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THEORY OF COVERT ACTION

M.A. THESIS

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FOREWORD

This thesis is originally founded on my ambition to understand the phenomenon of ‘dirty war’ which we cannot see, hear or perceive by any means in mass media, but live with its consequences. However, we intuit that a few selected men from different nations fighting with each other by cloak and dagger, around various parts of the world. In past couple of years, the number of these has been multiplied by those who want to establish a state or achieve a universal objective. And still, we cannot see their war but live by its consequences. Because of this, it was very hard to elaborate this thesis at scientific level of inquiry. I have tried to create a theoretical framework of this kind of war to not only to understand its nature, but also understand how this kind of war shapes our civilization. As St. Augustine said about his monumental work, “I have discharged my debt”: It might be too complex for some and too simple for others.

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Arda Mehmet Tezcanlar

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THEORY OF COVERT ACTION

SUMMARY

This thesis aims to challenge current definitions of covert action by presenting its analytical foundations. In addition to that, this thesis aims to answer these questions: Which theory of International Relations places the covert action within international politics? On what aspect is it related to actors' behavior? Is it a policy of its own or a substitute of a policy? On what conditions state's conduct of political violence is inevitable?

Today, the war against ISIS, whose acts of violence is notably brutal, fearful but at the same time political, necessitates acts of counter-terrorism and the same quality of violence. It also raises issues that require social control in conflict for terminating extremist ideas and its proponents. Therefore, it is not only war that is conducted by means of power but also means of ideas. This kind of war needs general conceptual framework for providing operational capability against radical extremist factions, and against those state actors whose institutions are captured by radical extremists and became rogue states.

Covert action is regarded as a type of intervention clandestinely executed by any state to another state in order to disrupt and sabotage its means of decisions at policy-making. Apart from that, in international politics, covert action is regarded as foreign policy against asymmetric threats. It is described by cases of security assistance to any allied state or faction in conditions that withhold direct means and by cases of foreign internal defense to allied states in which the use of force is limited under political circumstances. Both of these definitions cause fallacies that designate every intervention other than military or every counterinsurgency activity or every effort of counterterrorism as covert action. The reason behind this fallacious understanding is that covert action is elaborated on traditional approach to the studies on war and peace in international relations. This resulted in an ambiguous definition between violent politics and military science.

In order to overcome this ambiguity it is necessary to point out that political violence constitutes the context of covert action. This context has a determinant place both at actor level and system level. On actor level, covert action is the result of divergent relations between actors. The conflicting parties impose their political decisions without bringing conflict into a crisis and in doing so they conduct violence as a way of depriving their wellbeing for control of respect. Especially in the case of conflict between state and non-state actors, terrorism as conduct of clandestine political violence becomes a weapon of opportunity for the non-state actor. In that case, covert

action becomes a state's response by same means of terrorism. State modifies the terrorist organization by compartmenting its conduct of political violence at its coercive apparatuses. On system level, the causal mechanism between conflicting parties is revived by properties of international system which protracts the conflict on struggle for modification. The emerging conditions of protracted conflict constrain actors to penetrate each others' systems. These conditions constrain them conduct political violence to provide relative superiority above each other. Thus both conducts of terrorism and covert action is revived by the system constrains of international politics.

ÖRTÜLÜ EYLEM KURAMI

ÖZET

Bu tez örtülü eylemin mevcut tanımlarına karşı çıkarak analitik temellerini teşkil etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bununla beraber, bu tez şu soruları da cevaplamayı amaçlamaktadır: Hangi uluslararası ilişkiler kuramı örtülü eylemi uluslararası siyasete yerleştirmektedir? Hangi açıdan bu eylem devletler ile ilgilidir? Kendi başlarına bir politika mıdır yoksa bir politikanın parçası mıdır? Hangi durumlarda devletin siyasal şiddete başvurusu kaçınılmazdır?

Günümüzde kanlı, korkunç ancak siyasal şiddet eylemlerinde bulunan IŞİD'e karşı verilen savaş, eşdeğer şiddeti ve kontr-terör eylemlerini gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu durum ayrıca aşırılıkçı fikirlerin ve bu fikirleri destekleyenlerin feshedilmesini sağlayan çatışma içinde toplumsal kontrolün gerekliliği tartışmalarını da getirmiştir. Bu durumda, bu tür bir savaş sadece güç araçlarıyla değil düşünce araçlarıyla da yapılmaktadır. Radikal, aşırıcı gruplara ve kurumları aşırılıkçılarca ele geçirilerek haydut devlet halini almış devlet aktörlerine karşı verilen bu tür bir savaşın genel kavramsal bir çerçeve ihtiyacı vardır.

Örtülü eylem bir devletin herhangi bir devletin siyaset oluştururken kullandığı karar verme araçlarını gizlice bozmak ve sabote etmek için yürüttüğü bir müdahale türü olarak kabul edilir. Bunun yanında örtülü eylem, asimetrik tehditlere karşı bir dış politika olarak addedilmektedir. Bu eylem doğrudan yöntemlerin kullanılmadığı şartlarda ve güç kullanımının siyasi koşullarla sınırlandığı durumlarda müttefik devletlere yapılan yabancı iç savunma (*Foreign Internal Defense*) durumlarıyla ve herhangi bir müttefik devlete veya gruba yapılan güvenlik yardımları ile açıklanmaktadır. Bu anlayış, askeri müdahale dışındaki her türlü müdahaleyi veya herhangi bir isyan bastırma faaliyetini ya da her terörle mücadele faaliyetini örtülü eylem olarak nitelendiren yanlış tanımlamalara sebep olmaktadır. Ne güvenlik desteği ne de yabancı iç savunma durumları örtülü eylemdir. Bunlar, savaş durumunun güç kullanımının meşrulaştıracak kadar bariz olduğu durumlarda uygulanan askeri operasyon türleridir. Bu yanlış anlayışın sebebi ise örtülü eylemin, uluslararası ilişkilerde savaş ve barış üzerine yapılan çalışmalarda uygulanan geleneksel yaklaşım üzerinde irdelenmesidir. Bu irdeme şiddet siyaseti ile askeri disiplin arasında belirsizlik bir tanım yaratmaktadır.

Bu belirsizliğin üzerinden gelmek için, siyasal şiddetin örtülü eylemin içeriğini oluşturduğunu vurgulamak gerekir. Bu içeriğin hem aktör seviyesinde hem de sistem seviyesinde belirleyici yeri vardır. Aktör seviyesinde, örtülü eylem aktörlerin ayrışan ilişkilerinin bir sonucudur. Çatışan taraflar çatışmayı bir krize çevirmeden siyasal

kararlarını birbirlerine dayatmaya çalışır ve bunu yaparken saygının kontrolü için birbirlerini refahlarından yoksun kılmanın yolu olan şiddete başvururlar. Özellikle devlet ve devletdışı aktör arasındaki çatışmada gizli siyasal şiddetin tatbiki olan terörizm devletdışı aktör için bir fırsat silahıdır. Bu durumda örtülü eylem devletin terörizm araçlarına karşı aynı araçlarla karşılığıdır. Devlet siyasal şiddetin tatbikini kendi zorlayıcı aygıtları içinde kompartmante ederek terör örgütünü tadil eder. Sistem seviyesinde ise çatışan taraflar arasındaki nedensel mekanizma uluslararası sistemin özellikleri ile yeniden diriltilerek çatışma tadil mücadelesi olarak uzatılır. Ortaya çıkan uzatmalı çatışma koşulları aktörleri birbirlerinin sistemlerine sızmaya zorlar. Bu koşullar birbirleri üstünde göreceli üstünlük kurmak için siyasal şiddet tatbik etmeye zorlar. Böylece hem terörizm hem de örtülü eylem uluslararası siyasetin sistem zorlamaları ile yeniden diriltilir.

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis attempts to construct issues and concepts about covert action on an analytical framework. It is important to signify two historical cases from the 20th century world history that verify that covert action can be constructed on such a framework. One of them points out to the roots of political violence among nation-states to the days of Cold War. During the Vietnam War, the CIA and the Pentagon's special operations section coordinated a joint covert operations program called the Phoenix Program. The program's purpose was to eliminate and neutralize Vietcong Infrastructure and its political cadres, and it also entailed in some cases foreign military advisor efforts as well. The Vietcong infrastructure's existence sustained popular support to North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front (known as Vietcong) operations at both the rural provinces and city centers and could not be foreclosed by judicial means, due to their civil disguise. They were acting as ordinary civilians, but at the same time perform their duties as tax-collectors, doctrine agitators, and Hanoi-nominated party commissars. As their actions sustained the protracted war in South Vietnam, measures against them were taken as part of the US war effort. They were eliminated by paramilitary elements through extra-judicial actions, such as assassinations, false-flag attacks, and terror attacks. By these means, not only VC political cadres' logistical support and decision-making capabilities at the provincial level were terminated, but also the political consequences of these actions had alienated populations from political objectives of North Vietnamese government and political agitation of National Liberation Front. Even though the US involvement had failed to prevent the fall of Vietnam under the communist bloc because of the US strategy of limited war, the Phoenix Program succeeded not only to delay the fall of Vietnam, but also succeeded to retard USSR's expansion of its sphere of influence into Indochina and the Pacific Basin during the Cold

War. Phoenix Program will be one of cases selected for inducting theoretical aspects of using political violence against state actors¹.

The second case dates back to the early 1970s, when international terrorism was introduced as a new trend from emerging transnational relations which transgressed the concept of war out of interstate system. Disaffected social groups in Third World countries adopted techniques of terrorism, such as airplane hijacking, kidnapping and assassination to reach the goal of their political emancipation, which they had been yearning through their ideologies. As a result, these groups had created a new wave of mayhem by contesting the interstate system and posed new threats to security and the balance of power. One of these threats was realized when the subversive wing of the Lebanese Shia Muslim party, Hezbollah, bombed US Marine Barracks in Beirut in October 1983, killing 220 US servicemen, who were stationed as a part of multinational peacekeeping force. With this attack, the US government realized that “there was no single entity within the government responsible for countering terrorism” (Crumpton, 2013, p. 122). As a result, Counterterrorism Center (CTC) was established in 1986 “to identify, track, and defeat the terrorist enemy” (Crumpton, 2013, p. 122) and to execute “covert action operations, designed to complement U.S. foreign policy, in concert with CIA stations and often with foreign liaison partners around the world” (Crumpton, 2013, p. 123). In the following years, CTC has identified, monitored and targeted various threats from terror groups to crime networks and became the main apparatus among US security agencies to provide leverage after the 9/11 attacks. Today, CTC is still active and serves under the CIA, as part of the Global War on Terror.

Both of these historical cases show that covert action is a widely seen political and military phenomenon that appears in the grey area between war and peace². That

¹ For more information on the Phoenix Program, see Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty: The Inside Story of Covert Operations From Ho Chi Minh to Osama Bin Laden* (London: Cassell, 2002); Francis J. Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971: Vietnam Studies, Center of Military History Publication 90-23-1* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1973, 2004); Stuart Herrington, *Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account* (New York: Presidio Press, 1987); Michael J. Walsh, *SEAL!: From Vietnam's Phoenix Program to Central America's Drug Wars* (New York: Pocket Books, 1995).

² For more information on International Terrorism and the Global War on Terror, see Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty: The Inside Story of Covert Operations From Ho Chi Minh to Osama Bin Laden* (London: Cassell, 2002); Mark Mazzetti, *The Way of The Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of*

doesn't mean that covert action has been seen in international politics since 20th century. On the contrary, covert action is seen in world history with various forms; either as a subversion or as an assassination or as a ruse. On the other hand the notable war theorist Karl von Clausewitz explains that there are certain actions during the war which aim "a gradual exhaustion of the physical powers and of the will by the long continuance of exertion" (von Clausewitz, 1997, p. 30). For Clausewitz (1997) as great objectives will require larger forces to deploy, in such a long war of exertion these actions appear in small forms so that "means attain greatest relative value, and therefore the result is best secured" (von Clausewitz, 1997, p. 30). In that sense, what Clausewitz has mentioned for the 19th century corresponds with today's means of unconventional warfare. The question is that how Clausewitz's thoughts on the continuous exertion of the enemy and current thought of unconventional warfare is related with the covert action. Since the Cold War, the phenomenon of covert action has been classified under the concept of intervention. Intervention is regarded as one of the balance of power techniques, by one state intervening in the affairs of the other state when the former perceives the latter's actions as threatening (Spanier, 1987, p. 124). In studies of international law, the term intervention is synonymous with its meaning in political science, as "organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority structures of the target" (Young, 1968, p. 178). According to Gurr (1974) this definition encompasses a large spectrum of political actions from the reduction of diplomatic relations to the level of *chargé d'affaires* to economic sanctions and espionage activities and gunboat diplomacy (Gurr, 1974, p. 71). This makes intervention much complex in understanding its causes and conditions. With the post-Cold War era and upcoming American hegemony around the world, intervention became a policy of enforcing global security.

Intervention, before becoming an issue in foreign policy, was a matter of debate among political scientists at the US whether they "have a right to choose sides in other peoples' conflicts" (Rhyne, 1962, p. 105). Whether it is a right or not any intervention outside the territory of a state will require the exercise of state power in the world

Earth (New York: Penguin Books, 2014); Henry A. Crumpton, *The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service* (New York: Penguin Books, 2013).

(Rhyne, 1962, p. 105). At this point, the amount of state power falls into an ambiguity whereas both coercion and diplomacy falls into the concept of intervention and thus reflecting the same tension between war and peace or conflict and cooperation. This is also what makes intervention a subject of debate among political scientist. Political scientists argue this reflection on ideas of intervention versus facts of intervention. If an intervention can be executed by tools of diplomacy and political violence, which are opposites, then it is necessary to analyze foundations of these means, for understanding the nature of the subject. Their foundations are defined in actual set of their practices, which is set in the concept of political system.

All political systems are based on value systems. Political actors which have core values take decisions for their own sake of integrity and durability and thus influence each other for accumulating meager sources and privileges for these goals. Political actions for influencing government actors require certain kind of activities that are the sum of practicing methods of political change, either methods of *transformation* or *reformation* (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 268). However, for both methods, an absolute effect is desired over distribution of power in favor of the practitioner. Therefore, in cases where political survival is the only priority, political actions require the application of direct action, “action by others than duly constituted authorities, and usually by the exercise of violence,” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 269) into the hearts and minds of rival political authority.

Tools of influencing a government actor or forms of influences vary from ideas to brute force. However, political systems are also collective set of lingual symbols which indicate either the purpose of influence or identities of actors. In regard to that, arms are obvious indication of violence to the other actors. They are prerequisite of indicating a war and they escalate the level of threat and fear of extinction among other actors. In the case of intervention, this creates a problem that even an intervening state present its armed forces in order to show the dedication for securing its vital interests, the intervened state will realize them as an absolute threat to their existence. Thus armed interventions can either turn into a total war or become limited strategic wars. This proves that covert action cannot be understood by studies of intervention. The concept of intervention fails to explain political violence, its conductors, the reason behind it and its

political consequences. In brief, the studies of intervention at international politics fail to fulfill the analytical conditions that define a clandestine, political-military, violent, direct action as covert action.

