

**ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO EU:
AN OBSTACLE?**

M.A. THESIS

Gizem ERTÜRK

Department of Political Studies

Political Studies Program

MAY 2013

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İSTANBUL TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ ★ SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

**TÜRKİYE'NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NE ÜYELİĞİ SÜRECİNDE DİNİN ROLÜ:
BİR ENGEL Mİ?**

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
EC	: European Commission
ECHR	: European Convention on Human Rights
ECSC	: European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	: European Economic Community
EMP	: Euro Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	: European Neighborhood Policy
EU	: European Union
EURATOM	: European Atomic Energy Community
IR	: International Relations
JDP	: Justice and Development Party
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
NOP	: National Order Party
NSP	: National Salvation Party
OECD	: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	: Organization of the Islamic Conference
TEU	: Treaty on European Union
UN	: United Nations
USA	: United States of America
USSR	: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
PKK	: Partiya Kerkeran Kurdistan

THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO EU: RELIGION IS AN OBSTACLE?

SUMMARY

Turkey's accession to the European Union is an ongoing process with its longstanding background. Cultural differences between Islam and Christianity are one of the several issues which are considered to be an obstacle in the way of Turkey's full membership to the European Union. Even though objections to Turkey's membership stressing the cultural difference was not a central issue in the beginning of the accession process, religious differences and the place of religion as a component of the European identity definitions have been discussed. On the one hand, objections based on religious differences has increased. On the other hand, the borders of "Europe" are questioned. More importantly, religious differences have become an issue more recently in parallel with the increasing visibility of religion, particularly Islam in an age of constant globalization with incredible technological innovations. This thesis aims to investigate the role of religion, whether it constitutes an obstacle all by itself between Turkey and the European Union. The main question tried to be answered in the thesis is "Can Turkey be a member of the European Union *with* a Muslim majority?"

For the purposes of the thesis which is written assuming the accession process will go on, initially the role of religion in contemporary politics including debates on "resurgence" of religion, secularism, "soft power" will try to be comprehended. Secondly, the place of Islam in Europe "the European Union" - and what is called "Europe" or "European"- is analyzed in detail with an approach that Europe itself is an unfinished contested discursive construct. Following, whether there is a common pattern of "secularism" which can be offered to the candidate state will be questioned examining different state practices. Besides, there will be special focus to Turkey's accession to the European Union including a brief history of relations, religion in Turkey which has a *suigeneris* characteristic and interfaith dialogue whether it provides reconciliation between different religions. Within this context, the thesis reaches a conclusion investigating if there is a possibility of integration. Consequently, the main argument is that religion all by itself could not be an obstacle in Turkey's accession to the European Union. Integration can occur with changing stereotyped perceptions. To illustrate, dominant questions, such as "Does Turkey maintain membership to the European Union with its Muslim majority population?", should be changed into "Does the European Union *want* to live together with a country which has a Muslim majority population on the condition that Turkey provide all criteria expected from a candidate state?"

TÜRKİYE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NE ÜYELİĞİ SÜRECİNDE DİNİN ROLÜ: BİR ENGEL Mİ?

ÖZET

Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyeliği, hâlâ süregelen bir süreçtir. İslam ve Hıristiyanlık arasındaki kültürel farklılıklar, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik sürecinde engel teşkil edebilecek birkaç konudan biri olarak kabul ediliyor. Üyelik sürecinin ilk aşamalarında Türkiye'nin üyeliğine itirazlarda kültürel farklılıklar vurgusu merkezi bir rol oynamamasına karşın, dinî farklılıklar ve Avrupa kimliğinin bir parçası olarak din de bu süreçte tartışma konusu oldu. Bir yandan dinî farklılıklara vurgu yapan itirazlarda artış gözlemlenirken, bir yandan da "Avrupa"nın sınırları sorgulanmaya başladı. Daha da önemlisi, inanılmaz teknolojik yenilikler sayesinde sürekli ilerleme kaydeden küreselleşme çağında dinin ve özellikle de İslam'ın görünürlüğünün artmasına paralel olarak dinî farklılıklar da sorun olmaya başladı. Bu tez, dinin rolünü ve Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği arasındaki ilişkilerde kendi başına bir engel teşkil edip etmediğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezde cevaplanmaya çalışılan temel soru şudur: "Türkiye, çoğunluğu Müslüman olan nüfusu *ile* Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olabilir mi?"

Üyelik sürecinin devam edeceğい varsayıma dayanılarak yazılan bu tezde, öncelikle günümüz siyasetinde dinin rolü; dinin "yeniden canlanması", sekülerizm ve "yumuşak güç" tartışmalarını da içerecek şekilde anlaşılmaya çalışılacaktır. İkinci olarak, Avrupa'da İslam'ın yeri, "Avrupa Birliği"- ne "Avrupa" veya "Avrupalı" diye tanımlanır-, Avrupa'nın henüz tamamlanmamış ve tartışmalı bir inşa sürecinde olduğu önkabulüyle incelenecaktır. Bunu takiben, birlige üyelik için başvuran ülkelerde önerilebilecek bir "sekülerizm" modeli olup olmadığı, üye ülkelerdeki uygulamalar incelenerek sorgulanacaktır. Bunların yanısıra, AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinin kısa bir tarihi, Türkiye'de dinin kendine özgü rolü ve dinlerarası diyalogun farklı dinler arasında uzlaşma sağlanmasına katkıda bulunup bulunmadığı incelenerek Türkiye'nin AB'ye üyelik süreci özellikle vurgulanacaktır. Bu bağlamda, tez entegrasyonun ihtimal dâhilinde olup olmadığını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu tez dinin tek başına Türkiye'nin AB'ye üyelik sürecinde bir engel teşkil etmeyeceğini savunmaktadır. Entegrasyon, basmakalıp algıların değişmesiyle mümkün olabilir. Örnegin, "Türkiye çoğunluğu Müslüman olan nüfusuyla Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olabilir mi?" gibi hâkim soruların yerini "Avrupa Birliği, nüfusunun çoğunluğu Müslüman olan bir ülkeyle birlikte yaşamayı *ister* mi?" almalıdır.

1. INTRODUCTION

The 20th century witnessed radical changes in various areas. Political scene faced with many transformations of well accepted, predominant ideas and values in parallel with the world's fast change in the process of globalization which has gained a rather more widespread character due to technological innovations. There is no doubt that religion, which has played a significant role in politics throughout centuries, cannot be set aside from this change. The crucial influence of religion, perhaps more than before, has been felt in the world. The role of religion in politics has become an issue in various discussions with an increasing interest especially since the last quarter of the twentieth century. On the one hand many arguments have been proposed to imply a conflict between different cultures, such as "clash of civilization" instead of an ideological conflict that occurred between The First World War and The Second World War. On the other hand, it has been suggested that religion has a positive political impact between various actors in politics. In fact, the changing idea is that religion, which was considered a "private" matter in the past, has played an effective role in public sphere on both positive and negative levels (Appleby, S., et all, 2010: 5). In other words, "despite the continued ascendancy of science and technology, we are witnessing an extraordinary recovery of religious ways of understanding human experience" (Falk, 2001, p. 77).

There has been an ongoing accession process between the European Union (the EU hereinafter) and Turkey with its longstanding historical background. Turkey's application to the European Economic Community (EEC) for membership dated back to 1959. There are several issues which can be labelled as formal obstacles standing in the way of the membership of Turkey; such as Kurdish and Armenian issues, Cyprus, human rights, democratic shortcomings, and the argument that Turkey is not a fully-developed country in an economical manner. There are also other obstacles which can be called as "semi-formal obstacles": Geography, demography, security and institutional factors. Yet, the most significant obstacles of all, standing in the way of the membership of Turkey, are the religious and cultural

differences which can also be referred to as “informal obstacles” (Bogdani, 2011, pp. 37-43).

Turkey’s membership has given rise to disagreements among the EU member states since then; yet when it was announced at the European Council held in Copenhagen in 2002 that the EU was going to start membership negotiations with Turkey, there occurred a full-fledged discussion in the public spheres of France and the other member states (Göle, 2009, p. 167). The representatives of the Christian Democratic Parties from six countries announced that the EU was a civilization project and Turkey had no place in it. This announcement concretes the base of objections based on cultural differences (Müftüler Baç, 2000, p. 21).

These debates on the cultural features of Turkey mostly come from the fact that over 95 per cent of its population is Muslim (Zürcher and Linden, 2004, p. 87). Many people say that Turkey has different cultural roots -more specifically with its Muslim majority population- and that its full membership to the EU is difficult, even impossible. The idea of religion as an obstacle for Turkey’s accession can be easily seen in one of the specific instances. According to Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, “Turkey’s entry into the EU would be ‘the end of Europe’ ” (BBC, 2002).

Religious based oppositions obviously concrete the accumulating perception of collective memory. The general framework of discussion circles around the Christian heritage of the EU and Islam “as Europe’s other” throughout centuries. This is related to the definition of identity question based on “selves and others”. The enlargement of the EU towards the East and the debates on Turkey’s accession process has brought Europe’s characteristics and also its borders into question. According to Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, any “European” state could apply for membership to the EU. The enlargement process of the EU led to discussions about what “Europe” was, where it started and ended, or how a state was regarded as “European” and “Europeanness” of Turkey focusing not only on fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria¹, but also on cultural differences.

Walter Bryce Gallie (1956) introduces “essentially contested concept” in his article (pp. 167-198). The essentially contested concept refers to a concept which includes a

¹ The Copenhagen criteria are the rules that define whether a country is eligible to join the European Union focusing if a candidate state has the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, has a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations and intent of the EU.

variety of meanings. Indeed, Europe itself, if it can be regarded as a concept, is a contested one. It means that there is a “diversity of ‘Europes’ often found in the literature on the European identity formation” diversity (Levin, 2011, p. 164). Within this context, “‘Europe’ itself is a contested discursive concept which is successfully appropriated by the EU in recent decades (Keyman and Düzgit, 2007, p. 92).

Similarly, finding a single, all-encompassing definition of “religion” is difficult, even impossible. In this thesis, “religion” basically refers to Islam and Christianity acknowledging the fact that these concepts do not have homogenous meanings. Both Islam and Christianity consist of several sects. However, the issue discussed in the thesis is more general, whether Turkey with its Muslim majority can integrate with the EU based on Christian heritage.

However, religion was not an issue for Turkey’s accession to the EU at the beginning of the candidacy process. Even if it was a matter, this situation was not mentioned. Instead of religious differences, Turkey’s insufficiency has been investigated from other points, such as democracy, human rights and particularly economic development. What has happened to change the moderate atmosphere since Turkey placed its first application to raise so many objections emphasizing the cultural and religious factors in recent years? What has actually changed since then? Whilst there is no direct reference to the religious aspect of the organization in the EU founding treatments, what is the reason underlying the increasing political discourse on cultural differences? Is the EU going to be a Christian Club in the future as said by many people nowadays? Or is it going to embrace its multi-cultural discourse in accordance with the assumed European values? The main research question of this thesis is to investigate whether the religious difference, which is more and more emphasized in recent years, is an obstacle all by itself on the way to the membership of Turkey to the EU.

After the end of the Cold War, Samuel Huntington wrote his famous article which can be taken as a basis for oppositions based on religion which was published in 1993. Firstly, in his article and consequently in his book which was published in 1996, he defended the idea that international relations (IR) were being shaped by cultural factors. According to Huntington’s view, the world is divided into seven large cultural blocs which are Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western and Latin-American. He claims that there is solidarity among similar civilizations

and antagonism towards other civilizations. Particularly, he predicts that major conflicts would occur between China, the West and Islam. The most significant idea underlining the core of oppositions is that “the West’s security, and by extension global order, is under attack by international Islamic militancy” (Haynes, 2007: 4). Some thought that it was the anti-Western Islamist regimes in Afghanistan and Sudan in the 1990s, the September 11 attacks and subsequent bombings in Madrid and London, not to mention the US-led invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), which can be regarded as proof for Huntington’s thesis. One can argue that the relationship between Europe and Turkey, more specifically Europe and Islam, has entered into a new stage as a consequence of these events and recent geopolitical and socioeconomic circumstances. Maybe Huntington’s opinion provides a basis for comprehending religion based objections in the West. Moreover, one can think that Huntington’s view is exactly appropriate to today’s world. However, his ideas have some problematic arguments. For example, defining the clear territorial borders of civilizations is not an easy action. Or a concept of “civilization” is difficult to identify (Haynes, 2007, p. 5). Considering Huntington’s theory can provide a comprehension regarding the base of objections. However this theory just provides a one-sided glance to the accession process, since its emphasis about the impossibility of integration between different cultures. The idea endeavored to explore in this thesis is seeking whether an integration is possible between Turkey and the EU, *despite* religious differences.

In today’s world, to grasp the relation between religion and politics more clearly requires taking into consideration some current concepts. I defend that Richard Falk’s typology provides a better understanding of not only the role of religion in contemporary politics, but also a way of evaluating historical progress. Richard Falk (2001) proposes both interpenetrated and contested designations of societal identity explore the changes which occurred in the 20th century -pre-modern, modern and postmodern. In spite of the difficulties of such a categorization, it seems useful, even necessary. However, each one of these phases involves something from its predecessor and therefore cannot be taken as isolated periods of time; the modern and postmodern contains remnants of the pre-modern. In other words, there is an extraordinary unevenness of cultural circumstances throughout history. Understanding the argument of modernism is significant, because of the idea that

“implicit in dynamic of modernism was a process of Eurocentric globalization by way of colonialist extension and capitalist expansion” (p. 78). Thinking with the “modern” concept directly provides an acknowledgement about Europe. Today *secular modernity* – which is an inseparable part of European modernism- is no longer respected as undisputed and as the ultimate truth owing to the postmodern identity definitions. Contrary to what western policy makers envisaged (they said that religion belonged to the private sphere) today there have been many religious actors, such as religious communities and organizations taking part as influential forces not only in private sphere level, but also in the public sphere in politics. In fact, the influence of religion is like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the world has witnessed religiously inspired conflicts or terrorism. On the other hand, religion is used as a tool for peace-making. Moreover, it could be used as a tool of “power”.

When an issue investigated is religion or politics, if research subject is related to Europe and its Christian heritage and the “other” religion, perhaps the most significant concept which should be examined is “secularism” which was regarded as peculiar to European mindset. Almost all discussions occur within the scope of “secular” characteristic of the EU member states. Each member state is defined as “secular”. Basically, secularism refers to the marginalization of religion into the private sphere. In fact, it has more complicated definitions and process, as it will be elaborated in the second chapter. Shortly, all member states recognize and guarantee freedom of religion and conscience and provide an autonomy for both church and state, although they do not identify a common understanding of secularism..

It should be noted that there are three strands of scholarship which have contributed to the reconsideration of categories of religion and the secular. Three strands can be specified; the first one is “the sociopolitical philosophy of liberal secularism exemplified by Charles Taylor (and shared by thinkers such as John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas to an extent)”. The second is “postmodernist critiques of ontotheological metaphysics by radical theologians and continental philosophers who have helped to revive the discourse of ‘political theology’”. The last one, which is also providing a basis for the main approach employed in this thesis, follows the studies of Michel Foucault and Edward Said, the various forms of discourse analysis

focusing on genealogies of power most closely identified with the work of Talal Asad (Mandair and Dressler, 2011: 4).

Charles Taylor is one of the leading scholars on the relationship between religion and politics. Taylor (1998) mentions two approaches: a common ground strategy which allows all religions to coexist peacefully, and isolated religion into the private sphere, creating an ‘independent political ethic’. Since it is not suitable for today’s world, Taylor suggests a new secular approach based on the idea of ‘overlapping consensus’, developed by John Rawls, which requires all members of a society to build a real free ethic (pp. 33-38). According to *A Theory of Justice*, developed by Rawls, the neutral state is given a basic solution which European states have recently attempted to apply. However, this was not sufficient to conclude the debate, since the neutrality of the state would push all religions into the private sphere and ignore people’s demands for their religion to be equally concerned with moral, social and political spheres (Haynes, 1998, p. 2). Jurgen Habermas (2008) argues that this is the shifting from secular societies to *post-secular* ones (pp. 17-29). As distinct from Habermas, Taylor avoids using the concept of “post-secularism”. However, he agrees with Habermas’ analysis of religion in the contemporary world. Taylor proposes a revisionist explanation of secularism by analyzing the borders of secularist assumptions.

Both liberal-secular and postmodern/post-secular schools seem to verify a specific concept of what comes after secularism (Mandair and Dressler, 2011, p. 5). As it is stated by Habermas, secularism was a *modus-Vivendi* until the mid-twentieth century. There can be three reasons claimed as a reason for the ruptures of neutral status of a secularist society. Among these are the growing numbers of religiously inspired conflicts and the increasing effect of religion on the building of both public opinion and private morality. Also significant for this thesis is the increasing number of immigrants with different cultural, traditional values, particularly in Europe. Post-secular society is characterized by the “continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment” (p. 63). Post-secular society has two important conclusions: secularization does not essentially lead to the weakening of religious effectiveness and the increasing religious significance does not jeopardize the secularization process. It does not mean that there is no tension between religion and the secular. The idea should be taken into account within the framework which

implies that neither religion nor the secular outweigh one another; both of them regard the other as an equal opponent.

The third school focuses on genealogical and discursive deconstruction, taking its cue from Foucault (Mandair and Dressler, 2011, p. 5). According to Foucault's genealogical analysis, there seems to be a strong suspicion of religion as a universal category. It means that there are no universal concepts of "religion" or the "secular" (Mandair and Dressler, 2011: 17). The third school also provides a general framework to this thesis analyzing religion and Europe.

In fact, a state or an association can be secular. This means that religious ideas are privatized. That is to say, within a general framework, religion is publicly marginalized. However, the question of whether different religions can coexist under same foundation pushed one to think also about different lifestyles. Maybe, one of the most important questions about Turkey's accession to the EU is that whether all citizens under the same union can live together. This can be analyzed with the concept of "religiosity" as well as "religion". Religiosity refers to how religious an individual is (Wimberley, 1989, p. 126). Besides, a discussion on the possibility of different religiosities can live together in a secular based state is gaining importance, in condition that states responsible for religious freedom.

