen is red' is a truth-apt belief, it does not share the truth status of, say, the laws of logic. Because, according to Hume, the criteria by which I evaluate my pen is not independent of human experience. As Sayre-McCord explains, what makes our descriptions correct depends on the concepts we deploy: these concepts are human creations, but to say that does not mean they are arbitrary. For instance, various circumstances and capacities set the standard for the concept of redness because they are useful to us for communication, explanation, and prediction. We do not set these standards for special lighting conditions or based on how the color red appears to people with a specific vision impairment (2006, p. xxv). So, once the criteria by which we distinguish between vice and virtue is sorted, there is no bar to reason to discover that distinction and declare moral judgments true or false (2006, p. xvii).

As explained in Chapter 2, the correction taking place by moving from a self-interested point of view to a general perspective is analogous to our habitual corrections of impressions of our physical senses. How we correct our perceptual judgment when we observe from a plane that houses seem to be the same size of ants is similar to how we correct our moral judgments: moving from a self-interested or partial point of view to adopting an impartial view: " […] the appearance of objects in day-light, to the eye of a man in health, is denominated their true and real color, even while color is allowed to be merely a phantasm of the senses" (Hume, 1995, p. 215/ FD). As explained previously, we are led to correct our moral judgments because of the pressure of living together in social groups: to inter-dependently live together, to reliably interact with people and to achieve social coordination and cooperation, we need common moral standards, we are led to adopt an impartial point of view.

As Sayre-McCord states, although the account of morality Hume draws is primarily *explanatory*, Hume's ambition is also to *justify* it: his naturalistic moral psychology is about what is *already* happening in human affairs, Hume also hopes to show that our moral practice serves a purpose (1994, p. 203): that we inter-subjectively agree about our moral judgments, and that the ability to adopt impartiality enables us to live as a society.

Hume emphasizes that character is the appropriate object of moral evaluation and standard moral judgments found in Hume has one of the following structures:

i. A character trait T (cruelty/ justice/ modesty/ pride and so on) is virtuous/vicious.

ii. A subject S/ or a practice P is T (cruel/ sympathetic/ just/ modest/ proud and so on).

As is seen here, not all is-statements are necessarily value-free: for Hume, standard moral judgments are is-statements. However, careful judgment is needed to identify character traits accurately as people can be frequently partial due to their emotions; adopting a general point of view and evaluating things sympathetically from this impartial view is not automatic:

> "When our own nation is at war with any other, we detest them under the character of cruel, perfidious, unjust and violent: But always esteem ourselves and allies equitable, moderate, and merciful. If the general of our enemies be successful, 'tis with difficulty we allow him the figure and character of a man. He is a sorcerer: He has a communication with dæemons; as is reported of *Oliver Cromwell,* and the Duke of *Luxembourg*: He is bloody-minded, and takes a pleasure in death and destruction. But if the success be on our side, our commander has all the opposite good qualities, and is a pattern of virtue, as well as of courage and conduct. His treachery we call policy: His cruelty is an evil inseparable from war [...] 'Tis evident the same method of thinking runs thro' common life." (Hume, 2004, p. 225/ T, II. III. III. 2).

To counter these common tendencies of making partial (and thus possibly false) moral judgments such as, in Hume's example, 'The Duke of Luxembourg is bloody-minded,' a general point of view must be adopted:

> "[…] when [we bestow] on any man the epithets of *vicious* or *odious* or *depraved*, [we] expresses sentiments, […] [but we must] depart from [t]his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to […] [us] with others; […] [we] must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. […] One man's ambition is not another's ambition, nor will the same event or object satisfy both; but the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one, and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures." (Hume, 1998, p. 148/ EPM).

By adopting a common or general point of view or by making impartial or disinterested descriptions, we ensure that we make true evaluations in the sense that

evaluations made from someone's situated perspective are more likely to be false (Cohon, 2008, p. 152). To be able to adopt a common point of view, it is requisite that one's sympathetic capacities are in good order.

It is demonstrated, up to this point, that Hume's morality is descriptive rather than prescriptive and that his inquiry is on character traits and their classification under natural or artificial virtues or vices. This leads to the conclusion that the concepts that are exercised by Hume are not thin moral concepts of *rightness, duty, goodness, badness* (right being what we ought to do, good being what we ought to achieve); he is rather interested in virtues like justice, benevolence, chastity (Pigden, 2009, p. 27).

It is also demonstrated by now that there is no fact-value dichotomy in Hume's morality. The claim 'The Duke of Luxembourg is bloody-minded' both describes *and* evaluates so it is a statement of fact and a moral judgment. Furthermore, the standard form of Hume's moral judgments 'Cruelty is vicious' is not only the conclusion of a descriptive inquiry but also serves as a moral judgment.