Apart from the insufficiency of the concept of intervention, putting covert action into the dynamic concept of international relations becomes an important issue. Especially with the rise of international terrorism as a political trend in 1970s, states have turned their subversive activities to violent non-state actors which threaten their security and interests around the world. Particularly, during the Troubles of 1970s in Northern Ireland and the aircraft hijackings by PLO in the same period, covert action was widely conducted method of countering terrorist organizations for Great Britain and Israel. In following years after the Cold War, covert action has become a widely seen conduct in War on Terror ranging from high-value targeted killings to 'snatch-and-grab' missions and to subversive deceptions. This brings another ambiguity that whether covert action can be deduced as an intervention to violent non-state actors or a policy that states prefer in waging war against terrorism. Thus level of ambiguity expands from war vs. diplomacy into actor level state vs. terrorist organization.

Therefore, the studies on intervention are insufficient for studying covert action. The study of such phenomenon requires more analytical aspect that will provide axioms to compare it with other similar political phenomena. Moreover, various interpretations are given by international relations theorists about covert action, but nearly all of them are in form of traditional texts. While most of them elaborated covert action as intervention, the others have argued on what kind of intervention that covert action must be. The latter have formed their argument on the condition that covert action is a foreign policy that is preferred by national political authority, so that it should be conducted on legal norms that are upheld by both national government and public opinion. As a result most of the arguments about covert action are collected around the debate on whether it complies with ethical norms or not. The former, those who have elaborated the nature of covert action in form of an intervention, have attempted to generate arguments in accordance to changing nature of international politics. These arguments are attempted either to comply covert action with new phenomena in international politics such as counterinsurgency, drone attacks or are to put theoretical framework of covert action

into international politics. These attempts have failed to achieve their purposes because they have failed to signify the nature of covert action as a violent political behavior between actors. In brief, studies on text provide nothing more than mere persuasion of intellectual minds. Therefore, if covert action needs a definition then it should be studied for creating an analytical framework. This framework can only be achieved in field of discipline which will signify its nature of violence and its antecedent conditions by a certain methodology. Then, it is necessary to study covert action in the general theory of conflict.

Conflict is a competitive phenomenon that all parties compete of domination upon certain values. It is a ubiquitous phenomenon. In that sense, the general theory of conflict aims to provide an analytical framework of conflict for all areas which conflict emerges as a phenomenon. For doing this, actions are defined as behavioral sets. These behavioral sets are transformed into mathematical models. Then these models are applied to every interaction between actors. Incompatible results of these applications are compared with compatible results so that variables can be systematically proposed. In regard to the covert action, the general theory of conflict can provide means of deducing analytical prepositions and prescriptions where covert action is seen as a political phenomenon among conflicting parties. This can be accomplished by analyzing covert action as a violent behavior and deducing its conditions to emerge under the concept of protracted conflict, where conflicting parties are aiming either to transform or reform each other.

Covert action contains primordial violence which is conducted by advanced skills of military specialists. Unlike their ordinary fellow colleagues, whose main objective is to destroy their enemies' war-fighting capabilities, their objective is to terminate high level decision-making process and allocation abilities of the rival party. In doing so, they conduct violent actions at hearts and minds of their enemies under plausible denial, not only for destroying capabilities but also for forming influences which have undeniable political consequences for the benefit of their nation. With the success of covert action, a relative superiority upon an enemy is achieved not only for a military victory, but most importantly for a political victory. With the success of covert action, state can endure an area of bargain with a restless community that supports a

terrorist organization. In brief, covert action is a security tool and the purpose of covert action is to provide a relative superiority at political-military environment against the rival party, in which the superior party can accomplish its political actions.

In the chapter of literature review, I will present different arguments about covert action regarding its definition, nature and its role in international politics. With the changing trends in international politics, covert action is expanded from inter-state phenomenon to inter-actor phenomenon. This expansion imposes new conditions that are necessarily addressed in the definition of covert action. At the same time these new conditions should comply with the distinctive nature of covert action, which is political violence.

In the first chapter, I will compare the distinctive features of both state and non state actors. Through this comparison, I will explain that the causal mechanism between state and non-state actors create conditions of conflict, which results in conducts of terrorism and covert action.

In the second chapter, I will point out the properties of international system which affirms durability of state and non-state actors. These properties not only make actors viable but also constrain them to conflict each other. In that sense, apart from causal mechanism, systematic restraints of international politics create unique conditions of conflict between a state and a non-state actor, and thus lead them to conduct acts of terrorism and covert action.

In the chapter of conclusion, I will conclude my argument on covert action as a security policy tool. In doing so, I will recapitulate points I have elaborated at actor and system level analyses. I will also suggest assumptions on my argument for further studies of research on covert action.

2. METHODOLOGY

In this thesis, I will benefit from the qualitative methodology of process tracing and the model of political systems analysis. Process tracing involves with the analysis of interferences between agents and structures. Political systems analysis involves with demands, stresses and processes in the political life.

Process tracing follows “the operation of casual mechanism at work in a given operation” (Checkel, 2009, p. 116). According to Checkel (2009), process tracing reveals “agent-to-agent mechanisms” (Checkel, 2009, p. 115) and empirically it delivers “specific decision-making dynamics” (Checkel, 2009, p. 115). Process tracing looks for ways to identify “a causal chain that links independent and dependent variables” (Checkel, 2009, p. 115). By given features of state and non-state actors I will analyze how the causal chains between these actors results in conflict. I will analyze their decision to conduct acts of terrorism and in response how these decisions influence state actor to take decision for conducting covert action. In addition to that, I will trace the process that transforms a non-state actor in civic arena into a terror organization. In tracing these processes, I will conclude that the variable that is behind both conduct of terrorism and covert action is the political violence. At this point, the reader might expect example cases that will support my arguments. However, as I aim to achieve an analytical framework, I will keep my example cases quite limited because my purpose is to deduce analytical conditions that actors take decisions, rather than general explanations which limit the nature of events in time-space dualism.

In political science where politics had broken its ties with moral philosophy and thus disintegrated the whole discipline, systematic analysis was introduced as a methodological scheme (Easton, 1993, p. 229). According to Easton (1993) when it was realized that part of the political life was influenced by reproduced knowledge about the

relations between social structures, the political aspect of social organizations thus became subject of inquiry (Easton, 1993, p. 229). In regard to that he presented an interpretation of political life as “an adaptive, self-regulating, and self-transforming system of behavior” (Easton, 1965, p. 26). In analyzing political life as a system, he based his analysis on four premises: system, a definition of political life as a behavior; environment; where a system exists and influences from it; response, effects of behaviors; feedback, persistence of functions against behaviors (Easton, 1965, pp. 24-25). Upon these premises, Easton has constructed a model for the political system that will provide analysis and understanding on how political systems able to cope with the stress from environment and actors. In this thesis, the analysis of political systems will be my approach to figure out the reasons of why actors show certain types of conduct and how environment constrains these conducts. It is important to point out that the analysis of political system is not a method of inquiry but an approach to study political phenomena.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature of covert action is distributed among fields of security studies and intelligence in international relations. However, most of the debates about the nature and the definition of covert action are constructed by those who have both practical experience and academic learning. In that sense the literature review of this thesis takes a course by beginning from the early elaborations of covert action in international politics by both academic and intelligence circles to its latest appearance in War on Terror.

According to the official terminology of US government, covert action is defined as “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include (1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities; (2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities; (3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or (4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities” (US Code 50, 2006, § 413b). Official terminology provides a demarcation line between covert action and other kinds of military or intelligence activities. In that sense, it provides a practical definition. However, the official definition does not put sufficient necessary conditions that covert action is required to be conducted.

Prior to the use of term ‘covert action,’ acts of disruption, assassination, raids, bombings, kidnappings and false-flag attacks are defined under the concept of *sabotage* (Farago, 1954, p. 239). According to Farago (1954) sabotage “is a form of subversive warfare” (Farago, 1954, p. 239) in which aims to severe “an enemy’s administration, industrial production, food and commodities production, armed forces, lines of communication” (Farago, 1954, p. 239). Sabotage is divided into sub-categories: direct action, indirect action and psychological sabotage (Farago, 1954, p. 239). One of them, *Direct action* is “sudden violent actions against key targets” (Farago, 1954, p. 240). It includes acts of “arson, explosions, and mechanical inference,..., anti-personnel operations, in which sentries and guards are killed, key personnel kidnapped, or important personages assassinated” (Farago, 1954, p. 240).

During the Cold War, when acts of sabotage became conducts of rival Communist bloc to undermine political orders of Western-aligned European and Asian countries, western countries sought to reply in same means as a policy for both subverting Communist countries and reinstating political orders at Eastern European and Southeast Asian countries. Especially, at the height of the Cold War, Soviet and Vietcong subversions against US policies in Indochina necessitated the equivalent means to discourage their subversion. Thus sabotage was designated as “subversion against hostile states,” (Department of the Army, 1962, I-I) by its military conductors under unconventional warfare. At this point, it appeared a question that whether these acts are part of military effort or political effort. Since these acts were conducted to serve for political reasons, then they better ought to be planned and conducted by policy-makers, who would evaluate these actions for its political affects. Due to that reason, acts of sabotage were subject of unconventional warfare until the term covert action was introduced.

This problem was first argued in Russell Rhyne’s *Unconventional Warfare: Problems and Questions*, “as a lingual ambiguity between unconventional war and violent politics” (Rhyne, 1962, p. 102). Rhyne (1962) articulated three main problems: the problem of defining the unconventional war, the ambiguous taxonomy that has left the concept in disciplinary absence, and the lack of operateability at theoretical grounds (Rhyne, 1962, pp. 102-107).

Firstly, the concept of unconventional warfare became a subject debate among military specialists and political scientists, whose conception differs at level of practice. For military specialists if irregular acts of war were defined under unconventional warfare, then all non-military issues should be elaborated along with military (Rhyne, 1962, p. 103). Rhyne (1962) stated that this created a lingual ambiguity (Rhyne, 1962, p. 102). Within this lingual ambiguity laid a juxtaposition of terms: unconventional warfare, political violence, covert action, 'secret war,' 'dirty war,' subversive action, 'measures short of war;' but not a clear distinct definition. It is obvious that "directive influence of definitions both in military and academy makes the development of sound taxonomy important" (Rhyne, 1962, p. 102).

Secondly, as this juxtaposition of terms has created havoc among students of the subject, "western attitudes toward peace and war obstruct the invention of a satisfactory taxonomy by or for those nourished in the Anglo-European tradition" (Rhyne, 1962, p. 103). This obstruction is done by drawing a kind of intellectual abyss between war and peace, demonizing the former and idealizing the latter (Rhyne, 1962, p. 106). This attitude prevents a unified logic of inquiry during the study of the subject.

Thirdly, both problem of definition and ambiguous taxonomy cause the further compartmentalization of subject from a research area which makes any theoretical subject too hard to operate at scientific level. Each field of humanities can provide methods, but none of these methods can utilize an integrated methodology for team study (Rhyne, 1962, pp. 103-104). Thus, as Rhyne (1962) noted "individuals working in relative isolation have penetrated the subject deeply but narrowly, jeopardizing the quality of their insights by the impossibility of detailed attention to adjacent subjects" (Rhyne, 1962, p. 103). Also, the absence of such methodology causes disunity "between contents of study and the application of such knowledge to decisions" (Rhyne, 1962, p. 103). Because of these three problems, sabotage has been a subject matter of unconventional warfare until early 1970s. However, as Soviet subversion in Europe and Vietcong political support had brought the defense of US policies by political and diplomatic means to the defense by means of war, the planning of sabotage and subversion became a shared duty with the Central Intelligence Organization. Thus

sabotage, along with subversion, became a supplementary effort to political warfare (Smith, 1989, pp. 4-5). In brief, sabotage became a subject matter of intelligence.

One of the early detailed classification of sabotage actions as covert action was given by Shulsky (1984) as a scope of intelligence activity (Shulsky, 1984, p. 8). Shulsky (1984) defines covert action as “the attempt by one actor to pursue its foreign policy objectives by conducting some secret activity to influence the behavior of foreign government or political, military, economic or social events and circumstances in a foreign country” (Shulsky, 1984, p. 83). He argues that sometimes it is named as “special activities,” (Shulsky, 1984, p. 84) covert action includes “support for coups, ‘wars of national liberation’, and ‘freedom fighters’ (Shulsky, 1984, p. 99) and “specific acts of violence, directed against individuals (such as the assassination of foreign government officials, key political figures, or terrorists) or property” (Shulsky, 1984, p. 100). The Soviets had same activities of covert action which was called *aktivnye meropriiatiia*, ‘active measures’ but their methods resembled methods of political warfare which aim to influence people by tools of ideological power and diplomacy rather than relying more on violence (Shulsky, 1984, p. 85). British use term “special political action” (Shulsky, 1984, p. 240) for such activities. Shulsky (1984) not only presents sabotage and subversion under the definition of covert action but also he claims these actions under intelligence activities. Unfortunately, Shulsky (1984) fails to establish the analytical context of covert action in international politics.

Johnson (1989) attempts to define the role of overt action in international politics by claiming that covert action is “the policy of hidden intervention by the United States in the affairs of other countries” (Johnson, 1989, p. 64). For Johnson (1989) this policy of intelligence is preferred by US presidents and their national security advisors as a ‘quiet option’ or ‘third option’ between war and diplomacy (Johnson, 1989, p. 64). Covert action is decided as an option in policy making process of the US national command authority (Johnson, 1989, pp. 65-66). The action part of this option is the task of national intelligence agency who is conducting operations abroad (Johnson, 1989, p. 67). Johnson (1989) argues since the president is elected consciousness of American people, the president’s decision of covert action should comply with the public opinion of how an American intervention ought to be, rather than becoming a debate among

idealists and realists (Johnson, 1989, p. 74). Johnson (1989)'s claim of hidden intervention fits with historical cases of the Cold War but he fails to see that covert action cannot be interpreted by ideals of public opinion but by interests and much importantly by survival of the state. Because covert action is neither a policy nor an executive order but it's composed of violent actions.

Just like Johnson (1989), Haass (1999) argues that covert action is an intervention but he also claims as part of its nature an indirect use for force is involved (Haass, 1999, p. 64). He argues that covert action is subsidiary to US foreign policies as security assistance. These assistance efforts were emphasized for allied state actors and allied non-state actors, which were seen respectively in Richard Nixon's presidency as assistance to allied governments and in Ronald Reagan's doctrine as an assistance to allied factions (Haass, 1999, p. 64). Furthermore, Haass points out US military aid to Sandinistas in Nicaragua and Mujahideen in Afghanistan at 1980s as notably examples of covert intervention (Haass, 1999, pp. 64-65). However, he claims that such an indirect intervention is limited to the point that the rival side should not respond to intervening nation by taking it direct means, "less involvement in exchange for less influence over events" (Haass, 1999, p. 65). Despite Haass (1999)'s accuracy on cases of security assistance and relations between covert action and foreign policy, he fails to emphasize direct political actions in covert operations, which are performed by specialized military personnel and thus limits the covert action with activities of security assistance by intelligence services.

