

**ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRIPARTITE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
IN PLATO AND FREUD**

M.A. THESIS

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Department of Political Studies

Political Studies M.A. Programme

JUNE 2019

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İSTANBUL TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ ★ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

**PLATON VE FREUD’UN ÜÇ PARÇALI POLİTİK PSİKOLOJİLERİNİN
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ**

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRIPARTITE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN PLATO AND FREUD

SUMMARY

This thesis examines the political psychologies of Plato and Freud in terms of their similarities and dissimilarities, and argues that there are both advantages and limitations of doing political theory using psychological analysis. The first chapter explains the aim of this thesis, which is to compare the tripartite political psychologies in Plato's *Republic* and Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents*. The second chapter gives a detailed account of the city and the soul in the *Republic* focusing on Books II-IV and offering a review of different interpretations of the parts of the mind and city-soul analogy. Plato starts with contemplation on a just city and arrives at the conclusion that there are three different classes in the city that serve specific social functions. These are the money-loving producers, honor-loving auxiliaries and the wisdom-loving ruler class. According to his analysis a just city is where the ruler class rules with the help of the auxiliaries and producer class obeys. The analysis is then used to understand the soul through the city-soul analogy. The main purpose of the endeavor is to define justice in the soul and its advantages for the soul who possesses it. It is revealed that the city and the soul is isomorphic and the soul too have three parts to it with specific functions. These parts are called the appetitive, spirited and the rational parts. A just soul is where rational part rules with the help of the spirited part and appetitive part obeys. There are different interpretations in the literature of the functions and nature of these parts. Some of them understand the parts as agents whereas others see them as psychological functions. The third chapter starts with clarifications of several important concepts in psychoanalysis before moving on to a thorough explanation of *Civilization and its Discontents* and a review of different interpretations of the topics discussed. It is important to understand three meta-psychological hypotheses in psychoanalytic theory, namely the economic, topographic and dynamic factors. The economic factor states that psychological drives consists of quantifiable psychic energy that can be handled economically. The topographical factor states that there are separate places in the mind that contains the conscious, preconscious and the unconscious systems. The dynamical factor states that through mechanisms of repression the Id, Ego and the Super-Ego are in a dynamical relationship. *Civilization and its Discontents* is one of Freud's most influential book about the foundations and effects of civilization on human happiness. He ends his long essay stating that the life-preserving and life-destroying forces that maintain civilization and which are similar to the individual psychological development can have devastating effects on human life. The fourth chapter examines similarities and dissimilarities of the tripartition of the mental life and analogies between the individual mind and society in both accounts. It addresses several points of contribution of psychoanalytic concepts to understanding the mechanisms of self-knowledge that can resume a Platonic approach to developing a strong virtuous and happy life. The last chapter discusses the limitations and advantages of basing political analysis on psychological investigation.

PLATO VE FREUD'UN ÜÇ PARÇALI POLİTİK PSİKOLOJİLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

ÖZET

Bu tez Platon ve Freud'un politik psikolojilerini benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları açısından inceleyerek ve psikolojik analiz kullanarak siyaset teorisi yapmanın hem avantajları hem de sınırlamaları olduğunu savunuyor. İlk bölüm bu tezin amacını açıklamaktadır. Tezin amacı Platon'un *Devlet* ve Freud'un *Uygarlığın Huzursuzluğu* kitaplarındaki üçlü politik psikolojileri karşılaştırmaktır. İkinci bölüm, özellikle ikinci ve dördüncü kitaplara odaklanarak *Devlet* kitabındaki şehir ve ruhun ayrıntılı bir açıklamasını vermektedir, ayrıca zihin ve şehir-ruh analogisi bölümlerinin farklı yorumlarının incelenmesini de içerir. Plato adil bir şehir üzerine analiz ile başlar ve şehirde belirli sosyal işlevlere hizmet eden üç farklı sınıf olduğu sonucuna varır. Bunlar parayı seven üreticiler, onur seven yardımcıları ve bilgeliği seven yönetici sınıfıdır. Analize göre adil bir şehir, yardımcı sınıfın yardımı ile yönetici sınıfının üreticilere hükmettiği yerdir. Analiz daha sonra ruhu şehir-ruh analogisiyle anlamak için kullanılır. Çabaların asıl amacı ruhtaki adaleti ve ona sahip olan ruh için avantajlarını tanımlamaktır. Kentin ve ruhun izomorfik olduğu ve ruhun da kendine özgü işlevleri olan üç bölümünün olduğu ortaya çıkar. Bu kısımlara iştah, cesaret ve rasyonel kısımlar denir. Adil bir ruh, rasyonel kısmın cesaret yardımıyla iştah kısmına hükmetmesidir. Bu bölümlerin işlevleri ve doğası ile ilgili literatürde farklı yorumlar bulunmaktadır. Bazıları parçaları ajan olarak anlar, bazıları ise psikolojik işlev olarak görür. Üçüncü bölüm, *Uygarlığın Huzursuzluğu* kitabının detaylı bir açıklamasına ve tartışılan konuların farklı yorumlarının gözden geçirilmesine geçmeden önce psikanalizdeki birkaç önemli kavramın açıklanması ile başlamaktadır. Ekonomik, topografik ve dinamik faktörleri olan psikanalitik kuramda üç meta-psikolojik hipotezi anlamak önemlidir. Ekonomik faktör, psikolojik dürtünün ekonomik olarak ele alınabilecek ölçülebilir psişik enerjiden oluştuğunu belirtir. Topografik faktör, zihinde bilinç, ön bilinç ve bilinç dışı sistemleri içeren ayrı yerler olduğunu belirtir. Dinamik faktör, bastırma mekanizması aracılığıyla Id, Ego ve Süper-Ego'nun dinamik bir ilişki içinde olduğunu belirtir. *Uygarlığın Huzursuzluğu*, Freud'un medeniyetin temelleri ve insan mutluluğu üzerindeki etkileri hakkındaki en etkili kitaplarından biridir. Medeniyeti koruyan ve bireysel psikolojik gelişime benzeyen yaşamı koruma ve yaşamı yok eden kuvvetlerin insan yaşamı üzerinde yıkıcı etkileri olabileceğini belirtir. Dördüncü bölüm, her iki kuramda zihinsel yaşamın üçlü bölümünün benzerliği ve farklılıkları ile bireysel zihin ile toplum arasındaki analogileri incelemektedir. Ayrıca Psikanalitik kavramların, Platonik yaklaşımı devam ettirebilecek güçlü, erdemli ve mutlu bir yaşam geliştirmeye devam edebilecek öz farkındalık mekanizmalarını anlamadaki birkaç katkısını ele almaktadır. Son bölümde ise siyasi analizin psikolojik araştırmalara dayandırılmasının sınırlamaları ve avantajları tartışılmaktadır.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of the Thesis

The knowledge of human psychology drawn from theory and research on personality, psychopathology, developmental psychology and other subfields of psychology can be applied to the political realm. This research field is called political psychology (Sears, Huddy, & Jervis, 2003, p. 3). It can be argued that political theories make implicit or explicit assumptions about the nature of human behavior, what they value, feel or think, their goals or preferences, all of which make it intimately related to psychology. There is no one theory of human psychology as there is no one theory of politics and political psychology can be understood in terms of complex combinations of both fields to explain diverse political phenomena such as the study of political leaders, political movements, voting, effects of the media, socialization and education, conflicts about race, gender, nationality, political extremism, international relations, conflict resolution and more.

This thesis focuses on Plato's and Freud's political psychologies in terms of their similarities and differences. Both theories assume an isomorphism between the microcosm (soul) and the macrocosm (political structure). They both see an intimate relationship between the individual and the society in the sense that they can shape and influence one another and cannot be understood apart from each other.

Thus the thesis compares the tripartite political psychologies in Plato and Freud. It focuses on Plato's *Republic* especially Book II-IV and Freud's book *Civilization and its Discontents*. The reason for focusing on *The Republic* is that it gives a detailed account of the tripartition of the soul and the social classes in a city. This provides parallels for comparison with Freud's tripartition of the soul. The reason for focusing on *Civilization and its Discontents* is that it is one of the most influential books of Freud, and the one where he deals especially with culture and the effects of civilization on human happiness which is in many ways a central aim of Plato's *Republic*.

The following chapter gives a detailed account of the city and the soul in the *Republic* focusing on Books II-IV and offering a review of different interpretations of the parts of the mind and city-soul analogy. The third chapter starts with clarifications of several important concepts in Psychoanalysis before moving on to a thorough explanation of *Civilization and its Discontents* and a review of different interpretations of the topics discussed. The fourth chapter examines similarities and dissimilarities of the tripartition of the mental life and analogies between the individual mind and society in both accounts. It addresses several points of contribution of psychoanalytic concepts to understanding the mechanisms of self-knowledge that can resume a Platonic approach to developing a strong virtuous and happy life. The last chapter discusses the limitations and advantages of basing political analysis on psychological investigation.

2. PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* BOOKS I-IV

2.1 The Main Subject of the Dialogue

The translation of the title to English as the '*Republic*' can be misleading about the main subject of the work. 'The State or On the Just Man' might be more suitable (Guthrie, 1975, p.434). Despite elaborations on numerous topics, the central discussion aims at finding an answer to what justice and injustice are and their consequences for the soul that possesses them. Plato repeatedly reminds the reader of the main objective of the quest throughout the book (Grote, 1865, p. 123).

The *Republic* can be said to be a philosophy of the human being as a whole. It is a philosophy of mind that examines the inner operations of the psyche, external manifestations of it in the city, and its pure activity in philosophy (Barker, 1918, p. 169). The *Republic* addresses multiple subjects such as metaphysics, moral philosophy, education, political science, philosophy of history. However, these are not separable lines of inquiry for Plato. To understand the nature of a good individual and the conditions of her development, the discussion must involve the good state, because for the Greeks of Plato's time a good individual is part of a city. Aristotle states in *Politics* "Anyone who cannot form a community with others, or who does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city-state—he is either a beast or a god." (1253a 25-30). Moreover, the investigation is necessarily complemented with an account of metaphysics that addresses the nature of knowledge and an education program of the good state that can lead its citizens to be good (Barker, 1918, p. 168).

The political and the ethical are not conceived separately for Plato. Furthermore, from the perspective of Plato and the *Republic* "politics are founded on ethics, not ethics on politics" (Taylor, 1926, p. 265). According to Taylor (1926, p. 266), the overarching argument that binds ethics to politics can be understood by investigating the life of the philosopher who becomes the philosopher-king and who can only become just by serving the community at large.

Socrates states that the aim of the dialogue is to find a way of conducting one's life and "...to determine which whole way of life would make living most worthwhile for each of us?" (344e).

2.2 Theories of Justice

In the first book of the *Republic*, there are several attempts to define justice. Cephalus and his son Polemarchus offer the first. They assert that justice is paying your debts or helping friends and harming enemies. This category of definition is assumed to represent the unphilosophical, traditional, conventional morality. The second definition of justice is offered by Thrasymachus who asserts that justice is the advantage of the stronger party. This view represents the anti-conventional, immoral, view of the radical sophists (Barker, 1918, p. 179). Socrates analyzes both definitions and eventually he says "...as far as I'm concerned, is that I know nothing, for when I don't know what justice is..." (354c) announcing that none of the attempts was satisfactory. It could be argued that if Plato was satisfied with Socrates' refutation of Thrasymachus he would have ended the *Republic* at the end of Book I but instead the *Republic* is composed of ten books (Barney, 2006, p. 44). Reeve (1988) argues that Book I serves as Plato's "brilliant critique" (p. 23) of Socrates' theories. Methods of reasoning about justice in the *Republic* can be listed as the empirical method of Thrasymachus, the contraction method of Glaucon and finally the functional method of Plato (Santas, 2006, pp. 126-32). By offering different methods of examining justice and different conclusions about it, Plato deepens the understanding of both the conception of justice that he defends and the conception of justice that he criticizes (Santas, 2006, p. 145). Beginning with the second book, Glaucon gives a contractual definition and Plato starts to build his own theory in the mouth of character Socrates, which is discussed in detail in sections below.

Conventional definition Rep 330d-336a

Cephalus offers the first definition of justice. An elder businessperson and a metic, he is the owner of the house where the dialogue takes place. Socrates is interested in Cephalus' thoughts about old age and the conversation develops into a discussion of the way a person ought to live his life and be just in order to be content in old age so as not to fear death. Hence, the search for justice begins.

Cephalus believes that “speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred” (331c) is justice. Socrates suggests that people “... would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapons to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn’t return them, and wouldn’t be acting justly if he did.” (331c). Therefore, he refutes such a definition of justice because it can be just or unjust depending on the circumstances. From here, Cephalus hands over the argument to his son Polemarchus who refines the definition by asserting that it is “just to give to each what is owed to him” (331e) incorporating into the explanation that justice is doing good to friends and not harming them. Socrates inquires what happens with the enemies. This results in Polemarchus claiming that, “what enemies owe to each other is appropriately and precisely—something bad” (332b). Therefore the final definition turns out to be that it is “...just to give to each what is appropriate to him” (332c). A series of questioning through 332c-335e shows that this definition also fails. Giving what is proper to friends and enemies leads the discussion into considering justice as a kind of a craft, and determining in what circumstances it would be useful. Polemarchus suggests that it is most useful in the conditions of wars and alliances. However, it turns out that in partnerships, for example when playing a game, a skillful partner is more useful than a just partner is. Then, Socrates asks if a just man is useful in money matters. However, it turns out that, for example a horse breeder is a more useful partner than a just partner if one wants to spend money on a horse. After all, justice seems useful for keeping money safe, but not when using it. Socrates remarks that it seems that justice “is only useful for useless things” (333e). He also adds that being good at a skill goes both ways and for example “the one who is most able to guard against disease is also most able to produce it” (333e). This implies that a just man who keeps money safe would also be the best man to steal it (334b), which complicates the definition. On the other hand, Socrates reminds us that it is not an easy task to know who our true enemies and or the friends are because it is possible that you may believe that someone is your friend when in reality they are not. The possibility of being deceived holds true in the case of enemies too (334b-e). But even if there was a way to solve this problem, Socrates believes that it is still “never just to harm anyone” (335e) because harming someone makes them worse in human virtue and the function of goodness or justice cannot result in the opposite result as settled in the previous argument. Socrates ends the discussion by suggesting that the definition of justice as benefiting friends and harming enemies must belong “to Periander, or

Perdiccas, or Xerxes, or Ismenias of Corinth, or some other wealthy man who believed himself to have great power” (336a). Barker (1918, p. 179) thinks that, since these people mentioned are tyrants, kings or extraordinarily wealthy people, Plato is preparing for a definition of justice as ‘the interest of the stronger’ a position which is adopted by Thrasymachus, who speaks next.

A radical definition Rep 336a-354c

Thrasymachus is a pioneering rhetorician. (Smith, 1927, p. 278). Thrasymachus claims that “justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger” (338c) and “justice is the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule” (339a). Thus, the just person obeys these rules, and anyone who is against the laws of the government are unjust people. Socrates asserts that if a ruler is ever liable to error, she may enact laws that are not advantageous to her by error. So the subject who does not obey such erroneous rules would be benefiting the ruler, and not obeying becomes justice, rendering the definition inconsistent. Thrasymachus refines his position and argues from a “precise account, no craftsman never errs.... and in regard to that error he is no craftsman” (340e). Therefore if a ruler makes an error in ruling, she is no ruler regarding that error. From this point, Socrates takes up another line of inquiry and challenges Thrasymachus in likening ruling to craftsmanship. He illustrates that every craft benefits its recipient, and the crafts themselves are never deficient but must be employed with virtue in order to perform their function, e.g. medicine seeks advantage not of itself but of the patient. Socrates argues, “no one in any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself, but what is advantageous to his subject, that on which he practices his craft.” (342e). Thrasymachus counters Socrates’ argument in a lengthy speech. He starts with the example of sheep and shepherd. He asserts that a shepherd is ultimately seeking his own advantage when taking care of or fattening the herd, since he will benefit from them when he sells or eats them. Therefore, justice is serving the advantage of the stronger and obeying is disadvantageous. The just man is always worse off than the unjust man is. He gets less than the unjust man does when a partnership ends, he pays more taxes, and if he holds public office, he neglects his private affairs because of devotion to duty and does no favors to relatives or acquaintances and is therefore hated by them. The life of the unjust man is the opposite. Kidnappers or robbers who commit injustice on a small scale can be caught and be reproached. However, Thrasymachus

claims that the life of the tyrant, which is the most complete form of injustice, is called happy and blessed by everyone. He thinks that people blame injustice only because they fear suffering it; they do not fear doing it themselves. After all, Thrasymachus asserts, “injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice” (344c). Socrates firstly refutes the argument about the shepherd gaining advantage through his craft. He asserts that it is irrelevant to the art itself if the craftsman earns money or other advantages by engaging in it. The doctor is still practicing medicine even if she earns money for it. In addition, she is still benefiting the patient in doctoring. Moreover, what helps earning money is the craft of wage earning. This does not invalidate that medicine still benefits the patient. Secondly, according to Socrates, the unjust man cannot have a better life than the just man can. Socrates first settles the argument if justice is a vice or a virtue. Thrasymachus thinks that justice is “high-minded simplicity” and injustice is “good judgment” (348c-d). Socrates shows that a knowledgeable person with good judgment would not want to outdo anyone who is like him but an unjust person does this. He asks if Thrasymachus thinks, “That a knowledgeable person would intentionally try to outdo other knowledgeable people or say something better or different than they do, rather than doing ... the very same thing as those like him?” (350a). This outdoing is called *pleonexia* and refers to a rule of self-interest; it is considered a vice and opposite of justice (Annas, 1981, p.11). It is similar to greed and associated with the desire to get more of a good for one’s self (Fissel, 2009, pp. 35-37). Knowledge, which is the virtue of the craft, is for the craft. It is not used to outdo someone else who engages in the same craft. For example, a musician does not try to outdo another musician in her art but will outdo a non-musician. Craftsman try to excel in the art through knowledge rather than attempting to outdo others, and if by incidence any one craftsman is better at her art than another, this is a byproduct - not the function - of the virtue of the craft. Only an ignorant person would try to do this because she does not know that the virtue is for the excellence of the art. It turns out that an unjust person lacks good judgment and knowledge. Therefore, injustice cannot be a virtue. After that, Socrates turns to his theory of function. Everything has a purpose and its virtue enables that function. For example, the eyes have the purpose of seeing and sight is its virtue, while blindness is its defect or vice. In the same line of reasoning, the soul also has a function particular to itself. It is living, and living well can be achieved through virtue but not vice (353d-e). Since injustice is vice and ignorance, it cannot serve for the realization of a function.

Socrates proves his points by arguing that even for an unjust purpose such as enslaving another city, the members of the enslaving city must do justice to each other to achieve something in common, because otherwise their unjust purpose would become impossible due to dissension. This is also valid for the individual, who must have justice within herself in order to achieve anything at all; otherwise she would be in some kind of inner conflict. Ultimately “a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched” and “injustice is never more profitable than justice” (354a).