Before moving to the next chapter, it can be useful to give a brief summary about chapters. For the purposes of the thesis, various subjects will be focused within five chapters including an introduction and a conclusion. The second chapter aims to provide information about an understanding of how western secular viewpoint interprets incontestable impact of religion to politics. In the second chapter following introduction, the role of religion in contemporary politics is investigated with both current and dominant concepts. There is an increasing view that there is a global resurgence of religion. This issue will be analyzed to provide an understanding of how western thinkers interpret "religious phenomenon". However, the fact that defended is that religion gained more visibility particularly with the effect of the globalization process and technological innovations. To enlighten the issue of religion during Turkey's accession, Europe and place of religion within discussions occurring in contemporary politics are investigated under the heading of "the resurgence of religion in Europe." Religion will also be analyzed as a tool of

power with a concept of “soft power” and its utilization of the state actors and the non-governmental organizations (NGO) in this chapter.

The third chapter which is shaped by the purpose of providing a clear comprehension on Europe, consists of three main parts. In the first part, a place of Islam in Europe will be expanded and following this, Europe will be focused in detail. Two things should be kept in mind. Firstly, the concept of “Europe” is historically loaded with several constructions of essentializing narratives “that the mere equivalence itself alerts us toward the possibility of yet another essentializations with references to history, culture, and geography”. Secondly, as a logical consequence of the previous one, “this equivalence pushes us toward deconstructing the various meaning(s) given to Europe under the rubric of the EU” (Düzgit and Keyman, 2007, p. 92). Furthermore, it is useful to know several definitions of current “Europe” to comprehend different interpretations of Turkey’s membership to the EU. Yet, whilst the objections are based on religious differences, there are some people who think that Turkey can be a member of the EU. In the first section of the chapter, the title of “The idea of Europe” is mainly based on Talal Asad’s perspective. Talal Asad (2002) argues that the inability to comprehend the Islam would be understood by looking into how the notion of Europe was conceptualized by the Europeans (p. 209). That is to say, the concept of Europe is analyzed considering the “selves” and “other”, what or who a European and non-European is. İslamoğlu (1995) points out that there is a discourse, whose roots can be traced back to Hegel, that is based on the duality of Europe and non-Europe, or more dramatically west (occident) and east (orient) (p. 10). At this point, Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) also provides a noteworthy contribution to the thesis. In the second part of this chapter, the religious structure of the EU and state practices will be analyzed focusing whether it is possible to talk about a common EU structure regarding religion and if there is a common pattern which can be a model for a candidate state. The issue of religion will be analyzed under the skin of secularism. It is obvious that there is no single practices of secularism which can be offered to candidate states, although there is a secular sensibility in a common ground. There is no single, fixed state practices with regard to secularism. The common practice is that the freedom of thought, conscience and religion are integral parts of the basic rights in the member states. Different practices of states on secularism will be analyzed with two approaches. First one is using the

concepts of “Judeo-Christian secularism” and “*laicism*” used by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2007). The second is using the concepts of “passive secularism” and “assertive secularism” employed by Ahmet T. Kuru (2009). These different concepts are practical to differentiate and group different state practices. While secularism refers a neutral status of state towards any religion, *laicism* refers state control on religion. Assertive secularism clarifies an active role of state on religion, passive secularism, on the contrary of assertive secularism, indicates a passive stance of state on religion.

In the fourth chapter, Turkey’s accession to the EU is pursued in detail. Firstly, a brief history of accession process will be given taking notice of year 2002. There are two reasons behind this choice. The first one is that 2002 is the year in which the EC announced that the negotiations would start with Turkey for membership after a long accession period. The second reason for this decision is that 2002 is nearly a turning point in the history of modern Turkey. During this year, Justice and Development Party (JDP hereinafter)² won the elections in Turkey and a relation between Turkey and the EU has reached the highest level during the accession period with the effect of changing foreign policy of Turkey around “Strategic Depth” doctrine. Nevertheless, Turkey’s current government JDP is a matter of debate both in the EU and Turkey. The EU is questioning if Turkey has adopted a religious tendency which might end in burning bridges with the West. Relations have reached a peak point in its history with the policies and tendencies of this government. However, its “conservative democracy” has been an issue of discussions. There is also a conflict between Kemalist *laicism* and JDP’s approach on secularism in Turkey itself. In domestic politics of Turkey, JDP has some conservative policies such as prohibition of alcohol under some conditions in the public sphere, besides it also has more freestanding policies than oppressive Kemalism, such as the issue of the religious headscarf which was allowed in public spheres by the JDP. The clash of the secular and the religious is not only occurring between Turkey and the EU, it is also an issue of ongoing discussions in Turkey itself.

The second section of the fourth chapter, the place of Islam in Europe and its accordance with democracy will be discussed in detail main research question. The

² It is a political party which has formed government in Turkey since 2002. Its original Turkish name is Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti) and was established in 2001 by founders who are known their Islamic background. It will be analyzed in detail in the fourth chapter.

main purpose of the third section is to question whether religion is an obstacle focusing on the relationship between religion and state in Turkey. The place of Islam in Turkey will be investigated with respect to political Islam, potential use of religion as a soft power in foreign policy, the Gülen movement as an influential international non-governmental actor and surely The Presidency of Religious Affairs (hereinafter *Diyanet*). Yet, Turkey has a *sui generis* characteristic. It is not the only but also the first laic³ Muslim country. It cannot be identified neither as Judeo-Christian nor as an Arab-Islamic country. And describing JDP with basically Islamist identity would be partly correct but also deficient. One can claim both that Turkey with its post Islamist government, while adopting some conservative policies, also is building its own hegemonic discourse; yet on the other hand, stands closer to Western liberal democracy in comparison with the Kemalist *laicism*. Actually, no one can say what the future of Turkey within JDP will be; then again, how honest would it be to picture Turkey totally out of the EU's values? In the last section of the fourth chapter, it will be investigated if it is possible to provide a common ground between Turkey with a Muslim majority and the Christian characteristics of the EU through interfaith dialogue.

Finally the thesis reaches a conclusion discussing a possibility of finding different way /or ways of various viewpoints to Turkey's accession. The conclusion is that the idea that religious differences all by itself cannot be accepted as a main obstacle barricading to full membership of Turkey, despite the existence of different perceptions accumulated in a collective memory. It should be clarified that the main argument of the approach to "Europe" matter is based on the constructivist approach, since it underlines the changeable and multiple nature of identity question and the ability to interpret the role of religion between Turkey and the EU in a broader perspective.

On the other hand, neither Turkey nor Europe can be considered with only their cultural identities. They cannot be regarded outside of the global market economy. As is known, the EU was built around both political and economic purposes. Nevertheless, JDP also owes its success not only to its founders' background or closeness to Islamic values contrary to Kemalist view, but also for setting the course

³ I prefer to use the word "laic" for Turkey instead of "secular". This is because, as it will be seen in the fourth chapter in depth analysis, religion has been under state control instead of only privatized one.

to the Europe and the global economy with liberal policies. Religion should be taught as one of the components of the interaction of many factors. However, such a discussion requires a broader analysis and out of the scope of the focal point of this thesis. In this thesis the main question endeavored to respond focuses on how religion constitutes an obstacle in Turkey's accession to the EU?

Finally, it should be remembered that there are some limitations of this thesis. First of all, the extent of the subject is a very comprehensive study field. Each heading and section such as the concept of Europe, the history of Europe, history of the EU, European identity, Islam as European "other", secularism, religion, religion and politics, religion in Europe, religion in Turkey, the history of relations between Turkey and the EU, interfaith dialogue can be a research subject in different studies with broader analyzes. In this thesis, they were all tried to investigate sufficiently to enlighten the main question, if religion was an obstacle during Turkey's accession to the EU. Secondly, perhaps the most important difficulty of such a thesis is that it would be difficult to say ultimate or universal truths for social sciences. Following a historical background in each section is helpful to conceive the ideas which lay the groundwork for the current fact or subject. Nonetheless, the idea that Turkey and the EU can relate each other despite of cultural differences merely stays as a suggestion or interpretation. Yet, it does not provide a formula for the future. Political history of the world is changing or re-shaping due to alternating conditions. Aside from various discussions on the future of the EU itself, the future of the relationship between Turkey and the EU and how Turkey will shape its foreign policy in the future, this thesis is written assuming the Turkey's long-standing process to the EU will go on.

2. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

This chapter has a special focus on the role of religion in contemporary politics. It can be regarded as a general framework aimed to enlighten the main question in a broader context, showing the current position of religion in politics, before going into a further investigation about Turkey and the EU.

2.1 Religion and Secularism

It is obvious that “last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the return of religion to the mainstream of political life” (Gözaydin, 2010, p. 1) in the age of globalization. Religion has been one of the most debatable and frequently emphasized elements of today’s politics, particularly after the 9/11 attacks. It is playing a progressive influential role, not only positive but also negative, in the public sphere on many different levels. On the one hand, there are many religiously inspired conflicts and reactions to religious movements. The crucial role which religion plays in the emergence of new political actors, which are mostly shaped by cultural factors, cannot be overlooked. On the other hand, religion is also seen as a potential means for peacemaking in contrast with its contribution to wars and conflicts. However, the increasing role of religion is not only limited with the motives of the new political actors. Religion provides several advantages for state and non-state actors. Faith-based diplomacy has become crucial. Religion is also being increasingly addressed by many countries as a soft power in international relations. Furthermore inter-religious dialogue is becoming an element of conflict resolution and diplomacy.

Before discussing “religion” phenomena, one should argue that what religion is. It is extremely difficult to make a precise and comprehensive definition of religion. Scholars tend to agree that it is difficult and even impossible to provide an all-embracing definition of religion which is compatible with all religions, because “there cannot be a universal definition of religion, because the definition is the historical product of discursive processes” (Asad, 1993, p. 29).

There can be several points around the religion concept which help describe what we are talking about instead offering a single meaning. Marty (2000) states that religion focuses on our “ultimate concern”, “builds communities”, “appeals to myths and symbolism”, “is enforced through rites and ceremonies” and “demands certain behavior from its adherents” (cited in Haynes, 2007, p. 11). When these features are taken into account, religion may be referred to as a system of beliefs and practices - often but not necessarily related to a supreme being or beings, or to the supernatural and / or that which is sacred in a society –that is, ultimate beliefs and practices which are inviolable (*Ibid*, p. 12).

Starting from this point of view, religion, within the scope of the thesis Christianity and Islam, can be thought a type of social experience that binds people together with a certain cultural context and it is attached in everyday life. It is also one of the components of identity.

However, finding out effect of religion is more significant than identify religion for the purposes of the thesis. Religion can influence the world in two basic ways: “by what it *says* that relates to religious doctrine and theology and by what it *does* –social phenomenon and mark of identity, that works through a variety of modes of institutionalization, including church and state relations, civil society and political society” (*Ibid.*, p. 12). While the latter is more prominent than the first one in politics, although what it does is generally based on what it says. In Turkey’s accession to the EU, it does go on to be a “barrier”.

It is necessary to differentiate between religion at the individual and group levels. In the sense of politics, religion is often evaluated on the group level whose claims and arguments are very often to some degree political in spite of the existence of individual religious figures, such as Pope John Paul II (*Ibid.*, p. 12). This differentiation pushed into consider the concept of “religiosity”. Religiosity simply refers how religious an individual is. At an individual level, individual religiosity is considered as “private”. However, the main focus of this thesis is religion at group level which is not in the scope of “private”. The group religiosity is a determinant of the main discussion that highlight (in) consistency of different religions -Christianity and Islam- , as it is “a matter of collective solidarities and of inter-group interactions. Sometimes this focuses on cooperation with other groups; sometimes on tension and

conflict, concerned either with shared or contested images of the sacred, or on cultural and class concerns” (*Ibid*, p. 12).

Although religion specifically refers to Islam and Christianity in this thesis, at the same time “religion phenomenon”, which is under discussion in the contemporary politics, states much more than that with its diverse and dynamic effect on society. The influence of religion in politics is always changing. In this context, the interaction between religion and politics cannot be investigated without “secularism” which is “one of the most important organizing principles of modern politics” (Hurd, 2008, p. 23), especially a research subject is Europe.

Secularism can be defined as “the state or quality of being *secular*, the end result of a process of *secularization*” (Haynes, 2007, p. 9). Although analytic differences between secular, secularism and secularization at first blush as if not so clear, they all need to be revealed following the Talal Asad’s perspective. While secular is depicted as an epistemic category, secularism signifies a political doctrine (Asad, 2003, p. 1).

Secularism is a concept which was much employed in Western social science with concepts like “worldly” and “temporal for a long time. It “is normatively characterized by both universalist pretensions and a claim to superiority over each and every set of religious ideas (Haynes, 2007, p. 9). Secularism, if it is a doctrine, “demands the placing of the ‘religious’ in the former by ‘the secular’ “ (Asad, 2003, p. 8). Secularism needs religious ideas to be publicly marginalized in order to rule ideologically and searches to do this “by marking out the domain of the ‘secular’, characterizing it with normatively desirable attributes, such as tolerance, common sense, justice, rational argument, the public interest and public authority” (Haynes, 2007, p. 9).

The concept religious and secular employed to identify secularism require a deeper analyze. In spite of usage as if they refer a certain opposition, there is a limitation between the religious and the secular, and this type of differentiation should be done with caution. Both religion and the secular are created historically; different concepts, practices and sensibilities brought together out of randomly improvement makes this possible; and the law is involved in describing and protecting the uniqueness of social spaces in modern society, especially the determination of a legitimate space for religion (Asad, 2006, p. 209). Furthermore, secular, although being posterior to

religion, is not continuous with it and is not just a deviation from it. Therefore, the secular and religion are closely connected on the ideal level and in the way they have emerged historically (Asad, 2003, pp. 22-25). This mode of thought, not only recasts but also contributes to the contemporary discussion about “Muslims” living in Europe and the “Islamic threat” posed by Europe *harm* secular environment of European public life. In other words, it means that the dissidence ceaselessly investigated between Europe and Islam is cannot be explained with an incompatibility of secular and sacred values.

Before going on to investigate secularism in detail, it is beneficial to separate spouse categories of it. The social construction of secularism has taken two distinct paths in international relations (IR): a laicist one and Judeo-Christian secularist one (Hurd, 2008: 23). In the context of this thesis, it is beneficial to distinguish “secularism” and “*laicism*”. Both refer to the separation of the political and religious spheres and they have been evaluated with terms “public” and “private”. However, secularism is followed by a neutral approach of state institutions toward to religion while *laicism* is followed by state will to intervene in and control religion or pursue active antireligious policies. Nevertheless, there is no strong or necessary dividing line between these two concepts, both are not mutually exclusive (*Ibid.*, p. 23).

In each state in the EU there is a consensus on “secular principle” and they can be evaluated with both Judeo-Christian secularism of French laicism. Nonetheless, each state has different attitudes even if they all secular. That is to say, there is no uniform secularism in European states. However, all states are responsible to provide freedom of religion, thought and belief and a neutral status of state to religion even if some of them has state church. To identify similarities and differences in various states, I will use Ahmet Kuru’s conceptualization in the following chapter. According to Ahmet T. Kuru, “in secular states, ideological struggles to shape state policies generally take place between two different notions of secularism” (2009, p. 11), which he calls “assertive secularism” and “passive secularism”. Passive secularism is such that the state plays a passive role by allowing the public visibility of religion. Assertive secularism defends the idea that the state plays an assertive role to exclude religion from the public sphere and relegate it to the private sphere. It should be noted that he uses the metaphor of a ‘swinging pendulum’ to identify the swaying shifts of state

relations to religion, which represents a change based on the balance of power between opposing ideologies (*Ibid*, p. 11).

Secularism is a great transformation in the traditional relationship between politics and religion in parallel with a chain of events such as a development of liberal thought, capitalism and a formation of a modern state. The dominant political role of the Papacy and the Catholic Church in medieval Western Europe changed with the consequence of various events. The dominance of the Pope, who is the most influential political figure in Europe, was challenged with the rise of the Protestant Reformation movement in the sixteenth century. The serial excessive conflicts between Catholics and Protestants led to the limitation of papal political and religious domination, and open a new discussion about the relationship between religion and politics. A matter of the protection of religious minorities that had become the main victims during the religious wars in the Reformation, was one of the major issues in the political agenda of liberal thought. John Locke considered that freedom of religious belief to be one of the essential human rights whose protection formed the base of state legitimacy. And, during the Enlightenment, one of the main questions was related to state and church relations at the European level and with the 1789 French Revolution. Firstly France, and following the other European states applied secularization policies (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 96). That is to say, the liberal doctrine held by the nation states requires equality, neutrality and liberty as basic principles at the national level. It means the states allow any religious practice as long as it does not intervene with the others basic rights of others. The state does not take one religion as a superior to another, likewise, the state does not foster the religious over the non-religious (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 358). This historical narration reveals that theological-political distinctions are European devices and secularism is presented as the ultimate point that all modern, civilized and developed societies should be reached through realizing necessary and sequent social and historical development.

In light of the idea that there is an interrelation between modernity and secularization, the secularization theory also points out to describe the universalism of European modernity. Yet, an expected decline of religion could not be universal. It is peculiar to Western Europe. A belief that all world will do what Europe did was not tenable in all regions. There are three features of secularization which highlights the European progress of modernity: the differentiation (separation) of state and church, the

marginalization of religion to the private sphere, and the decline of religious beliefs and practices (Casanova, 1994: p. 211). And Bogdani (2011) adds up two others to these features: “religious tolerance, and that the state cannot use its power to impose religious beliefs on individuals” (p. 9).

Nevertheless, there is not single secularism which only peculiar to Europe and/or universal. It is obvious today it can be seen that many different secular systems in different national, cultural or religious concepts and among them are non-western secularisms like the ones in India and Turkey (Göle, 2012, p. 11). However, much identification of modernity is divided from the Enlightenment, our reasoning will be that open to the new form that modernity is gaining today and we will be able to see it in another light” (*Ibid.*, p. 41).