On the contrary of what Johnson (1989) and Haass (1999) have claimed, Carter (2000) suggests that covert action is a foreign policy that is conducted covertly by presidential authority (Carter, 2000, p. 599). Its conduct by presidential authority causes interbranch conflict among presidential authority and the congress because "covert action seek to implement foreign policy without the knowledge or consent of the American people" (Carter, 2000, p. 602). Through the historical examples of covert action in the US history between 1800-1850, Carter (2000) points that this interbranch conflict is most severe when both means and ends of covert action are controversial (Carter, 2000, p. 622). He claims the reason behind this severe conflict that in addition to the controversial means and ends, the president maintains a plausible deniability against

an inquiry of the congress (Carter, 2000, p. 622). Carter (2000)'s definition of covert action corresponds with a presidential foreign policy which, in the lights of his arguments about interbranch conflict, should be accountable to American public opinion and its representation, the congress.

Le Gallo (2005) proposes the covert action as an option just like Johnson (1989) does, but he presents it as a security policy in a political environment where drastic changes jeopardize US national security (Le Gallo, 2005, p. 354). According to Le Gallo (2005) the rise of radical Islam and its means of terrorism necessitate "a better balance between the tactical and the strategic" (Le Gallo, 2005, p. 356) responses from the US. In that respect, if the US government plans a long-term policy to prevent the rise of radical Islamic ideologies around the world, covert action will be effective policy option to support it (Le Gallo, 2005, p. 357). In brief, Le Gallo (2005) argues that covert action is a security policy that manages crises in complex international environment (Le Gallo, 2005, p. 359). Le Gallo (2005)'s argument has pros and cons: Covert action is not only a tool against a state actor but also against violent non-state actors and that's why it can be effective tool for securing US national interests around the world. On the other hand, Le Gallo (2005) argues that covert action becomes valid option only if it serves a kind of world-wide policy of nation-building. At this point he fails to see that covert action contains violence. The conduct of this violence is aimed to deny the rival party from making decisions. In that sense, any action that aims to supplement a policy of nation-building in political terms falls under 'civic action,' in which during the Vietnam War, was one of the main efforts on stabilizing legal political order after military action (Summers, 1981, p. 49). In brief, Le Gallo (2005) assumes covert action as a foreign policy. In relation to that, he fails to see the violent nature of covert action and falsely attributes the concept of civic action on it.

In regard to its assumption as a foreign policy, covert action faces with moral prescriptions. According to Bloomfield Jr. (2006) the president takes decisions to conduct covert action by relying on the definition of his duty at constitution or the basic law of polity (Bloomfield Jr., 2006, p. 222). This duty attributes him the role of protector from external threats and in extraordinary circumstances it guarantees to take actions against any aggression to the state, in which covert action is a part of them. In addition

to that Beitz (2006) argues that in order to take a decision to conduct covert action as a part of policy, three moral considerations in the minds of individuals should be addressed; the ends of covert action, the means deployed to conduct covert action, and characteristics that authorize the conduct of covert action (Beitz, 2006, p. 208). Individuals consider moral aspects of covert action only if it has political significance upon individuals (Beitz, 2006, p. 218). Both Beitz (2006) and Bloomfield Jr. (2006) argue that as a conduct, covert action should rely on a moral ground, either individual or constitutional.

In addition to these approaches to the definition of covert action, there are critical perspectives that approach covert action beyond its definition as a foreign policy or as an executive decision. According to O'Rourke (2017) covert actions that aim for regime changes cause civil wars (O'Rourke, 2017, p. 232). She bases her argument on historical cases of sixty-three US covert actions which have aimed to overthrow current government and replace them with pro-US governments (O'Rourke, 2017, p. 234). She argues that these pro-US governments have least domestic support because they are brought not by democratic means but by force (O'Rourke, 2017, p. 235). This compromises the plausible deniability of covert regime change which causes to "undermine the newly installed regime's capacity to suppress domestic changes to its rule" (O'Rourke, 2017, p. 235). In brief, covert action undermines the political order of target nation and escalates the violence in doing so. In that sense, O'Rourke (2017)'s argument is contrary to what Le Gallo (2005) and Carter (2000) have attributed to covert action; covert action is not a policy that aims to stabilize political crises but an aggressive policy to escalate them. This shows that O'Rourke (2017) has succeeded to point out the fact that covert action contains violence. However, this violence is applied by certain skilled specialists. Their knowledge on violence is so advanced that the US government applies it for political objectives, in unique conditions. O'Rourke (2017)'s argument requires an analytical inquiry on conditions that necessitates use of such political violence so that it provides understanding about its way of execution by advanced specialists of violence.

Apart from O'Rourke (2017)'s critique on covert action, a radical perspective is presented by Sanyal (2010) as covert action is one of the contributions to global injustice

(Sanyal, 2010, p. 213). For Sanyal (2010) US covert actions, along with other US military interventions, are unjust acts which cause unjust consequences because these actions are “interference in right to collective self-determination or democracy of the inhabitants of the country” (Sanyal, 2010, p. 215). These unjust acts are motivated by domestic institutions like defense industries to special interest groups who abuse democratic participation to policymaking, in order to achieve their interests (Sanyal, 2010, pp. 218-219). These institutions are “either reduce democratic accountability of the military and intelligence agencies or that create systematic pressures for their use” (Sanyal, 2010, p. 219). Thus, covert action is the result of “lobbying and campaign finance pressure from defense industry and from other industries on policy makers,” (Sanyal, 2010, p. 221) which makes covert action an aggressive policy towards global justice. For Sanyal (2010) such policy should be abolished by making reforms at domestic institutional level (Sanyal, 2010, p. 231). Sanyal (2010)’s definition about covert action is based on two misconceptions: firstly, he classifies covert action along with other military interventions. Military interventions are overt involvement of a country to another country’s internal politics by military means. In that sense, every military intervention is designed by legal framework of political decision-making whereas covert action is subversive involvement that includes advanced military means, which excludes legal framework for plausible deniability. Secondly, special interest groups and industrial pressure groups represent a part of small groups in society where a group of individuals make decisions in conflict and cooperation. These groups impose decisions by demanding available sources for public action and promoting promises about more valuable outcome of actions. In regard to that, the impacts of these groups only succeed if the US government’s approach to national security converges with the enduring outcomes they propose. Therefore, these groups are not the cause of any covert action or military intervention, but they benefit from it.

In the age of War on Terror, there are critical approaches to purpose of covert action, apart from constructive interpretations. One of them, Svete (2010) argues that the covert action cannot be the only effective way to counter terrorist organizations (Svete, 2010, p. 64). For Svete (2010) covert actions like targeted killings and capture of high-value terrorists become only military solution to counter terrorist organizations, but such

solution contradicts with the political environment where state sovereignties are secured by mutual recognition of international law (Svete, 2010, p. 65). In that sense, in these actions for fighting against terrorism, “international humanitarian law as well as domestic regulations may not be respected as strictly as before by the regular forces” (Svete, 2010, p. 56). Therefore, for Svete (2010) covert action should not be main effort on countering terrorism but a supplementary effort to counterinsurgency in which “building of population’s trust, confidence and cooperation with the government” (Svete, 2010, p. 65) is essential. Svete (2010)’s argument is familiar with Le Gallo (2005)’s: they both point out that covert action should be a supporting instrument for transforming security crises around the world into political stabilities. But unlike Le Gallo (2005), Svete (2010) realizes the violent nature of covert action as a military activity. He recognizes that its effectiveness as a military action against terrorist organizations but he also argues that its effect may go beyond desired consequences due to the influence it creates in political environment. In that case, Svete (2010) succeeds in recognizing both the violent nature of covert action as a military action and the political influence it creates. However, Svete (2010)’s method of recognition lies not upon an analytical framework but rather on reviewing literature of covert action on current historical cases. In reality, these cases are compromised cases of covert action in which plausible deniability is disregarded or cases failed to be compartmented among its conductors. An analytical framework will not only implicate the nature and the influence of covert action but also it will provide systematic restraints that where covert action happens and how is compartmented among its conductors.

With the changing role of covert action, Lyckman and Weissmann (2015) attempt to provide a conceptual framework for covert action under the concept of *Global Shadow War* (Lyckmann & Weissmann, 2015, p. 252). They argue that there should be a more definitive concept to be presented for operational requirements (Lyckmann & Weissmann, 2015, p. 252). For this purpose, they have formulated a definition on covert action under the term of ‘shadow war,’ which is “a form of armed conflict, conducted secretly in the nexus between war and peace where different actors utilize different means to obtain their goals” (Lyckmann & Weissmann, 2015, p. 255). However, their attempt for a more clear definition is limited with their preference on inducing general

descriptions from case studies (Lyckmann & Weissmann, 2015, p. 253). Also their field of research is limited on cases about US foreign and defense policies due to their easy accessibility and public transparency (Lyckmann & Weissmann, 2015, p. 253). Therefore, their attempt to provide a general framework is stalled as policy implementation. It is a fact that case studies are beneficial on verifying hypotheses on empirical evidences. Lyckman and Weissmann's (2015) attempt over case studies verifies their hypotheses on factualities of empirical observations. But their attempt reduces validity of general features of covert action on general explanations of history.

From the interpretations given above, it can be concluded that definition of covert action is based on the assumption that it is either a foreign policy or a foreign policy tool. Because of this assumption, it is concluded that covert action is conducted in form of intervention. Covert action is seen as an option which is preferred by the political authority at the cases where other policies such as diplomacy or containment become insufficient to keep state secure and durable. Much of the criticism is brought to covert action based on this conclusion. On the other hand both O'Rourke (2017) and Sanyal (2010)'s views on covert action is based on the assumption of its aggressive nature. In fact, they are well aware that covert action contains violence. Violent aspect of covert action is an aggressive stance rather than a defensive stance. This makes their arguments sound but invalid because of lack of analysis about conditions which oblige state actors to conduct covert action or acts of subversion and sabotage under cloak, just like during the Cold War.

Covert action is a conduct of violence for political influence, by a state power. In that sense, it varies from other forms of power. Therefore, in order to emphasize the nature of covert action as its essential feature, then its relation to power should be elaborated. In the course of elaboration, the concept of power should draw us into how acts of sabotage and subversion cause political consequences.

According to Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) *power* is "the process of affecting policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) severe deprivations for non-conformity with the policies intended" (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 76). Any act that is performed for affecting others by process of deprivation is a *political act* (Lasswell &

Kaplan, 1950, p. 242). If affected party shows stress towards the process of deprivation through the same means, there appears a conflict (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 242). However, not all conflicts are crises. In order to develop a conflict into a crisis, one of the participants of conflict should attempt to change “the content of demands, expectations and identifications” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 242) along with “the side of operations in terms of the manipulation of goods and services, instruments of violence, and symbols” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 242). When these changes are initiated, intensity of conflict increases because “a stress arises toward corrective action” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 242). This stress arises not from the mere deprivation, but demand of ratio between indulgence and deprivation (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 242). That is to say, stress increases when symbols of indulgence become more valuable than deprivations. This enables individuals to make great sacrifices for future expectations (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 242).

At this point, violence becomes a measurable variable for the outcome of the conflict. For Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) *violence* is “deprivation of physical health and safety” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 90). As the increase of indulgences causes increase of potential deprivations, developing conditions give a “rise to a stress toward action to forestall the threat” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 243). These actions are violent actions which are imminent in times of crisis. In addition to violent actions, the conditional changes also lead “toward action to reaffirm the value of the self” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 243) which is the identification of friend from the enemy. In this case, both violent and reaffirming actions are tools of opportunity during crisis.

However, not every transformation of conflict inevitably results as crisis. If there are resolutions available or the environment can be modified for possible solutions, then a conflict can “be resolved before the intensity of the situation mounts towards to an extreme” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 243). Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) supports their argument by claiming that two conflict situations “in which the expectation of violence is high are the *war crisis* and the *revolutionary crisis*” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 242). In these situations, they argue that the conflicting parties enter into the *balancing of power* which “is the power process among the participants in the area” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 250). This power process is influenced from the expectations that

succeed in creation circumstances, which resolve conflicts (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 252). These expectations are sentimentalized by circulating symbols and shared practices elaborate and implement the perspectives of peace rather than war (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 252). When these symbols are disposed in political discourses against arguments for violent actions, they will become premises for actions promoting peace (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 261). But on the other hand, if sentimentalization is going to be necessary condition for balancing, also the variations in power should be measurable and visible in early stages (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 259).

Unfortunately, what Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) fails to deduce is that in times of crises where reaffirmative actions increase the impermeability of the state, it also conceals the power variations once the reaffirming action becomes a supplement to violent actions. Especially, in times of war crisis, in which states prepare for war, the mobilization effort, strategies of winning war and the adjustments of forces are concealed. In that case, the authors have failed to envisage that reaffirming actions include *monopolistic propaganda* which “can effectively distort, conceal, and fabricate data concerning power conditions” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 149). Also the most importantly Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) have failed to foresee that modification of the environment for possible resolutions is also a political act. If this modification is achieved by the conduct of violent actions, that is to deprive the party from safety and health which the environment provides, then violence becomes political violence. The violent party creates or distorts symbols and values by depriving safety and health of the rival party, so that the rival party can be sanctioned to decisions of the violent party.

According to Nieburg (1969) *political violence* is “acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets and victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system” (Nieburg, 1969, p. 13). By making this definition Nieburg (1969) asserts that every act of violence has more or less a political significance, but this significance becomes an efficient consequence when it “constitutes the ultimate test of the viability of social groups and institutions” (Nieburg, 1969, p. 16). For him, society is the composition of competitive individuals and groups in which every member of it participates in struggle

to maintain and expand their status (Nieburg, 1969, p. 16). Thus the fluidity of power politics in society causes inevitable changes which the participants have to adjust their behavior in accordance to changes (Nieburg, 1969, p. 16). Within the course of these changes, threats of depriving well-being and wealth take many forms. Nieburg (1969) lists these forms as follows:

retributive feuds and murder chains, riots, provocative demonstrations, counterdemonstrations, acts of deterrence, compellence, enforcement, and punishment; warfare among tribal elites, reprisals, and rudimentary systems of self-help justice; symbolic, ritual, or ceremonial acts aimed at diverting the real thing by means of a substitute that has similar effects; violence and threats of violence as a form of 'propaganda of the act'; as a demonstration of group unity or individual commitment, or as a test of these qualities in rival groups; as a demand for attention from a larger audience; as a claim, assertion, and testing of legitimacy; as an act of enforcing and maintaining authority; as a provocation falsely blamed on innocent groups in order to justify actions against them; as a retaliation or reprisal in a bargaining relationship that moves toward settlement; as a method of terror; as a way of forcing confrontation on other issues; or as a way of avoiding such confrontation by diverting attention; as an expression and measure of group or individual commitment; as a test of the manhood and loyalty of new recruits; as a method of precipitating revolutionary conditions (Nieburg, 1969, p. 14).