A realist definition Rep 357a-368c

At the end of the first book, Socrates claims that they have not reached a satisfactory definition of what justice is. With the opening of the second book, Glaucon, one of the two brothers of Plato, begins to speak, saying that he is not truly convinced that justice is better in every way than injustice. He states that there are three kinds of goods. One is the kind of good that is valued for its own sake, the second type is onerous but is good for its consequences, and the third is the kind of good that is valued for itself and what comes from it. He asks where Socrates would place justice in this list. Socrates asserts that he puts justice “among the finest goods, as something to be valued by anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness, both because of itself and because of what comes from it.” (358a). Glaucon reports that people generally think of justice as belonging to the second type of good, one that is onerous but beneficial for its consequences. Socrates remarks that this was the kind of opinion held by Thrasymachus. However, Glaucon thinks that the refutation of Thrasymachus’ account was not satisfactory and that there is still need for Socrates to show that justice is among the finest goods. This is why Glaucon will argue as if he held the popular opinion, rendering an opportunity for the dialogue to truly convince them that justice is something with intrinsic value. Thus, Glaucon asserts that he wants “to know what justice and injustice are and what power each itself has when it’s by itself in the soul” (358b) regardless of the consequences. He argues that people are naturally inclined to do injustice, but that weak people who are not capable of doing it understand that suffering it is worse. As a result, they agree with each other to neither do injustice nor suffer it. This is the natural origin of justice as a convention out of fear. He adds that the best is to do injustice without penalty, the worst is to suffer it, and that justice is a compromise between these two extremes. He says that “people value it not as a good but because they are too weak to do injustice with impunity.” (359b). However if there

is a person powerful enough to do it with impunity she will naturally do it and will not be willing to agree with anyone else in a just convention (which reminds Hobbes' claim of the necessity of a sovereign to hold all people in awe and fear in *Leviathan*). He asserts that law towards fairness oppresses the natural tendency for injustice. If a just and an unjust person wore the ring of Gyges which enables invisibility, they will both act the same, and no one would be incorruptible in face of such an opportunity. The just person would act in the same manner as the unjust person due to a natural inclination towards injustice that we all possess. In case she did not commit injustice, everyone would think that she is foolish, but may still praise her in public, deceiving each other for fear of punishment. Furthermore, Glaucon invites us to contemplate the lives of the perfectly just and unjust persons. The unjust person is the master of injustice, can never be caught and must be praised for being just. Additionally, the just person must be stripped from all the reputation that justice brings so that we may not be confused about the real motives of the person; this is how we can make her the opposite of the unjust one. After all, the life of the just person will be wretched, and she will suffer whereas the unjust person will be loved by others, will be praised for being just, and wealthy enough to placate people and the gods with sacrifices. At this point, the other brother of Plato, Adeimantus, intervenes and adds that there are also cases where justice is praised as being better than injustice, but only a façade of justice is praised, not a true justice. He asserts that parents teach their children to be just for its benefits in the public and the gods praise it for its consequences in the afterlife. His criticism is that although religion praises justice, it is easy to be forgiven for unjust acts through rituals and sacrifices. He blames poets repeatedly for telling about unjust deeds being purified with rituals and sacrifices. He thinks that this kind of representation of virtue and vice has harmful/deleterious effects on the soul of the young. Persuasion and force are successful in hiding unjust acts among humans. Furthermore as for of the gods unjust deeds can be redeemed through sacrifices held with the wealth acquired by injustice.

Glaucon's and Adeimantus' concerns direct Socrates to show that justice is good for the soul of the individual regardless of its consequences. The challenge of moving justice from an onerous type of good to a type of good that is good in itself and for its consequences requires Plato to illustrate that the nature of justice is in fact different from its conventionally and unreflectively accepted conception. In the end, the

definition of justice in Book IV - that it is a form of proper organization for complex structures and a sort of mental health - is an unusual definition (Shields, 2006, p. 80).

The dialogue continues with arguments that will show that justice has intrinsic value, through an analysis of justice based on human nature, an account of the human soul as the foundation of the laws, and an account of the ways in which religion and education can support morality. Up to this point, everyone in the dialogue had been considering justice as something external, as a convention, or a force controlling the soul against its inclinations, but Socrates wants to illustrate that it is something internal, that it is the right condition of the human soul. Barker (1918) states that for Plato “man does not consciously create on totally different principles from those along which he instinctively develops” (p. 185). Plato wants to prove that justice is not just a code of conduct, but that it is essential to the well-being of the soul. The ways of political organization are introduced for the sake of illustrating this point in response to Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ questions (Taylor, 1926, p. 272). Socrates remarks that it is a formidable task to find justice in the soul and that it will require a careful investigation to prove that it has intrinsic value. However, he has a way to overcome this hardship, which will give them an opportunity to investigate the form of justice on a larger scale since it is much harder to detect it in the individual at first sight. In fact the hardship is firstly that they do not know what justice is. They need a definition of it first. Socrates asserts, “There is the justice of a single man and also the justice of a whole city” (368e) and

Perhaps, then, there is more justice in the larger thing, and it will be easier to learn what it is. So, if you’re willing, let’s first find out what sort of thing justice is in a city and afterwards look for it in the individual, observing the ways in which the smaller is similar to the larger. (369a).

2.3 Contemplation on the City

Socrates’ objective in contemplating “a city coming to be in theory” (369a), which would reveal the sources and the form of justice and injustice, is to apply what is found to the individual soul. For Plato the social aspects of the soul, manifest in the organization of the city, is an essential part of analyzing the nature of the human soul. He is not separating the city and the soul to compare and contrast them -he is drawing an analogy between them. Plato thinks that a city is a kind of a manifestation of the soul in the community, as a social consciousness of the soul, manifest in the city’s

organization as a collectivity of many minds. His remarks that the constitutions are born from the people that inhabit the city and not from “oak or rock” (544d) illustrates his perspective. The institutions of human beings are differing manifestations of their minds (Barker, 1918, pp.185-6). Therefore, analyzing the city will give indispensable clues about the human psyche, which is harder to observe at first sight. His parallelism also depends on his theory of Forms. Plato thinks that the soul is immortal and that it shares the qualities of the ideals within it even though it is incarnated and became complex through its interaction with the body and the environment. The stream of justice or unity flows to differing channels in the incarnated soul. What organizes the complexity as a unity reveals the form of justice in the soul and in the city. These topics are discussed in detail in what follows.

The original city Rep 368c-372e

Socrates argues that cities are formed because no one is self-sufficient; we need to collaborate as partners and helpers to settle together, and this is what we call a city *polis*. He thinks that we should investigate our needs because they constitute the foundation of the formation of a city. He counts the need for food, shelter and clothes as basic, he furthermore adds shoemakers and doctors. The argument leads to a necessity of a division of labor in terms of one person one job rule. Socrates asserts that everyone is suited by nature to one profession, and that it is easier to profess in one task if you engaged in it solely rather than engaging in many differing tasks. Therefore, the need for more professions such as metalworkers, carpenters, shepherds etc. arise, and making the city a medium sized one. As they investigate more, they find the need for merchants, sailors, more farmers and metalworkers, market place, currency of exchange, retailers, and wage earners in completing the city. The professions that can provide for the needs of the people will constitute the population of the city. Eventually Socrates asks where justice and injustice came into being while they were completing this city, and Adeimantus suggests, maybe it was in the need the people had for each other (372a). Socrates wants to examine the lives of the citizens and describes it to investigate more how the need for each other is the source of justice and injustice. However, Glaucon interrupts and asserts that this is not a civilized city and is a city for pigs. Socrates accepts Glaucon’s criticism to be a realistic one and asserts that the original city described will not satisfy some people. There seemed no need for a government and no trace of injustice in the original city. Even though

Socrates maintains his opinion that the original city they described is the healthy one (372e), he says that it may not be a bad idea to examine the origin of a luxurious one because it may well show them both justice and injustice. He states that considering the origin of a luxurious city "... may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well see how justice and injustice grow up in cities" (372e). Guthrie (1975) argues that Plato planned moving on to a contemplation of a luxurious city because "unity and concord do not have to be imposed on the simple, but only on the complex." (p.448). Guthrie (1975, p. 449) argues that Plato knew that human nature was complex and the people described in the original state does not adequately reflect the complexities of human nature. Plato knew that it is not very useful to ground his political theory on optimistic view that people will be satisfied and not demand more than their necessary needs, he expects that people will demand unnecessary gratifications. An ideally just state is conceived with a realistic theory of human nature rather on an impossible ideal (Annas, 1981, p. 77). According to Guthrie (1975, p.449) there may be two ways of contemplating a perfect city: the ideal state could be a composition of ideal people, or an ideal organization of the complexities of human nature. The original city may be an attempt to represent the former and the luxurious city an attempt at the latter. The ultimate purpose of the dialogue is to illustrate that justice has intrinsic value for the soul, so a design of the city that can incorporate the complexity of human nature will serve the purpose better. Taylor (1926, p. 274) argues that the original city has no social problems and it is as if the people in it do not have souls to be fed, only require to be provided with their physical needs.

The dialogue starts to investigate the luxurious city, to make an ideal organization of human beings as they are. However, Socrates and his interlocutors purge the city while at the same time considering the complexity of human nature. That is how they will make it good. It can be complex but if the organization is ideal or just then it can be good, the order must be preserved. Moreover, the principle of specialization in one task will play the most important role in the formation of the luxurious city. Socrates asserts in the process of contemplation of the luxurious city that, "Without being aware of it, we've been purifying the city we recently said luxurious" (399e). This shows that through their thought experiment, it is possible to reach a good state through purification and organization even though the city has its multiple parts. Socrates says

that if it is not possible to realize this city, there will be no chance of happiness in any other form of the city (473e).

Luxurious state Rep 372e-434d

The luxurious city is formed by expanding the original one: “increase it in size and fill it with a multitude of things that go beyond what is necessary for a city” (373b). Hence, there come new professions such as hunters, artists, actors, servants, tutors, beauticians, barbers, chefs, and doctors etc. to complete the economic factor of the city.

Socrates now thinks that if this city oversteps the limit of necessities it will also need to expand more and to seize neighboring lands. If it is assumed that the neighboring cities are of the same mind, then there is a need for protection too. Socrates argues that this is the origin of war. Thus, an army must be constructed. Socrates reminds us that if the city is to be a good one, having an adequate organization that can unite the complexities, they must stick to their agreement that every person engage in one profession only. Therefore, the money-making citizens cannot also be in the military. Fighting a war and protecting the city requires great knowledge and practice so it can only be reserved for a military class.

Socrates argues that this military class should have special characteristics. He asserts that in addition to physical aptitude they must be courageous and “as far as their souls are concerned, they must be spirited” (375b). Socrates remarks that these guardians must be gentle towards their own people while being harsh to the enemies. However, being gentle and being high-spirited seem to be opposites and Socrates must show that it is natural to combine them in a soul. Socrates gives the example of watch-dogs, stating that dogs are gentle to people they know even when these familiar people treat them bad, but they will be hostile to anyone with whom they are not familiar, even in cases where the stranger is kind to them. These dogs know how to differentiate between familiar and strange, loving the former while being harsh to the latter. However, this may never be possible if there were not a philosophical (rational) part to their souls. The philosophical part loves to know and the dog judges based on knowledge and ignorance. Whether it knows that person or not, and loves what is known, this presupposes a love for knowledge or wisdom; this is nothing but a philosophical element. He concludes his description of the military/guardian class by

asserting that “Philosophy, spirit, speed, and strength must all, then, be combined in the nature of anyone who is to be a fine and good guardian of our city.” (376c). Barker (1918, p. 194) argues that we see reason working together with spirit as allies already in the soul of the guardians.

The dialogue continues with an extensive description of the education of this class. The early stories told to the young must be supervised, they must not depict a picture of gods warring, fighting, hating or plotting against one another, or changing form to deceive people; gods must be pictured as good and the source of good things only. The stories must not reflect life after death as something scary; they must praise it, so that the young can be courageous warriors. The heroes must be depicted as self-sufficient and not overly emotional before a misfortune or death of someone close. Heroes must be pictured as moderate and having self-control, obeying the ruler and moderate in their pleasures, not as money-lovers, slavish and arrogant. Guthrie (1975) states that the musical education of these guardians is based on “the association of aesthetic values, especially the formal qualities of symmetry, proportion, rhythm, which in Greek eyes gave unity to a complex whole of parts and satisfaction to the eye and ear, with moral excellence.” (p. 451).

Socrates asks who among the guardians will rule, and he thinks that the ones worthy of ruling must pass several tests, after having been observed over many years to see if they ever abandon their willingness to protect and love the city. These ones are complete guardians who have proven themselves to be worthy of ruling. These complete guardians form the ruling class. The rest of the guardians are now can be called auxiliaries and they can assist the rulers. Therefore, the military class splits into guardian auxiliaries and guardian rulers. The characteristic of the philosophic guardians or rulers is reason, they are knowledgeable and care for and love the city most, whereas the characteristic of the military guardians or auxiliaries is spirit.

The philosophic element in the city loves the city because reason leads it to care for it, and through reason, it unites and organizes the whole. At the end of the third book, Socrates introduces the noble lie that the gods put three different metals into the souls of people, which makes them belong to a particular class. He thinks that the guardians must believe in this noble lie and persuade others to believe in it too. The rulers have gold in them, the auxiliaries silver, and the craftsman have iron or bronze. Therefore, they are naturally suited to their class. Plato elaborates on the philosophic guardians

who are to be philosopher kings and addresses the issues in their selection and education in Books V, VI and VII. The philosopher kings have true knowledge of the Forms so they will not rely on true opinion as stated in the noble lie at the end of Book III. However, they will make use of this lie to persuade others; philosopher kings may lie and are likened to doctors who lie for the benefit of the patient.

2.4 Justice in the Soul

Socrates defines justice in the city as each natural class, the moneymaking, auxiliary and guardian classes doing its own work in the city. The application of this formula to the individual is necessary if they want to be sure of their definition. Socrates asserts that if this structure cannot be found in the individual and if they find something different about justice there, then they should go back and test it in the city. This procedure can be back and forth, like rubbing fire-sticks together, where justice can light up, so that they can get a grip on it. This explanation of the method is important because it is a hint that justice is something that can be seen between the relationship of the individual and the city. Formulations based solely on one or the other would not provide the true essence of justice. This is what happens in 444 d-e, every citizen doing their own job and not meddling with others' jobs is only an image of justice, and justice "isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own" (443c-d). We can only observe the actions of a person the actions could be just when the soul is just.

One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things, he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he act. And when he does anything, whether acquiring wealth, taking care of his body, engaging in politics, or in private contracts—in all of these, he believes that the action is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that oversees such actions. And he believes that the action that destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees it as ignorance. (443d-e).

The city-soul analogy expanded Rep 434d-436b

In the first instance, Socrates applies the tripartition of social classes in the city to the individual soul. Since justice is every part of the city doing its own work, there must be corresponding parts in the soul that will do their own work. Otherwise, the formula would not be applicable. Socrates argues that if both the city and the soul are called just, they must share the form of justice. The initial method was qualitative comparison Book II, where it was assumed that justice would be larger and thus easier to detect in the larger thing compared to the smaller thing. Through their theoretical establishment of a good city, which was theorized to contain justice in it, they realized that justice is not a quality but a kind of organizational schema that preserves and unites the city as a whole. Therefore, now, Socrates hypothesizes that if both the city and the individual can be called just, and if justice is a kind of organizational form, then they both must share this form of justice. To be able to share the form they must both have the same number of parts.

Plato did not arrive at the conclusion that the characteristics of the individuals is what makes the characteristic of the city. He takes it as a given fact since cities are made up of individuals and not from oaks or rocks. The city is a human creation and at the same time it is composed of human beings. Therefore, an isomorphism between the structure of the city and the soul is expected. Since a city in theory is formed of three distinct parts, the soul must have parallel components in it. However, one needs to be careful here not to commit a part/whole fallacy. For example just because all people in a country are white does not make a city white – the buildings are still gray and red.

In the tripartition of the soul, Socrates uses the principle of opposites (Reeve, 1988, p. 118). He already stated that there must be as many parts in the soul as there is in the city. They must show that there must be separate works to be done in the individual soul in the first place. Socrates wants to apply the definition in the city to the individual. He must first employ the principle of opposites to show that there are different responsibilities that should not be meddled with by the other parts in the soul too (Reeve, 1988, p. 131).

The use of principle of opposites is very important in the sense that it lays the ground for the reader not to think that these parts can share work together. For example, the appetitive part can never calculate, the parts as agents hypothesis is eliminated from

the start. They are not capable, not naturally suited, or have the resources of each other so that one part can go on by its own (Anagnostopoulos, 2006, pp. 158-70). They are interdependent because no one can do the others' job. The special job that each has is not open to compromise or negotiation. Every part has its own good, its own particular knowledge (Reeve, 1988, p. 131).

Parts of the soul Rep 436b-441c

The tripartition of the soul begins with the premise that if the soul and the city can both be called just, they must both have the same form of justice. It was established that the city is just when each of the natural classes within it, namely the producers, military class and the rulers do their own work. The hypothesis is that if the individual has same three parts in the soul, then it too can be called just if those parts do their own work and do not meddle with each other. Socrates starts the inquiry to see whether the soul has these same parts. Their method of investigation would not render a precise answer to this question but it would be consistent with the level of their previous findings and inquiries. He states, "There is another longer and fuller road that does lead to such an answer. But perhaps we can get an answer that's up to the standard of our previous statements and inquires" (435d).

Socrates states that he is compelled by the fact that individuals possess the characteristics of cities, such as being spirited, wisdom-loving or money-loving too. Moreover, this fact must be because what renders a city to have a certain characteristic comes from the individuals who inhabit it; to think otherwise would be absurd (because they also stand in a mimetic relation to the form of justice). Therefore, individuals must have those parts too. Since a city is a composite of individuals and social classes it is fairly easy to understand that these are parts of the city. However an individual is a single entity at first sight and to attribute partition to its soul is more difficult. Socrates asks if individuals learn with one part, get angry or spirited with another, and desire the pleasures of food, drink or sex with a different part of the soul. Or is it the case that when an individual sets out after something she act with the whole of her soul. Their way of investigation is through the visible realm; they will focus on the actions of the individual to understand what's happening in the soul. This method of investigation is for Socrates a weak method to yield a precise answer but they will use it, because they have been on this track from the beginning. The principle of opposites gives an opportunity for Socrates to prove a tripartition of the soul. He

introduces the principle by asking the following question: since the soul moves towards the object of desire when it acts on it, can something move and stand still at the same time with the same part of itself? For example if a person is standing still but moving his arms, we would say that one part of him is standing still and the other moving. A more complicated example would be of a spinning top, or objects moving in circular motion, one would say that it is standing still and moving at the same time. However this is not the case. The object has an axis, and in respect to that axis it stands still, while in respect of its circumference, it is moving. This shows that the axis of the spinning top is not moving, while its circumference is. Therefore it is not possible that “same thing can be, go, or undergo opposites at the same time, in the same respect, and in relation to the same thing” (436e). Assent and dissent, wanting to have something and rejecting it, taking something and pushing it away are opposites. There is a rule of opposition that in such situations the opposing parties should be different parts.

Socrates states when the soul has an appetite for something, it desires and wishes for it, and therefore it wills for it. However, there are instances when the soul does not wish, and does not have an appetite for something. Those are the opposite conditions where the soul moves away from those things. Hunger and thirst are the clearest examples of appetite. Their objects of desire are food and drink. This is important for Plato, because if what the appetite desires is appetite is food or drink, there is no concept of good food or bad food, but only food. Any qualitative version of good food would require a reasoning part and would be subject to compromise to resolve the opposition. Plato thinks that reason and appetite must be different from each other if they have a conflicting situation that cannot be resolved in terms of rational calculation (Reeve, 1988, p.131). Appetite must relate to nothing but its natural good; anything relational stops being a thing in itself, and Plato wants to conceptualize the appetite as a thing in itself. Plato can demonstrate his purpose only through appealing to parts themselves if any qualification is added to the object that the soul desires it makes that part a particular type of a part and particulars can be compromised. To show that a thirsty soul only thirsts for drink not a drink with qualification, Socrates says, “Hence the soul of the thirsty person, insofar as he’s thirsty, doesn’t wish anything else but to drink, and it wants this and is impelled towards it.” (439b). If at the same time a thirsty person does not wish to drink, then this shows that a different part pushes the drink

away. This is clear in terms of the principle of opposites. A sort of calculation drives the soul not to drink. This calculative element is separate from the appetitive element. Plato calls the calculative part the rational part. The part that lusts, hungers, thirst, gets excited by other forms of pleasures, and indulgences the irrational appetitive part.