There are two crucial points that we need to pay attention to. Firstly, as previously stated, it is important to notice that Hume's standard moral judgments in both forms are is-statements. Secondly, these moral judgments are not thin evaluations. This is because Hume's moral philosophy is primarily descriptive.

As mentioned repeatedly throughout the previous chapters, Hume's morality gives a central role to virtues and vices and his understanding of morality is a naturalistic account of ethics. On this point, later in this chapter, I offer a further demonstration of why Hume belongs to (and inspires) evolutionary ethics framework although he has no theory of evolution to work with. However, it is not necessary to adopt this view to appreciate my main argument. So long as it is acknowledged that character traits (or virtues and vices) are central features of Hume's moral inquiry (regardless of the way it is interpreted), my argument that Hume does not endorse a fact-value dichotomy and offers a way to overcome the is-ought gap stands valid.

As it is seen from Hume's standard moral judgments, and from his emphasis and his central inquiry into virtues and vices, Hume's moral judgments standardly employ thick concepts (more specifically virtue and vice concepts). We shall now see how thick concepts fit into Hume's morality for I believe that Hume's usage of virtue and

vice concepts is more significant in understanding the alleged is-ought gap than it appears.

As Sobel writes: "Hume is confident that there is no serious controversy concerning which qualities of mind in all societies are denominated virtues, and which vices." (2009, p. 121). He further asserts that in Bernard Williams' language, the concepts Hume uses are thick concepts and Hume would say they *analytically* imply praise or blame (2009, p. 122)[16]:

> "It is indeed obvious, that writers of all nations and all ages concur in applauding justice, humanity, magnanimity, prudence, veracity; and in blaming the opposite qualities […] [N]oone, without the most obvious and grossest impropriety, could affix reproach to a term, which in general acceptation is understood in a good sense; or bestow applause, where the idiom requires disapprobation." (Hume, 1995, p. 205/ FD).

It is evident that Hume holds the *Inherently Evaluative Thesis* presented in the previous chapter to be true: "The meanings of thick terms and concepts somehow or other contain global evaluation" (Väyrynen, 2013, p. 255). And Hume voices more than once[17] how they analytically imply praise or blame:

> "The merit of delivering true general precepts in ethics is indeed very small. Whoever recommends any moral virtues, really does not more than is implied in the terms themselves. The people who invented the word *charity*, and used it in a good sense, incalculated more clearly, and much more efficaciously, the precept, be charitable, than any pretend legislator or prophet, who should insert such a maxim in his writings. Of all expressions, those which, together with their other meaning, imply a degree either of blame or approbation, are the least liable to be perverted or mistaken." (Hume, 1995, pp. 207/ FD).

Hume uses thick concepts (or virtue and vice concepts) because they are essential for his Newtonian experimental method based on observation (or in other words, his science of morality) to be relevant in ought-evaluations of morality. As explicated previously, Hume's descriptive account of morality and arriving at moral judgments *already* undermine any fact-value dichotomy attributed to Hume: there is strong

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[16] Sobel seems to be the only one that conducts an examination into Hume's moral philosophy and claim that these virtue and vice concepts are 'thick concepts'. However, he does not demonstrate this to establish that Hume uses them to overcome the putative is-ought gap. He elsewhere in the same book states that Hume's theory of morality is cognitivist although Hume offers a non-cognitivist theory of moral judgments (2009, p. 76).

[17] Sobel identifies five passages from Hume asserting similar points (2009 pp. 121-123).

support from the literature on this point, and I make use of some of these. Hume's usage of thick concepts serves another purpose: it provides an analytic bridge to the putative is-ought gap. So, when someone makes a moral judgment like 'Jane is rude,' Hume appears to take that 'charitability' can analytically imply a thin evaluative conclusion:

iii. Jane is charitable.

iv. Therefore, Jane is a good person.

By the meaning of 'charitable' or 'charitability' in our language, (Hume would say) the conclusion is implied from the premise, so although *logically* invalid, it becomes *analytically* valid (A similar example given in Chapter 3 is that 'Tom is a bachelor; therefore, Tom does not have a wife'). The other form of standard moral judgment found in Hume's moral philosophy also grants such a passage:

v. Cruelty is vicious.

vi. Therefore, we ought not to be cruel.

By the meaning of 'vicious' or 'vice,' the conclusion is analytically implied from the premise. Pigden asserts something very similar: "Hume seems to think that it is *analytic* that a virtue is a quality that arouses in a suitably qualified spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation, and furthermore he *needs* it to be analytic since it is hard to see how he could establish the point by empirical inquiry." (2009, p. 6)[18]. To say that 'X ought not to be rude' then boils down to saying, 'If X is rude, it would excite the sentiment of disapprobation in a qualified spectator.'