Secularization has been a subject of an academic literature which often based on the linkage between decrease of the significance the role of religion and modernization since the nineteenth century. In the 1960s, some academicians, such as Bryan Wilson, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger, contributed to prove “secularization theory”. The key idea behind the theory can be traced back to the Enlightenment: modernization leads to a decline in religion, both in society and in the minds of individuals (Bogdani, 2011: 10). The secularization theory stepped forward and in the following years, the struggle to develop and renew it continued with these publications, which have also discussed the decline of religion and marginalize it from the public sphere to the private sphere.

There have been an increasing interest in the role of religion in political affairs due to several events, especially in the period following the end of the Cold War. 1979 The Iranian Revolution, rapidly growing nongovernmental organizations -especially faith based organizations- and exclusively 9/11 attacks, Madrid train bombings in 2004, London bombings in 2005 are just a few of these events. As a result of these “dramatic” events, attention has turned to religion in the social sciences and literature has begun to flourish once again since the 1980s, particularly after the 1990s. Beginning from the last decade of the twentieth century, the role of religion in politics has been increasingly re-examined; and the secularization theory has been criticized. Today, there is a growing consensus on the idea that religion is one of the most significant and debated elements of the IR. One can argue that explaining politics without any reference to religion is almost impossible. As Micklethwait and

Wooldridge (2009) underlines in their book: “If you want to understand the politics of this century, you cannot afford to ignore God, whether you believe in Him or not” (cited in Bogdani, 2011: 6).

It should be noted that actually very few events are related to religion entirely. Many events are much more complex and they cannot be explained only by religion. Religion is not the primary factor in international relations; like other elements, it is one of the several significant variables (Fox and Sandler, 2004, pp. 163-179).

With the increasing visibility of religion, it has been debated that “the return of religious discussion” in the political realm. The increasing number of religious movements worldwide today, makes it clear that religion has never been missing from the modern world and if there is a mutual understanding on this subject, it would be that the argument which holds there is a process from religious to secular on an uninterrupted course will no longer be accepted (Asad, 2007, p. 11).

Arguments which counter modernization-secularization theory can be separated into two categories. The first one is that religion has always been an effective element, but the “prominence of modernization-secularization theory has caused many social scientists to ignore this” (Fox, 2008, p. 20-21). Indeed, religion has always been an important element in almost every aspect of the world. But it had been overlooked by the social sciences for a long time, particularly in the period following the modernization process involving secularization, in which the theory claimed religion’s influence decreased, or moved from the public sphere to the private one. At this point, secularization and modernization theory becomes a controversial issue as a general framework of discussion about the role of religion in politics, which needs to be analyzed carefully.

Secondly, an increasing role of religion takes these evolutionary arguments one step further, putting forward the idea that modernization contributes to the revival or resurrection of religion, rather than causing its demise. According to this idea, processes including urbanization, literacy, science, the increasing significance of legal and bureaucratic standards of behavior, etc. are displaying signs which modernization and secularization theory predicted, which is these processes have urged religious groups and institutions to evolve in order to defend themselves against these modern processes. Consequently, religion has been undergoing a revitalization process (*Ibid.*,

p.21). This viewpoint, namely “the resurgence of religion”, is a polemical issue in contemporary politics and it is the focal point of next section.

In today’s world, as it stated before, religion’s influence is not declining in accordance with the claims of secularization theory; on the contrary its social and political influence in some cases, is growing in many parts of the world (Haynes, 2007: 19). After a secularization theory has been questioned, some scholars create a new argument called as “de-secularization theory” instead of it in the academic literature with an assumption about a decline of religion seems peculiar to Western Europe, not universal. Thus, the European experiment is exceptional. Nevertheless, some authors like George Weigel, Jose Casanova, Timothy Byrnes and Grace Davie defends the idea that Europe is less exceptional than often thought as a result of certain factors such as increasing religious belief and the EU enlargement (Bogdani, 2011: 13-15).

Besides, other scholars, such as Richard Falk and Peter Berger claim that the secularization theory must be revised. According to Falk (2007), secularization should be revised for humane global governance On the contrary, others say that the secularization theory has lost its analytic significance. Jeffrey K. Hadden (1987) claimed that the secularization theory are converted into a doctrine or an ideological dogma rather than an unquestioned statement or theory (p. 587). Jonathan Fox (2008) claims that both secularization and sacralization are occurring simultaneously; religion while changing, is not undergoing a change of depletion (p. 13). Further, Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000) claim that the secularization theory should be sunken into history (p. 79). Fox’s claims may be right for its reference, yet still is a little problematic in the terms and the standpoint. What referred here as sacralization seems to stem from a western secularist approach at least in terms of “language”. Besides, I think that it would be unrealistic to expect to say goodbye to the secularization theory. Such a claim is not only unrealistic but is also defective, since secularism is still an influential key term particularly in Europe. Yet, western type secularism is not immanent reality.

In addition to the secularization and de-secularization arguments, there has been a great deal of talk in recent years suggesting that the world entered a “post-secular” age. Habermas (2008) asserts that there has been an alteration in political and social conditions as well as an alteration in ‘consciousness’ which characterizes a post-secular society. “Post-secular” basically refers to the idea that the western type of

secularism has come to an end. Post-secular society is characterized by “the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment” (p. 63). This definition specifies two significant consequents. Firstly, secularization does not essentially lead to a decrease in religious influence. Secondly, growing religious significance does not endanger the secularization process. Still, it should not be thought that would be no tension between religion and the secular.

As a result, many events are more complicated than they seem. It is true that secularization lost its power in some regions. Indeed, far from losing its significance, religion has become more prevalent. On the other hand, studies show that secularism has a significant place in the western European mindset. Consequently, it would be wrong to evaluate the historical events as progressive. For this reason, both secular or post-secular does not include all reality which includes a nested but various processes.

2.2 Religion and Politics

The role religion can be seen in various ways. Firstly, religion is a significant source of political legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to a general rule that you and/or your cause are legally valid which also means morally correct and one should support you and/or your cause or at least should not oppose. Thus, legitimacy may be a powerful factor for foreign policy makers which can be aimed at diverse audiences. On the one hand, it may be used as a means of persuasion imposed by policy makers from other countries. On the other hand, it may also be used to undermine the opposing policy makers from other countries by provoking the masses of their countries. Moreover, “it can help to mobilize support for policies within your own state, both among the population and other policy makers” (Fox and Sandler, 2006:35).

Religion has been always effective fore in politics. As it stated, under the influence of modernization and particularly the secularization process, religion lost its former effect. Nevertheless, even in modern times, religion plays its part in some cases, as it supports or challenges the *status quo*. For example, it can be utilized to support war or peace in countries. In sum, “even those who believe that the world is becoming secular and religion is becoming irrelevant in modern times concede that in those times and places where religion is relevant, it can legitimate a wide range of institutions and activities” (Fox and Sandler, 2006: 36). Both domestic policy and foreign policy can be legitimized by religion. Besides, another indication of the legitimacy of religion

attached to religious leaders of the media and the policy makers. Pope John Paul II, Dalai Lama in Tibet, and Bishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa are just a few of them (Fox, 2001: 66). Fethullah Gülen is also one example of prominent religion-oriented non-state actors with his “*Cemaat*” influential chiefly in Turkey and some other countries with his institutions.

The second influence of religion to politics is related to decision-making. That is to say, state policies can be altered by the religious views and beliefs of the assigned policy-makers. Religious belief systems can affect foreign policies in two ways. Firstly, these belief systems affects the manner of conduct and outlook of the policy-makers. According to Fox (2001), the Arab-Israeli conflict can be given as an excellent demonstration of this statement. In this case, both sides claimed the same territory on the basis of religion -at least partial (p. 62). Secondly, religion directly affects the decision-making process occurs when policymakers are restrained by widely accepted beliefs of the population they represent. Even in autocratic governments, policy-makers may need to take beliefs, values or morals which are widely-held by their constituents into account (*Ibid.*, p. 63).

Thirdly, many local religious issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, might spread across borders and may well become international issues. There are various ways for religious issues cross borders in today’s world. For instance, local religious and ethno-religious conflicts frequently advance to an international scale through the diasporas or lobbies of the population living in other countries. These populations don't only play a role in supporting the revolting minority but they can also be inspired to rebel by external forces. The Albanian uprising in Kosovo against the Serbian government is a specific example of this case. The violence in Kosovo spread to numerous Albanian minorities near the Macedonia border. Ethnic Albanians were also supported by Albania, as well as the other numerous Islamic countries and organizations. The second way of religion crossing borders involves the increasing efficiency of fundamentalist movements worldwide. These movements frequently seek to break the barrier between religion and the state where such barriers exist, in addition to their efforts to export their movements elsewhere (Fox, 2001, p. 67-68).

The other way in which religion gains international attention is related to human rights issues and religious freedom. According to the statement in the Article 18 in the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948⁴, religious beliefs should be respected. Similarly, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966⁵ prohibits religious discrimination. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious Belief of 1981⁶ guarantees more specific religious rights, including the rights of worship, assembly, and the right to maintain places for these purposes, the right to establish benevolent and humanitarian institutions, the right to make and/or elect religious leaders, freedom to observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays, and the right to have access to national and religious communities. Moreover, several international issues, such as women's rights and world population control strategies may overlap with local religious views. In addition, the world is becoming more interdependent. Local issues and problems can easily spread across borders or at least be more likely to receive international attention in a world where countries are economically dependent on each other for survival. This fact is related specifically to globalization and technological innovations, including Internet and news network which allow any idea voiced including religious ones (Fox, 2001, pp. 69-70).

Religion also can be used as a tool for peace building. In recent decades, religious actors have been playing an increasing role in peace-building. Until very recently, religion was regarded only as a threat to the secular international order. Yet, religious actors who made an attempt to resolve conflicts between conflicting groups and made an effort to build peace are often referred to as "religious peacemakers" or as "faith-based organizations" in the literature (Haynes, 2007, p. 178).

Additionally, transnational religions phenomena took place in the religion's influence on the international system (Fox and Sandler, 2006: 165). Transnational interaction can be defined as "the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an international organization" (Katzenstein and Byrnes, 2006, p. 683). Although transnational religion turns out to be a rather complex category, and included within that category is a very

⁴ URL, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18>

⁵ URL, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx>

⁶ URL, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm>

diverse set of political actors (*Ibid.*, p. 684). And particularly the EU enlargement to the East brings “three transnational religions including Catholicism, the Orthodox Church and Islam into a mutual plane, in addition to bringing them into close contact with the European project” (Bogdani, 2011, p. 7).

In the case of Turkey’s accession to the EU, religion crosses state borders and becomes a transnational issue. For instance, the EU evaluates religious issues in Turkey and particularly the ones related to the domestic politics in some ways, in regular progress reports published by the European Commission (EC). These reports make an assessment about the religion, specifying the issue as ‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ under the subtitle of “Human Rights and The Protection of Minorities”.

Religion, which was not recognized as a crucial factor by a secular understanding of political thought for years argued as exiled from the modern constitution of international relations for a long time Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (2003). To comprehend various causes of this situation, it is necessary to look why religion was overlooked in politics. There are several statements on the rejection of the influential role of religion in politics, and these statements not only explain why religion has been neglected as an international relations factor, but also provide with a resourceful profile on the processes which have shaped Europe and its frame of mind since the academic field basically formed by the European experience.

The reasons behind the rejection of religion are closely related with the Westphalian legacy. The predominant international legal system has guided by international politics that originated in Europe since the 17th century. It dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, one of the milestones marking of the medieval from the modern period in European history. The Treaty was created and signed in Europe by Catholic and Protestant leaders following the last and most devastating of the great wars of religion (the Thirty Years War) that had been haunting Europe for more than a century prior to 1648. While the causes of the conflict are complex, its results were disastrous with huge numbers of civilian casualties, and massive destruction of property, not to mention famines and widespread disease. The result was the defeat of the medieval attitude which had sought to promote the common good and the overwhelming contest for individual domination, mostly asserted by religious actors. A revolutionary change in the way European States interacted led Europe to rise from the ashes of the war. As

a result, Westphalia treaties created the grounds for a self-regulating system of sovereign and legally equal nation-states in a way that never existed before. Since then, the reality of decentralized, isolated and scattered power has been regarded as the legitimate mode of organization, first for the European and then the global system (Haynes, 2007, pp. 107-108). According to the Westphalian presumption, “religion must be disciplined by the state – privatized, marginalized, and nationalized as a form of order and social cohesion, or religion must be overcome by a global or cosmopolitan ethic as the basis of international order” (Thomas, 2005, 54). But, ironically “the origin of the Westphalian state system can be traced back to religious roots, even if those roots include the desire to regulate religion” (Fox, 2008, p. 21).⁷

Since the order established after the treaty, “religion’s significance for international relations appeared to decline significantly, linked to the development of politically centralized, increasingly secular states – initially in Western Europe and then via colonialism too much of the rest of the world” (Haynes, 2007, p.31). It is widely believed that modernization and secularization, as correlative processes, contributed the rejection of religion in politics. It was widely believed that the combination of simultaneous developments in secular modernization and the rise of science and rationality would put the heat on religious faith, which would lead in its decline and pave the way for decidedly secular polities and societies around the globe (*Ibid.*, 32).

Secular ideologies, rationalism and science are considered to be the sources of a better life in the Enlightenment. Positivism, naturalism and materialism are the essential grounds leading to the rejection of religion in international relations. Positivism promotes the scientific method to study natural sciences and the physical world to study social sciences. According to this theory, the world is about unconscious particles which are in mechanistic interaction. And this theory supports the idea that any event can be explained by empirical observation. According to this approach, human beings can be studied apart from the physical and social world (Thomas, 2005, pp. 60-62).

The modernization processes include economic development, urbanization, pluralism, modern social institutions, growing rates of literacy and education, in addition to

⁷ For more information, see Philpott, 2000. In this study, the main question is if the roots of secularization can be traced back to the Westphalian legacy and the main question is what are the roots of Westphalia? However, most of the studies on the religious resurgence take an account westphalian legacy.

scientific and technological advances. While the modernization literature was inclined to concentrate on ethnicity, it was also meant to apply to religion. Western political scientists widely adopted the modernization theory starting from the late 50s through the mid 70s (Fox and Sandler, 2006, p. 10).

The first assumption of modernization theory states that a modern society can be clearly distinguished from a traditional society, and perhaps from a society in the process of modernization through economic development. And the second assumption is that modernization is conceived to be a linear, progressive conception of social change (Thomas, 2005, p. 51).

In this discussion on reasons how religion is overlooked in an academic field, secularization cannot be overlooked. Although it stated above, it needs to made unveiled more. Secularization denotes a decline in the influence of religion that assumed a secondary role under the impact of rational, secular and scientific criteria which have replaced religion. However, it is difficult to define secularization in a proper way. There is a lot of debate on secularization's definition and the question of how much decline in religion constitutes secularization is controversial for those who support or describe this body of theory (Fox, 2001, p. 12). On the one hand, secularization is defined as the decline of religion at individual level which means that people are becoming less religious. On the other hand, secularization is defined as the decline in the influence of religion in the public sphere. In fact, these arguments face with a question stating that how much decline can end up with secularization. Besides, focusing only the West draws heavy criticism. While it is arguable that religion had declined in the West, it is rather difficult to make the same statement for the rest of the world (Fox, 2001, pp. 24-26).

Similarly, Rodney Stark (1999) emphasizes some common points of different versions of the secularization theory. For example, there is an accord on the idea which states that modernization is the main driving force for the disappearance of religion. It asserts that the secularization doctrine has developed within the framework of modernization theories. Another point is that, it is usually suggested that the most important aspect of modernization that lead to the disappearance religion to disappearance is science. Secularization is also been as irreversible and universal although most of the discussions focus only on Christianity (pp. 249-273).

To enlighten a current situation of religion, “the global resurgence of religion” will be investigated.

2.3 “The Global Resurgence of Religion” in World Politics

Religion “is now back on the agenda of the political commentator” (Bruce, 2003, p. 2). Due to several events such as many religious disputes in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the rise of Solidarity and the Polish Revolution, September 11 attacks in the United States of America Following the end of the Cold War, the role of Catholicism in the Sandinista revolution, and in the other political conflicts throughout Latin America, it seemed that religion cannot be ignored in the public sphere anymore. The return of religion to the political scene, as Haynes (2007) defined, is “something totally unexpected”: a near-global religious resurgence with important ramifications for international relations (p. 19).

One can claim that it is “a renaissance of religious tradition” which is happening right now and across the globe (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2003, p. 107). Religion, however, has always been one the significant element throughout centuries. Under the effect of globalization and shifting social and political conditions, it became more visibility. This situation is interpreted as “the global resurgence of religion” by some scholars in contemporary politics (Thomas 2005; Johnston and Cox, 2003; Petito and Hatzopoulos, 2003; Haynes, 2007; Gopin, 2009; Chaplin and Joustra, 2010). In this context, the global resurgence of religion can be identified as the growing salience and persuasiveness of religion, which is also observable through the growing role of religious groups and individuals, non-state organizations, political parties with religious beliefs, practices and discourses in both personal and social life (Thomas, 2005, pp. 21-45).

The resurgence of religion is interpreted as a result of the failure of modernization by some scholars. Mark Juergensmeyer (1993) emphasizes the failure of modern secular ideologies. The resurgence of religion originates in the failure of modern secular ideologies like socialism, liberalism and fascism. Furthermore, the governments can be accused of being puppets of the west. This situation led to a crisis of legitimacy for these secular ideologies and gave way to the revitalization of religion. To summarize, a religious resurgence is a part of a greater crisis of modernity (Rinehart, 2004, p. 273). It can be stated that the global resurgence of religion in developing countries can

be seen as a ‘revolt’ against the West. Consequently, a new era has begun in the politics of developing countries, which is “to indigenous modernity rather than to modernize traditional societies” (Thomas, 2003, p. 22). It underlines the resurgence of religion is an outcome of the failure of the modernizing and secularizing states which were supposed to establish a democracy in the Third World.

In this sense, the resurgence of religion is identified on a global scale, since it is not limited to a specific region. Derrida (2002) considers the return of religion as the spreading of a multifaceted and over-determined incident; and it is not a simple return because of its globality and unrivaled figures (p. 78). Moreover, the return of religion is directly related to the technological transformation and the intersection of cultures, societies, nations, and tokens of communication and exchange (Raschke, 2005, p. 13). New technological developments, including developed communication systems which eliminate the time-space limitations, newborn industries and inventions, and also societal and cultural interdependence, are all related to globalization. The current position of religion is altered due to the effects of these factors.