Socrates then goes on to show that the spirited part, the part with which we get angry, is different from the other parts. He uses the example of Leontius, who when he saw corpses on the side of the road,

had an appetite to look at them but at the same time, he was disgusted and turned away...overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the corpses, saying, "Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight! (439e).

This is an example showing that differing parts drive towards and away from the same thing at the same time. In addition, when the appetite wins in the struggle, the other part gets angry. He calls the part that we get angry with the spirited part. Socrates also notices that sometimes the angry part allies with the rational part when appetitive part forces its will. The spirited part gets angry at the appetitive part, and agrees with calculative element that this bidding should not have happened. Like some kind of a civil war, the spirit allies with reason. Socrates states, "When appetite forces someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and gets angry with that in him that's doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that are fighting a civil war...spirit allies itself with reason" (440b). Socrates also gives example of a situation where someone has done something unjust accept his punishments without resentment. In such a case, his spirit is not aroused. However, if he believes that someone is being unjust to him, his spirit gets angry and only can be calmed by reason (440c-d). These are the instances when spirit allies with reason and is sensitive to justice and injustice. The previous examples illustrate that the spirited and appetitive parts are different from each other. Moreover, the spirited and rational parts are different from each other too. Socrates says that children are full of spirit from birth and that calculation comes later. This is one of the arguments for why they are different from each other. The story of Odysseus is another example. Odysseus was angry with the suitors of Penelope, and wanted to attack them immediately. But he refrained from attacking them because it would ruin his ultimate revenge plan. He managed to tame his spirited part through calculation. This illustrates that spirited and rational parts are different from each other.

Justice in the soul Rep 441c-445c

The city reveals an image of justice as a kind of an order. If ordering is the form of justice, then the individual must have comparable parts to order within her soul.

On the other hand, Plato's analysis of the soul to find the corresponding parts is emerges through the principle of opposites, whereas the parts of city were determined based on a principle of social services, economic factors, military factor and the ruling factor. What the city needs for its survival and how to hold together all of these factor that the city needs in order to survive, what holds them together is justice. To create a just city in contemplation is considerably easier.

The city is formed out of necessity. However, the soul is not formed; it is there as it is. Therefore, investigation of the parts of the soul starts with different arguments. They cannot investigate how the soul comes into being; they can only question its development in the child and outward manifestations of it in the actions of the individuals.

The object of investigation is fundamentally different in the sense that a city is a creation of human beings but the soul is not, at least in the strict sense. However, its organizational scheme can be influenced by culture. It is important to realize that Plato, like Aristotle after him, conceives of the city as something natural, not artificial. Plato's arguments are a response to contract theory, which he sees as sophistical.

The city is in the visible realm and the soul is not. However, the human being acts, and his actions are in the visible realm so you can see the manifestations of justice in his actions. In addition, if Socrates can create a just city in thought it would reveal justice. The person's actions could only be just if his soul is just (this statement can be problematic because it can be asked, so a criminal cannot do a just act ever or what happens when someone who tried to break the law, but was mistaken about the law, and acted justly while his intention was to act unjustly). Similarly, they constructed the just city so that it operates justly. If they did not construct it justly, it would not be able to operate justly and it would dissolve. So justice in the soul would manifest in just actions and just actions can only spring from a just soul. Unjust actions would not spring from a just soul. Unjust actions would suggest an unjust soul (but again it is possible that just people can do unjust things sometimes). An unjust thing is deemed to dissolve. No one would want to act unjustly because it would reciprocally mean that

their soul is unjust and unjust things are diseased. Justice can be considered as what holds the soul together. If it is torn apart, then you would be two minded, in a war within and no one would want that. Justice is a kind of mental health, which preserves the unity of the community of different parts of the soul.

2.5 Division of the Soul

The purpose of this section is to elaborate on the different interpretations of the methods, assumptions and purpose of the division of the soul in the context of the *Republic*.

Investigating the nature of desire was a necessary topic for Plato to be able to complement the city soul analogy. Although Socrates states that if the city and the soul are both called just, they must share the structural and organizational properties of justice, he does not find it an adequate method of argumentation to accept the existence of three parts in the soul just because they found three parts in the city. Even though he declares that this would be a satisfactory conclusion in terms of their present methods, he uses a different approach in partitioning the soul than partitioning the city. Plato's appeal to simple desires without qualifications is what serves to partition the soul through opposites (Anagnostopoulos, 2006, pp. 158-70). By assigning particular desires particular to each part, Plato is completing the principle of opposites, what is in contradiction is contradicting desires. Santas (2010, p. 76) remarks that this method of investigation is independent of the theory of social justice, which enabled the deduction of individual justice from the previous definition of justice in the city.

Plato assumes three types of desires in the soul that drives the soul's flow, namely the appetitive spirited and rational desires. These desires have their own good, and each of these desires must belong to different parts of the soul. Plato thinks that the same part of the same thing cannot desire, flow, or move in opposing directions. For example, the good of the appetitive part of the soul is drink itself, not some special quality of a drink such as cold or hot. That kind of desire is an educated desire, and the appetitive part is not endowed with a calculation ability. That is why it can only desire drink itself. That is its particular good. Socrates describes the person who thirsts drives to drink like a beast. He is showing that the appetitive part is not rational; there is no belief system in it to qualify a specific sort of drink as good. Plato is focusing on this kind of desires and their particular goods (Anagnostopoulos, 2006, p. 171).

Plato locates the sources from which psychic forces derive, but this does not imply that what arises from a specific part is wholly established by the original source. Reason transforms appetitive desires into complex, qualified ones, and the core appetites can influence reason to form beliefs about what is good to pursue. A qualifying feature of the object of desire would make a qualified desire, and qualified desires are not natural to a specific part's natural object of desire. These are complex desires influenced by multiple parts. As an example the case of a desire for a cold or a hot drink, may stem from the appetitive part in origin, but through reason it is evaluated as an object of desire too, making it a complex appetite, it is not natural to the appetitive part per se but based on a simple appetite (Anagnostopoulos, 2006, p. 169). Anagnostopoulos (2006, p. 170) remarks that the simple appetites originate from and are characteristic of bodily sources, not capable of calculation. For example, the drive to eat stems from hunger, but a desire to eat a specific food is based on a simple desire of hunger that is complicated by the calculative part. Complex desires are built upon the simple ones. The appetitive part does not have cognitive ability to believing that a certain food is healthy; it is the person as a whole. Calculation is the specific function of the rational part. Anagnostopoulos (2006, p. 174) asserts that there is no argument in Plato that the appetitive part learns to calculate or that reason starts to desire appetites, but rather that the whole person experiences the process altogether. Plato is abstracting the core conflict from the examples he gives, he is not describing the examples themselves (Anagnostopoulos, 2006, p. 175). Moving towards something, an executive desire is already complex, because it involves the cognition of accepting the existence of an external object. Plato's examples show that there are different sources for desires but the adult human mind never has pure desires that are uncontaminated with calculation. To move towards an object of desire in order to satisfy that desire already assumes a sort of cognition, a recognition of the outer world and myself that I can fix my desires upon. Moreover, when describing the spirited part, Socrates states that it loves honor, and the person whose soul is dominated by the spirited element. He says "if they can't be generals, be captains, and, if they can't be honored by people of importance and dignity, they put up with being honored by insignificant and inferior ones, for they desire the whole of honor" (475a).

The desires of the parts are irreconcilable because they are desires for differing goods. As illustrated in this passage, spirit, like the appetitive part, also has no rational element inherent in it that can enable it to reflect on the modes or qualities of the good it desires (Reeve, 1988, p. 49).

Socrates' use of ordinary examples when partitioning the soul shows that everyone possesses reason and everyone's reason calculates what the best course of action would be for the whole community of parts. Calculation is not only reserved for philosopher kings. Socrates assumes that a non-philosophers' rational part can reason too. However, reason's capability is not merely influencing desires and aversions on practically worse and better courses of actions. It has theoretical and practical aspects as well. The practical aspect is to decide on behalf of the whole soul with foresight on what is advantageous and beneficial for the parts and the whole soul (Lorenz, 2006, p. 155). Lorenz (2006, p. 155) argues that, based on the argumentation up to the end of Book IV, it can be assumed that reason directs and coordinates intelligently the person's pursuits regarding desires originating from the other two parts. Reason is protecting the other parts' long-term interests. However subsequent books show that reason is not only there to achieve a practical purpose of effectively pursuing the other parts' desires. It has its own desire too, the pursuit of wisdom (Ferrari, 2005, p. 112). The desire to knowledge in its mature and developed form is the desire to know the Form of the Good (Lorenz, 2006, p. 156). Without any practical benefit, reason desires knowledge for its own sake. Lorenz (2006, p. 155) calls this aspect of reason theoretical as opposed to practical. Practical knowledge is knowledge about some particular thing and Plato already showed that knowledge on particular things becomes particular knowledge, for example knowledge of health is medicine. This is a particular kind of knowledge. Hence, reason too has its own particular object of desire, the truth.

The class division in the city is constructed according to natural capabilities of the citizens so that they can serve the social function for which they are naturally best suited. The three general functions of the city are provisioning, defense and ruling. Accordingly, the soul is divided into its parts by the natural inborn capabilities of the individuals, which serves the three psychic functions of the soul, provisioning, defending and ruling one self. Therefore, the parts of the city and the parts of the soul can be compared and virtues of both can be defined similarly. For example, the reason of the city (guardians) and an individual with an inborn capacity for high reason

(philosopher king as an individual) can be matched because this person is naturally better suited, with appropriate education, to rule the city (Santas, 2010, p. 88).

Parts of the psyche are partitioned according to different psychic activities. These are learning, being angry and desiring the pleasures of food, drink, sex and the like. This implies that psychic activities are psychic powers for such activities and conflicts of power between the parts help to distinguish one from the other (Santas, 2010, p. 80). There are three steps in Plato's argument for the tripartition of the soul. Firstly, the psychic activities are categorized into three kinds; desiring, getting angry and reasoning. Secondly, examples of contradiction or conflict among these activities are given. Thirdly, with the principle of opposites and the implicit assumption that these psychic activities are powers that can conflict with each other, the tripartition into the appropriate names are delivered (Santas, 2010, p. 80). In what follows I discuss possible interpretations of how the soul's parts function in relation to one another.

Agent interpretation

The three parts can be assumed to possess three kinds of respective love, namely love of learning, love of money and love of honor (Santas, 2010, p.82). Santas (2010, p. 82) states that in the *Republic* this love is *philia*, which requires cognition and belief. *Philia* is different from *Eros*, which is only used in the *Republic* to refer to sexual love. It may be understood that each part of the soul has its own beliefs and can be interpreted as agents. Santas (2010, p. 82) adds that Plato argues that parts can rule, and ruling requires a sort of reasoning. Therefore, the parts are acting like agents. This presents a problem. The way Socrates starts his investigation by asking whether we perform all these activities with the whole soul or learn with one part, get angry with the other and desire the pleasure of food, drink and sex with another precludes treating the parts as agents. Either it is the whole soul that has agency, or the parts have specific agencies pertaining to their specific desires. The domination of one part's desire in the soul is a result of a mixture of desire and learning. Santas (2010, p. 86) states that it is unnecessary that each part by its primitive nature can initiate action. Rather the developed and interacting parts experienced by an adult human soul is ruled by one dominant desire which is by that time already is a mixture of experience, learning, and interaction among parts. Santas (2010, p. 104) points out that the most obvious textual evidence for the agent interpretation is at 442d where the parts have a common opinion as to who should rule. However, Santas (2010, p. 104) refutes this by considering that

the education of the guardians that target both cognitions and habit, therefore harmony does not necessarily be of purely cognitive, it could be like the harmony in musical notes.

Plato's anthropomorphic language suggests that from time to time he is thinking of the parts as agents, for example the agents of loving or ruling (Santas, 2010, p. 84). However, I think that Plato did not conceive of the parts as agents. It is rather the case that parts of the adult psyche can look like agents because the actions are developed, educated and are the result of the interaction among the parts. To think of the parts, or write about them like persons is merely a linguistic aid to help understand them. This should not necessarily mean that they are agents. Claiming that the parts of the soul are agents, meaning each part is complex within, would result in multiple divisions within the parts themselves, which would be problematic and paradoxical.

Faculty interpretation

According to Santas (2010, p. 86) readers get confused as to whether the appetitive part and money-loving parts have rationality like an agent who can think. However misleading, Plato was trying to unify the multiform appetites for convenience of understanding because money is a major means to satisfying multiform appetitive desires. Santas (2010, p. 87) suggests that it would have been clearer if Plato could refer to the appetitive part as distinct from the other parts and having distinct desires from them by linking it to the body. Appetitive desires come from bodily sources and its objects are related to a bodily need or satisfaction. Santas (2010, p. 87) argues that Plato sees the parts as faculties or powers and since it is not possible to see the powers but only think of them in terms of their achievements and the objects over which they have influence; that is how Plato divides the parts according to their proper objects of desires. Santas (2010, p. 88) states that the principle of opposites helps to divide the soul, but it is not sufficient to identify the characteristics of the individual parts. The identification could be done through reference to the characteristic objects and exclusive functions of each part. Functional theory helps to understand each part as a psychic power with its own exclusive functions and objects, thereby rendering a coherent understanding of the isomorphism between the city and the soul. This subject is explained in detail in the sections that follow.

Psychic rule

Isomorphism is not enough to support Plato's claims about social and individual justice. Because other forms of ordering could be said to be just - for example one where spirit and appetite enslave reason - (Santas, 2010, p. 94). Plato has to ground his argument on the specific kind of form of justice required for the individual to have a happy life on more than the isomorphism with the city. Santas (2010, p. 95) suggests that one can use isomorphism as a heuristic and add a theory of appetites and reason to strengthen the claim that the form of justice will lead to the happiest and best version of life. The isomorphism breaks down when we consider the function of appetite. The appetitive part of the city is the producer class which provides for the city's economic needs; however the appetitive part of the soul cannot produce, for example food, at all. Santas (2010, p. 95) reminds us that when partitioning the soul, Plato focused on specific isolated appetites, such as the appetite for drink, but not appetite for hot or cold drink, indicating appetite unmixed with cognition and learning. Santas (2010, p. 96) suggests that Plato may be thinking of the individual appetitive part as a simple kind of psychic signal system about bodily needs. He thinks that appetite cannot provide resources on its own but rather signals or motivates providing. It should be guided by reason and learning. Otherwise, it would not be precise enough regarding the external object needed. It would abstract, as appetite for drink, so that it can be satisfied. Santas (2010, p. 96) theorizes that the exclusive function of appetite is to signal bodily needs and motivate activities that can provide satisfaction of the need. This is what it can do towards providing for the body. Moreover, since it is too abstract it cannot signal accurately enough and there is always the need for the rational part and learning to guide it. Santas (2010, p. 97) states that human beings are not naturally equipped with an accurate appetitive part of the bodily needs, and it is an abstract motivational signal; the optimal natural function of the appetitive part is to be ruled by reason all of the time with regards to satisfying bodily needs.

Lorenz (2006, p. 157) argues that psychic rule means that a part of the soul is imposing its particular object of desire. For example, reason pursues wealth and spirit admires things related to wealth, which is the particular object of desire of the appetitive part in the oligarchical man. This shows that his soul is ruled by the appetitive part. However, his rational and spirited parts are not incapacitated; they are influenced by false beliefs about the overall good of the psyche to value wealth. The rule of a given part means that the dominant good of the psyche belongs to that part. When the person

pursues the particular object of desire of the appetitive or the spirited part, his rational part becomes enslaved, cultivated to direct and efficiently pursue the relevant object of desire belonging to the other two parts. Moreover when the other two parts rule, reason accepts as the good desires that are alien to it. However, under the rule of reason, the other parts are not subjected to accepting as good something alien to itself. Under the rule of reason, every part is free to pursue within the limits set by reason its own particular object of desire (Lorenz, 2006, p. 157). Lorenz (2006, p. 157) argues that this justifies Socrates' conception that only the rule of reason is a well-ordered soul, and the rule of the other parts is a form of disorder.

The city is just because everyone is doing their own work, but this says nothing about the individual psyches of the people who are doing their own work. The psyche of the producer is also just. That is it is ruled by reason because he calculates things, and it is the outside reason that enabled him with the opportunity to follow his particular good, gave him education and training to be happy. However, it should be noted that justice is something internal, and education is not putting truth to the soul but turning the soul in the right direction (Bowe, 1997, p. 56). The producer's rational part is considering the whole when it uses the intellect in terms of calculation of the ways of producing money to satisfy needs; it doesn't pursue philosophy or true knowledge because it knows that it is unsuitable for its natural disposition. It craves for knowledge of course since it is its proper good, but the divided line can explain this predicament. Divided line is a metaphor in Plato's explanation of his metaphysics in the *Republic*. It divides reality into two parts, one visible and the other intelligible realm. One gets closer to truth and reality moving from the visible realm to the intelligible realm. Plato argues that most people think in terms of images, which is the first level of the divided line, belonging to the visible realm (Bowe, 1997, p. 57). Since the reason of the producer follows the ways of images and beliefs. This is not to say it is not a good, it is just a quality of a good. Not everyone is capable of going after true knowledge, and this capability given by nature affects rational pursuits. Even though it may be said that his soul is ruled by the appetitive part, the appetitive part can never rule because it doesn't know. Only reason knows how to rule and because reason seeks the happiness of the whole soul, it calculates to achieve appetitive goods. If you would let that sort of psyche to pursue the philosophic life, it will not be capable of it. It prefers appetitive pursuits. Reason knows that it is for the best for the whole psyche. By natural

disposition, the appetitive part is stronger. Reason must care for it most. There is a limited amount of capacity allocated to the psychic parts by nature. In the psyche that is ruled by the appetitive part, the appetitive part has more resources by nature compared to the rational part. Even though reason still rules the psyche, it rules with a limited capacity, and it can only engage in shadows at most (Bowe, 1997, p.57) It has a grasp of an image of good but never knowledge, because a limited capacity never lets that psyche to be able to engage in philosophic dialectical thought. Santas (2010, p. 92) argues that, for Plato, only a small number of people can have wisdom because wisdom requires the knowledge of what is beneficial and that can only be known when the person grasps the knowledge of the form of the Good. This is controversial for a modern democratic view where every individual is assumed to know best what is good for him or herself.

Psychic agreement is a complex topic. Social temperance is relatively easier to tackle; it is the belief among the citizens of the good city as to whom should rule. In other words, citizens with an inborn capacity of high reason with appropriate education rule, people with inborn high spirit with appropriate education defend the city and execute the rulers' commands, citizens with inborn high appetite produce for the city, and everyone agrees to this functional order. When we transfer this agreement into the soul, it gets trickier. Santas (2010, p. 93) argues that this agreement is not purely cognitive because the education necessary for such a harmony is comprised of two parts; the rational part is nurtured and strengthened through words and lessons and spirit is soothed through harmony and rhythm (*Republic* 441e). Santas (2010, p. 93) argues that Plato's use of parts being of one opinion is a metaphor and should not be taken as a source to conceive of the parts as agents that can cognitively agree on some belief.

2.6 The Relationship Between the Microcosm and the Macrocosm

There are different ways of defining justice in the *Republic* and before moving to Socrates' version, Plato introduces Cephalus', Thracymachus' and Glaucon's accounts. It can be argued that Plato thinks that a theory of justice must have an understanding of human happiness and what is good for human beings. That is why Socrates' account stresses justice in the individual and its consequences for the soul. Plato uses a microcosm-macrocosm approach in the *Republic* to demonstrate that

justice is a good in itself and for its consequences. The microcosm is the soul of the individual and the macrocosm is the city.