Put in this way, it does not make any sense to think that Hume endorses 'Hume's Law' or NOFI thesis or a fact-value dichotomy. Quite the opposite. His entire effort in morality amounts to producing value statements in the light of descriptive inquiry. This is what is implied from his dedication to 'a science of morality' in the first place: he thinks that by making observations about human affairs and people's moral nature, we learn something about the nature of morality and that explanations concerning these observations are somehow relevant to morality and have somehow

[18] Pigden, although correctly identifies that Hume's standard moral judgments are not 'thin' evaluations and that Hume hardly makes emphasis on 'thin concepts', never claims that the virtue and vice concepts analytically imply ought-evaluations because of their 'thick' nature.

an action guiding-function. Recalling from Chapter 5, Foot offers two analytical bridges to overcome the is-ought gap:

vii. If something causes offense, it is rude.
viii. If something is rude, then it is bad.

For Hume, the first analytical bridge is unnecessary, because Hume explains that something is *really* rude if a qualified spectator says so. But the second analytical bridge Foot employs is identical to Hume's. So, it is evident that Väyrynen's challenge for Foot could be applied to Hume too: that the analytical bridge used to overcome the is-ought gap is valid if Inherently Evaluative Thesis is true. Hume takes it to be true: the meanings of the virtue and vice concepts contain a global evaluation. I do not further engage these debates here. Whether the solution attempt offered by Hume is successful or questionable is a (related but) different discussion. Regardless of these, however, it is clear that Hume does not endorse a naturalistic fallacy thesis and the is-ought passage is not what it is cracked up to be: it does not point to a fundamental distinction between facts and values, it does not confirm or prove non-cognitivism, and it does not refute naturalistic ethics.

Another potential challenge could be that Hume commits Moore's version of the fallacy: he is defining *good* or *bad* or *ought* in natural terms. A suitable response to such a challenge would be that it is Moore that offered his version of the naturalistic fallacy as a means of blocking the way of ethical naturalism and as a means of drawing a fact-value dichotomy. Hume —as an ethical naturalist— shares neither of these ambitions. On the contrary, he offers a way to overcome the gap he highlights in the is-ought passage.

6.2 Moving from Is to Ought: The Example of Justice

As explained in detail in Chapter 2, the concept of justice is unknown and unnecessary for those living in 'rude and more natural' conditions: therefore, the concept of justice is unintelligible to those living in familial groups. Certain conditions must be met for *justice* to arise: 1. circumstances that humans experience in the world must be such that they make the concept *justice* necessary; 2. humans must have a natural disposition to justice. As there are not unlimited resources for people that make *justice* unnecessary or a grievous shortage of supplies that would wreck any potential laws of justice; the circumstances humans face in the world

render *justice* necessary. Furthermore, there *is* a disposition in human nature for justice: humans are not entirely vicious, such a case would make *justice* pointless. Neither are humans creatures of utmost beneficence; such a case would equally make *justice* pointless. For Hume, these are empirical and natural circumstances of justice.

As it can be recalled from Chapter 2, there are two transitions, and accordingly, three steps for the full development of the conventions of justice and they are shown in Figure 5.1.



Figure 5.1 : Hume's account of the development of justice.

From the empirical and natural circumstances of justice, through the last stage, justice becomes a moral matter. The pressure of living together in social groups, the need to inter-dependently live together, the need to reliably interact with people and to achieve social coordination and cooperation leads to the necessity of achieving impartiality. Hume explains that to achieve impartiality, we need common moral standards, and thus, we adopt the general point of view and look at things sympathetically.

Understanding Hume's tactic here is crucial: he defines virtues/vices as those traits that invoke feelings of approval/disapproval in a qualified spectator. So, sentiments of approbation and disapprobation still play a central role. As justice is a virtue, it leads to feelings of approval in a qualified spectator which means what we ought to do derives from what people impartially agree upon: hence the move from descriptive statements to value statements.

At this point, another matter needs to be presented: For Hume, our moral sense is rooted in humans' natural social affections; and although the development of virtues (for example, the development of justice) requires political artifice, 'artifice of politicians' can succeed with the support of nature only (Arnhart, 1995, p. 390): "The utmost politicians can perform, is, to extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds; but still nature must furnish the materials, and give us some notion of moral distinctions." (Hume, 2004, p. 321/ T, III. II. II. 25).

6.3 Cognitivism in Hume

It has been repeatedly stated, so far, that non-cognitivism implies a fact-value dichotomy or NOFI thesis. Establishing that Hume does not endorse NOFI thesis entails that Hume is not a non-cognitivist, and therefore is a cognitivist. However, there is still much to be explored: what kind of cognitivist is Hume? How can a moral theory with sentiments at its center be cognitive? And finally, if we accept that according to Hume, there is ethical knowledge, how does it compare with scientific knowledge? Let us start with why Hume is interpreted as a non-cognitivist in the first place[19]. For instance, the following passage is regarded as textual evidence to assert that Hume is a non-cognitivist:

> "[…] can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call *vice*. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action." (Hume, 2004, p. 301/ T, III. I. I. 26).