There are some prominent points which need to be taken into account. The global resurgence of religion does not mean that religion is a new factor. After the Westphalian Settlement, the international system has been considered as an altogether secular system. As Philpott (2002) underlines, Westphalia was “a structure of political authority that was forged centuries ago by a sharply secularizing set of events and that has endured in its secular guise ever since” (p. 67). For this reason, religion has not been taken as an important element. Although the religion’s influence is prevalent not only in the political sphere but also in private and social spheres, it took religion a time to get back into the literature again. With the increasing intensity of religious movements, the perspective in which religion was interpreted also has changed. An empirical approach to the global resurgence of religion cannot be separated from a theoretical approach. It means that religion has always been a part of politics, because the concerns of religions are fateful echoes of what it means to be human. Scott Thomas (2005) states that social scientists are looking into the same phenomenon but with a different perspective, because they have taken off the kind of ideological blinders (p. 27-28).

The turning point of the global resurgence of religion is usually related to Islamist movements. However, it should be noted that the chain of events called the global

resurgence of religion comprises not only Islamic movements but also Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. The rediscovery of the divine is seen even in the Western scientific and intellectual circles (Ahmed, 2005: pp. 103-118). There have been many instances of militant Hinduism in officially secular India. Jewish religious parties currently serve in the government in Israel, while the Catholic Church has been a leading actor in the wake of democracy in Spain, Poland and in Latin America. In sum, there are various examples of religion's involvement in politics in various parts of the globe (Haynes, 2006). Yet, the most important contemporary religious revivals are the Islamic and the Evangelical ones. Islamic fundamentalism is better defined since it has more obvious political implications and vast geographical scale (p. 4). Islamist movements are not the only, but surely the most prevalent of all compared to the others.

Whilst to know this discussion is necessary to understand the contemporary politics, it should be investigate keeping in mind that there are some problematic in the idea of "the global resurgence of religion". One critique of the global resurgence of religion made by Jeffrey Haynes is noteworthy. If there is a global resurgence, there is also a need to explain the concept of religion. Not only editors but also contributors seek for a sound definition of religion. That is because if there is no agreement on what is understood by this key term, how can we be certain that all the contributors are talking about the same thing, understanding in the same way (p. 538). With this regard, it could be said that 'the resurgence of religion' is usually apprehended with reference to a secularist way of thinking which underlines the threat of religion's spread into the public spheres. European secularist assumptions are the basis of the dominant understanding of religious resurgence It is employed to refer to activities, movements, and processes that challenge the authoritative secularist settlement of the relationship metaphysics, politics and state power (Hurd, 2008, p. 135).

Jeffrey Haynes (2006) holds an all-inclusive historical analysis rather than taking particular events to account. That is convenient regarding the idea that the return of religion did not become evident suddenly. According to him four phases can be identified in the period starting from 1945, taking the Second World War as a milestone. The first phase is the two decades after the end of the war in which religion was used in anti-colonial struggles and in the service of indigenous nationalists in some countries such as Algeria and Indonesia (pp. 539-541). In this phase we observe

another transformation: from decolonization to new born states. As Piscatori (1986) underlines this period, after the decolonization period, the natives of these new states found themselves in an atmosphere in which governments were trying to modernize their societies along Western lines (pp. 22-39). However, such modernization did not occur right after the end of decolonization. Ernest Gellner (1992) emphasized that since the colonial period, developing countries have faced a dilemma: whether to follow the example of the West and refuse their culture to gain power, or to affirm their own religious and cultural traditions but remain materially weak (p. 1-40). Furthermore, the modernization efforts of these states mostly failed to maintain economic development and democracy (Thomas, 2005, p. 40-41).

The second phase is in the late 1960s and 1970s which witnessed a period of conflict between Israel and Palestine and the Iranian Revolution (Haynes, 2005, p. 539-541). In addition to these events, the defeat of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967 war with Israel can be given examples (Piscatori, 2005, pp. 22-39). In fact, religion has not been a sole reason for the Arab-Israeli conflict, just one of them. The government lost its credibility as a result of economic failure and political repression. And people praised other leaders and institutions. Therefore ethnicity and religion became more prominent (Rinehart, 2004, pp. 271-274). For many Muslims, Islam has been the alternative solution of the social and economic problems of Muslim society due to the failure of modernization. As a result of this idea, Khomeini led a successful Islamic revolution in Iran and Islamic fundamentalists gained prestige (Marguilles, 2006: pp. 8-20).

The first two phases took place in the period of the Cold War which was a competition of two secular ideologies: liberalism and communism. Although religion was brought back into the literature of international relations in the late 1980s, it was already an important element of foreign policies and international affairs. For example, in this period, the US supported or manipulated religious movements in the Middle East and Central Asia against the Soviet Union. Therefore, it would be fair to say that religion was an important element at that time, but that international relations did not regard it as a significant almost all academic fields of politics.

Finally, the fourth phase was started with the September 11 attacks and the subsequent US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Haynes, 2005: 541). As Philpott (2002) underlines, the September 11 attacks brought the notion of religion -which scholars

had not paid much attention before- to the agenda of international relations are most recent and probably the most dramatic of the momentous events (66-67). The influence of religion is more prominent since the fourth phase was started.

Consequently, in contrast to the western secular assumptions, religion is prevalent, moreover it is an influential factor in many aspects of life. With the recent technological advancements and the globalization process, the scope of religion has been increased rather than being reduced. Yet, addressing this chain of events as a ‘global resurgence’ would only be possible from a Western secularist perspective. The fact is that, nothing has developed in a linear way in history and relations between politics and religion cannot be interpreted with an idea based on as if there is a linear process.

2.4 The Resurgence of Religion in European Politics

Mirela Bogdani (2011) explains the subject of religion and politics under three headings. In addition to the general impact of religion on politics and the revival of religious discussion in world politics, she brings up another topic: the return of religious discussion in European politics (p. 1). Actually, in accordance with our study, Bogdani’s perspective must be analyzed for a better understanding of the role of religion in Europe.

There are three main factors that explain the return of religious discourse in European politics. The first is an increasing number of Muslim population in Western Europe, and the challenges associated with this growing number. The second factor is the emergence of two independent countries, Bosnia and Kosovo, in Eastern Europe and their predominantly Muslim population and Turkey’s accession to the European Union. And the last one is that the resurgence of religion in European politics plays a part in the expansion process of the EU towards the East (Bogdani, 2011, p. 6).

Wilfred Spohn (2009) also specifies three interrelated reasons to examine the debatable role of religion in Europe focusing on the period starting from 1989. First, following the collapse of communism and the reunion of separated Europe, the enclosing cultural and structural pluralism of the European civilization motivated by different forms of religion and secularization patterns resulted in commutable impacts on nations, state, ethnic groups, and related collective identities. Second, European

societies have gained a more multicultural and religiously more disparate structure due to the increasing international migration (pp. 358-359).

In fact, the 9/11 attacks have had a worldwide impact on the discussion of religion. And in the following years, religion has become a focal point: Europe faced various Islam oriented events and controversies. New religious movements, Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh assassinations in the Netherlands, the publication of Danish cartoons, France's burqa ban, London and Madrid bombings and of course an accession of Turkey to the EU are just a few significant instances which would show Islam's effects in Europe's social and political atmosphere. Religion, which was once seen as marginalized in European politics, is now playing an important role in one of the most central political processes of modern European life (Katzenstein and Byrnes, 2006: 679).

As it seems, the global resurgence of religion in Europe is mainly associated with Islam and the Muslim population in Europe, that is significant to be familiar with the objections in the EU to the Turkey's full membership. The Eurocentric point of view signifies that the integration problem of Muslim immigrants mainly originates from their religion's interaction with the public realms and their rigid values which also lead to violence, intolerance and unease in European political and social domains. Religion has been regarded as the reason for violence and this was exactly how Islam became introduced to Western civilization. Again, specialists on "Islam", "the Modern World" and "political philosophy" have been dressing the Islamic World down to its inability to adopt secularization and to take part in the modernization. It is clear that violence does not need any recognition provided by the Quran or any other holy book. It just did not need one when 30-40 thousand civilians were slaughtered in the rebellious city of Hama in 1982 at the direction of Hafiz El Asad the secular president of Syria. It also stands for the Saddam Hussein's poison gas attack on the Kurdish population and the Dujail massacre which led to thousands of civilian deaths. Western or not, no government or opposition needed the support or the justification from a holy book when civilians were attacked. Although, they have addressed the holy book in some cases where it serves the purpose, it still does not mean they had to do so (Asad, 2007, p. 22).

In addition to all discussion, explaining the role of religion without any reference various concepts is even impossible. Two significant concepts which are used to refer

to the role of religion in politics both worldwide and in Europe: fundamentalism and Political Islam. A discussion about the role of religion in politics -international implications of religion, particularly with the scope of the EU and Turkey- cannot be completed without any reference to Political Islam (Fox, 2001, p. 70). There is an increasing emphasis on the concept of Political Islam. This brings up a specific question: What is the meaning of Political Islam? Political Islam is defined as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition” (Denoeux, 2002, p. 61).

The second concept which is important to describe religion and politics is fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is a sort of passionate religious movement and the desire to return to traditional sources of religious authority. In Islam, it aims to restore not only the Islamic beliefs, but also the Islamic lifestyles, which in many ways contradict modern ideas, including the boundaries between religion and the state, the role of women and moral codes of everyday behavior (Bogdani, 2011, p. 4). After all, fundamentalist events, if they are fundamentalist, are occurring in the world and are particularly overwhelming Europe. However, evaluating a secular country with a major Muslim population down by the fear of Islamic fundamentalism does not sound realistic. The government in Turkey is formed by Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP, hereinafter JDP), known for its Islamist background yet holding close contact with the EU and making progress with the accession process. Therefore, several accord processes held nationally can be seen as an effort to take place in the Union rather than an “expansionist” fundamentalism. Even if there has been no close relations between Turkey and the EU in the last years and Turkey has started to evaluate with its “soft power”, it is clear that, at least now, fundamentalism is not convenient to interpret Turkey’s accession to the EU.

After all investigations pursued above, the role of religion in contemporary politics will be more detailed around one of the current terms “soft power”. Today’s politics not only includes state to state interactions, but also non-state actors are becoming an effective with their influence in the political realm. Thus, soft power and religious actors will be examined in the next section before going to the third chapter.

2.5 Religion as a Soft Power and Religious Actors

Power is one of the most significant and inseparable concepts in politics. Max Weber (1964) defines power as the opportunity or a chance –whatever the opportunity is based on- to achieve one's own will within in a social relationship against resistance of others as well (p. 152). Power concept is influenced by a realist school of politics. Hans Morgenthau (1960), an outstanding defender of what is now called as classical realism, clarifies that “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (p. 5). Power, cannot be thought without realist school’s opinions, however this school takes into an account just one dimension of power that is military and/or economic power. However, this is not enough to interpret current affairs. Today, there are many non state actors and religion is regarded as a kind of power.

As a further analyze on power is beyond a scope of this thesis, related concepts to the thesis will be given in a shorter definitions. While hard power implies a form of power that adopted by states in order to maintain their political purposes by means of force, coercion, threat or military intervention, soft power is “the capability of an entity - usually but not necessarily a government- to control what others do through attraction and persuasion” (Haynes, 2009: p. 296).

The concept was pronounced in 1990 by Joseph Nye who sees religion as a persuasive power in foreign policy and international relations reserved for same-faith parties mentioning that utilizing religion as a soft power would have consequences depending on the person in charge of it (Gözaydın, 2010: 1). In Nye’s own words, “the coming century may see continued American preeminence, but the sources of power in world politics are likely to undergo major changes that will create new difficulties for all countries in achieving their goals (Nye, 1990: 155). According to Nye, the alterations in the nature of power that can be monitored in its general distribution, the alterations in the instruments and strategies of power and the complexity in world politics due to the emergence of new non-state actors and the new climate in accordance with this new complicated and interdependent structure resulted in less transferable, less coercive and less tangible dynamics of power.

Thomas (2005) also argues that religion can become a form of soft power in the service of states and non-state actors in international relations if the intangible elements of power –which are contrary to hard power involving military and economic

power- can be put into use (p. 110). Religious groups attract others utilizing religion as a soft power.

It is needed to identify who and/or what religious actors are in order to bring a clear understanding about the role of religion in international relations in politics. In addition to religion itself, religious actors, which are being analyzed with growing interest, are other overlooked elements in international relations. There are now religious actors in international relations, with various concerns that go beyond a narrow focus on religious fundamentalism and anti-modernism. On one hand, some encourage cooperation, for instance interreligious dialogue and greater religious engagement step forward in international development and conflict resolution. On the other hand, the rest is more concerned with competition, and occasionally with conflict, against both the other religious traditions and the other secular actors (Haynes, 2007, p. 33). They are divided into two main categories: state-related religious actors, and non-state religious actors. State-related religious actors are identified by Haynes in the following manner:

State-related religious actors are while practically in close contact with governments, conceptually they are very distinct from it. The USA, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the paragons of this notion, while other governments like Israel or Palestinian National Authority at various times also have been influenced by religious actors. It is inevitable that when a government has foreign policies which are influenced by religious concerns to a great extent, it implies that significant domestic religious actors are able to influence that country's international relations. (*Ibid.*, p. 34).

Non-state religious actors of various kinds comprise the second category. It is widely recognized that a range of non-state actors affect international relations, and it is possible through recognizing religious organizations or groups as one of non-state actors (Thomas, 2005: 98). There are many non-state religious actors defined as religious movements or individuals drawing on religious traditions which are active in international relations. They may meet each other as faith traditions in their concern with various global issues, including conflict resolution and human development; or in ways which are more characterized by competition or conflict (Haynes, 2007: 34). These actors can cross borders and are under the effect of globalization within many countries. Non-state religious actors were classified under three groups by Thomas (2005): sub-state religious actors, transnational religious actors and intergovernmental religious organizations. Sub-state religious actors include voluntary, non-governmental and non-profit organizations. Many religious sub-state actors delineate to larger, formal, multi-purpose umbrella organizations which represent sects or

nationwide religious institutions, and constitute a major type of religious sub-state actor (p. 99). Some examples are, ‘The American Hindu Federation’, ‘The National Association of Evangelicals in the United States’, ‘The French Protestant Federation’. According to Thomas (2005), sub-state or sub-national actors act as pressure groups or domestic interest groups which will seek to influence a state’s foreign or domestic policies (p. 99).

The second category of non-state actors is transnational actors which include profit and non-profit organizations as well as international non-governmental organizations, namely religious international non-governmental organizations. Transnational relations can be defined as the regular contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries by a variety of non-state actors that are not controlled by the states, or by foreign policy organs of governments, or by an international organization even though they are a part of international relations. And a religious transnational nongovernmental organizations can differ from the secular one because of “its mission statement explicitly refers to religious faith as a motivation for its work” (Thomas, 2005: 101). At this point, the concept of transnational civil society cannot be ignored. This concept challenges the concept that states are always the sovereign economic and political actors in both domestic and international contexts (Haynes, 2007: 46) under the influence of globalization.

The third category involves intergovernmental organizations or international organizations, such as The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. The European Union and the Arab League are other instances of this category having a limited domain in a particular part of the world. They also “may have a sector rather than general interest, such as the global economy (WTO) or the security interests of military alliances (NATO)” (Thomas, 2005, p. 104). However, it is difficult to find any international organization which is based on religious values. The Organization of the Islamic Conference is a significant religious intergovernmental organization (Thomas, 2005: 104).

In the scope of the thesis, “soft power” will provide a useful framework to clarify the role of religion in Turkey which led to a discussion in the way of its accession to the EU. Turkey has started to evaluate with soft power, as it is not an exception to

developments in international relations (Gözaydin, 2010, p. 2). Religion is used as a soft power at the state affairs level, via its state agencies and also the *Diyanet*⁸. Diyanet is also influential in various European countries in different immigrant organizations, namely the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation. Nevertheless, the administration also gets represented in as the councilors of religious services connected to the Turkish Embassies, and as the attachés of religious services connected to the Consulates General. The counselors of religious services are situated in European countries namely, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, Macedonia, and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Attacheships are found in Germany (Berlin, Düsseldorf, Essen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, Cologne, Karlsruhe, Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Münster, Mainz), the Netherlands (Deventer), France (Lyon), and Romania (Constanta). In the European context, among the Diyanet's activities are supported for mosque relations and spreading its own interpretation of Islamic knowledge in competition with some other Turkey-based religious groups like *Süleymanlılar* (a religious group formed by students/followers of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (Gözaydin, 2010: 3). Gözaydin also unfolds the functions of Diyanet as follows: "The president also has been running various projects to help establish a firm and lasting peace between Muslims and other religious groups, based on common values and principles. So the presidency cherishes a firm belief in the natural prospect of the alliance of civilizations and human beings on the grounds of those common values and ideals" (Gözaydin, 2010, p. 3).

In addition to state-related religious actors, there are non-state religious actors (nongovernmental organizations –NGOs) which are influential in Europe. Particularly, Fethullah Gülen who is the leader of a powerful community (*Cemaat*) of religious activists and his movement is known as the 'Gülen movement'⁹ (p. 3). A brief information about Diyanet and Gülen movement can be regarded as an introduction to look them with a soft power concept and they will be analyzed in detail in the fourth chapter.

⁸ Established in 1924 as a unit of the secular state with the objective of handling religious affairs, Diyanet have been one of the most controversial foundations in Turkey. It will be discussed in the last chapter while analysing the religious structure of Turkey. For detailed information see Gözaydin 2008a; Gözaydin 2008b; Gözaydin 2009.

⁹ I will study the Gülen movement at the last chapter on Turkey and the inter-faith dialogue in detail. Yet it is important to note that Gülen movement is a significant Turkey-based NGO.

The main question of the thesis is based on whether religion is an obstacle. Particularly after the enlargement process, under the “religious difference” debates, it started to be discussed that how the EU will (re) shaped pushed people to think about “Europe” and its borders, components of the European identity and religion. For this reason, in the following chapter, Europe and a common understanding of the EU member states on religion with regarding secularism will be focused before analyzing the role of religion in Turkey’s accession to the EU.