The analogy between justice in the city and justice in the soul is the basis of the arguments in the *Republic*. Socrates states in Book II that he has an approach in his mind that can help tracking what justice and injustice are and their true benefits. He claims that finding justice in the soul and its merits for the one who possess it is possible. However, the sort of investigation they are undertaking is challenging because the soul is not visible. Justice in the city is observable. Justice in the soul too can be observed through behaviors of the individual but it can be deceptive, as one can seem to act justly. He invites his interlocutors to search for justice written in a larger surface and he states “to be allowed to read the larger ones first and then to examine the smaller ones, to see whether they really are the same” (368d). The reference to visibility is important in the sense that the city is a visible thing but the soul is not very easy to see. The findings from the study of a city will deliver the image of justice. City and the soul share a quality that enables them to be called just. If a person and a city both can be called just, and since a city is larger than an individual, then there may be more justice in the larger thing and it would be easier to study it there first. After that, they could apply what has is found to the smaller one to see in what ways the smaller is similar to the larger. Socrates wonders if imagining a city coming to be in theory could deliver justice and injustice coming to be too. This is a hypothesis that they will be testing because Socrates explicitly asks ‘whether they really are the same (368d)’. Sharing a quality, being just, does not settle the question if they are the same (Blössner, 2007, p. 347). His ultimate goal is to engage the intelligible realm possessing the formal properties of justice; he wants to know what justice is. This is his first attempt at a relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm. The introduction of the analogy in Book II that justice in the city contains justice in larger and observable manner is an introductory hypothesis. It is not clear yet if the same letters are written in the soul with same relations among them (Santas, 2010, p. 56).

Socrates and his interlocutors contemplate a good city in theory. They build the city having three classes of citizens that engage in differing social services in order for it to be a good one. Socrates argues that division of labor is the right image of justice in the city. He states that it “is a sort of image of justice—that’s why it’s beneficial” (443c). The role that each part of the city plays for its survival depends upon the natural

disposition of the citizen's souls in terms of how it is governed. It can be argued that he assumes a mutual relationship between the micro and the macro. It is not only that they participate in the form of justice, but that together they enable a manifestation of Justice in the visible world. It is through the investigation of the relationship of inter and intra psychic realms that we can understand that there is one true Justice that is good. The city delivers only an image of justice. Therefore, his microcosm-macrocosm study is elaborated and differentiated in Book IV. Socrates extends his microcosm and macrocosm analogy by posing another hypothesis: if they can compare what has been found about justice in the city to the individual, they "might well make justice light up as if we were rubbing fire-sticks together. And, when it has come to light, we can get a secure grip on it" (435a).

Plato remarks that the city shows justice in the visible realm; justice is everyone doing their own work. This is the external manifestation of justice that we can see in the city. Socrates additionally says that justice also applies internally when the parts of the soul are doing their own work. His argumentation of the partitioning of the soul depends on his principle of opposites. The details of his account is discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5 of this thesis. The parts of the soul doing their own work means that reason rules, spirit gets spirited and appetite gets appetitive. Justice also means regulating one's own soul, being a friend to yourself, having a harmony within the parts to become one out of the many parts (Gish, 2016, p. 7). Socrates remarks that only then can an individual would act justly. In private or social engagements, a just soul acts to preserve the harmony and justice within, and "believes that the action that destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees it as ignorance" (443d-e).

Isomorphism

After establishing the just city in theory, Socrates turns back to see whether what they found in the city is the same in the individual. He states that if what they found out is not the same in the soul, they should revise and apply what they find in the individual to the city back again. Exercising this back and forth would reveal what justice is. This passage shows that Socrates has to find the similarity so that the similarity is no longer a mere hypothesis. Furthermore, the soul is expected to have the same three parts and same characteristic virtues as the city. The inquiry started in Book II, appealed only to the qualitative similarities between the city and the soul (in terms of being larger or smaller; therefore containing differing amount of justice) but now it turned out to

become a similarities in structure and characteristic too. Blössner (2007, p. 346) argues that similarity between the city and the soul is with respect to only one attribution, namely being just. Nothing is said about other attributes such as structural and characteristic similarities when the analogy is first introduced. Blössner (2007, p. 346) gives the example of groups; when the group is said to be multinational, this characteristic does not necessarily apply to the individual member. So if the city has three parts it does not directly support the claim that the soul has three parts too. Blössner (2007, p. 349) suspects that Socrates proceeds in this way because their method of argumentation would not yield a fuller answer to the question regarding whether the city and the soul have the same parts and characteristics. Nevertheless, Socrates thinks that this argumentation can meet the standards of the previous argumentation. Blössner (2007, p. 349) accuses Plato of moving on to a structural similarity without legitimately explaining why. However Socrates says that the characteristics of the cities comes from its inhabitants in 435e. This implies that he sees the city and the soul having a more intimate relationship, not only as sharing some qualitative similarity but that there is also a relationship between them. Ultimately they both imitate the form of justice. Moreover, the individual and the city influence each other through externalization and internalization processes (Lear, 1992, pp. 186-90, these processes are discussed in detail in sections below). Throughout their consideration of justice in the city Socrates has determined that justice is a kind of a formula of everyone doing their own work and not meddling in the work of others. Therefore, if we are to apply or see whether this can be true for the soul, the soul has to have parts within. If the soul does not have parts, they will have to revise the formula of justice. The city and the soul are expected to be isomorphic, having the same structural and organizational format.

The state is a production of the mind; however, Barker (1918, p. 199) is suspicious about why the state should be divided into classes that specifically correspond to the aspects of the mind. Barker argues that each individual has those elements in her mind, however when she belongs to a class, she will be functioning only through one aspect of her mind. Living her life like this would be incapacitating other essential elements of her mind. The designation of the three classes are informed by Plato's understanding of human nature (Barker, 1918, p. 199).

Plato's analysis of human nature has two important parts to it. First; reason is predominant in the life of the mind and secondarily the separation of the parts of the mind is based on a principle of opposites. Plato knows that everyone has contradicting inclinations from time to time (Barker, 1918, p. 199). Since the principle of opposites assumes that the same thing cannot be affected in opposing directions at the same time with regard to the same thing, the mind must have different parts that can enable situations where a person wants and does not want, drives towards or pushes away the same thing at the same time. Reason is capable of uniting this community of all three parts because "it exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul" and "it has knowledge on what is advantageous for each part and the whole soul" (442c). Reason, with the help of the spirited part, not corrupted by bad upbringing and education, rules or hold together the parts of the soul like the rational factor in the city holding together the "money-making, auxiliary, and the guardians (441a). Barker (1918, p. 200) finds Plato's application of the parts of the soul to the classes of the city as a perversion of reason in the name of unity and the incapacitation of the natural aspects of personality. Barker (1918, p. 200) questions the predominance of reason in the life of the mind and the principle of opposites generating different parts. He argues that a unity can be achieved by other means than a form of obedience to reason, and conflict in the mind is not necessarily a threat to unity that should be ruled by dominance of reason.

Functional Theory

There is a difference between needs and desires, and Socrates founds the city based on human needs, where no one is self-sufficient (Santas, 2010, p. 60). Desires are different from needs; a person may need something that she desires as well, but there are a lot of instances where she might desire something that she does not need or need something that she does not desire. Appetite can desire for something and the individual person is the best judge as to what she desires, but regarding bodily needs she or her appetite might not be reliable sources when compared to the guidelines of biology or medicine. Needs can be conceived as a more objective concept than desires. The basis for the establishment of the state is these needs and rational requirement for cooperation to satisfy these needs, because no one is self-sufficient. Socrates bases his theory of the origin of the state on needs, whereas the contractual origin, which was represented by Glaucon, is based on desires, the desire to acquire the scarce resources and the inability or fear that results in cooperation. Glaucon's theory is based on

conflict among individuals resulting in each sacrificing their freedom of harming the other to be safe from harms from the other (this conception is similar to Hobbes' claims regarding fear in the *Leviathan*). The solution for conflict and justice as equality is the basis of Glaucon's theory. Socrates takes up the phenomenon differently; he searches for the best way to cooperate, given that no one is self-sufficient (Santas, 2010, p. 60). Santas (2010, p. 60) argues that the reason why Plato uses analogies with medicine is that he thinks that desires are not an objective ground on which to base a theory of justice. However Santas (2010, p. 60) notes that we have both desires and needs, and the resources are scarce for satisfying both of them, and we cooperate and compete with each other for their satisfaction. Santas (2010, p. 60) argues that Plato's needs based theory is one sided in this regard.

The reason that Plato assumed that he will find justice in the city by contemplation on the formation of the good city and why he assumed the origin of the city was relevant in finding what justice is depends on his functional theory of the good (Santas, 2010, p. 63). Socrates gives account of two kinds of functions -exclusive and optimal - at 535a "the function of each thing is what it alone can do or what it does better than anything else." Socrates also states that "each thing to which a particular function is assigned also [has] a virtue" (353b-c) and that virtue enables functioning well, whereas vice results in bad functioning. This definition of virtue is important later when Socrates searches for the cardinal virtues (Santas, 2010, p. 64). For example, wisdom must be a virtue of 'something that has a function', and wisdom helps that something perform that particular function well. Santas (2010, p. 65) states that Socrates adds to this functional theory the idea that anything with the virtues particular to that kind of thing will be a good version of that kind of thing. Therefore a good thing of that sort of things performs well the functions particular to that kind of thing. Santas (2010, p. 65) argues that the functional theory of the good is exemplified in body parts, such as the example of the good eye, which performs well with its virtue of sight and poorly if it has its characteristic vice, blindness. The examples extend to artifacts. An artifact like a pruning knife can have multiple functions, but it is the best instrument for the function it was designed for; it is a good pruning knife when it functions well its primary function. Santas (2010, p. 65) also argues that the theory of function and virtue is articulating an ideal of well-functioning. He states that to understand the thing that has a function, the theory implies that we identify the natural division of its parts, the

function of each part, the virtues that help them perform well their particular function, and the vices that cause them perform poorly. When these are determined, then a thing can be said either to be good after its kind or bad after its kind - in other words it can be evaluated. Moreover what is good or bad for this thing can be determined too because things that help them function well are good for them. Santas (2010, p. 65) remarks that this application of the theory must start with the knowledge of what the function of the thing in question is in the first place, and the function of a thing is not always as evident as in the familiar examples of eyes or artifacts. Santas (2010, p. 66) argues that this is why Plato started with the original functions of the city, provisioning, defending and governing to understand justice in the city. Justice is a virtue of the city and a virtue helps it function well. The functions of the city are determined by appealing to its origins; its natural division into parts are discovered and particular functions are assigned to each part, and what helps it function well are its virtues. The city in theory is completely good when it can perform those functions well, and what helps it perform those functions are the virtues. Santas (2010, p. 66) states that things that have multiple functions, such as the soul or the city, have several virtues and that is why Plato not only considers justice but all four cardinal virtues in his analysis of the city and the soul. Moreover, Plato's analogy between health and justice in the soul is easily understood in light of his functional theory of good.

Parts of the Society

The parts of the soul, namely appetite, spirit, and reason are already associated with the classes before the tripartition of the soul. However, the distinct classes have a logical origin in their establishment too. They are actual classes in the external organization of a city. At the same time, each element is specifically superior in individuals and in the classes. Reason is dominant in few people and therefore the rational class, namely the guardians are the smallest in number. The auxiliaries dominant in spirit are larger in number than the guardians, and the most crowded class is the producer class where appetite is dominant.

When constructing the city Plato takes into consideration the economic needs of people and arrives at a principle of division of labor based on the natural abilities of people. He assumes that people are naturally endowed with different abilities, and with the help of a division of labor, people can advance on their natural capabilities and produce the economic needs of the society in an effective manner with enough time and

education to do well in an occupation. This division of labor is different from a division of labor in an assembly line, in that inborn capacities and education is important in Plato's division (Santas, 2010, p. 62). Socrates then moves on to the needs of protection and governing of the city, and tries to figure out which kinds of inborn capabilities and education is necessary for those social services.

The generation of the classes in the formation of the good state in theory is through a logical order, the economic factor emerges out of physical needs, the military factor is for protective purposes and the rational factor stems from the need for rule of reason through harmony to achieve unity, all for the state to strive for survival. The three classes in the city correspond to these three factor, which deliver their unique social service with a single function. The guardian and the auxiliary classes are composed of distinguished individuals who go through specific education and live their lives in differing conditions than the producing class. This division in the state can be understood as a division of labor, or division of functions, or social services (Barker, 1918, p. 203).

The specialization principle in the formation of the state and the nature of the human soul serves the purpose of understanding the nature of justice (Barker, 1918, p. 203). After completing the city in theory, which is assumed to be good, the dialogue continues to inquire where the four cardinal virtues, namely justice, courage, wisdom and temperance can be found in this city. The method is to locate the last three and then capture justice as what is left over. The virtues of the city consists of the virtue of its citizens functioning as citizens. The wisdom of the city is to be found in its ruling class that rules by reason. The courage of the city is in its military class, allying with reason in preserving the city. The virtue of a single citizen in matters of personal actions are not considered in the virtue of the city; rather the city's virtues are to be found when the appropriate class member acts appropriately in civic matters. Temperance or self-control is the harmony between the classes, as an agreement between the classes as to whom should rule. Justice in the state is every citizen serving its natural function and not meddling with other functions. Justice in the society is a precondition for other virtues, because if there were no justice - each member doing her own work - then other virtues would not be possible. This conceptualization of justice in the society understands the individual as a part of an order, not a separate part on its own. Justice in the individual therefore consists of each of the parts of the

soul doing its own work. Barker (1918, p. 188) argues that even though Socrates states that he will find justice first in the city and apply it to the individual psyche (which is the purpose of the dialogue) nevertheless the individual psychology is pre-assumed when constructing the city. Social justice is when the individual functions in the society according to her natural inclination, which puts her in the appropriate class so as not to meddle with other classes. As an individual justice means for her to manifest all the virtues of courage, wisdom and temperance through justice in her soul as every part doing its own work, in her mind she is a whole, in civil life, she expresses one aspect of her mind in her social service. Barker (1918, p. 189) remarks that the Justice Plato is defining is not equal to a system of laws, but rather an Ideal inherent in society's conception. It is not a remedy for the disturbances to its existence. It underlies the social relations, a social morality; it underlies the whole society to attain happiness that is not concerned with individual happiness. As the classes in the city were natural classes born out of necessity, a corresponding partition is probable in the human soul because the city was a manifestation of the human desire for survival and culture that enables long-term stability and happiness, and that fulfills the different kinds of dispositions that a human being can hold and would want to elaborate.

Plato uses political images to provide a better understanding of the soul, its structure, organization and functioning. Cairns (2017, p. 236) argues that the tripartition of the soul is Plato's illustration by imagery, an image of the truth of the soul, and it is not his direct epistemology. There are several manners that can be employed in political imagery including comparison, analogies, metaphors, synecdoche and metonymies (Renault, 2017, p. 138). The political imagery that Plato uses in the *Republic* has different forms. In Book II, Socrates hypothesizes that if city is to be the larger thing and the soul the smaller, if both can be called just, then the larger thing may contain more of justice that would enable easier detection. Renault (2017, p. 138) classifies this as a strict comparison between the city and the soul. When justice is defined as the function and order between social classes, Socrates goes on to compare their structure, functions and relations between the parts of the city and the soul. The fact that individuals are at the same time part of the city, complicates the analogical isomorphism. When Socrates asserts that the characteristics of the city come from the characteristics of the individuals, and when he places highest importance on education and the effects of socialization in character formation and organization of the soul, the

analogy starts to serve as a vehicle of exploration of the reciprocal relationship between the city and the soul (Renault, 2017, p. 147). Sometimes the city-soul analogy also becomes metaphorical. For example at 440d Socrates says that “we made the auxiliaries in our city like dogs obedient to the rulers, who are themselves like shepherds of a city” or when he is explaining the conflicts between the parts of the soul he says that they are “two factions that are fighting a civil war” (440b). Renault (2017, p.147) underscores that the use of metaphors through vivid images or substitutions can serve as an underlying attempt to introduce the decisive role that the socialization process plays in the formation of the organization in the soul. Plato attempts a substitution of laws with reason, where reason is not adequate to rule the soul in an individual. Metaphors have the power to legitimize why and how the reason of the individual citizens must side with public law in order to constitute virtue among citizens (Renault, 2017, p. 139). The analogical comparison of the city and the soul illustrates the basis of the effects of the society in the development and the organization of the soul, thinking of the soul as a city and the city as a psychological structure, justifying rule of reason. Renault (2017, p. 140) asserts that these kind of political metaphors are rhetorical devices to justify rule of law, specifically designed for audiences that have a limited capacity for reason, meaning non-philosophers, to facilitate understanding through representations and imagery. While Blössner (2007) criticizes Plato for using the analogy as a rhetorical device, since it has philosophical flaws, the rhetorical use of the city soul metaphor does not, for Renault, diminish the value of it, in terms of the scope of the *Republic*.

The isomorphism and the formal definition of the just city and the just soul, does not explain the relationship between the city and the soul. It cannot be concluded that a just city is composed of just individuals. The relationship between the just city and the just individual can be conceived as first defining justice in the city and then defining a just person as the one who acts according to the laws of the city (Santas, 2010, p. 101). Before Socrates’ definition, the conventional definitions also find a relationship between justice and the soul, but they do not attempt at an isomorphism between the two. Santas (2010, p. 101) argues that Plato’s way of relating them is not to define one in terms of the other, setting one standard first and defining the other in terms of that standard. Plato argues that if the same letters were written in same relational format in a larger surface with large letters and in a smaller surface with smaller letters, we

would assume that this is not by luck but someone must have written two copies of the same thing, or than one causally fashions the other. It could be both, and Plato's theory of justice allows for both because there is different standard of justice for society and the individual separate from each other and there is a possibility for a causal relationship between them (Santas, 2010, p. 58). Moreover, being just individually and socially is compatible for Plato because Socrates asserts that just souls act justly. The everyday examples regarding personal and interpersonal affairs of the just person show that just actions produce and preserve justice, and unjust actions produce and preserve injustice (Santas, 2010, p. 58).

Socrates argues that the early education of the military class is very important and what their psyche will look like depends on the stories heard when they were young, the cultural imitations of the role models exposed to and on education. Lear (1992, p. 189) defines internalization as taking cultural influences into the psyche. Several instances in the dialogue are examples for the relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm, the inter-intra psychic dynamic. As examples of internalization processes where culture influences the psyche, Lear (1992, p. 186) refers to 377a-b where Socrates says that "that the beginning of any process is most important, especially for anything young and tender? It's at that time that it is most malleable and takes on any pattern one wishes to impress on it." He also refers to 377c where Socrates places great importance on the selection of stories that young people hear "nurses and mothers to tell their children the ones we have selected, since they will shape their children's souls with stories much more than they shape their bodies by handling them". The soul is shaped with external influences. Another example from the dialogue that Lear (1992, p. 189) refers to demonstrate that Plato acknowledges the role of imitation in forming the psyche is at 395d; Socrates states "that imitations practiced from youth become part of nature and settle into habits of gesture, voice, and thought". It may be argued that we are dependent on culture to shape our souls. Nevertheless, the relationship can be reciprocal. Lear (1992, p. 191) explores the ways in which culture is shaped, and argues that it is shaped through a process of externalization defined as actions of an individual that manifests its internal organization. He points to 435e where Socrates explains that the characteristics of the cities comes from the characteristics of the individuals that inhabit them.