Does Hume imply in these passages that moral judgments are incapable of being true or false? Cohon suggests that "[...] the mere use of the word 'real' in 'real existence and matter of fact' does not bar Humean moral judgments from being true [...]". Although Hume does not explicitly state anywhere that some moral judgments are true; he never denies it either (2008, p. 108). He never denies someone's being cruel

[19] Although the non-cognitivist interpretation is presented in Chapter 3, I shall give more details here to answer these questions.

is a real existent or a real matter of fact. Moreover, as explicated above, he compares moral beliefs to perceptual beliefs such as color perception. The seeming non-cognitivist attitude of these passages can be attributed to, as Norton puts it, Hume's "deep distrust of the *a priori* reasoning characteristic of […] the Cartesians." (2009, p. 6). The non-cognitivist interpretation takes Hume to hold the following:

ix. A spectator's belief that 'Cruelty is vicious' is explained by natural sentiments of approval and disapproval.

x. Natural sentiments are not rationally justified.

xi. Therefore, the spectator's belief that 'Cruelty is vicious' is not rationally justified.

As our moral claims are primarily explained by our natural moral emotions, non-cognitivists argue that although moral language uses the propositional language, and seems to assert genuine beliefs, this is not the case. Accordingly, moral 'attitudes' are not truth-evaluable. For instance, Flew[20] states that "No doubt [Hume] ought to have said, boldly and consistently, something like: that when we say *This is wrong* we are not stating anything, not even that we have certain feelings, but rather we are giving vent to our feelings; or […] uttering some rather devious sort of crypto-command." Flew claims that to develop such refined moves, Hume had to spend years of labor and ingenuity (1969, p. 67). Before tackling ix-xi, let us see another passage regarded as textual evidence to claim that Hume is a non-cognitivist:

> "Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the *real* relations of ideas, or to *real* existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc'd either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason." (Hume, 2004, p. 295/ T, III. I. I. 9).

[20] It is interesting that Flew, in this paper is criticizing G. Hunter who states that Hume's is-ought passage must be re-interpreted because Hume's entire efforts in moral philosophy amounts to drawing evaluative conclusions from statements of facts by making use of a spectator that adopts a general point f view. Flew claims this ciew is strictly correct, it just gets the emphasis wrong. Flew seems to think that any ethical theory that attributes a central role to emotions is destined to be non-cognitivist. We shall see if this is the case.

It is worth noting that both passages quoted in this section are taken from the first section of Book III of the *Treatise*, *Moral Distinctions are not derived from Reason*. So, they are written when Hume is still in the sorting process of the criteria by which we can distinguish between vice and virtue[21]. Furthermore, Hume devotes a large portion of *Treatise* to explain qualities of virtue and vice he clearly considers to be true: that a concealed and well-founded pride is virtuous, or that justice is a virtue relying on artifice (Cohon, 2008, p. 108). It is crucial to note that the *fallibility* of moral knowledge is shared by all 'matter of fact' knowledge according to Hume. Let me offer xii-xiv to adequately respond to ix-xi:

xii. A spectator's belief that 'Fire will heat' is explained by induction and causation[22].

xiii. Induction and causation are not rationally justified.

xiv. Therefore, the spectator's belief that 'Fire will heat' is not rationally justified.

Both scientific and moral theory (and there is not necessarily a sharp distinction of character for Hume between the two, evident from the fact that he is doing a 'science of man' or from the fact that he is introducing the Newtonian method into moral theory) aim to be objective. However, they are not the discovery of truth and falsehood because *reason* is the discovery of truth and falsehood. These theories do not give us rational knowledge or demonstrative knowledge based on proofs[23]. Instead, they offer knowledge based on perceptions or empirical knowledge which is only probable and contingent[24], thus fallible.

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[21] Our faculty of reason, according to Hume, is limited and philosophical systems that give it priority fail to notice that i. there is no rational proof to even believe in the existence of an external world, ii. there is no rational proof to believe that there is a causal connection between two things (Norton, pp. 12-17). Therefore, Hume states that morality cannot be grounded on reason alone.

[22] I will not discuss in detail the connection of causation and induction, but Fogelin's simplified presentation suffices here for my purposes: Causal connections are not established *a priori*. Only the experience of constant conjunctions between event A and event B leads us to suppose a cause-effect relation. Induction comes into play when this kind of cause-effect relation creates a future expentancy: that event A and event B will continue to be conjoined in the future (2009, p. 214).