When violent actions are conducted in these forms of deprivations, they significantly revive the inner destruction power of individuals and intensify interpersonal conflicts onto social crises. Thus violence becomes a uniform social conduct. This uniformity tests the cohesion of society and the legal order that rests upon. At the end of this process of testing, the most violent party modifies the social system by creating "functional continuities" (Nieburg, 1969, p. 14) through violence. In brief, violence is political if it results in testing of social order and then modifies patterns of power for the benefit of the violent party.

As Nieburg (1969) points the consequences which define violence political, he also emphasizes the conditions among nations that make political violence a norm. According to Nieburg (1969) there are two impacts that international crises have upon norms of political order, which he has founded on the political behavior of the United States during the Cold War (Nieburg, 1969, p. 145). Firstly, international crises or war crises “intensify the rapidity of social change and the uprooting of establish institutions” (Nieburg, 1969, p. 145). It means that a nation sets tasks of sustaining order of peace and rights aside, prioritizes its efforts for defense and performs duties for the survival of the state. State shifts demands from the commitment to social order to the commitment to political survival, and in doing so, it coerces individuals commit the national security. Secondly, “war and diplomacy provide a pattern of national behavior which by its very nature legitimizes violence in all forms” (Nieburg, 1969, p. 145). The necessity of consolidation against a depriving threat legitimates the transformation of personal violence to a social hatred against the source of deprivation (Nieburg, 1969, p. 145). Individuals who are affected from the deprivation or the fear of getting deprived from their health and safety direct their personal hatred toward the rival party, which is seen as the source of violence. For Nieburg (1969) these two impacts provide a political connection between “domestic violence and violence unleashed abroad” (Nieburg, 1969, p. 146). However, Nieburg (1969) claims that political violence cannot be an instrument for states to create intended modifications for social bargaining because this political connection in times of international crises “facilitates overreaction on the part of those who oppose what they consider the unwarranted use of force” (Nieburg, 1969, p. 146). He supports his argument by claiming that that the US failure in Vietnam War is the cause of attributing more than acceptable risks and costs to minimal US national objectives (Nieburg, 1969, p. 147). In this attribution, generated political violence was more than to be indulged that it has caused a “credibility gap” (Nieburg, 1969, p. 147) between the US government and the US public. Thus the forms of political violence have failed to create the intended effects modification and conditions of bargaining which disintegrated the US political and military effort in Southeast Asia.

Despite Nieburg (1969)’s opposition toward its instrumentality during the crises, the political violence has been used in forms of sabotage and subversion during the Cold

War by both sides. Political violence created patterns of bargaining in great power politics for both sides. These patterns have not only prevented a major escalation of violence to an extreme point, but also prevented a nuclear winter. In most cases political violence enabled the modification of international environment by acts that Nieburg (1969) has listed. For the Soviets, most of these acts were conducted prior to invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979 in order to prepare political legitimacy for the invasions. But also in places like Indochina, Cuba, Angola these acts were conducted to prepare political conditions that Soviet-sponsored political groups could prosper as legitimate governments. On the other hand, the US conducted these acts of political violence to modify the environment where she denied a rival political order from its social basis and thus enabled to expand its political influence. In regard to that what Nieburg (1969) has argued as 'overreaction,' this modification and denial were achieved by compartmenting political violence among its conductors within the state. Once the US compartmented the conduct of political violence among its military and political specialists, the conduct took the term 'covert action' for practical usage. Therefore, the political violence is one of the necessary conditions to define what covert action is.

4. ACTOR-LEVEL TRACING

4.1. Introduction

Defining the nature of state is necessary since the covert action is attributed to state actors. As covert action is argued in this thesis as compartmented acts of political violence by state, it is important to analyze how state designates, compartments and evaluates these actions in its inner mechanism during its interaction with other political actors.

States are regarded as the main actors of International Relations. According to Evans and Newnham (1998) the definition of state is recognized by three principles, which are accepted in the Montevideo Convention of Rights and Duties of State (1933): “a permanent population, a defined territory and a government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and of conducting international relations with other states” (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 512). For Morgenthau (1962) state is defined as “the compulsory organization of society” (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 489) that employs its monopoly of violence for society’s peace and order. Through three functions, it maintains internal peace of society: “the legal continuity of the national society,” “the institutionalized agencies and processes for social change” and “the agencies for the enforcement of laws” (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 489). Both Morgenthau (1962) and Evans and Newnham (1998) have emphasized Max Weber’s definition of state in conditions for territorial and population control. For Weber (1978) a political organization can’t be defined as state unless “its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber, 1978, p. 54).

The point of this chapter is to approach critically to what both Morgenthau (1962) and Evans and Newnham (1998) have argued for the definition of state in

international politics. Both Morgenthau (1962) and Evans and Newnham (1998) have concluded the nature of state with sociological consequences of state's functional actions. That is to say, state is defined in terms of how it performs well with structural properties of international system. However, these terms are incompetent when state is analyzed in conditions of conflict. This incompetency is the reflection of an ongoing debate in International Relations about the nature of the state. According to Hobson (2000) one side argues that a state is the main actor in international politics because it is "imbued with high autonomy" (Hobson, 2000, p. 1). In opposition to that, state is not main actor of international politics because "state autonomy is declining as states are being increasingly outflanked by economic processes (interdependence) and non-state actors" (Hobson, 2000, p. 1). Other actors such as transnational organizations and multinational organizations have equivocal roles with state actors. In recent years, this debate is expanded on state-society relations which continues to hold its heat on the question of to "what extent do states structure society and to what extent do societies shape states" (Hobson, 2000, p. 3). The root of this debate lies on the inquiry of the nature of the state. Political sociologists and political philosophers brought various arguments to make necessary and sufficient conditions to define the state. Political sociologists have provided territoriality and population, which can be logically posited and empirically observed. But the concept of sovereignty is an abstract notion; the latter has to be sound and valid with former two conditions. Moreover, according to Bluhm (1978) this abstract concept keeps an intrinsic question on "the location of sovereign authority" (Bluhm, 1978, p. 268) within the political philosophy: To whom is sovereignty given, for what ends and on which moral rights is sovereignty founded on? These questions cause an ambiguity on the nature of state that takes its definition pending between notions of naturalism and noumenalism in political philosophy which results in the creation of a tradition that inquires on the nature of state. It is this tradition that initiated what Hobson (2000) argued as a debate over the nature of state in international relations.

This debate does not eliminate the fact that the state, as a distinctive political institution, is an end in itself. Its *base value*, "an influence relation that is which is the condition for exercise of the influence in question," (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, pp. 83-

83) has been constituted on a common goal and once it has been achieved its latter value is much more invaluable than its former one. And this achievement can only be succeeded by the conduct of power. Therefore, in order to argue about the nature of the state, one should realize its value as a power in itself. In that respect, current necessary and sufficient conditions for defining the state in international relations, which was provided in Montevideo Convention (1933) and argued by Morgenthau (1962) and Evans and Newnham (1998) is either incompetent in emphasizing the power politics or fails to emphasize Weber's definition on basis of power. The importance of state should be interpreted through its natural relation with power.

Today it is important to define states in terms on analytical grounds, because in crises of conflict states are not only engaging to other states but also terrorist organizations which are organized as social networks. These networks have already transcended out of territorial control and thus they have founded room for making their own decisions. They carry out these decisions through values and resources that they even have no control but depend on. Thus defining both states and these networks under categories of sociological taxonomy will be incompetent to understand the conflict between state actors and terror organizations.

4.2. Territoriality, Population and Sovereignty

The concepts of territoriality, population and sovereignty are regarded by Evans and Newnham (1998) as standard principles in defining a state actor in international politics. However, these concepts cannot be defined under principles because they have to be performed by state power. State exercise power to define boundaries, nominate identities, define enemies and in doing so it coheres its political actions. Thus territoriality, population and sovereignty are sociological consequences of execution of the state power.

4.2.1. Territoriality

Territory is a space, a part of earth or atmosphere that is under the control of a political authority. In the literature of International Relations, territory is regarded as the foundation of a state: “without territory there would be no state” (Spanier, 1987, p. 58).

For Weber (1954) territory for defining a ‘political community’ should be determinable, but it cannot be constant and static (Weber, 1954, p. 338). He argues that the people living on a part of a land may acquire a land or move another land (Weber, 1954, p. 338). This is because the people seek goods and means of services for living. Therefore, any conception of territory requires a “forcible maintenance over of orderly dominion over a territory and its inhabitants” (Weber, 1954, p. 338). In that sense, territory in the definition of a state is the minimum jurisdiction upon a part of land and its inhabitants, in order to perform the functions of political community (Weber, 1954, p. 338). These functions are more than the circulation of goods and services. It also consists of a systematic set of values that orders the circulation.

Apart from Weber’s legal argument, territory can also be defined as a result of human experiences. According to Van Der Pijl (2007) natural conditions that caused a set of experiences in the minds of people living on a certain land reflect the knowledge of experiences through generations as adaptations, which in return create *ethnogenesis* of a human group (van der Pijl, 2007, p. 45). These adaptations evolve a sense of belonging on human groups; people living on a land assert their existence. Traditions that have carried the knowledge of their survival to other generations verify that it is natural if a certain people exist in this certain land. Such verification of spatial domain concludes in a prescriptive right; a “sovereign right of being there alive” (van der Pijl, 2007, p. 45). This is also the right that transforms people on land into a communal identity which becomes a reference of solidarity against foreign intruders (van der Pijl, 2007, p. 21). The transformation of prescriptive right on a land into the territorial sovereignty corresponds with historical plot of 1648 Peace of Westphalia which created a challenge by prescriptive rights to Ecclesiastical rights of land property.

In brief, territoriality is the enforcement of *ethnogenesis* upon a land for prescriptive rights of its inhabitants. It is a jurisdiction that identifies inhabitants’

solidarity which distinguishes them from other human groups. This jurisdiction identifies fellow inhabitants from alien human groups. It also decreases the *permeability*, the participation into the territorial group, from to foreigner's level of eligibility (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 35). Thus, territoriality is not a principle in recognition of a state but a state's jurisdiction of *ethnogenesis* over land and its inhabitants.

In the historical context of Westphalian peace of 1648, the European states had regained prescriptive rights of their communities, thus had established their impermeabilities by enforcing *ethnogenesis* to their communities. Thus the notion of property right of territorial control in inter-state relations of Westphalia was recognized as an imperative of defining a state in international relations.

4.2.2. Population

Population is not only a definition for a group of people or a community of people inhabiting in a specific region of geography. It is a jurisdiction of state power upon people which enables state to control and mobilize them. In that sense, it is a decision for calling a community 'political'. According to Weber (1954) relationship between people are called social order, only if individual conducts are oriented as a communal action toward set of principles (Weber, 1954, p. 3). If orientation is exercised through political power, the political authority will receive a communal action in form of obedience to itself. Therefore any act of subordination by inhabitants to the domination of political authority, in form of communal action makes them a political community (Weber, 1954, p. 338).

The political authority has means of control that enable itself to achieve vital and valuable objectives. Because of that it is inevitable for a political authority to exercise power over community for transforming it into a political one. In regard to such execution of power, Weber (1954) argues that the political authority directs the conduct of population to the achievement of desired objective (Weber, 1954, p. 339).

This inevitable exercise of power upon population has much more importance as a form of power in sphere of international politics. Deutsch (1968) claims that population is "the collection of people that are subject and obedient to [the domain of

political power]” (Deutsch, 1968, p. 29). State orients communal action of its subjects against goal-oriented actions of another state, by creating an image of external threat upon minds of individuals, *Metus Hostilis*. Thus state influences its subjects to take a violent communal action against external threats, without constituting a major influence of power. Concisely to say, population is nomination of what is politically valuable to a community. It functions as an intermediate form of human group that carries the influence of state’s power to another state in international politics.

4.2.3. Sovereignty

Weber (1954) defines sovereignty as the main feature of the modern state. For him it is understood as a unity (Weber, 1954, p. 102). He argues that unity is provided when “acts of [state] organs are looked upon as instances of the exercise of public duties” (Weber, 1954, p. 102). These duties are performed in accordance to public law, “the norms governing the conduct of the organs of the state and the activities carried on within the framework of public administration and in relation to itself” (Weber, 1954, p. 14). In that sense, sovereignty is coherent operation of state power among organs of the state.

Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) bring another assumption about conception of sovereignty, by claiming that sovereignty is indivisible (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 179). For them sovereignty “is the highest degree of authority” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 177). None of the political organs of the state contradict in terms of actions because they share same source of norms that authorizes their actions (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 179). Thus their source of authority is indivisible. However, the norms that constitute the ultimate source of authority may vary.

According to Schecter (2000) sovereignty is justified on three theoretical sources: a metaphysical source of general abstract will, a historical fiction of necessity to survive from state of nature, and a distinctive theological source on making final decisions (Schecter, 2000, p. 123). At the times in which these sources of sovereignty fail to provide legitimate arguments for state actions, state turns to its subjects for obedience to its actions (Schecter, 2000, p. 123). However, neither multiplicity of sources nor the return to the people as a final resort do not prove that every action in

regard of different political circumstances present separate levels of authority within the state (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 179).

In international politics, sovereignty has dual aspect: internal sovereignty, “a state’s government deciding how it will manage its domestic problems” (Spanier, 1987, p. 55), and external sovereignty, “a nation’s right to define its interests” (Spanier, 1987, p. 56). In this case, the indivisibility among state sovereignties is achieved with same method that state transforms a community into a political one: *Metus Hostilis* (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2014, p. 25). However, the enforcement of *Metus Hostilis* for such indivisibility requires extraordinary circumstances in which the fate of the state is between life and death. These extraordinary circumstances is what Schmitt (2005) calls *state of exception* in which no laws, arbitration or convergence of interests can make compromises among conflicting parties, thus “making a series of executive decisions” (Schechter, 2000, p. 63) become only but surely option for the durability of the state. In this sense, sovereignty in international politics is making vital decisions about what is threat to the existence of the state or to say state’s indivisibility.

Internal sovereignty is the coherent exercise of public law in a territorial boundary with the enforcement of physical coercion. External sovereignty is the exercise of state law for deciding what is good and evil for the durability of the state. Therefore, the definition of state by its sovereignty is a formal definition; it does not show us the fact that power that state upholds in its nature is unstable and insecure (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 181).

4.3. Force, Consent and Law

State performs functional actions like adjudication through ethnogenesis, achievement by nomination and unity through indivisibility, in order to comply with structural properties within the relations of political communities. This compilation is necessary for its durability. These actions require power for conduct. State performs these actions only it has distinctive organizational quality which constructs influences of power for its durability.

When we look back to Weber (1954) in search of this organizational quality of the state we find that functions of state are performed by associations that are formed for certain tasks (Weber, 1954, p. 342). State power is distributed among group of specialists for its execution. By this distribution, power of the state institutionalized among specific groups of specialists. In that sense, these institutionalized groups become juristic persons representing distributed forms of state power as juristic persons.