Lear argues that according to 435e, there must be some members of the city that influence the characteristics of the city. The most evident example of the externalization process is philosopher-king's shaping of the city. The semantic principle between the city and the soul is just the first instance of a larger argument that contains a psychological understanding of the relationship between the soul and the city. It only opens up a road of investigation; it is not an indisputable axiom (Lear, 1992, p. 195). The semantic principle of both the city and the individual can be called just; the isomorphism of their structure depends on Plato's theory of how human psyche functions. Lear (1992, p. 195) argues that Plato has a developmental psychological theory. Therefore, once the individual internalizes cultural influences, she externalizes it in serving her specific function in the society. The soul and the city is reciprocally constituted, through processes of internalization in the youth and externalization in adulthood of the pre-internalized cultural influence. Lear (1992, p. 195) thinks that the city-soul analogy is the product of this reciprocal internalization and externalization of the inner and outer world dynamic.

The next chapter begins with explanation of several important concepts of psychoanalytic theory before moving on to thorough examination of *Civilization and its Discontents*.

3. FREUD'S CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

3.1 Important Concepts

It is important to clarify some of Freud's concepts before we can have a clear understanding of his book *Civilization and its Discontents*. The psychoanalytic approach in understanding group formation, cultural and social aspects of mental life that can inform political theory or philosophy cannot be adequately understood in isolation from its roots in clinical work. Clinical work ties psychoanalytic theory to direct observation of human nature in psychopathological experience that illuminates the dynamics of the inner psychological life that is otherwise not readily open to observation (Freud, 1933, p. 4667). Freud thinks that depth psychology (the theory of the mental unconscious) is applicable to many fields of research "concerned with the evolution of human civilization and its major institutions such as art, religion and the social order" and should not be confined to the treatment of neurosis solely (Freud, 1926, p. 4389).

Besides pathology Freud was also interested in the everyday normal workings of the unconscious. His dream analysis, his analysis of slips of the tongue and jokes are examples of his endeavors at nonclinical experiences of the mind (Paul, 1991, p. 267). His studies of these non-clinical phenomena illustrates the experience of the unconscious in everyone, indicating that it is a fundamental aspect of human life. Although these studies are not about the emergence of culture, they take in to account social aspect of human life. Freud's individual psychology is not a private one; it is always related to the social aspects of the mind. Freud's works on art, literature and mythology also show his interest in the cultural aspect of the human mind. Paul (1991, p. 285) argues that Freud's theories are valuable for systematic ethnographic research. He states that Freud's tripartite psychology can inform the research of people and their culture by exploring different arrangements between how "the agency of the organism

proper (the ego) negotiates its way through reality always prompted by the (often conflicting) imperatives of the sexual, directly instinctual, phylogenetic "program" (the id); and the asexual, nongenital, cultural "program" (the Super-Ego)" (Paul, 1991, p. 285).

Freud's theories are also related to philosophy of mind. Philosophical psychology analyzes the mind in terms of faculties having particular powers or functions, such as the will, judgment, reason, imagination and more. Freud's psychology is based on an understanding of a neurophysiology of mental life where mental capacities are explained in terms of sub-capacities and physiological identification of the parts of the brain responsible for those specific capacities. Freud's background in physiology, the analysis of biological capacities in terms of their functions and structures, leads him to understand capacities of the brain in functional terms. The advancements in language research and localization of cognitive capacities in the brain provided a framework for Freud's studies on the brain and the mind (Glymour, 1991, pp. 46-50).

The three major meta-psychological factors in psychoanalysis are topographical, dynamic, and economic (Birken, 1999, p. 311). The topographical factor is concerned with the separate places in the mind regarding the Unconscious, Preconscious, and the Conscious systems, which will be explained first in what follows. The dynamic factor is the mechanisms of powerful dynamic forces such as repression that enable the differentiation of the Id, Ego and the Super-Ego; these will be explained second in what follows. In addition, the economic factor is related to the pleasure principles of the mind; this will also be explained in what follows.

The topographical factor

The first concepts that are important in understanding psychoanalytic theory are the Unconscious, Preconscious and the Conscious qualities of the mental life. This differentiation is the topographical factor of the psychoanalytic theory. Freud states that the division of the psychical into consciousness and unconsciousness is the central premise of psychoanalysis. This division helps one understand the psychopathology of mental life. Freud remarks that any quality of the psychical, which is not conscious, could disqualify its argumentation on a logical basis. However, the phenomena of

hypnosis, dreams and aspects of memory itself convince Freud that there are modes of mental processes that are not completely understandable through the psychology of consciousness. He states that “an unconscious conception is one of which we are not aware, but the existence of which we are nevertheless ready to admit on account of other proofs or signs” (Freud, 1912, p. 2577). We can only come to know about the unconscious through a transformation, a translation of the unconscious into something conscious by overcoming the resistances that put them repressed into the unconscious in the first place and psychoanalysis helps this translation to come about (Freud, 1915, p. 2991). Freud explains that being conscious of some psychical element, for example an idea, is a descriptive term for its being perceived in the first instance, and it is characteristically in a transitory state. The consciousness of an idea can go away after a moment and could be called back again. The idea that occurs during the period in between can be called a latent idea; it is capable of becoming conscious again. However, the unconscious is a very different system. Mental dynamics play the essential role in the unconscious system. Powerful mental processes affect mental life in certain ways. These processes or ideas themselves cannot become conscious in the way that latent ideas can. However, they can produce effects that can become conscious ideas. Unconscious ideas cannot become conscious themselves because a certain force opposes them. Psychoanalytical techniques can remove these opposing factors. Repression, a powerful dynamic process, accounts for the state of these unconscious ideas, and the force that maintains the repressive state manifests itself as resistance in the course of psychoanalysis. Therefore, the psychical quality called the unconscious is based on the theory of repression. It may be said that there are two kinds of unconscious. One is latent, which is capable of being conscious as explained above. The other is repressed, which is not capable of being conscious. In order to distinguish the two, Freud calls the latent kind, which is only descriptively unconscious, the Preconscious. By contrast, he calls the repressed kind, which is dynamically unconscious, the Unconscious. In summary, there are three qualities of the psychical, the Conscious (Cs), Preconscious (Pcs) and the Unconscious (Ucs). Freud states that the distinctions between the conscious and the unconscious can be based on perception roughly, in terms of whether the psychical element is

perceived or not. However a detailed account of why it was perceived or not is related to dynamic forces within the mind.

The dynamic factor

Another set of concepts that needs clarification is the complex of the Id, the Ego, and the Super-Ego. This is the dynamic factor of psychoanalytic theory. Freud explains that in the mind of each individual the mental agency called the Ego is the coherent organization of mental processes; consciousness is attached to it, and it controls the discharge of the excitations into the external world. The ego supervises the all of the mental processes. The Ego is responsible for the repression dynamic explained above. Although the repressed materials or ideas are a part of the Ego itself, they but oppose it in the form of a resistance when one tries to reveal them during analysis. Internal sensations and feelings, especially pleasure and unpleasure are directly conscious or unconscious. These things do not require any verbal presentations to become conscious, whereas anything else in the unconscious system a verbal presentation is required to carry it first into the preconscious first and subsequently to the conscious system.

Thinking with pictures is an incomplete form of consciousness; it is actually closer to the unconscious. The surface is the consciousness when we enter the mind from the external and the thought and ideas regarding the external can go deep into the unconscious through repression, however they must be linked through words to rise again to consciousness.

Freud states that the Ego is the part of the Id that is modified by the external world through sensory perceptions. The Id works through the pleasure principle and the Ego tries to bring the reality principle within. While the Ego works through perceptions, representing reason and common sense, the Id works through instincts and passions (Freud, 1923, p. 19). Freud states that since the ego controls motility in relation to the Id:

It is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried a little further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged

to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into action as if it were its own. (Freud, 1923, p. 19).

The Super-Ego is formed in the process of the Oedipus Complex (It should be noted that Freud uses the term as a generic name and it is about certain types of identifications with the parents depending on sexes. The theories on the Electra Complex postulated by Carl Jung and related subjects are not necessarily relevant in the context of the thesis). Oedipus Complex consists of special kinds of identification with the parents that confront the Ego as the Ego-Ideal or the Super-Ego. It is a residue of the first object choices of the Id, and it also contains the reaction-formations to those object choices. The Super-Ego or the Ego-Ideal is the representation of the relationship of the individual to her parents. Freud states that:

We see, then, that the differentiation of the superego from the ego is no matter of chance; it represents the most important characteristics of the development both of the individual and of the species; indeed, by giving permanent expression to the influence of the parents it perpetuates the existence of the factors to which it owes its origin." (Freud, 1923, p. 31).

The economic factor

It is also important to understand Freud's theory of drives. The words drive and instinct are generally used interchangeably, and the original German word "*trieb*" is translated as instinct in the standard edition of Freud's complete works (Skoll, 2014, p. 40). Instincts are physiologically determined behaviors, whereas drives are organically originated psychological things. Drives are psychological motives underlying human behavior. Eros and death instincts (Thanatos) are not biological animal instincts but are rather psychological drives (Skoll, 2014, p. 49). A closely related set of concepts to the theory of the drives are the pleasure principle and the reality principle. This constitutes the economic factor in psychoanalytic theory. The pleasure principle is defined as a regulatory principle in the mind. This regulation is concerned with managing the fluctuations of energy related to tensions arising from desires such as hunger or sex; it is these desires which are collectively referred to as Eros. Increasing tensions are associated with unpleasure and they are followed by a discharge that is associated with pleasure (Freud, 1920, p. 1). The function of the pleasure principle is to either produce pleasure or avoid unpleasure.

There are however forces working against the pleasure principle of the mind, because the experience of the individual is not a constant or increasing state of pleasure all the time. Freud thinks that one of the major opposition principles is the reality principle, which is associated with the Ego's self-preservative motives. This principle functions to postpone the immediate gratification of desires in exchange for attaining more stable pleasure in the long run, taking into consideration the situations in the external world, as well as the possibilities and the dangers one may face. Freud explains that there exist other major oppositions to the pleasure principle besides the reality principle. He counts the compulsion in the mind to repeat the traumatic experiences or the experiences that create great impressions on the mind. In trauma patients, children's play and in transference relationships between the analyst and the analysand the unpleasurable experiences that are repressed reoccur. This compulsion to repeat could be understood as an attempt to master the event, changing the position from being passive to active. Freud argues that the compulsion to repeat has a relationship with the pleasure principle, but it is based on a deeper and elemental instinctual source in the mind that he calls the death instinct. The death instinct, associated with compulsion to repeat, is "the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery or the will to power" (Freud, 1924, p. 4075).

Another important topic to discuss is Freud's theories on how the group dynamic works. The group is held together through the identification processes, which can be defined as the primary process of emotional ties between the individual and her social world. The identification process is the first form of aim-inhibited love that is the outcome of the Oedipal Complex, where the child identifies with the same sex parent. The identification process is taken up by the larger social environment and creates libidinal ties among the group members and their leader. The individual ego fades away to the background in the context of the group, and can be replaced by the ego ideal that represents the leaders. Therefore, the relationships between the members of the community in the macrocosm can be transferred into the microcosm of the individual psyche. The study of the macrocosm and the identification process can

provide insight into the intrapsychic workings of the mind because the leader of a community is identified as a father by the members.(Quinodoz, 2005, p. 194).

The theories of the development of the Super-Ego and the Ego-Ideal are essential in understanding the main theme of the book *Civilization and its Discontents*. Therefore, a more detailed account of it will be provided next.

The development of the Super-Ego is based on sexual desires and the Oedipal complex. However, a developed Super-Ego is related to morality because of its interpersonal and intrapersonal effects. Freud thinks that basic desires are life-preserving and life-destroying, explained above as Eros and death instincts. However, the daily desires that everyone experiences are variations or alterations of these and not pure their forms (Church, 1991, p. 210). The logic of desire in the unconscious system has its own characteristics. When the object of desire cannot be attained to satisfy the desire, the subject settles for a substitute object by way of association with the original object. However, this substitution does not satisfy the original pressure and a part of it remains that must be continually deflected or transformed. This unconscious logic of desire is generally inconsistent with the logic of conscious thought because conscious thought knows that even if the substitutive object is very similar to the original one, it is not the original one in reality. The system of the unconscious responds to pleasures and imagination, while the system of the conscious is bound by reality, causal relations and time (Church, 1991, p. 211). Freud analyzes cases of irrationality by an appeal to the conflict between these systems, the unconscious system working with a principle of pleasure, and the conscious system with reality principle. The conscious system also has the capacity to understand subjectivity, that one's point of view is merely one point of view among others, and the capacity to use language (Church, 1999, p. 211). Church (1991, p. 212) interprets Freud's treatment of language capacity as that which makes consciousness possible. Subjectivity and language both enable the person to describe what is going on in the world in a certain way, representing or misrepresenting it. The possibility of interpreting the world in a certain way is the core of consciousness. The Id and the Ego

are the result of these differences in capacities. The unconscious and conscious systems allow for the differentiation between the Id and the Ego. However, while the Id is a reserve for subjective desires without an ability to recognize their subjectivity, the Ego is the emergence of one's recognition of one's own subjectivity (Church, 1991, p. 212). When we consider emotions, there is a difference between emotions and desires. In contrast to desires, it is possible for emotions to be subject to consciousness without language or word associations. This is because emotions are usually subject to outward restraint while being kept in inward awareness. For example, a person can be aware of one's anger but is able to restrain it and not act out because of it. When desires are kept unconscious or internal, they freely flow towards substitutive object without restraint or suspension because we are unaware of them.

To be able to have a consciousness, a person must have an understanding of the boundary between herself and the outer world, between the inside and the outside. Desires are acquisitive, and they pursue desired objects to introject and project undesired objects outside. The ability to grasp other people as psychological wholes with good or desirable and bad or undesirable aspects marks the occurrence of the possibility of internalization of the whole personality of the other. The individual has three chances here: internalization, deflation or narcissism. 1. Internalization: she can internalize the whole person with the good and the bad aspects and therefore her fantasy of control or possession is fulfilled by housing the original person inside in fantasy, and a continued presence inside of the hated aspects. The person starts her life, the first object to discern, as an outside is the first caregiver, generally mother and the father. For the baby these are the first persons that she will come to grasp as psychological wholes. The internalization process first requires a conflict between a desire to possess and control the other and an inability to do so (Church, 1991, p. 213-4). 2. Deflation: deflation of the desire to another object, outward, or 3. Narcissism: retreat to narcissism where one's own person becomes the object of desire. "The internalization of another is a way to imaginatively possess and retain a desired person who, in fact, cannot be possessed or retained." (Church, 1991, p. 214).

The internalization of the other starts with the primary caregivers and continues with other people too. The internalization, since it brings the hated aspect of the other person

inside the self, can inflict some internal conflict . Church (1991, p. 215) remarks that Freud rejected the idea of agency to the unconscious processes, like two selves conflicting with each other. Because Freud does not regard the unconscious Id as a self at all. For Freud, the drives from the Id are mine but not consciously mine. The aspects of the internalized other can be taken up by the unconscious or the conscious system depending on the conflicts with oneself. When it is taken up by the unconscious, it is diverted to displacements of which we are unaware. The opposition that is retained by the conscious system is recognized as the other, and this other inside indicates the emergence of the Super-Ego. The Super-Ego oversees the desires. The whole process starts with an abandonment of instinctual gratification because of fear of losing the love of one's parents; however, a sense of guilt remains because of the dread of the Super-Ego now established in the mind of the individual. The Super-Ego is not satisfied with only a renunciation of an instinct because the wish persists and nothing can be hidden from the Super-Ego. This creates an everlasting unhappiness and tension inside the mind. Freud explains:

In spite of the renunciations made, feelings of guilt will be experienced and this is a great disadvantage economically of the erection of the super-ego, or, as one may say, of the formation of conscience. Renunciation no longer has a completely absolving effect; virtuous restraint is no longer rewarded by the assurance of love; a threatened external unhappiness loss of love and punishment meted out by external authority has been exchanged for a lasting inner unhappiness, the tension of a sense of guilt. (Freud, 1930, p.90)

The Super-Ego could be harsher than the internalized authority because of the power that the child perceived in the adult. The adult exercises great control over the child, and the child also wants to control the outside external world, but is confronted with the authority of the parent. So when internalized, the Super-Ego can align with the Id against the Ego itself. The aggressiveness that was initially projected toward the parent is now internalized. Freud explains:

The aggressiveness is introjected, internalized; in fact, it is sent back where it came from, i. e., directed against the ego. It is there taken over by a part of the ego that distinguishes itself from the rest as a super-ego, and now, in the form of conscience, exercises the same propensity to harsh aggressiveness against the ego that the ego would have liked to enjoy against others. (Freud, 1930, p.84-85).

Freud provided original and influential ideas and ways of thinking about and studying human condition. He analyzed a wide range of human experiences, thoughts, emotions, behaviors, and interpersonal relationships. His theories are controversial, and often deemed nonscientific. However, his arguments and concepts about the human condition continue to contribute much to our self-understanding (Neu, 2006, p. 1). Freud's theories of the mind developed throughout his career. He revised his topographical theory of the mind, which is composed of the Unconscious, Preconscious and the Conscious systems into a dynamic structural theory that is composed of the Id, Ego, and Super-Ego. Along this revision of the structure of the mind, his model of the functions of the mind also changes. His first model was based on conflict in terms of pleasure/unpleasure tensions. There was only one primary instinct that he called Eros, which worked as a life preserving drive. His revisions to the model were a result of his clinical observations, especially his studies on obsessional neurosis, masochism, sadism, addictions, depression, and the traumas of war veterans. Although the pleasure and unpleasure principle of Eros remains valid, another basic drive, which he calls the death drive, is added to the model. He bases the death drive on to the biological mechanism inherent in every organism to return to its original inorganic state. The fundamental conflict between Eros, of which the libido constitutes a part, and the death drive (Thanatos) which harbors aggressive and destructive instincts, enables him to postulate very innovative ideas about the human condition, love and hate, ambivalence, object relations, unconscious guilt, anxiety, civilization and culture (Quinodoz, 2004, p. 185). The investigation of individual psychology can provide insight into culture and civilization. Freud studied the relationship between the individual psychology and society in several books, including *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13), *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), and *Moses and Monotheism* (1939). The central theories in these cultural studies are developed in parallel with the advancements in psychoanalytic research. The main ideas can provide valuable insight into human social existence despite some controversial arguments that may seem dubious to the contemporary sociologist (Paul, 2006, p. 267).

I will focus on Freud's long essay *Civilization and its Discontents*, which was written in 1930 after the revisions to the model. *Civilization and its Discontents* is the last book of his trilogy that started with *The Question of Lay Analysis* (1926) and continued with *The Future of an Illusion* (1927). Throughout these essays, he investigates certain aspects of civilization and society from a psychoanalytical perspective. *The Question of Lay Analysis* (1926) is concerned with whether non-doctors can practice psychoanalysis. In *The Future of An Illusion* Freud discusses the function of religion in people's lives. Freud states that the hidden connection between *The Question of Lay Analysis* and *The Future of An Illusion* is his attempt to protect psychoanalysis from medical doctors in the former and from priests in the latter (Freud and Pfister, 1963a, cited by Quinodoz, 2004, p. 229).