3. ON EUROPE

This chapter aims to investigate European side, including three sections. In the first part, “Islam in Europe”, which can be regarded as an expanded introduction to the main discussion, will pursue whether religion is an obstacle. Following, Europe and religion in the EU will be focused.

3.1 Islam in Europe: Is it an Obstacle?

A current discussions on Islam will be looked in this section in order to comprehend anti-Islamism in Europe. Islam, with its relation to Europe’s current domestic and international concerns, focuses on the following issues; the impact of globalization on the religious, political and social position of Europe’s Muslim minorities since Islam is a significant base of identity, the fear inherent in Europeans of Islamic extremism which has increased particularly after the 9/11 and Muslim Turkey’s bid to join the European Union with its 70 million, mostly Muslim, population (Haynes, 2007, p. 268).

First of all, the presentation of Islam in the mass media is a weighty matter. Talal Asad (2003) argues that it is obvious that the European media misrepresents the Muslim people and the Muslim minorities have been treated unfairly and with prejudice (p. 159). It is clear that there is a significant interaction between religion and media. Such as most aspects of our lives, religion is also on-line with the media. Religion somehow engaged in and contributes to the extinguished force of a ‘radical abstraction’ but also marks the ‘tele-technological transcendence’ of a *méechané* that creates a virtual, cyber space-time which introduces the realm of the televisual and digital to religion (De Vries, 1999, p. 16). Moreover, the relationship between religion and media provides an insight on the paradox of the ever more sophisticated negotiation between the private and public sphere. For this reason, contemporary studies can be criticized due to the rise of the new media that brushed aside in the revival of religion. In other words, the synchronic increase in new media

technologies and their relation with religion and religion's return as a political factor have been ignored.

The debates on Islam in Europe certainly arise from the Eastward enlargement of the EU and in particular, Turkey's accession to the EU. Indeed, the social and religious factors constitute the essential part of the European opposition (Hurd, 2008: 84). It is widely assumed that Turkey is out of the picture when Christian cultural heritage is the case.

Mirela Bogdani (2011) suggests five potential factors causing European opposition towards Turkey; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism worldwide and its effects on Europe, the increasing Muslim population in the Western Europe, fear of the Islamization of Europe, along with a country of 70 million Muslims becomes a part of the EU, and Political Islam as a part of Turkey's mainstream politics.

There is no doubt that Turkey is a large country with a large population, and accompanied with its Muslim identity, this poses a problem. The question of Kosovo (almost 90 percent of the population is Muslim) should be given to candidate status, and Macedonia's (25 per cent of the population is Muslim) ongoing candidacy process have been considered in terms of religion. Other examples of this are the potential candidates, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet, there is no strong opposition based on religion, although these countries have a significant rate of Muslim population (Bogdani, 2011, p. 147). Therefore, it is clear that the oppositions originate from the fact that Turkey is a large country and it will have a voice or at least a vote in case of membership.

Primarily, the Muslim presence in Europe certainly is an important reference point for the discussion based on religion in Europe. Maréchal (2003) distinguishes two types of Muslim presence in Europe, one being the Muslims that have migrated to Europe in the past thousand years and the other, the worker migrations of the 1960s (p. xvii). The first type of Muslim presence requires a deep investigation into the history and therefore will not be discussed in this study. Yet, it is important to note that the historical Turkish threat was not towards Europe, but was towards Christianity; for it cannot be imagined a Europe without Christianity back then (Asad, 2003, p. 163). It is important because, neither modern Turkey nor Europe and also their interactions originate from the 20th century. Both Turkey and Europe and

also their interactions have a history. To illustrate, according to Grace Davie (2000), what happens now is the memories imprinted in European's mind (p. 162). Similarly, Katzenstein and Byrnes (2006) emphasize that the accession of a Muslim country like Turkey to the European Union is derived from historical memories of the great battles that took place over European religious and cultural identity. It is perhaps no accident that opposition to Turkish accession to the EU is strongest in Vienna (pp. 687-688).

The second type of Muslim presence is related to Turkish labor migration to Western European countries started in the late 1950s and early 1960s and continued in the form of family unification (Küçükcan, 2007, p. 86). Austria, Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania and Spain are the primary countries which received labor migration. And Islam is usually associated with communities of fairly recent immigrant origin. Muslim immigration largely occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, in a time of tension between Muslims and the West due to Iran's revolution and the European economic recession. Muslim numbers have continued to increase as a result of childbirths in recent years. Over time, many Muslims, especially second generation immigrants, have become politicized under the influence of globalization (Haynes, 2007, p. 271). "The 'old' Europe is being transformed by its encounter with contemporary Islam – an Islam that is re-appropriated, interpreted, and revitalized in political and cultural terms by a new generation of Muslim actors" (Göle, 2005, p. 140).

It is clear that Muslims are living in many European countries. While there are economic relations between Muslim and European countries, the presence of Muslims in Europe still proves polemical. Frankly, as stated by Asad (2003), "Muslims are clearly present in a secular Europe and yet in an important sense absent from it" (p. 159). On the one hand, there are no fixed values or an established system to make it happen but a transforming texture due to the entrance of new actors, groups, and idioms on the public scene. On the other hand, both French Republicanism and Dutch multiculturalism, as two different forms of integration, fall short of providing a successful frame for reconsidering Islamic difference in European democracies.

Another important issue to be discussed in order to comprehend Islam in Europe is the impact of Islamic fundamentalism and globalization in Europe. The intrusion of various international events and concerns into the domestic scenes of many European countries –including the issue of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ following Iran’s 1979 revolution is a result of the media reporting international issues in greater depth than before in a globalizing world (Haynes, 2007, p. 273). In addition to fundamentalism debate, “we define globalization as a convergence between once divided parts of the world, and one of the characteristics of today’s encounter between Islam and Europe is that it is built on the global communication networks”(Göle, 2005, p. 13). It can be argued that Islam and Islamic fundamentalism have replaced the former threats to western societies, fascism and communism, with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Especially since September 11, 2001, the rise of Islamic international terrorism has been considered a huge security threat by the West, hence Europe has joined the war against terrorism. The terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 were followed by a series of al-Qaida inspired terrorist attacks in Europe over the next few years: the March 2004 train bombings in Spain, the brutal assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, the London bombings in July 2005. Moreover, there has been an increase in terrorist attack attempts in European countries, including Britain, Germany, Denmark and Austria as a British MI5 report 2007 confirms. Lewis, with good reason, says that most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists; nonetheless, most present-day terrorists are Muslims, and proudly identify themselves as such. In contrast, Irish or Basque terrorists do not identify themselves as ‘Christian’ (Bogdani, 2011, pp. 105-109). Yet, it is not right to label Turkey as fundamentalist whether governed by a party having roots in the fundamentalism but not particularly having fundamentalist purposes. Thus, the Istanbul bombings of the British Embassy, HSBC Bank and two Synagogues in 2003 are worthy of investigation in this context. The situation in Turkey is also interesting, on the contrary the idea which relates Turkey and terrorism, since “terrorism was aimed at Turkey’s pluralist and modern aspects. The targets were picked as a response to Turkey-Israel treaties and alliance with the USA and Britain -whether Turkey was a part of the Iraqi War or not. Beyond that, it was aimed at Turkey’s peculiar form of Islam which is different from the one that El Qaida or the “clash of civilizations” theory supporters had” (Göle, 2009, pp.176-178). However, due to many events that occurred in Europe, the discussion is no

longer only about Islamic fundamentalism, but also about Muslims and Islamic values (Bogdani, 2011, p. 109).

Following the September 11 attacks, there has been an increasing phenomenon known as Islamophobia against all Muslims in Europe. However, the reasons behind Islamophobia are not solely because of the increase of Islamic fundamentalist activity but also the growing fear among Europeans of an ‘Islamic culture invasion’, which is being perceived as a threat. The Turkey’s accession to the EU, this would seriously undermine the Christian and secular nature of the European continent, given the country’s population of around 70 million (almost all of them Muslim), combined with the 17 million Muslims already living in the EU. Islam could become the dominant religion in Europe with a population growth up to 20 per cent. The fear of the Islamization of Europe also contributes to the revival of far-right-wing parties in Europe and to the introduction of tougher immigration policies. Anxieties and fear about the ‘Islamization of Europe’ were clearly seen in two recent bans of minarets in Switzerland, and the burka ban in France; mosque and minaret construction projects in several European countries, namely Sweden, France, Italy, Austria, Greece, Germany and Slovenia have been met by protests.

As a result, it is an indisputable fact that Europe’s Christian identity is facing off against Islam today. Related discussions necessarily involve the concept of democracy. The presence of Muslims in Europe along with their claims, as well as the Turkish claim for membership in the European Union, arouse anxiety and raise a series of public debates, which generally address Western cultural values of democracy (Göle, 2005, p. 140).

It is thought that modern western civilization is represented by western values which are often described as “universal” values, such as democracy, pluralism, tolerance, fundamental freedoms, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, the separation of church and state, individualism, liberalism, and constitutionalism. Modern western societies base their philosophical principles, political and economic institutions and social structures on the values of liberal-democracy; therefore, all social, political and economic structures of these societies embody the values of tolerance, pluralism and individual freedoms. The embedding of these values has made western societies successful, politically, economically and intellectually. In accordance with Charles

Taylor's argument that "religion is part of the moral basis of Western civilization" (cited in Bogdani, 2011, p. 50).

On the other hand, Islam tends to be considered as a representative of a different civilization and not compatible with democracy. The incompatibility may be the reality in terms of Islam and Islamic law; yet it is not a one way street as far as Turkey is concerned. Turkey has been governed by a democracy rules though it experienced some interruptions and in a developing process, and it is not a secret that the current government emphasis pluralist democracy.

It is true that one of the main differences between most Muslim countries and western democracies is the separation between religion and politics, or church and state. There is no doubt that Islam has a totally different affair with secularization than the European experience. Ernest Gellner argues that Islam is immune to secularization. According to Gellner, "Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, eternal, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society... These rules are to be implemented throughout social life" (cited in Kuru, 2009, p. 30). Yet again, the Turkish Republic is not ruled by the canon law, moreover secularization has an important place in the country. Ahmet T. Kuru (2009) argues that "secularism is not a necessary condition for democracy. Similarly, secularism co-exists with both democracy and authoritarianism. Thus, secularism is not a sufficient condition for democracy either" (p.32) and Turkey is a typical example of this with its interrupted democracy process.

A modern Turkey has been a *laic* country (more of a repressed religion rather than freedom of religion delivered by Diyanet). Therefore, it would prove problematic and inadequate only to monitor Islam when discussing the incompatibility of Islam and secularism in the context of Turkey. It takes a thorough investigation to comprehend the religion in Turkey. Still, Turkey is governed by democratic elections even though it has a problematic issue compared to the western understanding on democracy. That is to say, holding elections is not an indication of democracy by itself. Nilüfer Göle (2006) mentions four concrete instances to illustrate Turkey with European democracies: the first tension in the Turkish political system is between authoritarian laicism and democracy, the second example is the abolition of the death penalty in 2002, the third crucial moment came when the Turkish parliamentary vote denied the

US request to attack Iraq from Turkish soil, the last topic concerns the Armenian question (pp. 256-259).

Mirela Bogdani (2011) collects the oppositions based on Turkey's democratic and secular identity being different than the one Europe has under four titles; two of them are in line with Göle's estimations. The first one is the secularization of the state being guarded by the military. Secondly, secularism was imposed by the state. Thirdly, Turkey is a secular country but a Muslim society; it was secularized at the official level, but religion has always remained a strong force at the public level. Fourthly, Turkey has difficulties even at the stage of the Copenhagen criteria (pp. 43-47).

Even so, the facts about Turkey listed above require analyzing the structure of Turkey. And it would be useful to understand Europe before analyzing Turkey. Because the issue of understanding Islam in Europe is directly connected with understanding how the notion of Europe is conceptualized by Europeans (Asad, 2003, p. 159). For this reason, following sections of the chapter are related to Europe.

3.2 Ongoing Discussion: What is Europe?

The EU can be analyzed with two different approaches. On the one hand, it can be argued that the EU traces its beginnings in the years just after World War II and possibly also to several economic and political developments during the interwar period. On the other hand, it also be stated that today's EU has a much more distant origin with the help of Emile Durkheim's notion of "collective representations", that called us as "the idea of a Europe" (Swedberg, 1994, p. 378), and the main approach of this thesis based on the second one. This chapter aims to investigate how "Europe" has been (re)shaped throughout the centuries, what place Christianity has in European identity, and the current position of religion in the EU to find out whether there is a common pattern which is stringent in each member state.

Particularly with an enlargement process of the EU, the characterization of "Europe" and "European" has gained further importance. Today, Europe seems to be "torn" between different and rivalry ideological visions about the formation of European identity (Keyman and Öniş, 2007, p. 92). Europe, if it is a concept, is one of essentially contested concepts. This comprehension corresponds with the range of

“Europes” which often found in the literature on the formation of European identity (Levin, 2011, p. 164). This variety also illustrates where Turkey situates within a European mindset.

Starting from this point, an approach to “the idea of a united Europe” inspired by Talal Asad’s perspective. Talal Asad (2003) states that the comprehension of Islam in Europe is associated with consideration of how Europe is being conceptualized by Europeans (p. 158). In this context, the concept of “Europe” has, in fact, been continually changing patterns and dynamics which are historically fictionalized (Delanty, 1995, p. 4) What significant is in this thesis, that it would appear that “Europe” as a contested discursive construct successfully employed by the EU in the recent decades (Keyman and Öniş, 2007, p. 92). In the postwar era, the EU has been progressively used interchangeably with Europe (Risse, 2004, p. 255). Within this context, Europe has geographical, historical and political meanings (Balibar, 1999, p. 3).

The Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome clarifies that any “European” state could apply for membership of the EU. However, what or who “European” is not conclusively defined. “European” concept stands out an identity definition which can be inclusive or exclusive based on “self” and “other”. Yet, to be “European” is a contentious concept which underlines various components of identity, especially evaluating candidate states with it. Moreover, “European identity” is also a “matter” from the point of member states. There are many differences with an existence of several cultural identities and this led to difficulties in the construction of the EU identity (Öner, 2011, p. 51). Here, a significant question becomes the main topic of the main discussion, “What holds Europe together?”. And this question is a lodestar to investigate the role of religion in the Turkey’s accession to the EU. The focal point is grounded on Europe and its perception of Turkey, more specifically Christianity and Islam as Christianity’s “other”. Therefore, one should initially comprehend the European perception. How can Europe be identified? What are the components of the European perception?

The discourse of Europe is paradoxical, because it does not always stand for unity and inclusion. It is also about construction which underlines differences based on exclusion and norms of exclusion (Delanty, 1995:1). *Othering* can be seen in the discussion on different religions, in the case of Turkey’s accession. Therefore,

defining Europe and finding a certain meaning for it is almost impossible.. The term ‘Europe’ has a long history, but the idea of Europe is a recent phenomenon. Until the end of the twentieth century, Europe was a concept with some assumptions. Linguistic usages in various historical contexts suggest a certain European self-awareness, that is to say, an awareness of being part of Europe and of Europe being the discriminating element, but the term itself has covered a variety of meanings, which have been changed with the changing historical circumstances (Wilson and Dussen, 1995: 13). Moreover, “although European identity, as a part of an elite culture, has existed since the 16th century, it has not existed until the end of the 18th century as part of individual identity” (*Ibid.*, pp. 8-9). Therefore, Europe should be analyzed in accordance with its perpetual meaning which has been reconstructed in history.

There are many confusing questions here, what do we refer to when we are talking about Europe? What do people understand from it? Does Europe have a simple and single definition? Is it a concept which only refers a geographical region? Does it have a purely subjective meaning? Or is it an idea/concept which is being reconstructed beyond a region in a historical process?

Klaus Held (2002) tries to define Europe which is an ambiguous concept. First of all, the concept of Europe is used as a geographical perception which refers to a specific region of the globe. The second one is a certain form of culture (p. 81). Despite the fact that it could be described as a region, it cannot be analyzed only within territorial borders. Yet, drawing up a definite territorial boundary has always been a problematic issue in Europe. Its borders are being constantly reconstructed by Europeans. Europe, however, has been redefined in connection with its neighboring states and world politics. Europe, as a geographical region, does not define borders between states. Especially, this argument is clearly made out by the current boundaries of Eastern Europe.

Considering Europe only as a geographical region would be incomplete. It is undeniable that Europe is more than this, “it is for sure that Europe is more than a region and polity; it is an idea and identity...” (Delanty, 1995, p. 2). People primarily tend to think of certain features which characterize a unique continental culture. In this framework, several things may be identified as European and for instance, several people indicate that democracy is a European invention (Held, 2002, p. 81).

In addition these two meanings of Europe, thinking Europe within historical context can provide a broader framework. Lila Leontidou (2004) underlines three regional narratives for Europe. The concept of Europe was generated from the polytheistic mythology of Ancient Greece as a cultural formation around the Mediterranean before the historiographical period. During the Middle Ages, the concept of Europe shifted to address the North West of Europe as colonial and cultural constitution of Christianity, before the formation of nation states. Finally, the integration of Europe which originated from the catastrophic World Wars in the 20th century not only close the borders between people in the context of globalization after the collapse of the bipolar world system, but also brings new and different bureaucratic and institutional hierarchies. In this pattern there are three main terms: Antiquity, Christianity and the European Union. These three narratives need to be clarified in detail for a better understanding of the sociopolitical constructions of Europe and its boundaries and the places of the neighboring and declared candidate countries of the European Union (p. 593-617).

As it stated Leontidou's argument, Christianity is a significant "reality" in Europe and the main argument shaped objections to Turkey's membership related to cultural difference, even though the EU has no formal specific policy with references to Christianity. Why do many states and people assert that Christianity and Islam are incompatible with each other? What is the role of Christianity in European history? The 'Europe' concept does not exist in the Bible (Wilson and Dussen, 1995:19), however, it became a Christian notion or at least a part of Christian way of thinking. How did it happen?