In International Relations, this institutional organization of state power has mediating role on making foreign policies. According to Taliaferro (2014) “institutional arrangements affect the ability of central decision-makers to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society” (Taliaferro, 2014, p. 215).

In this part, the state will be reappraised on Weber’s interpretation of organizational qualities of coercive apparatuses; military institutions, religious institutions and legal institutions. However, these institutions become apparatuses when contained parts of state power in them are set in motion. Because of that reason these institutions will be elaborated through their contextual features of force, consent and law for being referred as necessary sufficient apparatuses, rather than conditions, for defining a state.

4.3.1. Force

Weber (1954) points out that violence “is the monopoly of state” (Weber, 1954, p. 14). However, he also claims that violence does not comply with norms in first place (Weber, 1954, p. 343). For Weber (1954) violence emerges as a form of influence when an individual or group of people begins to dominate both actions of other individuals and communal action for its will (Weber, 1954, p. 343). Those who are skilled at violence for domination form up a profession. When this profession of violence is developed through military skill and principles of war, it becomes a permanent structure, ‘a coercive apparatus’ that enforces obedience to itself by violence (Weber, 1954, p. 343). Violence becomes legal when any threat appears to threaten the structure or its dominating actions (Weber, 1954, p. 343). Therefore, violence is the base value of the state and as Hoffman (2004) concluded that “the state ... is an institution that seeks to regulate conflicts of interest through the use of superior force” (Hoffman, 2004, p. 22).

The execution of this property may vary in accordance to internal and external circumstances. In political community, where the settlements of disputes are beyond the probability of direct arbitration, state enforces its decisions by violence. On the other hand, in international politics, the state secures its existence by applying the violence to the violence of another state. Thus, security of state by violence to another base value of violence becomes *force*. The execution of force requires a skilled group of individuals who are specialized in violence. This group of specialist is distinguished not only by their skill in violence but also with their discipline in doing so. In that sense, Weber (1978) defines such discipline as “consistently rationalized, methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command” (Weber, 1978, p. 1148).

In international politics Weber’s definition of discipline becomes a significant factor by apparatus of force. Its significance appears by security dilemma in military arena. According to Jervis (1983) there is no court of appeal in international politics. That means there is no institution that enforces international law (Jervis, 1983, p. 34). The absence of such institution has both positive and negative results: it enables states both to cooperate for peace and to enforce their objectives upon each other by violence (Jervis, 1983, p. 34). The latter causes a security dilemma that represents “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” (Jervis, 1983, p. 36). At that point the apparatus of force disciplines itself into a communal action that increases its security by decreasing others and in doing so it “examines the conditions under which this preposition holds” (Jervis, 1983, p. 37). In briefly, the institution of force provides both offense and defense capability for sustainability of state power in a military arena.

4.3.2. Consent

For Weber (1954) it is not sacred texts that constitute the religion but institution of religion makes texts sacred because religion guarantees the value of the texts, customs and practices as truth (Weber, 1954, p 206). The distinctive importance of such guarantee shows that religion is a kind of coercive apparatus. Religion orients

individuals who have disputes among each other to settle with compromises. In doing so, religious institutions propagate symbols and signs that satisfy collective demand. In response to that demand, individuals show “commitment to the satisfaction of a demand” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 49), that is to say, show ‘consent’ to psychological coercion. Thus individuals take both individual and communal actions to make compromises and avoid actions that jeopardize the political community and state. Those who don’t take these actions endanger the community and thus specialists of religion punish them for the sake of the community (Weber, 1954, p. 56). In that sense, religious institutions are coercive apparatuses that are formed by specialists who at the threat of communal disintegration put psychological coercion to keep legal order intact. (Weber, 1954, p. 17).

Propagation of symbols, signs and rhetoric for convincing or frightening people is an execution of power that is formed on influence of persuasion. All monotheistic religions have this power of persuasion on their followers due to the fact that all religions have doctrinal frameworks to influence other people. For example, in Western Catholicism the exercise of persuasive power is framed in Ecclesiastical Law, which is institutionalized in Roman Catholic Church. For Weber (1954) Ecclesiastical Law can be practiced with State Law even it conflicts with the latter (Weber, 1954, pp. 16-17). However, once the absolutist states of Europe have begun to confiscate the properties of the Church, sole right and monopoly of exercising such power was lost (Weber, 1954, p. 169). The Church’s persuasive power became autonomous in social associations. By parallel with that, technical necessities for administrating lands of emerging states required state’s monopoly on exercise of such power. As a result, persuasive power became a part of state power, by being institutionalized in apparatuses of consent such as churches, schools, banks. Thus role of religious institutions are taken by apparatuses of consent; psychological coercion is re-institutionalized for state and persuasive power become ideological power.

According to Mann (1995) the ideological power provides “immanent collective morale and a transcendent message to confer morality on one’s own collective identity, to deny it to the opponent, to totalize the struggle, and to conceive of an alternative society worth the struggle” (Mann, 1995, p. 227). The distinctive notion of ideological

power is not its psychological aspect but also its transcendence above boundaries. This feature of ideological power has enormous importance in international politics. According to Deutsch (1968) the moral notion of Ecclesiastical Law of the Church claims “a higher moral authority than the changing policies of any nation-state” (Deutsch, 1968, p. 28). Such claims provide any state to uphold a status for world domination or self-nominated major role in directing the course of international politics above given moral principles (Deutsch, 1968, p. 28). He also adds that such self-nomination is not only limited with religious notions; it also includes secular philosophies and ideologies in which states expand their influences of ideological power beyond their power domain (Deutsch, 1968, pp. 28-29). In that sense, Schweller (2014) claims that ideological power of modern ideologies provides a capacity to mobilize the state expansionism (Schweller, 2014, p. 234).

Over the arguments of Weber (1954), Deutsch (1968) and Mann (1995) it can be concluded that the environment that states struggle for their existence is not only determined by their sole exercise of violence. It also includes exercise of ideological power that they uphold for themselves and influence the others. However, the environment that they belong contains power. Therefore, states require apparatuses of consent as psychological coercion apparatuses which are actually group of specialists who are skilled in creating forms of symbols, signs and rhetoric as forms of influence. With these apparatuses a state exercises its ideological power not on well-being but on hearts and minds of individuals beyond its borders.

4.3.3. Law

When Weber (1954) argues about institutions of law, he refers to group of specialists who are skilled in creating obligations, duties and rewards or rationalize interpersonal conducts among individuals as juristic conducts (Weber, 1954, pp. 96-97). This kind of institution draws boundaries of private rights and liberties that enable individuals to create their own livelihood (Weber, 1954, p. 188).

For Weber (1954) law has dual function for keeping an order intact: it provides a ‘guarantee of certainty’ to an individual who exchanged its partial possession of power for a certain liberty or higher satisfaction of a value, and it provides axioms that either

enable or disable the coercive actions for protecting the structural guarantee of exchange (Weber, 1954, pp. 98-99). In addition to that institutions of law provide a notion of firmness to legal order that distinguish itself from other institutions. Weber (1954) explains this notion on case of radical economic transformation; even the economic structure will be transformed from private ownership of means of production to socialism, law will guarantee this structural exchange on the status of means of productions (Weber, 1954, pp. 35-36). This is because “any authority guaranteeing the legal order depends some way, upon the consensual action of the constitute social groups, and formation of these social groups depends, to large extent, upon constellations of material interests” (Weber, 1954, p. 37).

The notion of firmness does not mean that the state cannot be separated from economics. In that sense, state provides legal order that serve the prediction of economic activities (Weber, 1954, pp. 39-40). In doing so, state makes appropriate decrees that coordinate economic actions. Eventually the violation of economic coordination also causes the violation of public law, that is to say violation of legal order and its functions. Those who attempt to violate economic cooperation are defined by law as criminals and this definition gives state a right to punish them by enforcing coercion. State deploys a disciplinary power or a power of punishment to end such violation (Weber, 1954, p. 57). In brief, institutions of law provide legal propositions to coordinate economic activity and provide state to execute its disciplinary power.

In international politics, the influence of disciplinary power can be seen in punishment strategies. As it is mentioned before, apparatus of force provides offensive and defensive capability to a state. In order to diminish these capabilities, states punish sources that nourish these capabilities or punish the resistance that preserve these capabilities. According to Pape (1996) punishment campaigns attempt to “raise societal costs of continued resistance to levels that overwhelm the target state’s territorial interests, causing it to concede to the coercer’s demands” (Pape, 1996, p. 18). These societal costs are based mainly on “inflicting suffering on civilians, either directly and indirectly by damaging the target state’s economy” (Pape, 1996, p. 18). In that sense, the state defines rival state’s population as a source of violation of its unity and function and thus revives the state’s disciplinary power to punish rival state.

4.4. Non-State Actors

The concept of non-state actors is as old as the modern state. When Weber (1954) provides an insight on the nature of modern state, he also includes the state's distinction from other political entities. In regard to that he evaluates the influence of law making on organizational nature of groups, particularly on charismatic leadership's role on creation of law (Weber, 1954, p. 83). According to Weber (1954) consensual actions of individuals lead them to create laws which are imposed by head of the group, a charismatic leader (Weber, 1954, p. 83). Charismatic leader affects individuals by his enactment which in response, individuals acknowledge his enactment and communicate it as a new law of the group (Weber, 1954, p. 83). Despite his charisma, the leader cannot hold his power of influence stable, so as the subordination to enactment. This is the primitiveness of law making in early tribal, clan and village communities. The leader of the group can impose enactments by his magical or ritual activities upon members of the community, but his charismatic power is unstable and ineffective to rationalize his enactments. In that sense, in law making, the leader cannot distinguish between rights and laws or enactments and norms. However, when matters in everyday economics or political life require the compliance of these enactments or enactments go beyond group's interpersonal relations, members of group gather to form up *ad hoc* meetings or associations, in order to administer themselves by these enactments or imposing what is necessary for their community as an enactment but by the praise of leader or headman (Weber, 1954, pp. 83-84). Thus, these *ad hoc* associations are coercive apparatuses which due to the simplicity of the group organization, are only formed for certain execution of group power. Therefore, the foundations of the state begin when the law making becomes complex and this complexity requires structural organization for coercion.

When non-state actors are mentioned in international relations, these include international organizations that are composed of states or multinational corporations that operate in terms which are dictated by state sovereignty, or mainly political subgroups next to economic and social subgroups (Rosenau, 1990, pp. 124-125; Kegley Jr. &

Wittkopf, 1981, p. 104). This shows us that non-state actors are categorized more than their simple distinction of not having a territorial integrity like states have.

According to Rosenau (1990) “multinational corporations, ethnic groups, bureaucratic groups political parties, subnational governments, transnational societies, international organizations, and a host of other types of collectivities are called sovereign-free actors” (Rosenau, 1990, p. 36). Rosenau (1990) proposes this term against term ‘non-state actor’ because for him, current international system is so dynamic that the categorization of actors requires concern over their analytical features like structures and patterns in order to provide much understanding about continuity and change (Rosenau, 1990, p. 114). For this reason, he provides a paradigm of multi-centered world system against state centric world system (Rosenau, 1990, pp. 243-252). In this paradigm actors are classified by their size patterns of influence: micro, macro levels, and collectives and systems (Rosenau, 1990, pp. 114-118). States are categorized under macro-level actors. At the same time, actors other than states can be put in each these categories in accordance to their size of influences. But Rosenau (1990) states that the loss of authority, scope and influence of state actors in a dynamic environment cause other micro and macro level actors to challenge state authority (Rosenau, 1990, pp. 127-128). Therefore, for Rosenau (1990), non-state actors are those who challenge state authority at every level of international politics, regardless of their size of influence. Rosenau (1990)’s argument has a similarity with Weber (1954)’s: when a group of people forced to take extraordinary actions in absence of authority, they fulfill the absence by organizing into ad hoc groups.

In relation to this distinction, the historical conditions that had caused the emergence of interdependence and transnationalism had also eased the participation of non-state actors at the international system. Both multinational groups and political subgroups are subordinate to the authority of state actions, due to their advantage on holding a territory for practicing power (Spanier, 1987, p. 84). The difference is that multinational groups which are consisted of state actors, are restrained “from the need to produce consensus among its members;” (Spanier, 1987, p. 77) whereas transnational political subgroups which are consisted of individuals are restrained “from its need to gain operating authority in different sovereign states” (Spanier, 1987, p. 77). Upon this

distinction, when we talk about non-state actors they should refer all groups except groups that have state members. Therefore, when analyzing non-state actors in this thesis, the subject of inquiry will be political subgroups due to their distinction from state actors.

In regard to such importance in analyzing non-state actors, it is necessary to point its transnational functions, “functions not only across national frontiers but also often in disregard of them” (Spanier, 1987, p. 77). This transnationality causes them to be *sovereign-free*, a feature that differ them from sovereign-bound nature of state actors (Rosenau, 1990, p. 36). However, the reproduction of this sovereign-free nature is related to organizations within a civil society, “diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state” (Gellner, 1994, p. 5). At this point, non-state actors are proposed as antithesis of the modern state.

According to Nordringer (1981), even in democratic countries, where it is assumed that the people has the final say on political decisions, the state is “frequently autonomous in translating its own preferences into authoritative actions, and markedly autonomous in doing so even when they diverge from those held by politically weightiest groups in civil society” (Nordringer, 1981, p. 203). In that case, the concept of non-state actors provides premises to engage the foundations of the modern state, which is interpreted as a phenomenon that coercion was used to restrain the dignity of human groups whose social norms were incompatible with the state. Schechter (2000) summarizes these propositions that sovereignty is regarded as a form of authoritarianism to restrain civil society through means of violence, power and theological discourse, which is demagogically presented by modern state as basis of law (Schechter, 2000, p. 50). Also, sovereign structure of state has brought materialistic assumptions upon human lives like statistics, contracts and competition in which they designate the value of humankind no valuable than inanimate things (Schechter, 2000, p. 55). Against state, individuals seek to organize within society that will execute civic actions for upholding human liberty. In brief, non-state actors seek their durability upon moral codes of civil society (Ryngaert, 2016, p. 187). Through their moral obedience, non-state actors influence state policies by upholding values as public opinion, which is regarded by state as public consent (Ryngaert, 2016, pp. 188-189). Therefore, despite their transnational

function, they are limited by state to operate within state's territorial jurisdictions as a part of civil society. On the other hand, this enables them not only to preserve their positive rights against state but also enable them to intervene in domestic sovereignty (Ryngaert, 2016, p. 189). It can be understood that durability of non-state actors is based on utilization of a kind of social contract between itself and states in order to place its moral obligations under cloak of jurisdiction of constitutional law.

In brief, all non-state actors are "states-in-waiting;" (Spanier, 1987, p.81) they have inevitable tendency to organize themselves within civil society to fulfill the functions where state cannot perform or performs against them. As Weber (1954) has stated, they have their distinctive notion of authority. This authority is realized when non-state actors' actions aim to influence state preferences by persuading civil society into political participation. Once the persuasion is succeeded, non-state actor takes a representative role in political arena. In brief, non-state actor becomes the image of people who show consent to its value actions. This image of representation shows that every non-state actor is the precondition of political party, which they "attempt to exercise control over group decisions" (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 169). They attempt to control collective conscience of individuals by indicating the possibility of normative order of society that is an ideal in the minds of individuals. However, the verification of both its nature as a political party and the notion of authority can only be realized in political conditions in where the state is either challenged or lose its power.