[23] By demonstrative knowledge based on proofs, Hume means a proof of a proposition that deems it necessarily true, or that shows it cannot possibly be false in the absolute sense that it is impossible to conceive anything contrary such as mathematical truths (Bell, 2009, pp. 152-153).

[24] Because it is not impossible to conceive the contrary of the knowledge based on perceptions. It is perfectly conceivable that fire, although generated heat up to this point, wil stop generating heat. Or likewise, we can conceive that a shift in human nature or the conditions in the world could make some virtues/vices unintelligible and unnecesary— or even a distinction between vice and virtue (See Section II in this chapter).

The justification that Hume gives for both beliefs ('Cruelty is vicious' and 'Fire will heat') seems to be psychology-based: human nature displaying moral emotions/ or custom and habit in perceiving things the way we do. But this does not mean that the justification is arbitrary: as Norton explains, Hume analyses that regularities of experience give rise to the feeling of expectation that fire will heat (2009, p. 15) and as Sayre-McCord explains, the distinction between vice and virtue and the concepts we deploy to describe the moral qualities of people or actions —although human creations— are not arbitrary: they are contingent standards to which we arrive from making observations on the regularities of how people solve problems of explanation, communication, and moral conflict (2006, pp. xxv-xxvi).

6.4 Anti-Realism and Intersubjective Objectivity in Hume's Morality

There are two ways of understanding anti-realism: the first concerns whether the concepts we deploy to describe the moral qualities of people are *real* or *genuine* concepts (as opposed to being pseudo-concepts). Secondly, anti-realism can be understood in the sense that anti-realism is asking whether these concepts are response-dependent, or they exist independently from any subjects' perspective. Sayre-McCord (1994; 2006), Cohon (2008), Pigden (2009; 1991; 2016), Arnhart (1995), Krause (2008) all take Hume to be an anti-realist of the latter kind and a realist of the first kind, and I agree with their view. This is to say that for Hume, the concepts we deploy while making moral judgments are genuine concepts, but they are response-dependent.

As previously presented, my perceptual judgment that 'This craw is black.' is true only if the object is constituted so as to prompt the impression of black in humans with no vision defects under standard conditions and likewise, my moral judgment that 'The Duke of Luxembourg is bloody-minded.' is true only if the person's character is such to prompt the feelings of approval in humans with no empathy defects under standard conditions. This response dependence on Hume's account of morality is not subjective or relativist: as repeatedly explained, it grants us inter-subjective objectivity (although not cosmically, or universally or absolutely objective).

6.5 Political Consequences of the Analytical Bridge

The remaining question is whether or not Hume's thick analytical bridge from descriptive to evaluative moral judgments has challenging political consequences. As commonly accepted, nature's authority is frequently cited to support certain political ends: for instance, Daston gives contemporary examples, examples from nineteenth-century and medieval times. In the debates over genetically modified organisms and homosexual marriage, nature is usually invoked as an ally. In the nineteenth century, the opponents of higher education for women claimed that the natural occupation of women is to be mothers and wives. Medieval rulers appealed to nature when defending the subordination of the majority of the population to the clergy and the aristocracy by stating that hands and feet naturally serve the heart and the head (2014, pp. 579-580). It is, therefore, important to determine whether or not Hume's account legitimizes such controversial social arrangements under the pretense that they are natural. I agree with those (for instance, Krause, 2008) that state that Hume neither dogmatically supports status-quo nor legitimizes everything that happens in nature.

The general point of view (which is explained in Chapter 2 in more detail) plays a crucial role in understanding what Humean morality would entail for such questions and issues. By looking from a general point of view, we leave our self-interests and partiality aside and think for the common good, and this might mean to diverge from current practices from the society that we live in. The intersubjective nature of our judgments does not mean that for Hume, our moral judgments are a matter of following the social norms blindly.

As Krause explains, according to Hume, the popularity of bigotry or false opinion in any specific era does not justify its moral mistakes such as the prevalence of slavery among ancient societies. To avoid making such mistakes, or to resist the popularity of such social conventions, social groups must be 'in conversation' with other social groups and with a wider range of people. Krause points out that this conversation may be metaphorical, that it can happen through reading literature and history (2008, p. 82). According to Hume, humans, by their nature, live communicative, cooperative, and interdependent social lives. Thus, the standards of morality, or in general values, are arrived at inter-subjectively.

Likewise, there is room for criticism in current practices in Hume's morality with the element of sympathy, too. As Krause explains, there are two modes of sympathy Hume employs, and they naturally come together: for example, when I sympathize (as a faculty of mind, the first mode) with a victim of racial discrimination, I empathetically experience the pain and the unpleasantness that victim experiences and this generates a feeling of disapproval for the racist character of the perpetrator or the practice of discrimination in general. This is different from the second mode of sympathy because my moral sentiment of disapproval does not necessarily entail a worry for the well-being of the victim personally. However, the second mode of sympathy can facilitate the first when it comes to sympathizing with people that I know and care about (2008, pp. 80-81).