Freud studied the foundations and the effects of civilization on human happiness in both *The Future of An Illusion* and *Civilization and its Discontents*. In *the Future of An Illusion* Freud argues that religion explains to the ordinary person the mysteries of existence and how the world works. It gives her hope of a salvation in the afterlife and patience to endure the pains in this life because eventually she will be happy in the afterlife. Freud thinks that this is an infantile perspective; it is just a yearning for a protective father. He anticipates that humanity will get over religious practices with the rise of science and govern themselves with rationality, just as a child progresses into adulthood by gaining rationality and learns to rule herself according to reason. He considers religion as a "universal obsessional neuroses" and he hopes that the progression of science will lead humanity to maturity and dispense with infantile illusions. Rationally based acceptance of the rules of society through a realistic assessment of human beings' capacities and their nature will replace the acceptance of illusions. However Freud is suspicious of whether his faith in science could be an illusion too. In effect, in *Civilization and its Discontents* there is a considerable change in his optimism regarding the future of humanity in light of science. He ends the essay on a rather pessimistic note, suggesting that science and technological advances have come to a point where they can enable humans to exterminate one another to the point on extinction. He thinks that the life-preserving and life-destroying forces that maintain

civilization can have devastating effects on human life. This constitutes a great part of human unrest and their mood of constant anxiety. The rise of science as a remedy for the uneasiness of the individual within society is not as plausible a solution in *Civilization and its Discontents* as it was in *The Future of An Illusion* (Deigh, J., 2006, p. 287-8).

3.2 The Religious Feeling

In the first chapter of *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud answers the objections put forth by Romain Rolland, a French author about Freud's treatment of religion as illusion in *The Future of an Illusion*. Rolland argues that religious 'oceanic feeling' is the origin of religion and it is not an illusion. This is supposed to be a feeling with which one becomes whole with the external world. Even though Freud asserts that his aim was to analyze the function of religion and not its sources in the *Future of an Illusion*, he devotes the first chapter of *Civilization and its Discontents* to examining the sources of this oceanic feeling.

Freud uses his theory of the development of the Ego to shed light on this feeling. The Ego is at first the same as the all-inclusive Id and it cannot discern between itself and the external world. The sensations of pain and pleasure are all it has, and through a primitive pleasure principle it throws out everything that is painful and attaches everything pleasurable to itself. However, the Id learns that not everything that is painful can be attributed to the outer world, and not every pleasurable thing can be attributed to itself. It understands through the reality principle what is part of the Ego and what belongs to the external world. Freud expects that there might be a conservation in the mind of the adult human being of this old experience of an all-inclusive Ego. He wonders if the remnants of this idea is taken as the source of religious feeling by his friend. He compares the mind to the city of Rome. One can understand, through archaeological findings and ruins, the older buildings and the structure of the city but one can only experience its present form. However, the mind

is different in that sense because it is not bound by time and space: everything experienced stands still in the mind. The survival of the earlier stage of development along with the final stage is only possible in the human mind. Nevertheless, Freud thinks that this earlier experience of all-inclusive Ego in the mind cannot be the source of the need for religion. He thinks that the feeling of helplessness of the child against the external world's threats and its need for a protective figure is the source of religion. The limitless narcissism of the original Ego that may be likened to the oceanic feeling cannot be the primal source of religious needs. Freud argues that this is better explained by the derivation of the need of the child for protection. The narcissistic embrace of the external world as an oceanic feeling could be an attempt of religion to comfort the person in the face of the unpleasure/pain arising from the reality principle adopted by the Ego, by denying the dangers of the external world. Therefore, this need is not a primal source for a religious feeling but a function of religion as it attempts/seeks to ease the pain of the reality principle.

3.3 Sources of Happiness and Unhappiness in Life

After the first chapter, Freud starts to discuss the sources of happiness and unhappiness in life, which will evolve into his analysis of culture and the development of a civilization that functions externally and internally in order to accomplish the workings of the pleasure and reality principles through a dynamic relationship between the microcosm (the individual mind) and the macrocosm (society at large). This is the Freud's similarity with the Platonic approach starts to emerge.

Freud acknowledges that human nature is complex. He thinks that there are various ways of living one's life, and people vastly differ in their opinions about how to live and what to value most. The majority may be thought to be after fame or wealth and admire people who accomplish such things. However, there are also other people who are not motivated by these things, but who still achieve great accomplishments in life. Only a minority praise these people. Freud states that these diversities in opinions about the purpose of life and diverse conduct of people makes the study of the purpose of life of the human being a very difficult one. He thinks that one should investigate the thoughts and behaviors of people in order to understand what purpose they have

and what they want to achieve. Freud asserts that the answer is clear - they seek happiness. Therefore, the purpose of life is set through by pleasure principle. The pleasure principle which functions to seek pleasure/happiness or avoid unpleasure/pain is cut back by the reality principle during the development of the individual when the Ego is erected out of the Id.

Freud argues that the sources of unhappiness are so readily dominant in life, understood with the help of the reality principle of the Ego, that people are attracted to the direction of avoiding unhappiness instead of seeking happiness. He counts the “superior force of nature, the disposition to decay of our bodies, and the inadequacy of our methods of regulating human relations in the family, the community, and the state” as the three sources of human unhappiness (Freud, 1930, p. 34)

To avoid the pain coming from the reality principle, by stating that there are limits to one's Ego and that there are other people in the external world that can oppose the Id's passions, one can choose to be alone voluntarily. However, one needs to join others to effectively cope with another source of unhappiness that is related to the supreme power of nature. Therefore, it is not very easy to avoid these sources of unhappiness in life on one's own.

Freud sees religion as a kind of refuge that protects and eases the pains of reality and sources of unhappiness. He asserts that religion offers a way of seeing the world and understanding one's role in it. However, he thinks that it is insulting to the human intellectual capacities. He asserts that religion is a mass delusion and no one delusional person recognizes it as such. Freud regrets that the majority of people will not be able to pass through this stage of understanding of the world and life. Therefore, Freud analyzes other human institutions that function to cope with the sources of unhappiness, which will constitute the main theme - culture and its development - throughout the rest of the book.

As explained above, the pleasure principle can work in two ways; one is the elimination of pain, the other is the attainment of pleasure. A person can aim in both directions, one direction can be dominant, or one direction can be exclusively aimed at in a person's life. Freud shows that this principle is at work from the beginning of the life of the human baby, and it is confronted with the demands of the external and the internal world.

Freud talks about several ways to seek happiness in life. One of them is attaining physical pleasures. However, the internal world, due to its very own nature, works against the constant attainment of pleasure, because the satisfaction of such needs only gives temporary pleasure. It is a transitory experience. For example when you are too thirsty, drinking water is very pleasurable but it is a transitory experience and you have to wait for a while in order to be able to experience intense pleasure in drinking water again. Building up the desire and becoming thirsty again is associated with unpleasure and the release of the tension is only associated with pleasure. For Freud, if we were to be satisfied constantly regarding our bodily desires, this would merely be a feeling of comfort, not pleasure.

Besides internal sources for attaining happiness through bodily satisfactions, Freud argues that love too is a source of happiness. However, there is weakness in this way of life too. When we love someone we fear losing their love or the love-object (the loved person) itself, which can make us unhappy.

Freud suggests another source of pleasure and happiness, the appreciation of beauty in the art or in scientific creations. These can also ease the pain of reality. Freud remarks that even though there is no apparent use of art, art is one of the major occupations and accomplishments of every civilization. Freud is curious of the place of art in civilization and speculates on it in the following sections of the essay when he analyzes manifestations of culture.

There are many paths that one can take to achieve happiness. It could be an active search for happiness or the avoidance of pain, and be sought through all of the ways described above, or even through religion. Nevertheless, none of them is a certain

route to happiness. Freud asserts that while it is hard to achieve pleasure, it is easy to feel unhappy. It is useful to bear in mind that Freud was a psychoanalyst who was working with patients and basing his observations on unhappy people. He tried to find the mechanism and the source of this unhappiness. He saw that the high demands of the societal norms was the source of their misery and the elimination or relaxation of such pressure was the mechanism to alleviate such suffering.

Freud states that although it is not possible to eliminate the first two sources of unhappiness completely, namely the disposition of our bodies to decay and the superior force of nature, humankind can mitigate a large part of them through advancements in science. He asserts that, as regards to the rest, we have to accept that we can never have supreme control over nature or our bodies, which are part of that nature. Freud also adds that the technical advancements and power over natural sources in the last decades did not bring the happiness it promised because every advancement came with a cost. He gives the example of advanced transportation enabling people to go and discover many places. This however created distance between friends and families, and the innovation of the telephone was just a small remedy for the cost of advanced transportation of missing people close to you. He says that he would not need the telephone in the first place if there were no advancement in transportation that enabled us to live far apart from each other. Such examples prove to him that human happiness cannot be obtained solely by gaining power over nature, nor is it the only goal of civilization.

Freud argues that the third source of unhappiness, the regulation of the relationship between people in the family, and in the state, etc. is what we can work on. He thinks that when we investigate the social source of our distress, our own mental constitution hinders the quest. We are so invested in the idea that the institutions that we developed for our protection and well-being are working fine, that we find it hard to admit that they may be a source of our distress. The regulations within the culture that are designed to protect us from misery are so embedded in the

definition of the concept of 'culture' that it is difficult to understand how it can cause misery while aiming at protection.

Freud ends his discussion on the sources of happiness and unhappiness in life by counting three ways of easing the pain of reality. One is by intoxication through, for example, drugs and alcohol. The other is through a powerful diversion of interest, such as in science, which Freud calls sublimation. Sublimation is a process in the mind of directing desires away from antisocial ends to intellectual and cultural endeavors (Pappas, 1995, p. 142). The last one is through substitutive gratification such as in arts. Freud considers art and science as the highest achievements of the human mind. After this Freud moves on to elaborating on the purpose of civilization which is explained in the next section.

3.4 The Definition of Civilization

Freud asserts that many people in his times had a hostility towards civilization, conceiving of it as a source of their misery, and this attitude leads to a doubt whether if primitive conditions without civilization would be a better. Freud thinks that such a judgment about civilization must be a result of preexisting discontent of the state of civilization triggered by several historical events. He thinks that one of these events is the triumph of Christianity over pagan religions. He suggests that the low value given to earthly life in Christianity could be a source. Second, he references the discovery of primitive cultures, which seemed at first sight happier because they have less needs and wants than "civilized" Europeans. However, Freud notes that later discoveries showed that it was not that the lack of complex culture, (itself a mistaken observation) but the rich and fertile lands that provided an abundance of basic needs and enabled happiness in these primitive people. Freud asserts that there is not an empirical way to assess whether earlier or primitive people were happier, because happiness is subjective. He sees this kind of comparison as fruitless. Plato on the other hand does not see happiness as subjective.

Freud argues that there is another perspective that can explain the hostility towards civilization as a source of misery. The discovery of the mechanism of neuroses in

psychoanalytic theory shows that the small amount of happiness offered by civilization is reduced further when the civilized person is suffering from neurosis, which is a result of the excessive demands of societal ideals. Psychoanalytic theory argues that only when these ideals are reduced or eliminated can the person become happy again. Because culture or civilization is accused of being the source of our discontent, Freud thinks that the investigation of its nature can reveal why this happens and how to cope with it. Freud first of all defines culture as “the sum of the achievements and institutions which differentiate our lives from those of our animal forebears and serve two purposes, namely, that of protecting humanity against nature and of regulating the relations of human beings among themselves” (Freud, 1930, p. 39).

Freud gradually analyzes the components of this definition, as it is manifest in the lives of human beings and civilization itself, and the aspects of human lives that are called cultural.

Freud argues that everyone acknowledges the first part of the definition. Through scientific and technological advancements, human kind gained enormous power over the forces of nature; we have machines and tools that extend our abilities. Freud remarks that every achievement of human kind that helps overcome the power of nature, that is useful is cultivated and protected, and is called civilization. Humans become like gods through technological advancements that enhance human capacities (i.e. telephone, photography). He thinks that future generations will advance to be more god-like, but this becoming god like did not bring happiness in his days, and he is not hopeful that it will bring pure happiness in the future.

Freud also finds order, cleanliness, art and philosophy as part of culture. These aspects of culture do not directly show their utility in terms of protecting humanity against nature. The analysis of the relations of human beings among themselves sheds light on the sources of these in the pleasure principle and renunciation of instincts. Freud states that beauty, cleanliness and order are requirements of civilization. They

are not as useful and vital as controlling the forces of nature, but everyone thinks of them as necessary conditions for civilization. Freud states that beauty shows that culture is not entirely utilitarian in its aims. While it is true that order and cleanliness have utilitarian values, solely a utilitarian perspective does not explain their place in culture. Freud states that culture values higher mental activities too; these include intellectual, scientific and aesthetic achievements, including religion and philosophy. Freud assumes that all human activities are aimed at profit and pleasure and he can explain art and science in this regard easily but has difficulty in finding place for philosophy and religion. Although religion and philosophy are considered to be indicative of a high level of culture, he asserts that these creations of mind could be either our highest achievements or our greatest fallacies.

3.5 Discontent in Civilization

After the examination of the first two components of the definition of culture, Freud moves on to the last component:

The ways in which social relations, the relations of one man to another, are regulated, all that has to do with him as a neighbor, a source of help, a sexual object to others, a member of a family or of a state. (Freud, 1930, p.45).

Freud investigates the first attempts at social regulation and thinks that these contain the elements of civilization. If there were no attempt at regulation, the relationship between individuals would be subject to individual will. The person who is physically strong could dominate others. Human life in a community is only possible if people unite against individual force. He states that the strength of united people is right against the individual strength that is brute force. This is an important step towards civilization. The result is that everyone who unites has to suppress desire to dominate others to be able to be protected against brute force. Freud asserts that the liberty to be aggressive to others is under restriction in civilization, and justice demands that this applies to all. Freud thinks that the main source of hostility against civilization is rooted in this primitive human psychology; the suppression of desire creates this hostility towards culture itself. He thinks that human beings, since it is rooted in their psychology, will always be demanding and defending their own freedom from the will

of the multitude. This makes the human condition very difficult because it tries to balance this innate need with the demands of the community. It is an important area of inquiry to find forms of civilization that best balances this double claim.

Modification of human instincts

Freud states that the evolution of culture is a process of the modification of human instincts. Through absorption, some of these modified instincts become character-traits in the individual. Freud gives the example of the anal character that is described by its preoccupations with orderliness and cleanliness; these are preoccupations of the culture too. This is why Freud thinks that we can see a similarity in the evolution of culture and the development of the human psyche. Freud explained in the previous section that cleanliness and orderliness are more of a pleasure source in the culture rather than having a protective vital aim.

Other than absorption, some of the instincts can be forced to change their way of gratification. Freud calls this the process of sublimation of the aim of an instinct. Freud thinks that sublimation makes possible the higher mental activities observed in culture, namely, scientific, artistic, and ideological.

Other than absorption and sublimation, the last process of modification of instinct through culture is the renunciation of instinctual gratification. The existence of civilization presupposes the repression of powerful instinctual urgencies (i.e. aggression) as explained above. Freud calls this cultural privation, and it dominates social relations among people. It is why people are hostile against culture itself. Freud states that it is very hard to understand how renunciation of the gratification of instinct occurs. Referring to his economic hypothesis of psychoanalytic theory, he thinks that it is a very delicate task to be able to do this economically, because if the deprivation is too much, serious disorders may ensue.

Freud wants to investigate whether the likening of the process of the evolution of culture and individual development can yield results that can help explain the human condition. To be able to compare the two, Freud primarily investigates the origins of

cultural evolution, the stages that it passes through, and what determines its course. This is similar to Plato's method in approaching the conditions of the soul.

The origins of cultural evolution

The former analysis of the components of culture, as defined in language and manifest in human life, is complemented with the analysis of its origin throughout the next sections of the book. In the former analysis, people were considered as already living together. They were seeking to be protected against brute force. Now, Freud examines the psychological foundations of culture; he is investigating the reasons for the need to form families.

Freud argues that there are two major sources family formation. He attributes one to Eros and other to the compulsion to work which he calls *Ananke*. He asserts that because primitive people understood that it is necessary to work to live better, and they noticed that other humans worked too, they must have mutually understood that it would be better to work together than against each other. Therefore, primitive people started to see the other as fellow-workers and helpers. It was advantageous to live together.

Freud thinks that the first helper community was the family. Another source for forming families occurred when the need for sexual desire settled permanently in human beings in evolution. This resulted in forming families. Freud argues that the male wanted to keep his sexual object near, and that the female stayed with the male for protection in the interest of the offspring. Therefore, the first community also began as a result of sexual desire. The essential feature of culture, which is the renunciation of the gratification of instinct, is not present in this version of a primitive family. Freud cites his book *Totem and Taboo* to illustrate that these family units formed communal life through a band of brothers, which at last united against the supreme father in order to become stronger than the single individual through union. The taboos were the first laws employed to maintain the system. Finally, Freud states:

The life of human beings in common therefore had a twofold foundation "the compulsion to work, created by external necessity, and the power of love, causing the male to wish to keep his sexual object, the female, near him, and the female to keep near her that part of herself which has become detached from her, her child. (Freud, 1930, p.52).

Freud argues that the foundation of social control in the culture is the channeling of energy from sexual desire to aim-inhibited love. Regarding sexual love, Freud states that even though it cripples the sexual life of humans, channeling sexual love solely to monogamous heterosexual love through restrictions and taboos is the best way to procreate the human species, and it is easier to control sexual desire by channeling it into one place. Freud explains that the sexual love between male and female is different from aim-inhibited love in friendships and with the other members of the family. Aim-inhibited love creates great bonds in culture by enabling the unity of large groups.

Freud likens the difficulties in the development of culture to the difficulties with regard to evolution. Rendering the libido passive is the source of both problems because the libido has an aversion to the change that repressed it, namely culture. Civilization is founded on groups of people, whereas sexuality belongs to only two people, and this creates an eternal opposition of sexuality and culture. Freud remarks that when two people are in love they are in a state where they no longer need the external world to be happy and the two of them are enough for each other. Whereas Eros's aim is to unite the many into one, in sexual love it betrays its own aim and does not try to go further.

Freud argues that society could have been formed of such couples libidinally satisfied with each other, and united with the rest through the necessity of work and common interests. However, this perfect condition is hardly ever achievable, and the culture makes use of aim-inhibited love in order to create stronger bonds between its members through friendship and identification. The restriction of sexual love is necessary for this aim, so as to extract a greater amount of energy.

Aggressive instinct

After his initial examination of the origins of culture, Freud moves on to try to understand the religious edict that 'you should love your neighbor as yourself' which will evolve into a discussion of aggressive instinct that is repressed by culture. Freud already noted in his previous analysis that culture demands the repression of the aggressive instinct. Freud is suspicious of the Christian doctrine of loving all people, which is a very generous thing, and impossible to achieve. He says that it is

unreasonable and impossible to love one's neighbor as one's self because you cannot love a stranger if they do not have any significance for you or your emotional life. On the contrary, a stranger may be hated more than loved. Because a stranger may abuse or use you for their own advantage, one can only treat the stranger in ways similar to the ways that they treat him or her. Freud thinks that human nature also has an instinct of aggression that cannot not be denied. He thinks that people do not see the other only as helpers or sexual objects but also as potential means of gratification of their aggressive instincts (which are similar to Nietzsche's arguments in *On the Genealogy of Morals*). All of the wars in history show that when not kept under control, the aggressive instinct of human kind manifests in extreme form.

This inborn aggression is a source of frustrating the aims of culture in uniting people together. Therefore, culture must find ways of suppressing it, just as it did with sexual instinct to levy energy from it to bind people together in larger groups. This was something that was practically impossible when it was stuck between two people who were libidinally satisfied with each other.

The aggressive instinct should be satisfied; otherwise, people are not at ease. The enmity of small groups' towards each other is an outlet of such aggressions. To bind the group members better the aggressiveness towards other outside groups, which are similar but have minor differences, is a good outlet of aggressiveness that is repressed for binding them. The ridiculing and feud among such groups are means of outlet.