4.5. Conclusion

State exists as a conflicting party in international politics due to its organizational quality in regard to power. This organizational quality is the organization of its institutions as coercive apparatuses. Non-state actors challenge this organizational quality either when its values and sources are dominated by state actor or when its civic actions become divergent from state actions. In both cases, members of non-state actors take political decisions and put it in action by coercing its members' actions into communal actions at political arena. This coercion is executed by ad hoc organizations. However, this kind of ad hoc coercion necessitates instant consequences against state

actors due to the fluidity of power. That is to say, power is contained more permanently by state actors due to the fact that power has already been institutionalized. In that case, violence becomes a weapon of opportunity for non-state actors and it needs an ad hoc group of laborers as a coercive apparatus.

This point, in which the conduct of violence becomes a political option for challenging state power or for fulfilling the absence of state, also presents conditions that a political party enters into realm of terrorism. According to Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger (2009) during the crisis of national integration, when representatives of an ethnic or religious community are partly or totally suspended from decision-making at national level, “they may promote a political party to mobilize their supporters and achieve a some measure of power” (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 17). However, this promotion may fail to bring enough individual votes for popular support, which fails to contain over. If this lack of power remains long enough, then “elements within the party...may urge the organization to replace the pursuit of votes with the use of terrorist tactics” (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 18). In the same manner, during the crisis of disintegration, when legal order is dissolved into a civil strife, political parties organize armed militias to protect their communities from rival armed factions (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 18). These militias are not only employed for territorial control but also in order to sustain their communities they are employed “to carry out terrorist attacks, assassinations, bombings, bank robberies and kidnappings, in the defense of their sectarian interests” (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 18). In the crisis of legitimacy, political and social transformations leave an absence of authority that brings the problem of who will constitute a political order and how (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 19). In that case, this absence leaves political factions in an ambiguity “about whether the rules of open or peaceful electoral competition now prevail or whether the use of terrorist violence and urban guerrilla warfare is still an appropriate means of pursuing political power” (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 19). All three of these conditions “strengthen the political party’s tendency to adopt violent methods of operation” (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 34).

Adoption of violent methods by a political party shows that non-state actors have tendency to monopolize violence on the behalf of their interests. Political party initiates methods of violence to directly influence a deprivation over its supporters, which in return they will consolidate around the political cause that party cadre enacts. These methods first appear in form of *brigandage* which “is power over wealth based on well-being” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 90). By acts of kidnapping, pillaging and hijacking a political party “controls the distribution of wealth by threatened deprivations of health and safety” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 90). This also brings a transformation of civil norms that a political party complies for operating in civil society. By acts of brigandage, the treatment of human lives as means rather than ends becomes a norm for achieving political objectives: regardless being of supporters or not, if people of the polity don’t comply with ends of the party, they will pay for it with their well-being. Thus *terror*, “the control of respect with well-being as a power base” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 90), becomes politics of the party.

Despite the fact that monopolization of violence by a political party inevitably turns them into a terrorist organization, violent actions are conducted under tight secrecy. Due to their limited force capabilities, terrorist organizations seek to evade from surveillance and sanctions to protect their physical projection. However, this secrecy deprives terrorists from popular support. They cannot communicate with their sympathizers and fail to manifest the messages behind their actions to public (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 21). In that case, terrorist organizations form up “an above ground political wing” (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perlinger, 2009, p. 21), in civil society which will not only comply with legal order but also will carry out the orders of terrorist organization. So that, a terrorist organization can exchange its communiqué with the wing, which in return the latter will form up a civic image for legal popular support. Through this civic image, the terrorist organization will promote ways to justify its violent acts.

At this point, a causal relation is asserted between state actor and violent non-state actor. The divergence between state actor and non-state actor create initial conditions of conflict which violence becomes condition variable. In that sense, the consequence of the conflict either results in two caused phenomena which are

disintegration of a political community from a nation-state or state's reinstitution of security upon political community. One of these phenomena will be concluded if conflicting parties conduct amount of violence for not annihilating each other but politically subjugate each other. That is to say, one of the parties will deprive another one from its commitment to execute its political decision. Thus terrorism becomes intervening variable for non-state actor to achieve this objective. On the other hand, state actor has similar intervening variable for conducting political violence. Because once acts of political violence are conducted as a necessity in a causal mechanism between actors, the pattern of power affirms the political violence as a uniform political behavior. For state actor, its acts of political violence are compartmented within its coercive apparatuses; just as terrorist organization conceal its acts of violence among its ad hoc specialists of violence but carry out the political influence of acts by specialists of symbols and rhetoric. State compartments executions of power upon terrorist organization, within its coercive apparatuses. These executions of power will be punitive to those who deprive state from its power, ideological to disintegrate the popular support to the terrorists and destructive to the political cadre that decides acts of terror. The sum of these executions under the conduct of compartmented political violence is called covert action.

5. SYSTEM-LEVEL TRACING

5.1. Introduction

International politics has its own rules which are arranged as properties of pattern among actors. For being durable, every actor has to comply with these rules. In addition to that, in an environment where sources are scarce and values are prepositioned every actor inevitably competes for these sources and values to uphold their existence. Thus international politics is struggle for existence. States, by their organizational quality, are the best survivors of this struggle because within this organizational quality they hold the monopoly of violence. By violence they create conditions that regulate the change and continuity of patterns. On the other hand, non-state actors create conditions that regulate patterns of relations among each other but these are constrained by patterns of state relations. In brief, international politics is constituted as a dual system by which its rules have set an equilibrium.

5.2. International System

International system is a composition of political and social systems. As a theory, the international system was argued for the first time by Rudolf J. Rummel as *Social Field Theory*. According to Zinnes (1981), Rummel had summarized five axioms on the international system:

Axiom 1: International relations is a field consisting of all the attributes and interactions of nations and their complex interrelationships.

Axiom 2: The international field can be analytically divided into attribute (A) and behavior (B) spaces into which attributes and interactions are projected respectively as vectors.

Axiom 3: The attribute and behavior spaces are generated by a finite set of linear independent dimensions.

Axiom 4: Nations are located as vectors in attribute space and coupled into dyads in behavior space.

Axiom 5: The distance vectors in (A) space that connect nations are social forces determining location of dyads in (B) space (Zinnes, 1981, p. 151).

Each of these axioms shaped the analytical frame of the international system. From these axioms it is concluded that like the constitution of political systems into arenas of *civic* and *military* (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 252), the international system consists of two spaces: one sphere is *attribute space* where social or domestic factors designate or attribute variables to nations; and other is *behavior space* where relations between nations are reflected as dyadic behaviors (Zinnes, 1981, p. 150). In this thesis, behavior space will be corresponded with the *interstate system*, which is composed of state actors, and attribute space will be corresponded with *interhuman system*, which “refers to the totality of human interaction on the planet, and incorporates a range of units varying from individuals, through firms, nations and a great variety of other nongovernmental organizations, or entities, to states” (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993, p. 30).

5.2.1. Interstate system

Interstate system, or state system, in international relations is the condition of power politics that the absence of a high-authority has imposed self-reliance over state actors (Emery, 1955, p. 6). As a result of these factors, the interstate system is a political system. The self-reliance in this political system was the consequence of the positional value of a political group in an environment: it imposed a calculation of distinctive ratio between capabilities and necessities to positional power for its extinction in an environment (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 61). However, the realization of self-reliance

and the formation of interstate system happened upon in historical circumstances of Westphalia Peace of 1648, in which the exclusion of hierarchy over European politics was replaced by anarchy between territorial powers; each state had to practice authority over their own territories for deriving both material and mental sources to be self-reliant. After the Westphalian peace, state system passed through a series of certain historical events like Utrecht Peace of 1713 and Vienna Conference of 1815, where necessity of self-reliance re-emerged from historical conditions of Europe, and as a theory it became scripted in treaties as juridical principles. Even after its historical evolution, the conceptualization of the interstate system both in the studies of International Relations and statecraft went back to the early 1960s when world was ideologically segregated into bipolarities. The necessity of influencing other state actors for expanding a specific ideology as dominating mode of thought around the world has compelled bureaucracies of bipolar powers to analyze mechanics of state system and the nature of the balance of power.

Until the 1960s, attempts to understand the state system and balance of power were limited with descriptive explanations from “diplomatic history and *belles-lettres*” (Boulding, 1958, p. 329). In 1957, when the Cold War was intense, Morton A. Kaplan, in his book *System and Process in International Politics* (1957) presented a theoretical interpretation of the state system in terms of general systems theory, classifying types of international systems in accordance to sociological taxonomy (Boulding, 1958, p. 329). It was the first attempt for “systematic understanding at macropolitics,” (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 525) despite its lack of analysis on actors and processes (Boulding, 1958, p. 331). In the forthcoming years, Kaplan’s sociological taxonomy was incorporated with James N. Rosenau’s proposition of linkages between agents’ behavior and system’s behavior from *Linkage Politics* (1969), in studies of systems analysis (Zinnes, 1981, p. 116). This incorporation has led to further studies in general explanation of variables at systems level, such as Lewis F. Richardson’s hypotheses between arms race and causes of war in his *Arms and Insecurity* (1960). Richardson’s studies concluded that systems analysis was more complicated beyond present variables, which were actually composed of other variable factors (Zinnes, 1981, p. 121).

All these series of attempts by Kaplan, Rosenau and Richardson in studies of systems analysis proved that the complexity of interstate system could be perceived without dissolution of system's integrity. However, the accumulated knowledge was still far from both in explaining agents' behaviors with regard to each other and in systems' final decision upon agent interactions and processes. It was Kenneth E. Boulding, in his book *Conflict and Defense* (1962) that would modify the effects of system on variables among agents' relations through general theory of conflict.

The tradition of international relations has defined four characteristics of the state system: Balance of power, limitations of choice, uniformity of behavior, and continuity (Spanier, 1987, pp. 135-138). However, in this thesis, these characteristics will be elaborated on their analytical features rather than their usage in traditional literature, through Boulding's work on general theory of conflict: *balance of power*, *anarchy*, *viability* and *re-equilibrium*.

5.2.1.1. Balance of power

According to Boulding (1962), the interstate system is a dynamic social system. It is composed of *eiconic* (Boulding, 1962, p. 24), epistemologically motivated, actors in an environment where values and sources are registered at a certain amount. In addition to their *eiconic* aspect, they possess both qualitative and quantitative capabilities, or to say powers for participating in enjoyment of values. That means system actors have variables that are constantly in interaction with each other. These variables are either independent, whose value is fixed on constructing cause of a phenomenon or theory; and intervening, whose value is manipulative on explanation of a phenomenon or theory (van Evera, 1997, pp. 10-11). These actors act identically in an environment where they are seeking an enjoyment of their base values in accordance to position they hold, thus develop *equilibrium*, "the maintenance of particular pattern of interaction" (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. xiv). Equilibrium has its own conditions of maintenance, thus once it has being developed then it will be understood by only its own conditions. If each actor converges onto same positional value in the system that is *stable equilibrium* (Boulding, 1962, p. 20).

In international politics, as each state seeks its durability in political environment, they develop equilibrium of state system. In this equilibrium, states possess variables that affect the outcome of their actions of durability. As sources distributed relatively to positions held by states, system aggregates its independent variables on its level. Therefore, *eiconic* aspect of states sum up on system level as intervening variables. All these variables are “implication of anarchy” (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2014, p.20) for neoclassical realists. If states hold equal distance in relative distribution of power with each other in regard to common positional value, then this shows that each actor holds same hostility that is complementary with each other. For Boulding (1962) this is *balance of power* (Boulding, 1962, p. 28). In this respect, the elements of national powers are independent variables and state autonomies are intervening variables for determining system’s equilibrium at balance. Thus balance of power as a stable equilibrium is neither the condition of peace nor premise of peaceful world. It is vital to point out that main purpose of balance of power is “the protection of the security of each state” (Spanier, 1987, p. 121) through the distances of hostility which are designated by independent variables and following “the protection of state system as a whole” (Spanier, 1987, p. 121), through positional values of each state which are nominated by intervening variables.

5.2.1.2. Anarchy

Anarchy is defined as cessation of coercion in ruling (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 223). In international relations, it “implies the absence of any authoritative institution of, rules or norms above the sovereign state” (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 18). That means goal-rational actions are relative in accordance to multiplicity of epistemological agents. As it was claimed in this thesis before, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the definition a state are its power apparatuses of force, consent and law, rather than its areas of practice such as territory, population and sovereignty. These necessary and sufficient conditions are also its means of exercising its pursuit of interests, either material or historical. Any idealistic design of positional value based on ideological principles or moral codes is axiom of agent’s conduct. However, such designs are *redactio ad absurdum*; no design correspond its transcendental nature to sum of proved

experiences from ratio of stimuli between positional satisfactions and deprivations. Therefore, states calculate outcomes, “set of rewards or penalties accruing to each party at each combination of positions of all parties” (Boulding, 1962, p. 20); matrixes are constructed by state bureaucracy which includes *behavior spaces*, “possible position of variables” (Boulding, 1962, p. 20), and possible outcomes in process of interaction with other agents are put in preference of decision-makers. Behavior spaces are only valid if system imposes its laws on behavior space. Self-reliance is one of those laws that system imposes when it is in stable equilibrium; desired positional value in the system can only be enjoyed by the one who will compel to use every means for its attempt to reach this value, before others do the same thing. Anarchy has dual effects: it eases movement within the system but it also limits the choice of actions by multiplying its members.

5.2.1.3. Viability

No equilibrium can stay stable when actors are compelled to pursue their objectives or at least protect their positional value by given conditions of anarchy. Even state actors which are comfortable with the positions they hold, show hostility to those who seek enjoyment of their positional value; such act of keeping inertia is security, “the high-value of expectancy, position, and potential: realistic expectancy of maintaining influence” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 61). In international politics, security policies aim to eliminate threats; elimination of threats require threatened actor to move into another positional value that is incompatible with the nature of threatening actor. Reciprocally the other actor will defend its position in the system. In this sequence of actions, values of positions will not decide the outcome but powers of variables will. As each actor applies its power to its rival’s power, the violence emerges as a caused phenomenon in the system.

Once these agents realize their ambitions and the future conditions in desired position, they will influence each other’s physical security by depriving each others’ capabilities. At this point neither ideological similarities nor moral conducts can limit the behavior of actors for resolution. Thus the system will go into crisis, “a conflict situation of extreme intensity” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 242). Violence, application of power to power itself (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 90), becomes a system-oriented

behavior that influences every actor within the system, more or less. At this point, balance of power becomes a process of balancing of powers between participating actors which will be concluded in accordance to the positional value (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 251).