Before going to investigate Europe and Christianity in historical context, I mention how an approach of this thesis to this spesific issue inspired. Micheal Foucault (2005) states that people's manner of action and reaction is related with a way of thinking and so, this way of thinking is normally related to a tradition (p. 103). Political and social processes which paved the way to regularize western European societies are familiar parts of perspective which were used to. Political and social processes, which paved the way to regularize Western European societies, are used in parts of the perspective. These political and social processes are not clear, since they were used out or forgotten. According to Foucault, the subject could gain individuality through displaying the fact that many things, which are the parts of

accustomed appearance and accepted as universal, are the distinct products of historical changes (Foucault, 2005: 100).

There is one more significant concept which is a basis of my approach: invented tradition. Many traditions were invented in many cases throughout history. “Invented tradition” is taken as a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm, 1993, p. 1). Traditions have played an important role in the perception of Europe throughout history. For example, as mentioned above, state-building also includes many invented symbols and traditions. Therefore, the viewpoints of Foucault and Hobsbawm are significant to trace historical context. Nonetheless, the concept of Europe, as a strong power, could not be minimized to any idea, identity or reality. The fact is that the discourse in which historical facts were constituted, also shaped the ideas and identities (*Ibid.*, p. 5).

In the light of information given above, the concept of Europe will be analyzed under the title of “the idea of a United Europe” which refers to a historical background. Beyond being a unique regional unity established in the 20th century, as Europe is “an idea and identity, a historically fabricated reality of ever changing forms and dynamics” (Delanty, 1995, p. 3).

3.2.1 The Idea of a United Europe: Historical Background

In this section, ideas and events which promote the idea of a United Europe with a historical context will be examined. This historical analysis traces the historical accumulations of building Europe as an identity and the perception of “the other” considering periods of Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, the mutual cultural heritage of Christianity and Islam, the Renaissance and the Reformation, the French Revolution, the foundations of the Modern State and finally the EU. In these various periods, Europe has been re-identified for many reasons. Yet, Europe history is much more comprehensive and full of many events and details. This section regarded as a glance to comprehend the idea of a united Europe, before moving on an investigation whether religion is an obstacle in Turkey’s accession to the EU.

Although Europe did not have a sophisticated meaning back then, its historical roots lie in Antiquity. The idea of a Europe used to belong to myths and legends before becoming a geographical statement (Delanty, 1995, p. 27). The etymological root of the term Europe originates from the Greek mythology. Rather than its geographical meaning, Europa was the name of a mythological figure. In several myths, the figure of Europa was symbolized as princess or semi-goddess, Phoenician princess; a granddaughter of Poseidon, or a princess who was kidnapped by Zeus in the form of an after which and then she married to the King of Crete (Leontidou, 2004, p. 596). Not only Europe, but also Asia and Africa have a place in the mythology. They are all sisters in many myths (Delanty, 1995, p. 17). On the other hand, some scholars claim that Europe is not a Greek invention, but it is a Phonecian one and it may have Semitic roots. The notion of Europe based on Greek origin was an invention that occurred in the subsequent term, and according to Bernal's famous thesis (1987) this notion arose from the struggles within the formation process of the European cultural tradition whose roots were based in Ancient Greece, not the East (*Ibid.*, p.18) .

Europe as a broader notion in Antiquity expresses at most a geographical idea with no definitive borders, and still less of a political identity. In the South, the Mediterranean separated Europe from Africa; in the east, the Sea of Azov and the River Don were often considered to mark the boundary between Asia and Europe, in the West, the Pillars of Hercules indicated the start of the ocean that was thought to surround the whole world (*Ibid.*, pp. 7 – 11).

The geographical expression of ‘Europe’ gets a special connotation as a consequence of the confrontation between the Persians and the Greeks. “Greek colonists settled in the West coast of Asia Minor, the Ionian coast. The Greek city-states were located around the Mediterranean and so, they had more contact with Asia rather than Europe as the continent that we refer to today. The Aegean Sea had for centuries been a connecting route which made possible intensive commercial contact. Colonization increased the awareness of the differences between Hellenes and non-Hellenes” (Wilson and Dussen, 1995, p. 16). The Ionian city-states got help from the Greek homeland against the expansion of the Persian Empire. Therefore, wars began between the Greeks and Persians.

The conflicts between Greece and Persia was viewed by the Greeks as representing the conflict between Asia and Europe, and stood for freedom as opposed to

despotism (Wilson and Dussen, 1995: 16). In the 5th century BC, Greek authors started to emphasize the differences between language, customs, and distinct systems of government between Europe and Asia. Herodotus indicated that wars between Greece and Persia were confrontation of Asian people who are despotic, ruthless, and unjust with the free Hellenic people (Fontana, 2005, p. 3). During this period, the word “barbarian” was used by the Hellenes to identify non-Hellenes firstly. After the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC, there was increasing Hellenization in the East, as well as influences from Eastern cultures in the West (Wilson and Dussen, 1995: 17). In this period, Europa is binding with Hellen (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 21).

In various references, The Roman Empire was accepted as an inheritance in Europe. As Delanty quoted, T.S. Eliot said “we are all, so far as we inherit the civilization of Europe, still citizens of the Roman Empire” (p. 17). Christopher Dawson (2003) illustrates this idea, the expansion of the tradition of a higher civilization to the West was the work of Rome whose mission was to act as the intermediary between the civilized Hellenistic World of the Eastern Mediterranean and the barbaric people of Western Europe (16). However, it should be noted that neither Greeks nor the Romans had a strong sense of an understanding what called as European identity today.

Following years, Christianity started to take a role in Europe history scene when the Roman Empire accepted it as an official religion. There were many gods and goddesses, fragmented rituals, taboos, and traditions before Christianity was founded as the official state religion in The Roman Empire. In fact, Christianity had been a missionary religion which relied on preaching and instance to persuade people to join the Christian community. Christianity was considered to be a factor which could have unified the Empire.

However, the Roman Empire was separated into two parts, Eastern and Western, in 286 BC and new concepts evolved: the Occident and the Orient. The notion of the Occident refers to the Hellenistic Occident and it used increasingly to refer to the Western region of the former Roman Empire and came into the picture with Latin Christianity and Europe and Occident becoming synonymous with Christendom. The conflict between Europe and the Orient was slowly becoming apparent in these far-reaching developments. The Orient was no longer merely Persia, but was gradually coming to designate Asia Minor. However, the concept Occident was not significant

like today, it did not have more than geographical meaning. Thereafter, the idea of Europe began to take shape as a cultural idea (Delanty 1995: 22-23). Thus, the gap between Asia and Europe, East and West and especially Occident and Orient with their changing and expanding meanings have played a great role in the formation of Europe throughout the centuries.

Political existence of Europe dates back into the Roman Empire as its spiritual unity originates from the Catholic Church (Dawson, 2003, p. 52). In other words, two concepts, namely Western civilization and the Western Christendom, have a major impact on the notion of Europe (Davies, 1996, p. 9). Following years, Europe was under the influence of feudalism. Feudalism was the dominant government system of the Middle Ages, in which people were faithful to their lords, their seniors and also to universal authority, namely the emperor or the Pope (Yurdusev, 1997, p. 38). The feudal system, as a social and economical foundation, is peculiar to Europe and it distinguishes Europe from the rest of the world. Davies (1996) states that “feudalism, remained essentially a western phenomenon. Feudalism deeply affected the life of the church. It greatly weakened central ecclesiastical authority. It gave great power to local potentates and put the clergy at their mercy” (p. 315). The Middle Ages was an extended span of time in which colonials had become vassals, landlords had become feudal lords and theology had governed the politics in a multipartite international system (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 23). It can be argued that “early feudalism can relieve the strain only by simplifying institutions and personalizing loyalties. It must start by working against state-building, even if in the end it can become the basis for state-building” (Tilly and Jordan, 2005, p. 15).

As a dividing line between the Ancient and Medieval periods, the foundation of the Germanic kingdoms in the West has always been accepted as one of the important milestones in the history of the World, as well as the barbarian invasions (Dawson, 2003, p. 78). The barbarian tribes of the North, for example Anglo Saxon Kingdom in Britain, Persians, Vikings and Hungarians were no longer a threat because many of them had been converted to Christianity (Delanty, 1995: 24). It was difficult to find anything like a state anywhere on the continent of Europe until the year 1000; fragmentation proceeded at various rates (Tilly and Jordan, 2005, p. 15).

The barbarian attacks, as the biggest threat to Greek and Roman civilizations, left its place in the Muslim colony which was a building threat at the time and this led to a

conflict of Islam and Christianity was considerable on the formation of the Eurocentric Worldview (Delanty, 1995, p. 23). The age of the Crusades had a great role in the clash between Islam and Christianity. From the tenth to thirteenth centuries, Western European aristocrats known as crusaders and their forces charged from their homeland to the East (Bartlett, 1993, p. 24). A total number of the 150 crusades held until the 12th century had an important role in bringing Europe together in a common concept of threat and joint action and created a unifying effect. Christianity and the Latin language had been the braces of this process while the concept of expansive religion, suggested by St. Augustine, had become the manifestation of the dominant perception until the 11th century (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 23). The significance of this event is that the notion of Christianity was seen as a unifying tool for nations that are divided by language and ethnicity. Furthermore, an ethno-cultural homogenizing identity was created which also became a core feature of European identity.

In the 15th century, the seeds of the industrial revolution, political reforms and new regimes were shown via the developing manufacturing technologies, the collapse of feudalism, discoveries and exploration of new trade routes and new lands (Dedeoğlu:, 2003: 25). The relations with the other continents and cultures as a result of the geographical explorations played an important role in forming European identity. During the fifteenth century the Portuguese were the first to sail to the coast of West Africa, America (1492) and to India (1498), not to mention Magellan, the first to circumnavigate the world (1519-21). Geographical knowledge has ever advanced. For instance, *Atlas Minor* was published by Hondius in Amsterdam, in 1607. It regards Europe as the first of the continents in terms of its population, fertility and illustrious deeds of its habitants. It contains an intriguing map of the world on which the spread of Christendom was indicated by symbols. The French edition is more interesting, since it includes also Islam and Judaism indicated by symbols. And this is important since it is the first map which attempts to indicate the distribution of the world's religions by symbols (Wilson and Dussen, 1995: 45). According to Edward Said (2004), the fundamental relation in the political, cultural and even in the sacred context was a form of enforcement: to educate the East by modern western methods and to give an identity and a definition of the East, saving it from its barbarism. All these ideas are proposals which have become reality with the orientalism that was

launched with the geographical explorations (p. 96).

It can be argued that the term ‘Europe’ had begun to be used as more than a geographical cultural term, with the underlying meaning of Christians living on the European continent between the 8th and 10th centuries. Yet it was not until the fifteenth century that the word Europe took its place in the literature with the above-mentioned meaning. During the following period, in spite of the predominant depression, vast mortality, social unrest, political and religious crisis, which Europe endured from the mid-fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century, the identification of Europe with Christianity also became widespread (Wilson & Dussen, 1995, p. 34). At this time, the polarization between Christianity and Islam that was not related to the notion of Europe, although it will shape this nation in the future to a great extent. By the 10th century, the notion of Europe had evolved into a cultural notion with political attributes rather than a geographical term, yet was not the basis of the European identity.

The fall of Constantinople also had major importance in the conflict between Islam and Christianity. Since Constantinople was conquered by the Ottomans in 1453 then, it is the capital of the greatest Islamic civilization in the world, and it also brought along the argument of what is known as ‘Turkey in Europe’ (Delanty, 1995, p. 36). During their hegemony, the Ottomans were Europe’s other.¹⁰ The border between the West and the East Europe, once was determined with Byzantium, was replaced with the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman surges into the west was considered as a threat for the 15th century Europe. In response, George Podebrad, the king of Bohemia and Pope Pius II, called for a European alliance against the Ottoman threat in 1459 (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 25). Pope Pius II (1458-1464) tried to organize a joint defense for the “Respublica Christina” against the Ottoman threat, but without effect. Conquering Jerusalem was out of the question for the Crusaders, rather defending Europe. Republican Christina and Europe were used as interchangeable synonyms. Pope Pius II was the one who was the first to use the adjective ‘Europeus’, derived from the Latin noun ‘Europa’ (Wilson and Dussen, 1995, p. 35). All, these of facts show that Christianity had an important place in the

¹⁰ In fact, one may think that the Turkish Republic is different from the Ottoman Empire is the only fact. But the assumption asserting that they are completely different is not true. The history of the Turkish Republic cannot be thought without the Ottoman Empire.

notion of Europe in the Medieval period. The notion of Europe was basically a geographical term and was at the service of the dominant Christian identity until the end of the 15th century. The Western notion of Europe was reinforced with the triumphs of the Age of Discovery. Later on, Europe began to grow away from its alliance with Christendom and created an independent discourse.

In fact, the idea of a Europe “is a creation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for it was during these centuries that it entered into its own as a secularized version of Christendom which began to decline as a unifying narrative” (Delanty, 1995, p. 64). On the one hand, Renaissance represented “a tremendous affirmation of the limitless possibilities of human existence” and this Renaissance point on “realizing hitherto latent intellectual and creative possibilities no doubt underlies the extraordinary achievements of European culture first in art and then in science in the early modern period” (Pubul, 2012, p. 22). On the other hand, the division of Christendom the Protestant North and the Catholic South was one of the most important issues of the 16th century. The Reformation and the seventeenth century wars which related to religion divided Christianity: Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism and its Puritan sects (*Ibid.*, p. 67). Moreover, following Thirty Years War, The Treaty of Westphalia was signed, which was “a structure of political authority that was forged centuries ago by a sharply secularizing set of events and that has endured in its secular guise ever since” (Philpott, 2002, p. 79). This means that the salience of religion in politics declined, that is to say “two related developments – secular modernization and the rise of science and rationality- would combine to put relentless pressure on religious faith, resulting in its steady decay and the emergence around the world of decidedly secular polities and societies” (Haynes, 2007, p. 32).

The Enlightenment Age provided a basis for a new secular identity of Europe (*Ibid.*, p. 65). With the Enlightenment, reasoning, knowledge and science had become distinctive powers. An individualism and liberal thought influenced the history of Europe. One of the fundamental elements which is effective in the *sui-generis* character of Europe after the 18th century is that religion gave up its claims to be a distinctive central power during the period in which the nation-states emerged. The rationalism and the inquisitive spirit of the era realized itself within a differentiated society in which the state and religion assumed different roles (*Ibid.*, p. 101). Therefore, it is a fact that “the Enlightenment’s progressivism was premised on an

optimistic account of human nature and a high confidence in the beneficence of science” (Pubul, 2012, p. 18).

Within this period, the other important element which is capitalism¹¹. The role of capitalism in the building of states and the historical changes cannot be ignored. Charles Tilly (1990) mentions that a long-lasting process of negotiation took place between the state-makers and the emerging capitalist bourgeoisie in which “the pursuit of war and military capacity, after having created nation states as a sort of by-product, led to a civilization of government and domestic politics” (p. 206). In other words, the primary events affecting the notion of unity in 18th century Europe involved the growth of the capitalist bourgeois economy and the predominant liberal political disposition. As a result of growing trade as the keystone of the economy, the bourgeoisie gained political power and the idea was promoted that the system would work ‘efficiently’ in a peaceful environment. Therefore, the Enlightenment Age of Europe had flourished around peace and trade. However, European history cannot be read without one of the most significant ideas, maybe the most one, “*property theory*” which can be regarded as a basis of today’s European mindset. John Locke sees the body as everyone’s original property, and people increase their property by mixing their labor with the earth. This theory justifies interest and accumulation of “wealth” and it is central to a western and European mindset¹².

Following these events mentioned above, The French Revolution does have capital importance for European society. It was not a movement only about France but about Europe in general. National movements started out with the mottos of equality, freedom and fraternity. For this reason, the French Revolution was thought to be an adjustment of the idea of a united Europe (Delanty, 1995, p. 65). The French Revolution is based on anti-Christian humanism (Pubul, 2012, p. 23), and the process ended up with state and nation building processes within secular understanding. The idea of a United Europe was taking the shape of a cultural model in the 18th century. The words of Jean Jacques Rousseau perfectly explain the notion of a united Europe; “There is no longer a France, a Germany, a Spain, not even England, there are only Europeans. All have the same tastes, the same passions, the same way of life” (cited

¹¹ For a detailed analysis on capitalism see, Giddens, a. 1987. The nation state and violence. United States: University of California Press (122-172). Wallerstein, I. 1979. The Capitalist World-economy, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Braudel, F. 1984. The Perspective of the World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

¹² You can see “Second Treaties on Civil Government” chapter 5 for more detail.

in Delanty, 1995, p. 71).

The friction between the East and the West was increasing due to the West describing the East in a “self and other” contradiction. It was a time when new terms were added to the literature. And with the linguistic evolution of the term civilization, which stands for ‘enlightenment’, was complete in the middle of the 18th century with its first appearance in the printed media (Braudel, 1980, p. 180). Furthermore, the 19th century was not only the age of nationalism but also was the age of romanticism. Although nationalism and romanticism are closely linked, they are conceptually very different. While nationalism was a prospective political ideal, romanticism was based on the revival of the old revolutionary pattern (116). Unlike in ancient Greece, Europe gained importance as a concept beyond mythology. The concept of Europe was invented in the first half of the 19th century. The classics were forged as a conventional discipline to generate a European cultural tradition stemming from a purified ancient Greece with no reference to its roots in the Orient (Delanty, 1995: 18).

Wilson and Dussen’s analysis on Europe in the 19th century is noteworthy:

The concept of European culture has arisen in the eighteenth century, but the *history* of European culture as an idea in itself originated only in the nineteenth. The concept of Europe became a dynamic one. This historical vision of Europe was closely connected with contemporary political, social, and religious ideals and ideas of what the future should bring. The concept of Europe was therefore not only historicized, but also politicized; in other words, it was seen more and more historical terms, with contemporary political debate forming the frame of reference. Roughly speaking, the division was one between the supporters and the opponents of the ideals of the Revolution, but within both parties there were considerable differences of emphasis with regard to the vision of Europe (1995, p. 70).