Hume does not attempt to legitimize everything happening in nature either: although he is a moral naturalist who attempts to derive prescriptive statements from descriptive statements (or an *ought* from an *is*); he explicitly denies that everything happening in nature can be identified as 'morally good':

> "[…] that nothing can be more unphilosophical than those systems, which assert, that virtue is the same with what is natural, and vice with what is unnatural […] It is impossible, therefore, that the character of natural and unnatural can ever, in any sense, mark the boundaries of vice and virtue." (Hume, 2004, p. 305/ Treatise, III. I. II. 10).

As it can be seen, the Humean account of morality rejects that a practice can be approved or disapproved of merely on the basis that it is natural or merely on the basis that it happens to be the current practice.

Looking sympathetically from a general point of view can ensure the truth of our moral judgments and ensure that we correctly distinguish virtues from vices. And indeed, this is what we happen to *naturally* do when coming to agreements about our moral conflicts (and these agreements are an essential part of the community life, without them, we could not have formed societies or continue to live in them).

In conclusion, the derivation of prescriptive judgments from descriptive judgments does not have such challenging political consequences according to the Humean account of morality. As it has been previously stated, regardless of how some philosophers aim to give abstract accounts of morality in guiding us about how to act, Hume deems such abstract accounts of morality are not useful, because both

moral distinctions and the way we nominate certain character traits as virtues and vices in our languages come from experience and the common course of life. Therefore, such inference is what makes community life possible in the first place.

7. CONCLUSION

As it has been repeatedly stated in the previous chapters, my main thesis is that in contrast to the common reception of Hume's is-ought passage, by using thick concepts, Hume attempts to overcome the naturalistic fallacy. Hume is well-known for many things, like his objections to miracles, his stance against the Cartesian rationalism and the rational justification of causation or induction. He is also well-known for a passage that people believe to be the origin of the fact-value dichotomy. The passage is also known as Hume's Law (Hume, 2004, Treatise, III. I. I. 27, p. 302). This passage constitutes the heart of many puzzles about Hume's morality. It has been discussed for decades that the passage of interest creates a contrast with Hume's general naturalist outlook and there are different views of how we should understand this passage. Accordingly, there are diverging interpretations of Hume's moral philosophy.

I have classified the diverging interpretations of Hume's take on this issue under two main branches: there are those who claim there is a logical gap between is-statements and ought-statements and they claim that this gap is unbreachable. Secondly, there are those who claim that the seeming gap can be overcome. Scholars like Sayre-McCord (1994; 2001; 2006) and Pigden (1991; 2009; 2016), for example, claim that (without classifying Hume in a certain ethical system) Hume explains how the inference can be made. Hume understood in the evolutionary ethics framework is also said to explain how the inference can be made; people like Tullberg and Tullberg (2001), Arnhart (1995), Ruse (1998), Curry (2006). Others like Searle (1964) believe that the gap is breachable, but Hume does make a gap claim. Virtue ethicist interpretation of Hume constitutes a somewhat middle ground stating that a connection between is-statements and ought-statements can be made, but the connection is made by feelings, not inference (Cohon, 2008; Sobel, 2009). The fifth and sixth responses arise from an acceptance of the fact-value dichotomy. Positivists exclude morality from the realm of philosophy altogether stating that ought-statements, unlike is-statements, are unverifiable (Carnap, 1995). And other non-cognitivist interpreters state that Hume's central theme of morality is emotions,

which entails that Hume can neither accept that moral judgments to be genuine judgments nor that moral attitudes can be true or false (there are only moral attitudes or stances). Scholars like Flew (1969), Blackburn (1996), Snare (1991) are under this branch. And lastly, there are non-naturalist interpreters, like Shafer-Landau (2010), who takes that Hume grants ethics autonomy from natural and social sciences by establishing the fact-value dichotomy.

As Curry identifies, there are at least 8 versions of the naturalistic fallacy thesis that we can come across in the literature: moving from is to ought which is known as Hume's version; moving from facts to values which is known as the fact-value dichotomy; identifying good with its object which is Moore's version of the fallacy; claiming that good is a natural property; going in the direction of evolution; assuming what is natural is good, assuming what currently exists, ought to exist; and substituting explanation for justification. All of these versions are somewhat connected; but for the purposes of this thesis, I am mainly interested in the first two versions as they are the versions that are claimed to originate from Hume's no-ought from-is passage.