The intervening phenomenon that results in increase of violence and eventually to conflict is *viability*. According to Boulding (1962) viability is “ability and willingness of one party to destroy or eliminate other” (Boulding, 1962, p. 58). Viability has conditions for exercise: if an actor cannot be eliminated from system due to its ability to take independent decisions, then it is *unconditionally viable*; if actor can be eliminated from system but the eliminating power avoids from this, it is *conditionally viable* (Boulding, 1962, p. 58). In distribution of power, viability is determined by dominating power: if dominating power is restrained from using its power due to system’s restraints, it is *secure conditional viable*; if dominating power is restrained from using its power due to moral intentions, it is *insecure conditional viable* (Boulding, 1962, p. 58).

5.2.1.4. Re-equilibrium

If interactions between state actors are not identical then state actors divert from equilibrium. Such divergence in the system results in *unstable equilibrium* (Boulding, 1962, p. 58). If the process of divergence affected from intervention of viability, which is inevitable, then process will result in change of laws of interference at system level that is *system breakdown* (Boulding, 1962, p. 20). At actors’ level, the process that results in system breakdown is actor’s failure to become a state. If a state does not seek durability and expansion at system level, like other states do, then new actors emerge in previously held position in the system. This non-identical behavior of a state actor or to say renegade behavior, and its consequent failure of durability, corresponds with historical concepts of ‘Yahoo-states’ (Waltz, 2001, p. 111) in early 20th century and rogue states in Post-Cold War world. Yahoo states or rogue states are states controlled by autocratic governments who seek the destruction of other actors regardless of their viability and failed states are states whose institutions of coercion, or the apparatuses of force, are so weakened that state loses its monopoly of violence to other armed domestic political factions. In the context of both concepts, insecurity and eventually war become

inevitable consequences within the system. They break down the rules of balance of power and thus destabilize the system. At the same time, since all actors are *eiconic*, arising conditions of instability is perceived by other state actors as imbalance of power and thus frightens these state actors that such an imbalance might ease power politics for renegade actors to become dominant actors, which will inevitably impose its will over others (Spanier, 1987, p.120). As system goes into crisis, state actors who are in balance of power with each other will reinstate the rules of balance of power by showing an identical behavior, which is preservation of their own security in the system. At this point balance of power becomes a process of balancing. Therefore, a new equilibrium among states arises not only to prevent violence and thus threats to their security due to the necessity of cooperation but, also to secure the system. This process of re-equilibrium will lead to “the process of establishing pluralistic security community” (Deutsch, 1968, p. 201). According to Deutsch (1968) pluralistic state communities are political communities composed of state actors who have compatible political values to establish institutions and policies for enhancing their security (Deutsch, 1968, pp. 193-196). By pluralistic security communities, not only threats of renegade actors are deterred but also power within the interstate system is put in management for “uneasy but tolerable peace” (Deutsch, 1968, p. 202) among identical state actors.

5.2.2. Interhuman system

The interhuman system is what Rosenau (1990) distinguishes as a multi-centric world from a state-centric world (Rosenau, 1990, p. 250). However, beyond Rosenau’s distinction, interhuman system is where both state and non-state actors recognize their interests on common grounds thus they cooperate like bodies of individuals rather than wait for conditions of competition (Buzan, 2004, p. 123). It is civic arena at the international level where, unlike the state system, expectation of violence is low. Like civic arena, social norms and moral codes are predominant in interhuman system for forming relations of actors rather than power. In addition to that, interhuman system contains a potentiality of succeeding peace, the absence of violence. The absence of violence gives way to the rule of cooperation and coordination among actors that will create a new stable equilibrium. This equilibrium will be rule of law or global

governance by rule of laws and reason. A historical evolution of interhuman system might confirm the generation of this potentiality into a reality, if empirical evidences from certain timeline of evolution are tested for process tracing. Unfortunately, this argument needs to be evaluated on theoretical grounds, apart from its place in the historical evolution of international relations, in order to verify its truth value. Thus trends that progress interhuman system into absence of violence should be analyzed with its consequences on the international system as well. These trends are complex interdependence, transnationalism and globalization.

5.2.2.1. Complex interdependence

According to Evans and Newnham (1998) interdependence indicates that “actors are interrelated or connected such that something that happens to at least one actor, on least at one occasion, in at least one place, will affect other actors” (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 256). That is to say, political actors in the system are in more or less sensitive to actions of each other, thus this sensitiveness indicates vulnerability to actors.

Interdependence, just like non-state actors, is not a new phenomenon. According to Weber (1954) interdependence is a consensual action among economic units in a market whose economic capacities to submit legal coercion are so limited that they rely on those who successfully submit and thus keep economic life without frictions (Weber, 1954, pp. 37-38). However, the interdependence is has more definitive meaning beyond its economic aspect. In international relations actors show *dependence*, “a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces” (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 7), when they can’t rely on their capabilities to survive in an environment. Therefore, they rely on various capacities of other actors. This reliance is *complex interdependence*, due to the fact that actors show complexity and “reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries” (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 7). Complex interdependence is a caused phenomenon, realized in consequences of two events that also challenged interstate system.

The first event was the rise of political economy among states, who suffered collateral damage during the Second World War, gave way to reconstruction efforts under International Monetary Fund (IMF), which acted as “a formal mechanism to assist

states in dealing with such matters as maintaining equilibrium in balance of payments and stability in their exchange rates with one another” (Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf, 1981, p. 154). Undertaking of such a task by an international organization necessitated its cooperation with other elements in countries, either national corporations or individuals by overlapping national governments. Thus the reconstruction gave way to rise of war-torn countries to regain their national powers as developed countries and in long-term they became influential in international politics, especially against Soviet expansion. However, the significance of this rise about complex interdependence was not in context of the Cold War politics but in context of North-South distinction. At early stage, this rise had given way to the concentration of power in developed countries which orientated their policies from increasing the wealth to securing the wealth (Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf, 1981, p. 154) and thus caused distinction in politics with high and low levels, which former represents aspects of security and latter represents economic aspects (Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf, 1981, p. 28). When international politics was presumed to be progressing into a kind of universal body politic through the United Nations, this concentration of power showed its effects in the decision-making process of the United Nations. In addition to that, global economic disparities caused by unequal distribution of wealth led this concentration into a struggle between developed countries and less-developed countries, into North-South conflict (Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf, 1981, p. 73). Developed countries, along with the western superpowers had dominated the international decisions mainly by high-politics due to their status in the distribution of power at international politics; whereas less-developed countries demanded policies of low-politics against unequal wealth at international level but whose weak state apparatuses failed to challenge this domination. Thus these less developed countries formed inter-political leagues that founded on solidarity against policies of developed countries, which made them interdependent to each other.

The second event in world history was the same event that had challenged the state, nuclear insecurity. As it was mentioned before, proliferation of nuclear arms caused the propagation of nuclear fear which state actors took advantage of it as a security policy, a balance of terror that deterred each other (Spanier, 1987, pp. 212-213). However, the image that represented balance of terror in the minds of people was an

incapability of state's sovereignty against nuclear strike. As this image enabled the emergence of pressure groups who sought to influence security policies, which were dictated by nuclear strategy, it also clarified interdependence among political pressure groups and governments on international issues.

Whether state actors or non-state actors, interdependence has created axioms for integrating all actors at the same dimension. It created points of bargaining among actors, points in system where no actors were deprived from any resource and base value. These points of bargaining enabled them to cooperate for their interests. Through these points, conducts of actors were multiplied from preferences of competition and conflict to preferences of choice and cooperation. Interdependence also accelerated transnationalism process, which will create conditions of competition for territorial control from sovereignty.

5.2.2.2. Transnationalism

Neither the emergence of non-state actors nor complex interdependence has declared the fall of state actors from dominant role in international politics, unless transnationalism actualized the permeability of state territories, even against the apparatus of force. But transnationalism does not solely mean functionality beyond borders. Transnationalism is creation of new systematic dimension from interstate system, which elements within system actors will to move into this dimension by subscribing their foundational values on rights and moral attributions, rather than mechanism of power politics. One of the examples of these elements within state actors is multinational corporations. As mentioned before in the previous chapter, multinational corporations are non-state actors but their rules of conduct depend in terms dictated by laws of state. However, when economic interdependence broke the tariff barriers that were protecting sovereignty's rule over properties, it also broke through the barriers of indigenous modes of thought on domestic problems and carried onto international level via the operations of multinational corporations. Such breakthrough can be exemplified either by dam construction conducted by western construction companies in a drought-suffering country or by private military contracting firms which are outsourced by a weak state actor to protect country's natural sources. In sum, nation-wide problems

became major issues for every nation by transnationalism. Most importantly, not only problems regarding wealth but also “the issues of war and peace, the traditional concerns of nation-states” (Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf, 1981, p. 30) became major issues as well. Transcendence of these issues brought a search for institutions to succeed continual resolution of conflict phenomenon, which at the same time search “generated concern for developing political controls of global violence” (Kegley Jr. & Wittkopf, 1981, p. 31). However, as these functions defined in making truces or applying diplomacy, it was realized that these were functions of governance belonged to state sovereignty. Thus alternation of this search was integrating state functions of diplomacy to a kind of global civil society as disintegrating those functions from state was a necessity. This is the point that transnationalism puts its gravity on challenging the status quo of the interstate system.

The disintegration of the conduct of diplomacy or the conduct of resolving a conflict from functions of the state notably referred to studies of liberal thinkers in international relations, who had been trying in vain to dispose concepts from power politics at international level to values and morals of liberty, freedom and human rights in international politics (Mitrany, 1966, p. 92). One of these thinkers, David Mitrany (1966) had argued earlier than the time of transnationalism that founding such principles on international organizations might not serve to functionality because it was executed by politicians within political-constitutional environment rather than functional-sociological design (Mitrany, 1966, p. 191). The execution of this functionality within an international organization would result in disunity among its executioners who were seeking their national interests. This was what happened to the League of Nations during the Munich Agreement of 1938. Therefore, such functionality could not be disposed within international organizations whose functionality relied on its unity, which was unambiguous. On the other hand, both interdependence and transnationalism had promoted the idea of international society which designed a demand over functionality of resolution. This demand is global governance whose functionality depends on resolution of world problems, particularly of war, which assumes a social contract between an international civil society and international institutions.

5.2.2.3. Globalization

Globalization is the latest stage in creating an international civil society. It is the integration of everything that belongs to human lives at universal understanding and it is a process that transforms political functions of governance from state system to a social system.

Apart from interdependence and transnationalism, globalism dates back to the age of discovery when European sailors were wandering around the world for finding new continents and trade routes. These wanderings not only resulted in spoils of new resources but also transcendence of cartographic data onto structural knowledge about the mechanism of the world. Through world history, this structural knowledge created on the mechanism of worldly systems has carried more or less indigenous aspects of interpretation. With the advent of the 20th century, these indigenous aspects started to lose their functionality on interpreting the way of the world, and replaced by an universal view on the event. However, effects of this functionality over political communities correspond with late 20th century which the term globalism made sense.

The legacy that interdependence and transnationalism have brought to the late 20th century international politics was a search for a foundation of moral world order, in which globalism has created its material foundations by integrating all levels of human interactions and putting functions of nation-state out of the state system. Those material foundations were intensified economic exchange by liberation of production from local restraints (Kirshner, 2006, p. 11); hypermedia environment, which meant “the dramatic expansion in communications technology” (Kirshner, 2006, p. 6), and creation of the market that attributes values to human interactions by economic control (Kirshner, 2006, p. 22). By the foundations, globalism expanded areas of bargain that interdependence has created; re-evaluated international issues that have been transcended by transnationalism in expanded areas of bargain; and brought a function of global governance as a set of structured rules over solving international issues in actions of cooperation. It transformed the pattern of interactions from high politics of national interests to low politics of humanitarian interests, which was a modernization of the foreign policies of nations through replacement of political-military functions with

social and economic functions (Spanier, 1987, p. 658). This transformation led to a proposal of new equilibrium among state and also non-state actors, which was based on a kind of material altruism rather than viability. As viability designated the process of balancing among state actors, material altruism designated the flow and exchange of ideals and morals among societies which eased the permeability of territorial states. As a consequence, a new dimension of interhuman system has emerged as an antithesis of the state system.

5.3. Conclusion

In these two systems, actors tend to construct their image. In doing so, each system constrains actions by these properties. Properties of each system create dialectical process among systems. In this dialectical process, sum of actions which have been constrained by system properties are categorized into relations and rules that will reproduce systems. In the case of international system, sum of non-state actors' actions which are constructed by interdependence, transnationalism and globalization are countered by sum of state actions which are constrained by their anarchical nature, their viabilities, the balance among each other, and the tendency to re-equilibrate the relations. The countenance results in a drawback of actors into the systems that they are most compatible with their nature. That means state actions are aggravated under interstate system and non-state actions under interhuman system. In these systems, actors become durable because their viabilities are conditioned by system properties and secured by their powers. However, this doesn't mean that power process among actors is abolished. On the contrary to that, power process is conditioned in the environment by systems. This process forms its own dimension where all target values and source are allocated for struggle of viabilities. Once conflicting international actors draw into one of these systems in order to secure their viabilities, the conflict among each other will transform in accordance to the system they partake in. If these two actors are different on the distinction of that one of them is state and the other is non-state, then they will draw into different systems. The dyadic relation between two systems will eventually subject these actors into an inter-dimension where conflict is a constant variable.

Since the nature of conflicting actors is not identical, the nature of the conflict in that dimension will be formed on asymmetrical exercises of power. That means actors exercise their decisions with non-equivalent capacities. These non-equivalent capacities are result of the dynamics of the environment. In that sense, the effects of changes and continuity in the environment inevitably affects the dimension upon existing capacities. This brings a possibility that the intensity of conflict may increase to a so much extreme point that even the dimension cannot constrain the emerging crisis within its frame. At that extreme point, the crisis challenges properties of international system and dis-equilibrates both interstate and interhuman systems. This is what happened in August of 1914, when consequences of a simple assassination led to a world war. Thus this dimension sets its own constraints upon the conduct of conflict. The dimension conditions the conflict in a way that won't jeopardize the equilibriums and so that it won't challenge the system properties. The condition of this conflict is that actors can only modify the environment that will insecure each others' viabilities. Once the viabilities are unsecured, the system will be re-equilibrated by influences of insecurity. This condition of conflict is referred by Strausz-Hupé (1963) as *protracted conflict*. For Strausz-Hupé (1963) protracted conflict "attends upon every systematic breakdown and the ensuing quest for new equilibrium" (Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, Dougherty, and Cottrell, 1963, p. 1). This characterizes strategies of protracted conflict upon "the total objective, the carefully controlled methods and the constant shifting of the battleground, weapon systems and operational tactics for the purpose of confusing the opponent, keeping him off balance and wearing down his resistance" (Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, Dougherty, and Cottrell, 1963, p. 2). Thus the Cold War of 1960s fits into the frame of protracted conflict. For Strausz-Hupé (1963) superpowers confronted each other from different systems, it took in space and time and the goal was "the domination of the earth, and, now, its outer space and over the future of human society" (Strausz-Hupé, Kintner, Dougherty, and Cottrell, 1963, p. 7).