In sum, proceeding to the EU, it is important to note that Europe does not have a common history that embraces every region in Europe. For starters, Ancient Greece was a local civilization. The Roman Empire was unable to conquer Europe totally; Scandinavia, half of Germany and England, Eastern Europe were not included in the Roman Empire. Christianity had influenced almost all of Europe in the 16th century. The Renaissance did not reach Northern and Eastern Europe. The Reformation was only influential in Latin Christianity. When the above-mentioned events are taken into account, it would be fair to say that all of the social movements are dynamic in their nature and these phases do not necessarily stage an ultimate result. Each phase works up the next one and the resulting structures and foundations manifest changes

due to the time and conditions (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 38). Consequently, “Europe’ presupposes neither a prior identity to be overcome, nor a new one to be achieved” (Gasché, 2007, p. 17).

3.2.2 Europe in the Twentieth Century: A Unification Process

The 20th was one of the most significant ages in the history of Europe humanity with the World Wars and devastating catastrophes, following technological improvements and the velocity gained in the destruction of the planet, that can be called as “age of extremes” by Eric Hobsbawm. Each period of economic or political crisis brings about a need to re-evaluate the historical background in accordance with the international conjuncture. Therefore, the World Wars of the 20th century have unprecedentedly accelerated the integration process (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p 41). Indeed, the two World Wars devastated the European and the bipolar world system, brought by the World War II and increased the debates on integration. In the aftermath of World War II, all Europeans had difficulty of reconstructing their economies, and Europe needed peace and stability, above all (Staab, 2008, p. 6).

One can argue that the idea of Europe is a product of conflicts rather than concord (Delanty, 1995, p.3). Indeed, there had been numerous wars throughout European history. For example, a war broke out in the last quarter of the 15th century and went on through the first quarter of the 16th century between France and the Hapsburg Empire for the domination of Italy. Another significant war was the Thirty Years’ War 17th century. The War of the Spanish Succession in the 18th century is another instance. In the last quarter of the 18th century, expeditions of Napoleon Bonaparte resulted in other wars. Italy and Germany had established a political unity as a result of the hard times of the first half of the 20th century. With the changing balance of power, the First World War, one of the most important wars in the human history, broke out. The war cost 8 million lives, led empires to fall apart and alliances to break up (*Ibid.*, p. 150).

The post-World War organization process in Europe was limited to the victorious nations’ efforts to support the *status quo* within the League of Nations (founded in 1920) rather than promoting a regional revival. This notion of revival, which was invented by the French President Aristide Briand, is also supported by Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi. Kalergi’s (1894-1972) book entitled “Pan-

“Europa” was published in 1923. Kalergi takes a political alliance established in Europe as a security of the peace. The first federalist movement of Europe, the PanEuropean Union, was founded in 1924 and carried on until it was prohibited by Nazi Germany in 1933. Several other initiatives were introduced in the years in question.

The ‘Organization for European Economic Co-operation’ which brought banking and industry communities together; and the project of Anatole de Monzie which was involving the cooperation of France and Germany in the coal and steel plants in Ruhr and Lorraine –which also brought about the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)- are just a few of the significant initiatives. By the way, the Europe concept cannot be set apart from the European fascism and its heritage, the EU; just as it cannot be set apart from the catastrophic Nazi attack in the guise of homogenizing the European culture. The German point of view and claims of European leadership and their conception of ‘*Sonderweg*’ have played an important role in the making of the political map of Europe after 1945 which made Germany closer to find a united Europe (Delanty, 1995, p. 114).

Since the process of the EU has much more detail, it will be reviewed shortly. Basically, today’s European Union consists of three communities established in the 20th century: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). However, there were different viewpoints that influenced the notion of integration before the 20th century. We will mention these viewpoints before analyzing the integration of Europe.

3.2.3 Different viewpoints on the idea of a united Europe

In fact, many ideas were brought up on the unification of Europe throughout history before the establishment of the European Union. For instance, St. Thomas Aquinas, a philosopher who lived between the years 1225 and 1274, law is a hierarchy of rules and the social movements can only be successful if they are for the ‘common good’ – or common interest-, moreover it is possible to find common interests between different fractions. Nevertheless, the insight of John of Paris, who lived in the 14th century, suggesting a separation of the powers of the Church and the King.

The suggestions in the book *De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae* dated 1306, written by Pierre Dubois, a Normand lawyer and the consultant of the King of France, happens to be one of the milestones in the evolution of the idea of European unification. Although, Dubois advocates the reoccupation of Jerusalem, the procedures he proposed to reach this goal involve the unification of Europe. He also mentioned that the ongoing conflicts within Europe weaken the states and make them susceptible to attacks; what was necessary in order to avoid this situation and to provide peace is organization. And this organization in question is not based on a global monarchy but an international arbitration.

One of the contemporaries of Pierre Dubois, The Florentine writer Alighieri Dante almost refers to the freedom of movement and residence when he wrote “one’s country is the whole world” in his masterpiece, *Divina Comedia*. Dante also carries out a similar course in his book *De Monarchia* dated 1308. Dante suggests that the reasons behind the chaotic order of his era and the obstacles behind why a person cannot be regarded as a world citizen are caused by state sovereignty. Dante proposes to maintain the structural differences between the Papacy and the Monarchs and while doing this makes sure it is rooted in the cultural unity in Europe. Being the first to pronounce a cultural unity, Dante underlines that monarchy plays an important role in sustaining this legacy in contrast with Dubois. According to Dante, many states should be united under one monarchy and there must be only one set of rules applied to all the participants. This layout, which is almost the same as the first step of today’s European Union, aims to revive the ‘*Pax Romana*’ (Dedeoğlu, 2003, pp. 24-25).

The King of Bohemia, George Podebrad, mentioned the necessity to unite in order to take Istanbul back from the Ottomans in his book dated 1463. The prevailing theme of this book was that in order to take Istanbul back, first they needed to tend the intrinsic issues in a peaceful platform and combine their forces. In other words, they needed to establish a new ‘*Pax Europa*’. A European confederacy was designed in line with the definition above, yet the union could not be actualized (*Ibid.*, p. 26).

The concept of Europe while on one hand, was aiming to defend against the ‘other’, on the other hand became an ethos opposite to the ‘other’. Jean Bodin mentioned *laicism* in his book ‘*Les Six Livres de la République*’ dated 1576 and Hobbes’ (1588-1679) social contract theory along with a baseline for the principles regarding the

European unification (*Ibid.*, 26).

The first half of the 17th century had been a time for taking on tangible initiatives and applicable projects in line with European integration. Almost all of the proposed designs involved a peaceful atmosphere provided by the organization. Today's European Union was also formed around the idea of peace. As we may see here, a sense of peace feeding on wars has been surfacing at intervals. Emeric Lacroix (Emeric Crucé) has suggested ways to provide political unity in Western Europe in his book *Nouveau Cynée* dated 1623. The most striking part of his suggestion involves the establishment of the worldwide trade liberalization. This suggestion resembles the European Council in terms of politics and the World Trade Organization in terms of trade liberalization. Associating peace and trade liberalization directly corresponds to the integration of Europe ((*Ibid.*, p. 28). Duc de Sully (1560-1641) argues that the importance of a council which includes countries that could be identified as 'Christian'. The article titled "de jure belli et pacis" dated 1625 and written by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch jurist and the person who laid the foundations of the international law, also involves similar suggestions. Grotius suggests the establishment of a 'general assembly of nations' consisting of princes or kings at the service of the international peace (*Ibid.*, 29). Nevertheless, in the last quarter of the 17th century, Quaker William Penn argued that a united Europe was necessary in order to protect the integrity of the Christianity and to join forces against Turks (Delanty, 1995, p. 84).

John Locke (1632-1704), one of the significant promoters of the Enlightenment Age of the 17th century Europe, has set the scene for his successors by building his ideas around social contract, separation of powers, liberty and property which led to a new phase of the European mindset. William Penn (1644-1718), inspired by notably Duc de Sully and his contemporaries, in his book dated 1693, suggests the organization of Europe in order to prevent another war between France and England. Similarly, St. Pierre (1658-1743) also supports the organization of Europe in his book dated 1713, yet underlines that this organization should only include Christian nations. Aside from Montesquieu's theory of the separation of powers, Jean Jacques Rousseau's studies have also had a significant impact on the development of the European Integration model. Rousseau (1712-1778) not only paved the way for modern constitutions but his ideas also appealed to the people who were instrumental in the

events leading to the French Revolution (*Ibid*, p. 31). Rousseau presented the essentials of political engineering in his social contract. The idea of Europe is made up of the evident social contract which is also conceived as an alliance of nations (Delanty, 1995, p. 102). Jeremy Bentham's (1748-1832) discourse in 'A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace' (1789) is also abounding with innovations on the integration of Europe. Bentham suggested a European union with two branches; first is the European Council and the second is a collective army. Another significant name for his contribution to the integration of Europe after the French Revolution is Kant (1724-1804). Kant refers to a universal peace in his essay "on perpetual peace" dated 1795. He also supports the idea that peace should have been built among European countries in order to build the World peace and it should be interconnected with the orders of the law (Dedeoğlu, 2003, pp. 31-32). Edmund Burke stated in 1796 that "no European can feel completely like an exile anywhere in Europe" (cited in Delanty: 103). Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) also noted, in the periodical (1814) which Augustin Thierry was also collaborating, that Europeans should be united by means of common institutions and establish a confederation (Dedeoğlu, 2003, pp. 31-32). Nevertheless, the divisive and warlike attributions of the Europe notion are prevalent in most of the preliminary ideas on the integration of Europe. Leibniz and Hume were the well-known advocates of the Enlightenment ideals, championing a European alliance (Delanty, 1995, p. 104). In addition, Kalergi's statements after the World War I, as mentioned above, were highly influential on the integration of Europe.

Finally, Jean Monnet suggested that France and England to unite in a confederacy and Tonybee suggested these two countries to enter into an alliance in issues such as defense, economy and European citizenry in 1940. Similarly, Paul-Henri Spaak called for an economical, political and military alliance between France, Belgium and Holland in 1944. In the same year, Luxemburg, Holland and Belgium signed a customs union agreement in order to take effect following the end of the war (Dedeoğlu, 2003, p. 45).

3.2.4 Towards the European Union: communities and treaties

The notion of Europe was overshadowed by the notion of the West for most of the 20th century. Yet, the West was not only about Europe anymore. The West, globally

speaking, found a new meaning during the Cold War when the West faced off against the East. Europe had lost its significance due to the East and West opposition in the setting of the Cold War. It is clear that the Cold War had an impact on the development of the idea of Europe in the period starting from the end of the World War II.

It can be claimed that the Cold War has its roots in the October Revolution, yet it takes a while until there is an evident polarization between the East and the West. In the period following 1945, Russia had a border with the West for the first time and the Slavic nations, primarily Poland and the Balkans, have found themselves symbolically separated from the West with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The Berlin Wall was the prominent example of the internal split of Europe. The war while bringing guilt to the German national identity, also made the notion of Europe a prospective program, cleared from the past mistakes. Europe, as the Eastern border of the United States, had become a re-patterned power against communism. Therefore, it can be said that the United States supported the idea of Europe. Besides, the United States was re-exploring Europe by this time, just as once Europe was inventing myths about the East. Americans were considering themselves a part of an old civilization through romanticizing Europe and the notion of Europe increased its importance by being the Eastern border of the West. Poland, while losing one fifth of its population in the war, had physically expanded a couple of hundred meters towards the West. Besides, the Soviet Union had advanced towards the West by capturing Eastern Poland and the Baltic countries. This historical turn of events resulted in a new West which had lasted until 1989 (Delanty, 1995, pp. 157-163).

In the period after the Second World War, the new polarization was between the North Atlantic and the Soviet Union. Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech (1946) and the Truman Doctrine made this new polarization clear (*Ibid.*, p. 115). And the Marshall Plan was launched to help European countries, with a goal to reconstruct Europe. Following that, many organizations were established with the motto of "Never, again" (Ülger, 2008, p. 27). Two important institutions which include many European countries were established in 1949: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Council .

France and Germany, enemies in the Second World War, had joined in cooperation for bringing a solution to the problems going on even if the war ended. One of the

most important problems was the control of Ruhr area. For this reason, in 1949, French politicians Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet prepared a draft for an international institution which would be effective in the control of steel and coal production which also can be used for military purposes. The “Schuman Declaration” was published with the consent of Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. Following, the European Coal and Steel Community began uniting European countries in economic and political terms in order to secure the peace. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were the founding countries.

In 1955, Foreign Ministers of the founding countries debated and decided to extend the integration and to cooperate on economic relations and nuclear energy. A committee was then established to analyze the conditions of cooperation and the Belgium Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak appointed as secretary-general. In 1957, the Spaak Report was published and the Treaty of Rome was signed. In accordance with this agreement, European Atomic Energy Community and European Economic Community were established. Today's European Union consists of these three communities, namely the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). When the socioeconomic imbalance and the due conflicts are taken into consideration, it is concluded that economic interdependence and adaptation will promote peace. And this was what the EEC was trying to realize with the Treaty of Rome. It can be argued that with the establishment of the EEC, the notion of Europe had gained a new dimension. The EEC was not only a political community but also an economic community. Europe was no longer only about the politics and was gaining an economic aspect owing to the common market of post-war reconstruction. The new notion of Europe as an economic community was crucial for the social democratic parties to disengage with the old and unreliable notion of Europe. Besides, the European Union project was the solution for the problems caused by the fallen nation-states (Delanty, 1995, p. 127).

In 1973 the Communities were expanded to include Denmark (which one included Greenland, which later left the Community in 1985), Ireland, and the United Kingdom. In 1981, Greece became the 10th member of the EU and Spain and Portugal followed five years later. In 1986, the Single European Act was signed and

took effect in 1987. Several new policies, such as economics and social integration, technological research and development, environmental policy and cooperation in foreign relations, were defined later on.

The year 1989, while marking the end of the communist revolution, is also a milestone in the history of Europe. Some new definitions of Europe have cropped up starting in 1989. While the former polarization between Eastern and the Western Europe was set aside, *Mitteleuropa*¹³ reemerged as a political program and as an ideal. The polarization between the East and the West was superseded by the polarization between the North and the South. Due to the concerns about entirely losing Europe, the Eastern border issue of Europe was suspended until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the reunification of Germany in 1990 (*Ibid.*, pp.130-155).

The third expanding process occurred with the participation of Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1995. Meanwhile, Norway had been applying for the accession and was rejected for the third time. Besides, the borders of Europe were redefined and expansion towards the East was on the agenda with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. By the mid 90's, twelve more countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta) applied for the accession. In 2004 Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia became members of the EU. The number of member states of the EU has increased to 27 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. It is a process of the former Eastern Bloc countries returning to Europe as members of the EU (Karlsson, 2007: 33). As we may observe in the usage of the word "return" here, the ever-changing borders of Europe signify an unsettled geographic structure.

The Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 changed the official denomination of the European Economic Community (EEC). Henceforth, it would be known as the EU. This treaty defined a new structure in terms of economic and monetary unity, mutual security,

¹³ Mitteleuropa is the title of the polemical book of German evangelistic theologian and social politician Friedrich Naumann, written in 1915, and aimed to contribute to the arguments on the war held by Germany. Naumann refers to Mitteleuropa as a German sphere of influence in the Middle Europe. According to this, Germans was going to group German-Austrians, Hungarians and Slavic People in a political unity and this union was going to claim to be both Eastern and Western. However, this part of Europe has also been altering throughout the history. The concept of Mitteleuropa was referring to an economical union between Prussia and Austria (the lands between Copenhagen and Trieste) by the mid 19th century. With the influence of Bismarck's reign, Mitteleuropa was defined as the region between Germany and Russia, Vienna being in the centre. After the World War I, the concept was questioned. The concept, which was suspended during the Cold War, has come to the fore after 1989 (Karlsson, 2007, pp. 25-32).

internal and external affairs and law.

The recent expansion of the EU puts stress on the organizational extent and bureaucracy and made it necessary to make organizational reforms. The phrase “any European country may apply to EU membership” was changed to “only European states which respect the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to EU membership” with the Amsterdam Treaty which took effect on 1 May 1999.

As we may see here, the political map of Europe has been changing throughout history and may as well change in the future. The members of the EU are trying to provide peace within the union. However, the fall of the communist regime in Yugoslavia resulted in separations in the East. Apart from the countries removing the customs, Bosnia divided into three regions, Spain divides into federal states and Czechoslovakia’s dissolution show that unification and dissolution in Europe is simultaneous.

In sum, history has witnessed several Europes and the European Union is *sui generis*. It is neither a federation nor a confederation of states. Nevertheless, it has a distinct supranational dimension in which the state governments play a more prominent role. However, one can mention that Europe is not an alternative to nationalism, on the contrary is an emphasis on the hegemony of the nation state. In fact, Europe is a function of the nation state which contributes to the rise of nationalism in the region. Even though it was born out of the discord between the nation states, Europe has reinforced nation states in the end (*Ibid*, p. 156)). On the other hand, Europe still exists by defining ‘others’. Particularly in the period after 2000 with the emphasis on Christianity and the accession process of Turkey -which revolves around Islam-taken into consideration we may see a Europe based on the enmity of ‘other’. In the next section the place of religion in the EU will be focused to make deep the main investigation.

3.3 Religion in The European Union

Discussing whether Turkey is feasible to integrate with the EU regarding religious factors obliges to know the role of religion in the EU and state practices. For this reason, in this section, firstly religions’, particularly a Christianity’s current position

in legal documents of the EU, and state practices will be investigated. In order to demonstrate religious differences or similarities, state-church relationships and the role of religion in societies, how religion is represented in law and in each member state will be included. Although there is no homogeneous pattern among the member states, yet all of them is based on a secular principle. Following, the current position of Islam in Europe will be focused.

3.3.1. Religion in the legal system of the european union

What most significant is to mention that there is no specific policy on religion or an explicit competence in relation to the religious matters in the EU (McCrea, 2010: 1). Nevertheless, as it stated above, the role of Christianity in European identity cannot be overlooked. Christianity and humanism form the capital part of the European identity (*Ibid.*, p. 53). However, there are several significant treaties in effect which are legally binding and establish the basis to which EU members are bound within. These treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)¹⁴, involve articles on religious freedom, that these conditions have direct or indirect binding affects upon their judges (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995, p. 7).