As Williams presents, there is a historical and philosophical connection between the fact-value dichotomy debates, Moore's version of the naturalistic fallacy thesis and how it connects to 'Hume's Law' (2006). Although Moore's naturalistic fallacy is not of main interest for this project, it is important to tackle the connection between Moore's and Hume's versions of the naturalistic fallacy thesis (as Hume's no-ought-from-is passage also came to be known as a naturalistic fallacy thesis). Moore's naturalistic fallacy thesis claims that *good* cannot be defined in natural terms. although this ban also is taken to apply to supernatural terms (such as anything commanded by God) which means *good* cannot be defined in natural or in supernatural terms. It amounts to a ban to *define* good in terms of anything, and indeed this was Moore's position. However, Moore was prepared to define, for example, *right* in terms of *good*. So, others, following this strategy, took one of the alternative reductive routes while preserving this ban on the naturalistic fallacy. Accordingly, Moore's naturalistic fallacy ceased to be a fallacy about defining *good*. The fallacy, now, was about defining good in non-evaluative terms. If definitions are made using merely non-evaluative terms, the fallacy is said to take place. Therefore, Moore's version of the naturalistic fallacy turned out to ban any deduction of an

evaluation from entirely non-evaluative premises in which definition is merely a special case (since there is a two-way implication). Once put in this way; people realized Moore's version of the fallacy looks pretty similar to 'Hume's Law' (pp. 120-122). Hence, Hume's no-ought-from-is passage gained popularity in the twentieth-century naturalism vs. non-naturalism debates.

Although Moore is a moral non-naturalist, such a position cannot be attributed to Hume. Therefore, I mainly argue that: Hume's ethics proceeds in a very descriptive fashion; he hardly makes emphasis on thin concepts like *good, bad, right, wrong*; his inquiry is rather on character traits or virtues and vices. These character traits can be classified under what is known today as 'thick concepts' and thick concepts prominently provide an analytical bridge to the putative is-ought gap. Accordingly, far from endorsing a fact-value dichotomy, Hume's moral philosophy offers a passage from is-statements to ought-statements.

Such understanding of Hume's is-ought passage can aid us in eliminating the seeming contradictions. This is not to say that I assume Hume is infallible like Flew (1969) accuses certain interpreters or that I assume Hume cannot possibly make any contradictions. My point is that if there is a way to accommodate the seemingly diverging passages and reconcile Hume's philosophy without attributing him series of contradictions, then that's the way we should understand Hume's philosophy.

In order to understand how Hume's moral philosophy offers a way of deriving prescriptive conclusions from descriptive premises, an outline of Hume's moral principles must be appreciated. Motivation Principle states that reason alone cannot motivate people to act by itself. Reason by itself is cold when it comes to matters of morality. Moral Distinctions Principles 1 and 2 state that moral distinctions are not derived by reason alone, these distinctions are rather derived from moral sentiments. And lastly, according to Hume, there are natural virtues and vices and artificial virtues and vices: while natural virtues can arise from our personal natural feelings, artificial virtues arise from human conventions and impersonal cooperation. For example, benevolence, generosity, gratitude, friendship, self-esteem, and prudence are among natural virtues and justice, honesty, faithfulness to promises and contracts, allegiance to the government, conformity to the laws, chastity, modesty are among artificial virtues. And for Hume, virtues are those character traits that are

immediately agreeable or useful over long-term to their possessors or to those around.

Daston (2014) claims that a passage from descriptive to evaluative moral judgments has challenging political consequences: nature is invoked by the opponents of higher education for women: they claimed that the natural occupation of women is to be mothers and wives. Medieval rulers appealed to nature when defending the subordination of the majority of the population to the clergy and the aristocracy by stating that hands and feet naturally serve the heart and the head. In order to understand whether or not Hume's inference of prescriptive statements from descriptive statements entail such consequences (or to understand whether or not Hume's rejection of fact-value dichotomy entails consequences like these), the connection of his moral philosophy to his political philosophy must be grasped. For Hume, certain conditions must be met for the concept of justice to arise: firstly, circumstances that humans experience in the world must be such that they make the concept justice necessary; and secondly, humans must have a natural disposition to justice. For example, as there are not unlimited resources for people that make justice unnecessary or a grievous shortage of supplies that would wreck any potential laws of justice; the circumstances humans face in the world render justice necessary. Furthermore, there is a disposition in human nature for justice: humans are not entirely vicious, such a case would make justice pointless. Neither are humans creatures of utmost beneficence; such a case would equally make justice pointless. These are empirical and natural circumstances of justice according to Hume. Thus, the concept of justice cannot be inferred from reason alone, nor can it be abstract and come from idealized circumstances.