However, Strausz-Hupé (1963)'s assumption on protracted conflict relies on system breakdown. In that sense, protracted conflict would be concluded by catastrophe of one of systems that actor relies on. In the case of the Cold War, that would be the catastrophe of the interstate system which despite different social systems that

superpowers were founded on, it was the arena that constrained ideological motives of superpowers by its properties. Thus Strausz-Hupé (1963) have failed to assign property of viability into protracted conflict. On the other hand Boulding (1962) points out that in protracted conflict, “either both parties are unconditionally viable or there is a secure conditional viability” (Boulding, 1962, pp. 58-59). The resolution comes not with destruction of one side but with transformation (Boulding, 1962, p. 59). Therefore, conflicting parties attempt to change each others’ nature (Boulding, 1962, p. 59). When both actors are state one of the conflicting parties attempts to modify the viability of the other at the interstate system, either condition the power of rival party or make its viability insecure. If one of the conflicting parties is a non-state actor, thus its viability is secured by moral codes of civil society which are reproduced interdependently among individuals and small groups, permeated through national boundaries and globally manifested as universal values judgments.

In protracted conflict, conflicting parties balance each other through modifying their viabilities. In the case of protracted conflict between state actors, the balancing takes place in interstate system. In case of protracted conflict between state actor and non-state actor, it takes place in the dimension between interstate and interhuman systems. At both places actors form up patterns of area control upon the place they want to secure their viabilities. These patterns may vary from *confrontation* “which the control areas of two opposing powers are contiguous” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 258), to *penetration* “in which the control area of one power extends beyond the outer bound of the control area of another power” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 258), and to *flanking* “in which one power adjusts its control area to further encirclement of another” (Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950, p. 258). For protracted conflict, the designated pattern is penetration. In processing pattern of penetration, the penetrating party attempts to breach the outer boundary of the rival sphere of influence. In doing so, the penetrating party deprives the instruments of impermeability, which are either citizens or supporters of the rival party, from their health and safety. So that the penetrating party can achieve the control of respect over individuals and it can coerce them to act for its political causes, in an area which is controlled by the rival party. The penetrating party can only succeed this by acts of political violence. It conducts acts of political violence in order to modify

actions and relations which will balance the rival side. Through this balance, viability of the rival party will be insecure and this insecurity will enforce the rival party change itself in accordance to the penetrating party's decisions. Thus protracted conflict will be resolved in change. In brief, methods of political violence are tools for balancing the rival actor in protracted conflict.

Protracted warfare is not a pattern of penetration. It's a condition of conflict that protracts the causal mechanism between two conflicting actors whose viabilities are secured by conditions of systems that they take part in. In relation to that, violence is not imminent as in cases of war and revolution crises but it's a sole opportunity to insecure each other's viabilities. The importance of this opportunity becomes clear when the strength of actors are compared upon their distance to systems that they are viable. For Boulding (1962) the relevance of strength to viability is defined in *Loss-of-Strength Gradient* (Boulding, 1962, p. 230). According to Boulding (1962) a "nation's strength declines as it moves from its home base" (Boulding, 1962, p. 230). That is to say further an actor attacks its rival, weaker in its strength. In regard to protracted conflict, both actors are either unconditionally viable or secure conditional viable if the distance between actors are great, "if the LSG is steep, and if the difference in home strengths is slight" (Boulding, 1962, p. 232). Therefore, the conflict will resolve when one of the conflicting actors penetrates closely into home base of its rival, decrease the rival's home strength and increase its own LSG. In brief, protracted conflict concludes when one actor modifies both the environment where its rival is viable and the environment where it is viable. Political violence is the instrument for both of these modifications. By political violence the violent actor penetrates into area that the rival actor is viable. It deprives rival actor from its viability by political violence and thus manipulates the respect of the rival party. For a non-state actor which is in protracted conflict with state actor, political violence is conducted as terrorism. On the other hand, for state actor which is in protracted conflict with either state or non-state actor, political violence is conducted as covert action.

The consequences of covert action result in establishing a *relative superiority* upon loss of strength of the rival. According to McRaven (1995) the concept of *relative superiority* is crucial term for the theory of special operations (McRaven, 1995, p. 4).

McRaven (1995) defines the relative superiority as “a condition that exists when an attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a well-defended enemy” (McRaven, 1995, p. 4). That means the superiority is achieved when a skilled military element efficiently assaults the enemy at its home base and denies enemy from its most powerful condition, its home strength. The achievement of this condition is seen “at the pivotal in an engagement” (McRaven, 1995, p. 4), that is the time when the attacking party is closest to the enemy and farthest to its home base. This is the time when loss of strength of the violent party is the greatest. Once the condition of relative superiority is achieved, it is necessary to be sustained for the victory (McRaven, 1995, p. 5). The sustainment of relative superiority will protract the conflict for the rival party to a point where it cannot sustain its strength. At that point, the home strength of the rival will decrease so effectively that it cannot execute its political decisions and eventually it will subdue to political decisions of the violent party. If the violent party cannot sustain relative superiority, it will lose the initiative (McRaven, 1995, p. 6). The loss of initiative is crucial because it happens in an area where viability of the violent party is insecure, and thus might lead to a pattern of confrontation. Therefore protracted conflict is not only a necessary condition for defining covert action, but it is a proof that covert action is equivalent of special operations.

In brief, along with the political violence and the causal mechanism of conflict among political actors, dyadic nature of international system creates rules and resources that organized into properties. These properties regulate the relations between actors which in return reproduces the system. In the same manner these properties create a necessary condition that is called protracted conflict. The conditions of protracted conflict assert the causal mechanism between conflicting state and non-state actors. In conditions of protracted conflict, actors aim to penetrate their systems and make their viabilities insecure by acts of political violence. These acts of political violence are similar to what military circles define as special operations. This similarity comes not with identical conduct of political violence but by causing the similar outcome, that is relative superiority. Therefore, protracted conflict and relative superiority are two of the necessary conditions for sufficiently defining what covert action is.

6. CONCLUSION

In the chapter of literature review of this thesis, I have argued that the definition of covert action is insufficient in defining its analytical framework. I have argued that the current literature has constructed the definition of covert action by assuming either as a policy of intervention or as a presidential foreign policy. As a result of these assumptions, the inquiry on the nature of covert action is turned into an inquiry about finding moral grounds of justification. Furthermore, the inquiries on these two assumptions are interpreted through traditional texts. This has limited the scope of inquiry with reconstructing the logic of justification, leaving the formation of logic of discovery out of inquiry. This has resulted in an ambiguity on defining covert action between contexts of military terms or political science and the dissonance on using term covert action in dynamic nature of international politics, especially in regard to different types of actors. In order to overcome these problems, I have challenged the assumptions of foreign policy and intervention that are summed up in literature by pointing out that nature of covert action consists of acts of sabotage and subversion. These acts, in fact, are violent political actions that take in context of conflict. I have argued that in times of conflict where expectation of violence is high, conflicting parties in politics try to resolve the crisis by balancing the power. This balancing ought to provide alternative ways to for preventing conflict to turn into a crisis. In doing so, the balancing can either promote symbols and rhetoric of resolution or modify the environment of conflict where points of bargain can be reachable. But in times of crisis the balancing also justifies actions that terminate the threat of violence and reaffirm the cohesion of the conflicting party. Balancing also provides symbols and rhetoric for violence and modification of the environment. In that sense, violence is political if it modifies the environment for resolution of conflict in beneficent to the violent party. The violent party forms functional patterns against the rival party. In regard to that, I have analyzed the impacts

of times of war and diplomacy upon political order, which necessitates political violence for establishing these patterns. Times of war and diplomacy accelerates the social change for mobilization and makes violence a normative behavior. In order to achieve these two impacts, the political authority conducts acts of political violence that will modify the social and political order which, in return, combine violent behavior in home and abroad. In the same time, it is argued that political violence cannot be an instrument that serves such purposes during the war because its consequences will create an overreaction among the citizens. This overreaction will lead into a credibility gap between the authority and the public which in return denounce the government's justification of war-fighting. Despite the fact that such credibility gap was attributed to the US failure in Vietnam, political violence was instrumentalized and succeeded by both superpowers during the Cold War. The instrumentalization of political violence is one of the necessary conditions for defining covert action.

In the chapter of actor level analysis, I have argued that covert action is a state behavior of political violence. I have pointed out that when state actor conducts acts of political violence, these acts are compartmented in state's coercive apparatuses. In order to support my claim, I have challenged the three principles that define a state in international relations: Territoriality, population and sovereignty. In doing so, I have analyzed that these three definitions are functional consequences when state exercises its power over upon space, people and itself. These functions are adjudication through ethnogenesis, achievement by nomination and unity through indivisibility. Thus territoriality, population and sovereignty are actually sociological taxonomies that used for defining state as pure functional entity. In regard to that, I have argued that these consequences can only be achieved when state organized into coercive apparatuses which are composed of skilled individuals. These apparatuses are force, consent and law. Each of these apparatuses contains certain types of power that keeps state as political actor. These powers are physical, ideological and disciplinary. Through these apparatuses, these types of power are institutionalized as state power. Such institutionalization is only unique quality to state actors. In comparison to the challenged sociological taxonomy, I have argued that this organizational quality makes states unique political actors rather than its functional features. In addition to that, every non-

state actor demands such organizational quality in order to achieve its political objective and existence. This demand becomes obvious when divergence between state and non-state actors intensified into a conflict. In the case of conflict, non-state actor attempts to establish a control over respect in order to consolidate popular support behind its political struggle. This establishment can only succeed if a non-state actor deprives individuals from their health and safety, in exchange of respect. In brief, non-state actor becomes a terrorist organization. A non-state actor organizes ad hoc formations in itself both to commit acts of terror and to impose a peaceful image that justifies terror acts for the political cause of the non-state actor. Such transformation of a non-state actor into a terrorist organization asserts a causal mechanism into the conflict between state and non-state actor. That means violence turns conflict into a crisis. With this causal mechanism, the crisis is concluded either with the manifestation of autonomy of the non-state actor or with the reinstatement of state security over non-state actor. In response to that, I have argued that if terror acts become a tool for a non-state actor, similar acts can serve to state's security. As terror acts are acts of political violence, state conducts these actions against violent non-state actors, to reinstate its political dominance. When conducting these acts, state compartments these acts among its apparatuses, just as the violent non-state actor ad hoc organizes its acts of terrorism. By doing this, state actor executes its violence to politically punish those who deprive state from its power, ideologically manipulate popular support to disintegrate terrorists and physically terminate the political cadre that decides acts of terror. From all these causal manifestations of power between state actors and non-state actors, I have concluded that the necessary condition of covert action is state's compartmented conduct of political violence by its apparatuses.

In the chapter of system level analysis, I have argued that the dyadic nature of the international system has its own rules and resources that are organized into properties of interstate and interhuman system. I have presented the properties for interstate system as anarchy, balance of power, viability. Anarchy is the ability to define the environment which state exists. Balance of power is the hostility through the same distance to power and objective. Viability is the will to exist in the environment. Re-equilibrium is the will to secure the system. At the same time I have presented the

properties for interhuman system as complex interdependence, transnationalism and globalization. Complex interdependence is the reliance of actors on complex capabilities to survive all together in the system. Transnationalism is the foundation of new system upon existing political system. Globalization is the process of universalizing the images of actors. In regard to these properties, every actor finds their conditions to exist and so they construct their images upon these systems. Properties of each of these systems constrain actions of their members, and the interplay between these actions creates a dialectical relation between systems. This results in drawback of actors to their systems and transforms the divergent relation between actors into protracted conflict. In protracted conflict, actors struggle to modify their viabilities. A pattern of penetration is established among actors as a pattern for controlling the area among each other. In this pattern, actors try to breach each others' impermeability. Since impermeability is provided through institutions and individuals, the deprivation of these entities from their health and safety is expected to bring a control over their respect to political actors. I have argued that actors can achieve this breach and control only by violence. In order to consolidate my argument on analytical grounds, I have inserted the concept of loss of strength gradient as a comparison of strength between actors who are in protracted conflict. Upon this comparison, I have claimed that actors attempt to establish relative superiority upon each other by methods of political violence. By this claim, I have concluded that properties of international system create their own conditions which transform the causal mechanism between conflicting actors into protracted conflict and thus provides a necessary condition for covert action at system level.

Through these chapters, I sum up necessary conditions to that are sufficient to define covert action: Covert action is the conduct of political violence; it aims to modify both environment and the rival party to subdue them to its own political decisions; it is compartmented within coercive apparatuses of state which is the organizational feature that aim to institutionalize violence in state's nature, and it is constrained as a state behavior in protracted conflict by the properties of international system. Therefore, covert action is neither a foreign policy nor a form of intervention but a security tool for state actors against both state and non-state actors, who attempt to submit their political decisions through the modification the viability of the state by methods of political

violence. It is a military tool, because it provides relative superiority which is achieved by military special operations by same acts of sabotage and subversion.

The further research can be attempted through findings of this thesis, most notably on the necessary and sufficient conditions that I have argued. The technology is evolving and so new methods of political violence might emerge. These emerging methods may not deprive individuals from their health and safety but from consciousness and conceptions. As covert action was evolving during the height of the Cold War, disciplines of cybernetics and behavior control were also evolving upon studies for modifying, manipulating and deceiving social and interpersonal relations. With the birth of neural networks between biological entities and computers, any capable political actor can directly manipulate individuals by imposing them both physiological and psychological fear of deprivation or emitting stimulants to manage thoughts and actions. In regard to that, states might carry preemptive actions to format social consciousness or stimulates individuals to fear from deprivation if they attempt anything that unsecure the state and its political order. In brief, cloak and dagger might be replaced with neural interfaces and feedback sensors. For covert action, these assumptions might result in challenge to the necessary condition of political violence and provide suggestions to necessary conditions like, let's say neuro-pathological violence. This suggestion for further inquiries may be too futuristic. Until the technology gives way to such futuristic challenges, the lesser inquiries may be conducted about covert action. For example, one necessary condition of covert action is its compartmentalization at state's coercive apparatuses. The compartmentalization may require a further study on how coercive apparatuses analyze variables which determine the amount of violence that is necessary for modification. In doing this study, the apparatuses can be evaluated upon input-output approach and thus evaluated with either with real world cases or agent-based modeling. In addition to that, in the case of collective conduct of covert action against terrorist organizations, there appears a communal behavior of state actors which is the participation into protracted conflict. Due to the compartmentation of covert action, this behavior can only be indicated in de-escalation of violence and social upheavals around the world. That is to say, a multiple conduct of covert action by different state actors against terrorist organizations will form

an area of bargain among each other. The only conduct that is indulged in this area will be the participation to political and military actions on solving security problems. Such conduct asserts that common conduct of covert action might create a new doctrine of balance of power for peace and security. A further inquiry on finding variables for the creation of this area might prove this assertion.

Last to say, covert action is a valuable security tool in international politics only if its analytical framework is considered for both further studies of intellectual inquiry and further applications of national security.

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