Freud states, "If civilization requires such sacrifices, not only of sexuality but also of the aggressive tendencies in mankind, we can better understand why it should be so hard for men to feel happy in it." (Freud, 1930, p. 74). Freud argues that criticizing civilization because it does not provide happiness like it is supposed to, is not the same as being an enemy of civilization. He asserts that we may change aspects of civilization by taking these critiques into consideration. We may change some of the elements of culture in order to satisfy our needs better, even though there are some difficulties in the nature of culture itself that will never yield to any reforms. Freud states that "Over and above the obligations of putting restrictions upon our instincts, which we see to be inevitable, we are imminently threatened with the dangers of a state one may call *la misere psychologique* of groups" (Freud, 1930, p. 75).

Freud summarizes that the program of civilization is through the work of Eros to bind the members of the group to one another libidinally; the advantages of working together solely would not hold them together. Moreover, the natural instinct of aggressiveness opposes this program of civilization. Therefore, Freud asserts,

...the meaning of the evolution of culture is no longer a riddle to us. It must present to us the struggle between Eros and death, between the instincts of life and the instincts of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of and so the evolution of civilization may be simply described as the struggle of the human species for existence. (Freud, 1930, p. 83).

Control of aggressive instinct

Freud investigates the ways in which civilization controls the destructive instinct. He thinks that the investigation of the individual development will show it. He already mentioned that the aggression towards other groups is a way of controlling it. Now he searches for some other ways. In the course of the development of the individual, the aggression towards others, especially the parents, is introjected and internalized. The part of the psyche called the Super-Ego takes this aggression and uses it against the Ego itself, through a sense of guilt and a need for punishment. Freud likens the Super-Ego to a garrison in a conquered city. The person learns that something bad equals to something that can lead to loss of love from others. The person is dependent on others and fears their loss of love due to evil acts, which otherwise he would enjoy on its own.

This depends on whether the authority sees you doing the bad action, and if there is no chance of being caught then maybe you will do it when you are a child. However, things change when the authority is internalized through the development of the Super-Ego. Nothing escapes the Super-Ego; therefore both the act and thought of the bad act are equivalent reasons for punishment for the Super-Ego. Being caught by an external authority is not necessary. When people try to be more conscientious, then the Super-Ego gets more suspicious and looks for more sins. As a result and ironically, it is the saints and the most virtuous people who think of themselves as the most sinful. In addition, if a misfortune happens, then it stands as the external authority punishing the

Ego for something so that the Ego feels guilty and the Super-Ego blames it, looking for the bad things that it did to deserve such misfortune.

Freud summarizes that there are two sources of fear, one coming from the external authority and the other coming from the later developed Super-Ego. The first one makes us repress instinctual gratification. The other, since we still desire to satisfy those instincts, represses more through punishment. That is why Freud sees that the sense of guilt is related to the renunciation of instinctual gratification. This is the formation of conscience, and the need for punishment is necessary for the Super-Ego. The mechanism thus follows with the renunciation of instincts in fear of loss of love, and conscience emerges when the authority that could inflict punishment and take away the love is internalized, resulting in the creation of the Super-Ego. With every renunciation the Super-Ego demands more and becomes more intolerant and severe of the Ego. The extreme case is of the saints who think they are sinful all the time.

Freud explores this in the development of the Super-Ego in the child. He states that when the parents denied him of an instinct gratification, it must have aroused an aggressive impulse which was repressed because of dread of loss of love. This must be economically hard to stand, and there must have been a mechanism which Freud calls the identification with the authority that absorbs into itself the authority. This becomes the Super-Ego, and it is full of the aggressiveness that the child first wanted to inflict on the external authority.

Civilization, therefore, obtains the mastery over the dangerous love of aggression in individuals by enfeebling and disarming it and setting up an institution within their minds to keep watch over it, like a garrison in a conquered city.” “That which began in relation to the father ends in relation to the community. If civilization is an inevitable course of development from the group of the family to the group of humanity as a whole, then an intensification of the sense of guilt resulting from the innate conflict of ambivalence, from the eternal struggle between the love and the death trends will be inextricably bound up with it, until perhaps the sense of guilt may swell to a magnitude that individuals can hardly support. (Freud, 1930, p. 97).

Sense of guilt as the main problem in civilization

Freud asserts that the sense of guilt, which is the source of the discontent with civilization, is the main problem of the evolution of culture. Progress in culture is paid for by a heightened sense of guilt. He wants to explore the relationship between the consciousness and the sense of guilt. He thinks that the discontent with culture is actually a sense of anxiety (of loss of love at first) manifested in a sense of guilt, which eventually coincides with fear from the Super-Ego. The uneasiness or the distress associated with civilization is caused by this anxiety and fear of punishment, which is mostly unconscious; therefore, we seek other sources for it. However, the whole analysis in the book shows that it is the anxiety of a severe punishment of the swelled Super-Ego. Freud remarks that in religious systems, this sense of guilt is expressed as sin. He thinks that ethical education should be realistic, and that children must learn the role that sexuality will play in their lives and the aggressive tendencies of humanity, but instead they are brought up with false promises that everyone will love each other and won't be aggressive to each other, and culture demands this from them.

3.6 A Solution

Through the necessity to work together, Eros works its way to develop culture. This mirrors a life process, the unification of humans into larger communities, and this is done through the libidinal energy. The development of a single human being and the evolution of culture is the same process applied to different objects, the incorporation of the person to a group, and the creation of a single group out of many individuals. The incorporation of the individual to the group is set forth through pleasure principle, and happiness can be attained through that incorporation. The ethical standards of the Super-Ego can be moderated in therapy, and so the ethical standards of the cultural Super-Ego can be moderated too. The Super-Ego has an unpsychological attitude, because the Ego does not have unlimited power to tame the Id in every respect that the Super-Ego demands. If the limits are pushed too much it leads to a revolt or a neurosis in the individual resulting in unhappiness. Freud wonders if there could be neuroses in

civilization and whether there would be any form of therapy for it that could be informed by psychoanalytic theory.

The next chapter investigates similarities and dissimilarities between Freud and Plato in terms of their tripartite psychologies, tripartite societies, their methods of partitioning the soul and the society, the functions and organization of the parts, morality and self-understanding.

4. COMPARISON OF TRIPARTITE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGIES

Both Freud and Plato suggest that findings from an investigation can be imported to another object of inquiry where the former supplies writ large the characteristics of the latter. Freud uses the argument when he states that dysfunction can reveal writ large the components of the inner realm. He also employs it when he argues that the workings of the cultural Super-Ego can reveal writ large the functions of the Super-Ego in the psyche. Plato uses the argument that society can reveal writ large the structure and organization of the soul.

Freud's early work in psychology started with his studies on hysteria. Freud argues that the study of psychopathology can reveal important aspects of our psychic dynamic otherwise not observable because it makes things larger and more basic (Freud, 1933, XXXI, p.4667, cited by Neu, J., 2006, p. 4). Psychopathology makes people turn away from external reality, and for this reason, these people know more about internal reality; investigating psychopathology can lead to an understanding of psychical reality (Freud, 1933, XXXI, p. 4667). Freud also suggests that the analogy between the individual development and cultural evolution supports a conception of the community developing a Super-Ego by which cultural evolution proceeds in a manner similar to the individual developmental process of the psyche. Freud states "...many of the effects and properties of the super-ego can be more easily detected through its operations in the group than in the individual." (Freud, 1930, p. 110)

Similarly, in Book II of the *Republic*, Plato suggests that justice would be easier to detect in the community because it would be written larger. If a person and a city both can be called just, and since a city is larger than an individual, then there may be more justice in the larger thing and it would be easier to study it there first. After that, they could apply what has been found to the smaller one to see in what ways the smaller is similar to the larger.

Freud also attempts a city soul analogy in *Civilization and its Discontents*. Freud imagines the Eternal City, Rome, with all of its past - he imagines the ruins of the old

temples and buildings that are now occupied with new ones. He says that it is not possible to have the old and the new in the same space and time, since the city is a physical object. He then turns to the human mind and argues that the human mind is not bound with space and time. Only in the human mind the constraints of time and space erodes. The analogy helps us to grasp the notion that the city can represent civilization in the physical realm. The mind can provide a timeless understanding of civilization. As cities are built, destroyed, and built anew, the mind goes through several developments through gains and losses, reserving both forms, the old and the new within it (Schorske, 2006, p. 8-9).

4.1 Tripartite Psychologies

The tripartition of the soul in the *Republic* and the tripartition of the mind in Freud can be compared with each other. It should be noted that it is not the same theory, so Freud and Plato are not doing exactly the same thing. However, there are some interesting similarities, their way of approaching psychology as tripartite and the functions of the parts are similar and dissimilar in certain ways.

Plato's definition of the three parts of the soul is as follows. Regarding the rational and the appetitive parts Socrates states,

We'll call the part of the soul with which it calculates the rational part and the part with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites the irrational appetitive part, companion of certain indulgences and pleasures. (439d).

The spirited part is defined as the "part by which we get angry" (439e) "without calculation." (441c). It is "by nature the helper of the rational part, provided that it hasn't been corrupted by a bad upbringing" (441a). It is sensitive to justice and words of reason so that it can "endure hunger, cold, and the like and keep on till it is victorious, not ceasing from noble actions until it either wins, dies, or calms down, called to heel by the reason within him, like a dog by a shepherd" (440d).

Freud's structure of the mind is also composed of three parts, the Id, the Ego, and the Super-Ego that interact with each other. Id is associated with the unconscious domain, consisting of drives and repressed ideas and experiences. The ego "is partly conscious and contains the defense mechanisms and the capacities to calculate, reason, and plan" and the Super-Ego, which is only partly conscious, "harbors the conscience and... unconscious feelings of guilt" (Gay, P., 1989, p. xxii).

The limitation of Plato's model of the mind from a psychoanalytic perspective is that it focuses on conscious conflicts, and conscious mental states, except in his treatment of lawless desires in dreams in Book IX (Price, 1995, p. 180). However, both Freud in *Civilization and its Discontents* and Plato in the *Republic* acknowledge the difficulties of self-knowledge. It could be argued that Plato's *Republic* anticipates some psychoanalytic principles in the way of its acceptance that the psyche is a composite plurality of drives, and people cannot always act as they want to due to internal conflicts and that drives can be discovered and understood. However the fundamental difference is that self-knowledge is not a particular kind of knowledge of your own soul, but a normative knowledge of human self-hood in Plato, as opposed to more individual idiosyncratic self-knowledge in Freud (Pappas, 1995, p. 292). We may now look in more detail at the specific elements of the psyche in Plato and Freud respectively.

Firstly, we can compare the appetitive part in Plato with Freud's Id. In Plato, the part of the soul which lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites is the irrational appetitive part. It is companion of certain indulgences and pleasures and is associated with loving money. In Freud, the Id is the unconscious domain of the mind. It consists of the drives of Eros and Thanatos. Eros is the life preserving drive and libido is a part of it. Thanatos is the life destroying force and aggressive impulses are a part of it. The Id also contains traumatic experiences that are repressed. It could be argued that the Id of Freud and the appetitive part in Plato are similar because both harbor appetitive drives and they are linked to bodily sources.

Secondly, we can compare the spirited part of the soul in Plato and Freud's Super-Ego. For Plato the spirited part of the soul is defined as the "part by which we get angry" (439e) "without calculation." It is also sensitive to justice and injustice and responsive to the rational part. It is associated with love of honor, competition and aggression. It is sensitive to criticism. Lorenz (2006, p. 151) states that after Book IV, spirit is explained to have more than only anger to oneself, and what is appropriate to fear or not. It loves honor, and spirit contributes to the mental life with its desire to earn admiration and esteem; it also understands whom to challenge or not in social circumstances. Spiritedness is sensitive to one's worth and level of accomplishment, in terms of what kinds of behaviors are respectable or not. Lorenz (2006, p. 152) states that Plato acknowledges the effect of upbringing on spirit and that it can change from

culture to culture. Lorenz (2006, p. 152) also notes that in distinguishing appetite from spirit, the Leontius example shows that spirit is not only responsible for anger in face of non-respectable deeds, but contains other emotions - it shows that it is disgusted, bearing strong aversion from the corpses too. For Freud, the Super-Ego harbors the conscience. It is the source of the sense of guilt, which is manifested as the need for punishment. It is erected through interaction with other people. It operates in two modes. It functions as an Ego Ideal that sets the standards. It also functions as a punisher or a critic of the Ego. It could be argued that the Super-Ego of Freud is similar to Plato's spirited part because they are both related to aggressiveness, guilt and sensitivity to criticism, and are affected by upbringing.

Thirdly, we can compare the rational part in Plato and the Ego in Freud. In Plato, the rational part is the one with which we calculate, which is apt for ruling because it can acquire knowledge of the good for the whole soul and it is associated with love of wisdom. In Freud, the Ego is rational, it can calculate, reason and plan, and it works through reality principle and enables self-consciousness. It could be argued that the Ego in Freud is similar to Plato's rational part because they are both associated with reason and self-understanding.

Another point of similarity of Plato and Freud is their depiction of cultural influence in the soul. Socrates states:

...in ruling our children, we don't allow them to be free until we establish a constitution in them, just as in a city, and—by fostering their best part with our own—equip them with a guardian and ruler similar to our own to take our place. Then, and only then, we set them free. (591e).

Lear (2005, p. 193) argues that this is the internalization of culture. The external authority is there until it is internalized. After it is internalized, the individual is said to be free, but forever held in check by an internal authority implanted in his psyche by culture. This is the way that Freud describes the formation of the Super-Ego - it stands in the mind "like a garrison in a conquered city" (Freud, 1930, p.85).

It can be argued that both Plato and Freud have a model with limited energy capacity to be distributed. Plato suggests it at 485d: "Now, we surely know that, when someone's desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another channel." Plato also states a similar vision in the *Phaedrus* that internal motive of force is Eros and the stream of desire can be directed into different channels. (Guthrie, 1975, p. 475-6). In Freud, one

of the fundamental premises of psychoanalytic meta-psychology is the economic factor. This factor states that drives are psychological elements. They are not just instinctual impulses, they represent quantitative energy that can be channeled.

Freud's and Plato's psychological perspectives can be compared further. Freud is a psychoanalyst whose works are all related to psychology. Plato is a philosopher who did not specifically focus on psychology. However it could be argued that he merely invented psychology. Plato has assumptions regarding human psychology. Lear (2005, p. 197) argues that Plato's psychology consists of inter-psychic and intrapsychic dynamics. The inter-psychic is the political realm, and the intrapsychic is the soul within the person. Freud's psychology is also dynamically built through inter and intrapsychic relationships. Freud sees that a person's psychology, the inner workings of her psyche, is closely connected to the society that she inhabits. Especially what develops the human psyche into a social and political one is the process of civilization. Civilization sets up an institution in the mind of the individual to complete her psyche. Therefore, Freud's psychology also employs an inter-psychic/intrapsychic dynamic.

4.2 Tripartite Societies

Plato and Freud both accept that people come together out of necessity. The individual human condition is intricately bound up with the social. No one can survive on their own. Both thinkers agree that coming together shapes our psyche.

Freud and Plato differ in their starting point of their analyses. Freud analyzes the psyche and through his knowledge of the psyche, he understands the civilization. The structure and the working model of the psyche enables Freud to understand civilization, whereas for Plato the structure of the city enables him to proceed with an investigation of the psyche. He states that the city is a representation in some way or another of the citizens' souls; because a city is a human artifact it must be a manifestation of their minds. The city and the soul are not separate entities for Plato, but rather through a process of internalization and externalization, the city and the soul create each other (Lear, 1992, p. 197).

In Plato, the parts of the soul are mapped on to three different parts of the society through the city-soul analogy. The appetitive part of the city is the producer class. The

spirited part of the city is the military class, and the rational part of the city is the ruling class.

Freud draws an analogy between the development of the individual and the development of the civilization. He argues that cultural development is pursued through a cultural Super-Ego. He suggests that the workings of the Super-Ego can be detected in some valuable ways if one works through its role in cultural evolution.

Freud locates the cultural Super-Ego within the society. He asserts that it is manifest in people with great influence, the leaders of the society, one of his examples being Jesus Christ. He does not expand his localization to the cultural Ego and the cultural Id. However we can follow Plato's mapping and suggest that the cultural Ego corresponds to the ruling class (in Plato's terms), which is the government, and all the rest of the citizens represent the cultural Id. In addition, Freud argues that the Super-Ego works in two modes, in Ego Ideal or a punishing Super-Ego. If the leaders of the society are the cultural Ego Ideal mode, then the military and the police force are like the punishing and criticizing mode of the cultural Super-Ego.

If we try to locate the punishing/criticizing mode of cultural Super-Ego and Ego Ideal back to Plato's society we can argue the following. The Super-Ego is a process of internalization of the influential people in the community and parents. This means that the moral codes are not direct products of reason. Plato acknowledges the influence of culture on morality and tries to envision a society ruled by reason. We can argue that he incorporates the ideal in the rational part. There is no separate cultural Ego Ideal in Plato's society because the Ego Ideal is already manifest in reason, namely in the philosopher king. In terms of Plato's account, we can say that the Ego Ideal mode is closer to the rational part and the punishing mode of the Super-Ego is similar to the spirited part, which is associated with the military class. As I explained before, as a strong Ego Ideal and a strong critic, the Super-Ego debilitates or punishes the person or the society in Freud's analysis. Since the Ego Ideal is already incorporated into reason in Plato's analysis, it is why there may be consent and not enforcement.

4.3 Methods of Partitioning

Freud starts his analysis of the psyche by examining confusing behaviors. He understands them as a complex psychological arrangement. He assumes there are

underlying forces that explain puzzling behavior, and tries to work out the dynamics of the forces that result in the particular behavior. The parts of the psyche are divided through the development of the human psyche (Ferrari, 2007, p.177) whereas in Plato, the partitioning is not a developmental process. Rather, it is analyzed in a mature human being's contradicting actions. For example, a thirsty person wants to drink but does not drink because his reason says not to. In Plato, there is not a developmental contradiction. It is more of a state of three elements that are always there, always working. They do not develop or change over time. While it would seem that Plato has a more a rigid tripartite psychology, there is a point in the *Republic* that brings him closer to Freud in this regard.

Plato's explanation of the spirited part of the soul in children is as follows:

Even in small children, one can see that they are full of spirit right from birth, while as far as rational calculation is concerned, some never seem to get a share of it, while the majority do so quite late. (441a-b).

This passage can be interpreted as if Plato too had a developmental psychology. Lear (1992, p. 193) argues that Plato had a developmental psychology in mind. Nevertheless, his method of partitioning the soul is based on a mature human being's actions. Freud partitions it by conceiving of the partition as a developmental process, going back earlier in an individual's life.

In Plato the intrapsychic conflicts are of a special sort. It is an inner conflict that cannot be resolved by arranging external circumstances or dividing the object of desire into parts (Santas, 2010, p. 81). Plato analyzes contradicting behavior in his analysis of the psyche, and he partitions the soul into three parts according to a functional scheme of the parts and their relationships. It is through their conflicts that the parts of the soul are discovered (Ferrari, 2007, p. 168). Freud's analysis consists of psychic conflict too. The conflict that he stresses is between the conscious and the unconscious drives that can be attributed to the Id, the Ego or the Super-Ego. Santas (2010, p. 81) states that contemporary psychological theories attach direction to drives as approaching or avoiding the object of desire and only partition the self in an approach-avoid instant, as in fearing and desiring the same object at the same time. This is also the circumstance where both Plato and Freud divide the self. When there is an approach-approach or avoidance-avoidance conflict, those conflicts can be resolved by dividing the external world. For example, when one fears two different things but cannot avoid

both of them together because of external circumstances (avoidance-avoidance), or desiring two things that we cannot have at the same time because of external circumstances (approach-approach), we do not have any reason to divide the self (Santas, 2010, p. 81).