The development of the concept of justice takes place in three steps according to Hume: in the first stage, there are families and familial groups formed by the sexual nature of humans. The concept of justice is unknown and unnecessary for those living in this 'rude and more natural' conditions. When conflicts start to arise between these groups, some conventions or rules are created and adopted by the tacit recognition that it is in one's self-interest to obey. When societies become larger and more complex, people start to disregard some of these rules as they cannot realize it's in their self-interest to obey. So, in this final stage, being in conformity with the conventions of justice becomes a moral matter because we are lead to sympathize

and look from a general point of view by living in large groups. Sympathy and general point of view are important elements of Hume's moral and political philosophy: a spectator feels the pleasures or pains of others caused by just or unjust actions regardless of whether it directly affects the spectator or not. Through sympathy and moral sentiments, we inter-subjectively arrive at moral judgments and our moral judgments become impartial by looking from a general point of view. The impartiality aids us to move from the self-interest claims to inter-subjective claims. For example, personal perspective directs one to disapprove of being treated cruelly or approve of being treated generously whereas the general point of view leads one to hold that cruel treatment vicious or that generous treatment is virtuous. Therefore, looking sympathetically from the general point of view draws a line between idiosyncratic moral judgments and reliable moral judgments by introducing impartiality. The pressure of living together with others in groups leads to the correction of judgment and the adoption of impartiality. Although Hume's account of morality is primarily descriptive, and offers an empirical account of how we act, and how we are rather than giving prescriptions of how we should act or how we should be; his inquiry becomes relevant to normative ethics by the realization that our moral practices have a point and that they serve a purpose: they enable people to live together in communities and aid in overcoming conflicts. Therefore, Hume's ambition is not only to explain our moral practices, but also to justify them. As explained through the thesis, once we descriptively distinguish which character traits are regarded as virtues and which ones as vices, prescriptive statements *analytically* follow and accordingly, Hume's inquiry focuses on how to make such distinctions rather than how to derive ought-statements. Hume explains in multiple passages that language plays the primary role in normative ethics. Regardless of how some philosophers aim to give abstract accounts of morality in guiding us about how to act, such abstract accounts of morality are not useful, because both moral distinctions and the way we nominate certain character traits as virtues and vices in our languages come from experience and the common course of life.

As shown by Krause, Hume neither dogmatically supports status-quo nor legitimizes everything that happens in nature. Looking sympathetically from a general point of view plays a crucial role: we leave our self-interest and partiality aside and think for the common good, and this might mean to diverge from current practices of the

society that we live in. The intersubjective nature of our judgments does not mean that for Hume, our moral judgments are a matter of following the social norms blindly. To avoid making such mistakes and the popularity of bigotry and false opinion in a certain age like the prevalence of slavery, or to resist the popularity of such social conventions, social groups must be 'in conversation' with other social groups and with wider range of people: this conversation may happen through reading literature and history. Likewise, we sympathize with a victim of racial discrimination, because we empathetically experience the pain and the unpleasantness that victim experiences and this generates a feeling of disapproval for the racist character of the perpetrator or the practice of discrimination in general.

There are two main assumptions that I make in the thesis. The first is that the logical invalidity of an argument does not entail that the argument is also analytically invalid. For instance, although the argument, 'Tom is a bachelor. Therefore, Tom does not have a wife' is *logically* invalid, it is *analytically* valid. With the meaning of 'bachelor' in mind, it is impossible for the premise to be true and the conclusion to be false. The second assumption that I make is the distinction between thick and thin concepts: concisely, thin concepts are a lot more abstract and a lot less descriptive while thick concepts are a branch that includes epistemic concepts such as reliable, open-minded, gullible, and observant; aesthetic concepts such as banal, gracious, sublime, and grotesque; practical concepts such as shrewd, imprudent, idiotic, mesmerizing, folksy, corny; and virtue and vice concepts such as generous, selfish, industrious, compassionate, discreet, brutal, deceitful, just, generous, considerate. Moreover, thick concepts are said to be descriptive and open to scientific/descriptive analysis. Those that work in this framework like Foot (1958) and Putnam (1981; 2002) claim that these concepts analytically imply prescriptive conclusions although they are themselves descriptive.

I believe that such analytical implication of thick concepts can be traced back to Hume. For the two standard Humean moral judgments 'Jane is charitable.' and 'Cruelty is vicious.'; the conclusions 'Therefore, Jane is a good person.' and 'Therefore, we ought not to be cruel.' *analytically* follows which enables us to overcome the logical invalidity Hume points out in the famous no-ought-from-is passage. So, we can say that Hume offers a ground for the derivation of prescriptive statements from descriptive statements and such grounding which Hume believes

other philosophers take for granted. The prominent arguments used to point out the fallacious reasoning in inferring is-from-ought lack such analytical connection: for instance, ‘Seeking revenge is natural. Therefore, seeking revenge is moral’ does not offer an analytical bridge to overcome the logical invalidity. The virtue and vice concepts (or character traits) Hume uses analytically imply praise or blame. And this analytical implication undermines the logical gap between is-statements and ought-statements. Indeed, Hume’s employment of these thick concepts, instead of others, makes such implication possible.

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