It can be argued that both Plato's and Freud's psychology is dynamic, in that they allow for development in the parts and interaction among them (Santas, 2010, p. 85). Plato and Freud both consider the adult human psyche as a result of education, experience, and interaction among parts.

4.4 Organization of the Parts of the Psyche

In terms of the organization of the soul, Plato thinks that the proper or just organization between the parts of the soul is when reason rules with the help of the spirited part in executing its commands and the appetitive part obeys. This is a sort of mental health. In effect, Justice, happiness and mental health amount to the same thing. Disorganizations in the soul represent various sorts of mental disorders, resulting in an inability of the soul to seek happiness, or a just life. Similarly in Freud, although there will always be tension among the parts of the soul, the strength of the Ego in effectively responding to the instinctual demands of the Id and social demands of the Super-Ego through self-consciousness, or in other words, self-understanding, is a necessary condition for psychic health. His version of psychic health is not equal to happiness as it is in Plato. This is because Freud has a different conception of happiness than Plato.

Freud associates happiness with pleasure, and concludes that the human condition is not suitable for attaining constant happiness. One has to make compromises of immediate pleasures for long-term happiness, which is by nature not a pure seeking of pleasure. Plato's happiness is not associated with pleasure but it is associated with fulfilling the specific function of the soul, which is to live virtuously, which is happiness. His analysis allows for a happy life through virtue.

Furthermore, the inner harmony of the just man in Plato depicts the arrangement of the soul in harmony; there is no internal conflict anymore. However, in Freud the internal pressure and conflict is a necessary component of the partition and its collapse is not a wanted situation, as for example in the case of mania. In the case of mania the person's Ego and the Super-Ego collapse and she thinks she is all capable and

omnipotent. However it should be noted that Platonic psychic harmony is a balance, not a collapsing.

4.5 Morality

The psychoanalytic theory can contribute to Plato's ethics in a search for the development of a happy life through virtue. The unconscious mental life, mechanisms of internalization and externalization, and the process of the establishment of the Super-Ego explains a specific mechanism of the external social world in shaping the psyche. Psychoanalytic theory can inform the education of children and show ways for adults to pursue a virtuous life. The psychoanalytic theory also prescribes being careful in finding a balance between social demands and individual needs. It suggests making social rules realistic by taking into account the nature of human beings and helping people to consciously understand the reasons for rules. Plato knew that education and social policies were very important in shaping the soul, but since he did not elaborate on the exact mechanisms of how this shaping occurs, he also did not see the dangers of high social expectations on human happiness. Gould (1990, p. 242) argues that Plato was the first to carefully define the Super-Ego, but he failed to see it as a source of unhappiness because of the influence of Socrates. Socrates' Super-Ego must have been extremely strong in an advantageous way; however, it is not the ordinary case for a swelled Super-Ego to help a person pursue a happy life. Indeed Aristotle says that Socrates' life was not a happy one. Socrates may have been the ultimate philosopher who fashions his soul to achieve the most eudemonic life in Plato's eyes. However, Socrates' life could be considered a life of a benign paranoiac (Gould, 1990, p. 242).

If we consider Freud's thoughts on the dangers of high expectation, we can say the following. The Super-Ego is generally characterized as a harsh and criticizing part within the mind. However, Freud also describes its positive aspects. In fact, it represents one of the highest achievements of the evolution of the human mind because it makes human beings very capable social beings.

People admire and fear their parents at the same time, and this admiration is manifested as the Ego Ideal. The harsh and criticizing Super-Ego and the Ego Ideal are different aspects of the same internalization process. The child has a primitive world in contrast to an adult, she has a distorted view of the power of the parent, and she magnifies it.

The same is true for the parents' virtues. Therefore, the Super- Ego and the Ego Ideal contrast with the self. The Super-Ego has two differing roles, when it stands as a judge it is aggressively critical, and when it stands as the ideal, it becomes a point of aspiration. The Ego strives to improve in response to the ideal, and in response to the harsh judgments, it becomes anxious that it may fail. These two modes of the Super-Ego may at first seem to cooperate in the sense that one mode sets a standard, an ideal, and the other imposes it. However, when these two modes strengthen, they seem to work against each other. The higher the ideal pressure and the greater anxiety about failure cripples the Ego in self-disgust (Church, 1991, p. 218).

Plato searches for an internal motivation for moral actions and this is why he partitions the soul and tries to show that moral acts without external rewards and punishments are possible. Freud also provides an answer to this. He provides the mechanism for how this can come about. Psychoanalytic theory argues that through the internalization of the external authority, and housing it in the mind as the Super-Ego, the person can act morally without external motivations. The rules of society becomes the rules of one's own through the Super-Ego. For Plato a person who is virtuous is the most happy. For Freud the most virtuous person is the one who thinks she has sinned the most, because her Super-Ego is swelled and monitors the Ego all the time. It grows more and more intolerant with not only deeds but also immoral thoughts and wishes. On the outside she is a moral person, but inside she is suffering because she reproaches herself thinking she is sinful all the time. Nothing escapes the Super-Ego, and therefore an inevitable sense of guilt torments the individual. The more one attempts to follow moral standards, the more her Super-Ego becomes harsh and sensitive to immorality. That is why she faces unhappiness.

Freud's remarks on the topic is clear when he states that:

The more virtuous a man is, the more severe and distrustful is his behaviour, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried saintliness furthest who reproach themselves for the worst sinfulness. This means that virtue forfeits some part of its promised reward; the docile and continent ego does not enjoy the trust of its mentor, and it strives in vain, it would seem, to acquire it. (Freud, 1930, p.88).

The establishment of the Super-Ego is fundamental for morality and civilization. However, the strengthening of the Super-Ego and the increasing internal pressure causes discontent, an uneasiness, which debilitates individuals who live in increasingly

civilized and religious societies. Freud argues that morality disregards individual happiness for the sake of civilization. Therefore, a sort of weakening of the Super-Ego and lessening the oppressive mode is necessary to be able to ease this sense of discontent in civilization. More compassionate and realistic parenting and social codes that understand that the Ego is not all powerful to realize these high standards and endure aggressive critics, and strengthening of the Ego through self-understanding and grasping consciously the contents of the Super-Ego and the Id is necessary for a cure for the discontent. Freud argues that if one is able to understand how unrealistic the demands of the Super-Ego are, then she may free herself of its criticism or she may incorporate into the self, the Ego, some of its standards and make it its own consciously. We can conclude that these points can address how high expectation of the strictly virtuous life can pose dangers to happiness.

Freud argues that moral and religious systems help people gratify unconscious needs (Lear, 2005, p. 190). However, there is also a possibility for the psychoanalytic concepts to contribute to a flourishing ethical life if morality is not solely taken as a system of repression and discontent. Lear (2005, p. 191) argues that there is more to understand about the significance of moral and ethical commitments to human life.

Freud's analysis of religion and morality is based on an investigation of its origins. His account of the origins of morality and religion are naturalistic, trying to prove that it is a natural phenomenon that arose out of the relationship between people and the environment, and he seeks to reject it. Freud argues that morality works against its so-called aims in reality, and it is antagonistic to human well-being (Lear, 2005, p. 194). Which is again very similar to Nietzsche's arguments in *On the Genealogy of Morals*. It should be noted that Freud's analysis of morality is morality as it is lived in his Twentieth Century Europe, whereas in Plato, the virtues are fundamental characteristics of the human psyche to achieve a happy life. However, it should be noted that Plato too is temporally located.

Freud's analysis of morality shows that it is a capacity developed in the human mind as a response to the problem of aggression. Aggression is useful for protection but it creates a problem for forming societies. Therefore, society has to find a way to lessen the aggressive tendencies in its individual members. Lear (2005, p. 193) argues that, up to a point Freud's analysis of morality is similar to the accounts of Thrasymachus and Glaucon, in that people have aggressive tendencies but they give up those

tendencies in exchange for protection. Freud expands such an analysis and gives a detailed account of what happens to the repressed tendencies. He states,

Something very remarkable, which we should never have guessed and which is nevertheless quite obvious. His aggressiveness is introjected, internalized; it is in point of fact, sent back to where it came from – that is, directed toward his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego which sets itself over against the rest of the ego as superego, and which now in the form of conscience, is ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other extraneous individuals. (Freud, 1930, p. 123–4).

Nietzsche *On the Genealogy of Morals* too argues that sense of guilt is a result of internalized aggression. However, Freud provides the mechanism of how this comes about (Lear, 2005, p. 193). Freud provides a dynamic psychological account of this phenomenon based on his studies with clinical patients. This mechanism works in two aspects. The first aspect is socialization within the family. The second is the social institution of morality. The transformation in the child's psyche in the family, because it is socially advantageous within the family at first, is reinforced and shaped by cultural morality. Freud thinks that morality functions as a 'cultural Super-Ego' because it specifies straightforward behavioral rules and standards that secure the unification of the members socially and psychically. The standards of the morality system are internalized in the adult psyche and become part of the adult Super-Ego. The Super-Ego's of adult members of the society share the same standards of the morality system that brings them and keeps them together. This is the inner or psychic trigger of morality. In summary, Freud thinks that morality is a set of social practices and rules that seizes the natural transformation of the psyche in the family and uses it for the advantage of the society at large. The consequence of this embrace is the source of unhappiness. The Super-Ego is constantly watching, and the fear of punishment and criticism within makes people inhibit their desires continually and live in frustration. For Freud, a moral life is necessarily a life of suffering, and unless virtue provides rewards of happiness in this life it serves as a source of unhappiness. He states, "I should imagine that as long as virtue is not rewarded in this life ethics will preach in vain." (Freud, 1930, p. 112). The individual is motivated by two trends, one towards personal happiness and one towards unity with the society at large. Freud asserts that, "The two processes of individual and of cultural development oppose each other and dispute the ground against each other." (Freud, 1930, p. 108). Freud remarks that this conflict is a conflict in the libido and not a struggle between Eros and Thanatos. It is a

conflict between libidinal investment in one's own Ego and others (Ray, 2014, p. 18). Therefore, Freud is hopeful that this conflict can be resolved in the future civilizations although civilization of Freud's times greatly oppresses the individual.

Lear (2005, p. 171) argues that Freudian view on the Super-Ego and its everlasting cause of discontent in civilization can be treated not as a problem but as route to a solution. He thinks that psychoanalytic theories can help bring about political change that loosens the grip of the cultural Super-Ego, the individual Super-Ego, and the sense of guilt. Lear (2005, p. 171) argues that the reason why Freud did not construct such kind of a possibility of healthy relationship between the parts of the psyche that can ease the intra-psychic tension that creates perpetual unhappiness in civilized life is because he mostly focused on pleasure rather than happiness.

4.6 Self-Understanding

Plato's ethics and philosophy is intimately related to self-examination, and Freud's psychoanalytic theory expands the process of self-examination more into an introspective version with the account of the nature and the role of the unconscious mental life. Several psychoanalytic mechanisms such as repression, rationalization or sublimation are usually used as modes of contemporary self-understanding despite critics and refutation of Freud's theories (Cottingham, 1998, p. 112).

Plato starts with the just city and arrives at a just psyche. However, Freud starts with the unhealthy condition. He tries to find a cure for the psyche to become self-conscious so that it can go about living in a rational way free of unconscious motives driving his life to unhappiness. Freud sees no happy future for the psyche because of the necessary principle of reality, but he thinks that awareness of being unhappy is better than unawareness of its sources. Through self-consciousness, people gain a sense of control over their inner life, which gives them greater chances of being happy. The psychoanalytic theory for gaining control over the inner workings of the mind is explained in the next paragraph.

Unconscious motivations drive a person to repeat their earlier emotional memories. The person sees her life through a lens of these earlier dreads, unconsciously making herself feel helpless, where in reality she is not. The repetition of trauma in the unconscious drives the person to relive the same pattern in life. The person feels

trapped and acts helpless like a child, but in reality she is an adult. Because the mind contains all of those hidden memories of trauma, through the talking cure, the patient can identify those memories, rationally process them, and understand her role in recounting them. The central principle for the analysand in psychoanalysis is to speak her own mind freely without censorship or inhibition. The aim is to enable the free-flow of self-conscious thought. What some philosophers call the psychic capacity of reason is either a manifestation of self-conscious thought, or an indication that self-conscious thought makes possible the psychic capacity of reason (Lear, 2005, p. xv). That is why the field of psychoanalysis and Freud's theories are closely related to certain kinds of philosophy. Psychoanalysis has identified an aspect within the free-flow of self-consciousness that opposes it, namely the unconscious. Psychoanalysis provides insight to this internal conflict within self-consciousness that interrupts its flow.

Psychoanalysis can contribute to the Platonic ethical philosophy regarding the development of strong moral psychology. Plato argues that a virtuous person should have a harmonious psyche in that the rational part should rule with the consent of the other parts. This account does not explain how psychic unity and harmony is obtained in detail, and psychoanalysis can expand this approach. Psychoanalysis aims at promoting the development of self-conscious thought. The philosophical tradition also argues that humans can develop their capacity of reasoning, the distinctively human capacity.

Unconscious thinking can rule the soul in one direction; as Plato said, the soul could be ruled by parts other than the rational part. The unconscious system is not a reserve only for multiform desires, but there are unconscious fantasies that unify the soul (for example an unconscious ideation or fantasy 'I am unloved') that can bypass rational thought. Those kinds of unconscious fantasies form desires that distort rational thinking. When the person tries to distance herself from those desires to judge self-conscious thoughts, those thoughts can be infiltrated with the core fantasies that tilt the judgment towards justifying the fantasy. As a result, distancing oneself from desire could be an illusion (Lear, 2005, p. 7).

Plato suggests when reason is enslaved by appetite, then reason enjoys pursuing that appetitive good only, and it justifies itself with it. The psyche can dwell in illusions like the cave dwellers in the *Republic*. Plato is aware that reason can fall into illusions

if the psyche is ruled by the appetitive part. He thought education and upbringing is very important. He focused on right upbringing and education and focused on degeneration as well. His way out of the illusions was a philosophical life. In the *Republic*, Plato did not provide a very detailed account of psychological mechanisms of the cure for illusions as did Freud with psychoanalytic cure. However the account of education at the end of the cave myth is an important clue. Freud advocates self-conscious thought through psychoanalysis was a way out of illusion, and he elaborates in detail on the mechanisms and processes of psychoanalysis. In conclusion the phrase “Know yourself” and self-examination is a central aspect in both accounts. Both can be understood in terms of their contribution to political philosophy.

Psychoanalysis can provide insight into what human flourishing is. Speaking one’s own mind without censorship enables integrating the psyche and creates a possibility of being true to one self, when unconscious thoughts are brought to conscious awareness, thereby offering a possibility of self-control. In fact, psychoanalysis is a form of self-conscious speech and a process of psyche formation through self-understanding (Lear, 2014, p. 95). For Freud an ethically virtuous life is possible if one is educated to be truthful to oneself, integrating the unconscious mode of thinking in an efficacious way to self-conscious thinking to have a harmonious soul.

5. CONCLUSION

This thesis examined Plato's and Freud's political psychologies in terms of their similarities and differences. Both theories assume an isomorphism between the microcosm (soul) and the macrocosm (political structure). They both see an intimate relationship between the individual and the society in the sense that they can shape and influence one another and cannot be understood apart from each other.

Plato's political theory is based on his understanding of human nature. Throughout the *Republic* he elaborates on the nature of human mind, its capacities and its functions. His theory of the Forms informs his understanding of human nature. He argues that that the form of the Good or Justice is shared by both the individual and the city which justifies the study of one to reveal the truth about the other. His perspective on the nature of human beings as complex creatures with diverse desires and capacities who are at the same time not self-sufficient explains his theory of the foundation and function of communities. His focus on education and social policy suggests that he acknowledges the effects of culture in shaping the soul. Moreover, his account of the philosopher kings shaping the city in their own images grasped by looking at the Forms provides a clear example of the effect of the individual in shaping the society. The limitations to his political psychology can be his position about the Forms. It requires a certain kind of belief in the Forms separate from ordinary experience, only accessible through dialectical thinking which can be acquired through extensive training. A certain amount of belief-inculcation or lying by the rulers is required for individuals who do not have the powers or the means to achieve the high level of dialectical thinking required to reach the Forms. This was suggested by Plato when he argued that the reason of the ruler shapes or guides the reason of the individual in the form of the laws and policies. It poses a danger, because certain religious and ideological systems can abuse this political theory with their ideals which Plato would deem not Forms but opinions.

Freud does not have an explicit political theory. He argues that the establishment of the Super-Ego in the mind of the individual is an internal representation of civilization, and that civilization is an external institutionalization of the Super-Ego. Freud saw biological, physical, mental and social realms as parts of one single system whose parts dialectically and dynamically interact. He values rationality, his theories and psychoanalytic therapy aims at establishing rationality as opposed to irrational forces (Skoll, 2014, pp. 54-5).

Moreover, Freud examines culture and cultural evolution, and his analyses are based on the formulation of the struggle between Eros and the death instinct that reveal the secrets of organic life in general. He refers to biological mechanisms contradicting each other in living organisms in order to justify his theory of instincts “one constructive or assimilatory and the other destructive or dissimilatory” (Freud, 1920, p. 43). He states that the development of the individual and the evolution of culture in human species can be understood as the same process of struggle between Eros and the death instinct applied to different kinds of objects (Freud, 1930, p. 106). This application of a formula or a form to different object is similar to Plato’s application of the form of justice to the city and the individual soul. While Plato uses his metaphysics to justify his isomorphism Freud is suspicious if one can carry analogies to an extreme (Freud, 1930, p. 107). Freud’s macrocosm is the human species which he takes as more abstract than the individual’s developmental process therefore rendering it harder to grasp. He also claims that the operations of the cultural Super-Ego would be easier to detect than the operation of the Super-Ego in the individual. Nevertheless, he argues that the two processes, one of cultural evolution of human species and the other the development of the individual only coincide in sharing one aspect. They are both associated with the incorporation of the individual into the community. The development of the individual is programmed according to the pleasure principle, and it is achieved through incorporation into the society, even though Freud suggests that it could have been better if there was a way of achieving happiness without this incorporation. In the development of culture, even though happiness is important it is pushed to the background. Plato also affirms this when he says that they were trying to conceive the complete good city not the happiness of the individuals in it.

The advantage of basing politics on human psychology is that it can provide practical knowledge. The disadvantage could be that psychological theories are dynamic, and they change over time and from culture to culture.

There is no single theory of psychology, and there is a possibility of changing political theories, and thus there is not merely one single good political psychology theory. This is a point of view with which Plato would not agree because his theory of Forms enables him to postulate a single formula of the good that can inform and characterize all things in this world. Freud also is trying to find a single formula that can be applied to the diverse realms, but he acknowledges that there is not only one form of happiness.

For Plato, a good state functions to promote the happiness of its citizens and vice versa. Everyone has to sacrifice some of happiness to achieve the overall happiness of the people in the state. Freud thinks that civilization is not striving for human happiness but it provides an order and unity at the cost of individual happiness (Lear, 2014, p. 97). Understanding Freud's critiques of civilization means understanding the conditions whereby the demands of the society have become so great that they pose a threat to human happiness. From this line of critique one can commit to social and political change and promote happiness by trying to minimize the conflict between society's demands and individual happiness.

There are several lines of future inquiry that can reveal interesting discussions. One can examine how Freud would deal with Plato's different personalities that he investigates in Books VIII and IX. Another interesting discussion can be investigating any possible tensions between Freud and Plato regarding rationalism and belief in purity. One can also investigate the role of *technē* (craft), and if politics are considered a *technē* (know-how) what would Plato offer us at the end of Book I.

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