The international treaties which are referred to in this study are especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ECHR. The article 6.2 in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the rights which are recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be applied as general principles in the EU legal system:

The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.¹⁵

Even though the exact meaning and scope of this article is still debated, article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may constitute a reference point in overcoming the problems related to the freedom of religion which cannot be tended by the EU law (Ferrari, 2006, p. 12).

¹⁴ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. ECHR, with the total participation of the members, was enacted in 1953. It sets forth a number of basic rights and freedoms.

¹⁵ For a complete reading of the “Treaty of European Union” see the URL, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf>

In article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”

This article is significant in the way it stresses the importance of freedom of religion and consciousness in the EU context. As stated in this article, each citizen of the EU has the right to choose what to believe in. And there is no definition stating that the religion in question is only Christianity. One has the right to practice her or his religion whatever it is. This article is similar to article 9.1 in the ECHR which also asserts that each EU citizen has the right to freedom of religion. The article refers religion as an individual right and avoids its cultural or communal aspects which is in a way a prediction of the potential friction between public and individual elements of the freedom of religion (McCrea, 2010, p. 121).

The second clause of the ECHR is also related to religion:

2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.¹⁶

The second section deals with the limitations on religious freedom. The rights mentioned in the article 9 can be interfered with, yet with a weighty consideration within the scope of the principles namely ‘the protection of public order’, ‘health or morals’, and ‘the protection of the rights and freedom of others’ (*Ibid.*,).

When collective religious freedom – and in particular relations between States and religious communities- is taken into account the things get complicated. According to Ferrari, the main cause of this unwillingness is due to the principles which organize the distribution of power between the EU and the Member states. The EU treaties do not mention religion, because religion is left to the responsibility of the member states just as culture and education, for those matters involve the identity individual of States (Ferrari, 2006, p.13)

In declaration number 11 of the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam it was stated that:

The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member

¹⁶ European Convention on Human Rights. <http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf>

States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organizations.¹⁷

The EU is not supposed to manage the Church-State relations existing in the Member States such as the State Church of Denmark, Concordat in Italy and the separation in France which are framed by the national laws. The EU is bound to respect the Church-State relations as long as these legal systems do not violate fundamental rights. The frame of this declaration is not clear and therefore it has a limited legal value (Ferrari, 2006, p. 14). Consequently, the EU law does not directly shows different state practices in the member states. However, analyzing the various religious structures of the member states one by one would prove resourceful for a better understanding of religion as an “obstacle” and whether there is a common state practice on secularism. In the next section, state practices will be focused.

3.3.2 Is there any common pattern for the member states?

In this section, relations between state and religion and religious actors in the EU's member states will be evaluated. Within this context, it is clear that finding common practices which are effective in all member states or common patterns is difficult. Each member state has various practices, but beyond this diversity is a common European pattern of church and state relations which can be observed under three features and a general principle which are asserted in different forms in the juridical systems of each EU member (Ferrari, 2006, p. 15).

The first feature is protection of individual rights of religious freedom. Both the constitutions of the EU States and the international conventions were built around the principles which guarantee the right of every citizen to practice his or her own religion in equal conditions with citizens of other religions (or of no religion) as long as it is in the limits of civil and political rights; and permits any religious gathering with the intention to practice their faith and to form religious communities and associations which can obtain juridical status under the law of the State (*Ibid.*, p. 15).

The second common feature of the relationship between state and religion among the EU members is the mutual autonomy of not only the States, but also the religious communities. To be specific, there is an organizational and doctrinal autonomy

¹⁷Treaty of Amsterdam <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>

provided for religious communities. The independence and autonomy of religious communities are granted in the constitutions of many EU countries. One of the important examples of this grant is art. 25 of the Polish Constitution which states that “the relationship between the State, the churches and other religious organizations shall be based on the principle of respect for their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own sphere”. As Ferrari underlines, there are different examples in other countries. On the other hand, similar arrangements can be found in the treaties and agreements stipulated by many States with several religious communities and in the decrees of the national Constitutional Courts and of the European Court of Human Rights other than the constitutions of the EU countries (Ferrari, p. 16/)¹⁸. The general principle suffers certain exceptions even in this case. For example, in some Northern European countries such as Norway, Denmark and England the bishops of the Church are appointed by political authorities and the ministers of the Church are considered as public servants. Even though the State-Church system is in declination all over Europe, the autonomy of the religious communities is more and more considered as a consequence of the principle of collective religious liberty (*Ibid.*, p. 17).

It should be noted that these features by no means represent an organized system which is applied perfectly to all EU countries; it is only a paradigm or an “ideal-type” which is helpful in providing a context to the constitutional traditions of the member states (*Ibid.*, p. 19). These features provide a conceptual framework to comprehend the common mechanism in the EU states. Nonetheless, in the light of this general information, different and/or common practices will be investigated for broader comprehension.

3.3.3 State practices

It should be kept in mind that all current member states share a largely Christian past but the influence of religion over law and politics have been reduced by humanist and secular ideas coming into the force (McCrea, 2010, p. 16). There have been various practices of religion-state relations since the establishment of nation-states. The issue of relations between state and religion cannot be fully understood without

¹⁸ For more detail, see art. 137 (Weimar Constitution) of the Basic Law of Germany, art. 8 of the Italian Constitution, art. 44 of the Irish Constitution, art. 41 of the Portuguese Constitution

analyzing how the state-founding process shapes its pattern, and examining the policies concerning religious issues that the citizens of the state are subjected to. The West had the tendency to control religion on a state level until the 19th century, either by suppressing religious authorities or driving them into being fighting factions (Madeley, 2003, p. 47). Indeed, the state's dealings with religious institutions began to undermine the nation-states, starting approximately with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Although this paved the way for the emergence of the secularization (Haynes, 1998, p. 63) and the attempts to suppress an impact of religion, it is becoming more and more visible in the public sphere in today's multicultural societies, and religious toleration for all groups has come to the agenda (Madeley, 2003, p. 47).

In accordance with the purposes of this thesis, religion will be analyzed separately for each member state in the context of state and church relations. The standpoint here is that both church and state are equally matched in terms of power in line with the traditional European-centered perspective (Haynes, 1998, p. 8). On the other hand, it is the fact that the separation of state and church shows diversity among the member states. Each member state has its own practices and laws in its domain. In this part, this differentiation among states will be mentioned focusing on the state and church relations and also secularism and attitudes towards the other religions, particularly Islam.

There is a presence of a Turkish diaspora in Europe since the labor migration in the late 1950's and early 1960's (Gözaydin, 2010, p. 2). Including this minority in the equation will provide a better understanding of the structures of the EU countries and also of the place of Islam in Europe in terms of the attitude towards the existing minority.

It can be stated Austria is one of the best instances which shows rather "passive secularism" characteristic. In Austria, the state and churches/religious communities are institutionally separated and there is no established state church. Freedom of religion is provided by the Constitution. Although the Constitution does not provide a definition of secularism, Article 15 of the Fundamental Citizenship Law guarantees religious equality and freedom. Furthermore, the constitution does not refer to any specific church. It includes extensive indemnities with regard to freedom of religion and belief.

However, Roman Catholicism is predominant and many Roman Catholic holidays are also government holidays.¹⁹ Nevertheless, it is significant for the state to preserve its objectivity, although the state supports religious groups as a social element in society. The door is left open to recognition for different religious groups. Despite the fact that religious services in Austria are provided by a state-run institution and the state provides tax reliefs for all religious institutions, those individuals providing these services are not employed by the state; rather their salary is paid by individual religious communities. Finally, concerning religious education, students are allowed to take ‘ethics’ courses instead of ‘religion’ courses. With Bosnia and Herzegovina being occupied by the Habsburg Empire in 1908, Islam gained the status of a legally recognized religious society in Austria and Hungary. Covering only Hanafiyah Islam until 1987, the law was revised to involve the entire Muslim population regardless of sect. While the Muslim population is facing problems similar to their counterparts living in other European countries, the recognition of the state provides rapid resolutions for these problems. Discussions on the headscarf are mostly attended by the European Court of Justice. For instance, a teacher is allowed to wear a headscarf as long as it is not considered as a threat, and students are allowed to wear a headscarf in any case. Liberal solutions are delivered to the problems of the Muslim population. Nevertheless, there are several mosques, and the biggest one of these mosques which was built in 1980, is allowed to make the call for prayer out loud in specific holidays and on Fridays. Even if Islam has been officially recognized by the state, negative attitudes towards the Muslim population have been increasing, especially after September 11 (Potz, 2006, pp. 35-56).

The religious and ideological communities of Belgium have a tendency to form socio-religious or socio-ideological sides'; yet in the last 150 years it has evolved from the war of independence into a secular nation. Belgium's stance towards religions is neutral. The civil government won't give in to any kind of Church hegemony, on the contrary, it forbids religion to interfere with its internal affairs. Article 15 of the Constitution protects freedom of conscience (Martin, 2003, pp. 59-63). Belgium does not have a state religion in the Constitution. The impartiality of the state in religious matters is explicit, and financial relations between state and

¹⁹ For more detail, see the website. URL, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71367.htm>

religious institutions are regulated in the Constitution.²⁰ Article 24 of the Constitution guarantees freedom and neutrality in education. Belgium seems to have found a balance between religion and a secular state; although there is a superiority of Catholicism in country, religious groups are recognized by the state as long as they are not against the law. Besides a neutrality of state towards various religions, religious communities have right to self determination (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995, p. 12). Furthermore, it is also possible for the people working for religious institutions to participate actively in politics. The state also provides financial support for the religious groups and their activities. And religious education remains available, although there are alternative courses provided for student who refuse to attend religion courses (Torfs, 2006, pp. 57-77).

In Belgium, that is one of the founding members of the EU, Islam is one of the six *de facto* religions. However, the former prime minister of Belgium and the current and the first full time President of the European Council, Herman A. Van Rompuy is one of the key names stressing religious differences. In 2010, he stated that the EU should pursue close relations with Turkey²¹. In April 2012, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, Didier Reynders paid an official visit to Turkey, and he stated that “Belgium fully supports Turkey’s EU membership²².

Luxembourg is a conservative country where the Catholic church extensive influence. (Messner, 2003, p. 137). Freedom of religion was manifested in the Constitution long before other European countries²³. Subsidies to private religious schools are provided as well as the opportunity for religious education in public schools.

In the Netherlands, the relations between state and religion are specified with three principles which are religious freedom, non-discrimination based on religion and freedom of education (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995, pp. 18-19). The state does not promote one faith, but neither does it deny support of religious institutions. Although there is not a public department concerned with religious services, every ministry

²⁰ For the English version of the Constitution of Belgium see the website, URL: http://www.fedparl.be/constitution_uk.html

²¹ http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/newsDetail_getNewsByld.action?newsId=230424

²² For more detail, you can see the website. URL, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/belgium-foreign-minister-reynders-belgium-fully-supports-turkeys-eu-membership.en.mfa>

²³ For the English version of the Luxemburg Constitution:
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/lu00000_.html

takes the demands of religious institutions into considerations and establishes a separate department under its jurisdiction if needed. The confessional schools receive financial aid from the state if they fulfill legal requirements, in a manner similar to Belgium. From the very beginning, Muslims have religious freedom just like any other minority. However, it is obvious that Christianity has an impact on church and state relations and on religious freedom. An instance of this is the existence of the church as a legal entity (Bijsterveld, 2006, pp. 193-209).

State and church in Protestant societies are shaped by “de-facto co-option” of state by religion, and one of the examples of societies with this kind of a structure is Denmark (Haynes, 1998, p.64). The Evangelical Lutheran church is the national church; thus, the state is not neutral in religious affairs. Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution. Denmark provides a model pole apart from the Latin countries (particularly France) in terms of relations between religion, state and society. Denmark has a three faceted structure: Lutheran Church and national Church, other religious communities with a recognized status; and freedom of individual and collective conscience.

It can be stated that Denmark is a supporter of the membership of Turkey to the EU²⁴. In fact, relations between Denmark include some troubled events. For example, when the twelve cartoons of Muslim Prophet Mohammed were published in Danish newspaper, Jylland-Posten in 2005, it was shocking for many people not only at national level, but also international level. Many Muslims from different states held protests against the newspaper. On the other hand, the case of Roj TV broadcasting from Denmark is another example of the recent friction between Turkey and Denmark. Yet again, the Danish deputy prime minister and president of the Radical Party, Margrethe Westager stressed the necessity of Turkey’s accession to the EU in her annual party speech in September 2012. While this does not provide insight to the general attitude of the country, Westager has been criticized for her stance on the subject²⁵.

²⁴ For more detail see the official website. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-denmark.en.mfa>

²⁵ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/21487401.asp>

There is no doubt, with its peculiar *laïcité*, France has a total different structure from the other member states which can be described within Christian secularism. However, there are only a few constitutional texts related to religion in France, in contrast to the other member states in the EU. The French Republic is a “laicist” state, which maintains a neutral stance in religious affairs. Freedom of conscience and religion are guaranteed by the constitutional tradition, like in many other countries. Indeed, contrary to the popular assumption, religion and state in France are not particularly hostile to each other. Religious communities are recognized by the state in France, and their members are allowed to participate in active politics. However, there is no public institution which looks after religious matters. The French government can also provide financial support to some of the activities of religious communities, as long as the neutrality of the state towards the other religious communities is maintained. Although Islam is granted the same rights as other religions under the Law of 1905, there is no Islamic community recognized under the law of Alsace-Lorraine. However, in France, Muslims are assembled in many different organizations, of which the most important ones are; The Muslim Institute of the Paris Mosque (1926), The Union of Islamic Organizations of France, The National Federation of Muslims of France, The Islamic Community of Milli Görüş in France and The Turkish-Islamic Union of Theological Affairs of France which was established by Diyanet (Messner, 2006, pp. 81-106).

The Stasi Commission Report²⁶ makes *laicism* more visible in the French Republic. This report displays the laic feature of the Republic by referring the separation of church and state with a law dating back to 1905. Indeed, this principle is a historical tradition which also found its place in the Constitution. As a result, France explicitly declares *laïcité* as a constitutional tradition of the French Republic.

The objections to Turkey’s accession to the EU are particularly voiced in France, in where “assertive secularists” are dominant (Kuru, 2007). The friction between Turkey and France was particularly prominent during the government of Nicolas Sarkozy. France is “exclusionist laicist” attitudes to Muslim population. Nicolas

²⁶ Commission de Réflexion is installed by President Jacques Chirac in 3 July 2003 in order to make reflection about the application of *laïcité* in France. Since the Commission is headed by Bernard Stasi, the Commission is also called as Stasi Commission. The Commission has prepared a Report on this specific issue.

Sarkozy's objections to Turkey's accession to the EU set the direction of the French discourse. The law draft on the so-called Armenian genocide has also played an important role in the dispute. Nevertheless, there is an affair of the headscarves which is the issue of national crisis and debates between Turkey and France. As Benhabib (2008) discussed many of the dilemmas experienced by the French national identity in the age of globalization and multiculturalism and she asks:

How is it possible to retain French traditions of laïcité, republican equality, and democratic citizenship in view of France's integration into [the] European Union, on the one hand, and the pressures of multiculturalism generated through the presence of second-and-third generation immigrants from Muslim countries on French soil, on the other hand? Would the practices and institutions of French citizenship be flexible and generous enough to encompass multicultural differences within an ideal of republican equality?. (p. 105).

Besides France, Germany also has a distinctive objection to Turkey's membership to the EU. Germany's Constitution guarantees the liberty of religion and the relation between the state and religion is underlined in many articles for instance, article 4. Yet, the judicial system of Germany bestows a privileged status to the Church. The economical and social importance of the Church is a sign of this. This peculiar construct is a result of the modernization period and the Church gained ground in the period following the World War II. Christianity is the major religion in Germany with both Protestantism (the United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany which was founded in 1948) and Catholicism (Ouédraogo, 2003, p. 43).

There is no reference to secularism in German Law. Instead, neutralism plays an important role in the German perception. According to this neutrality, there is no established state church; the state should be neutral towards any religion. This is a positive type of neutrality, in which the state is obliged to support religion and to provide space for religion to flourish. The education system in Germany is based on religious education. In other words, there is a Catholic religious education for Catholics, Protestant religious education for Protestants, etc. The state also funds the schools of minority religious groups, such as Muslim, Hindu and Jewish schools. There is no specific status of 'minority' in Germany. The state should respect all religions. It means that no religion is officially recognized. In the case of Islam, there must not be any legal discrimination against Islam given the above-mentioned structure. Germany hosts probably the largest Turkish expatriate population,

however, there are doubts about Turkey's accession to the EU (Robbers, 2006, pp. 107-151).

Great Britain consists of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The differences of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland put any kind of generalization away (D'Hellencourt, 2003, p. 167). King Henry VIII established the Church of England, the Anglican Church, as independent from the Vatican in 1534 which once was subject to the Roman Catholic Church. The Queen of England, the constitutional head of State, is also the formal head of the Anglican Church (Catto and Davie, 2006, p. 153). A Presbyterian (Protestant) Church was found in Scotland in 1690 similar to the one in England. However, there is no Anglican Church for the Welsh or Irish connected with the UK (D'Hellencourt, 2003, p. 167). There are close historical ties between State and Church in Ireland, thus the Catholic Church is still very influential in many aspects of the social life. In this case, whether it is not the official religion of the state, Catholicism utilizes a whole different organization in Ireland (Champion, 2003, p. 125).

There is no written Constitution in England. For this reason, the principle of religious freedom is guaranteed by special laws and international treaties. Neither the State Church nor the other churches or religious communities can get any financial aid from the State in England, (Shadid and Koningveld, 1995: 11-17).

Indeed, there is a large Muslim community in Britain. However, there has been an increasing fear of Islamic extremism in Britain particularly after September 11, 2001, and also the London bombings. The Rushdie Affair had also triggered a huge debate on the place of Muslims in Britain. While Muslims in England keep being contentious, having a state Church and this Church playing an active role in many fields including politics can be given as an example of secularism's place in England.

Greece is an Orthodox Christian Eastern European country which is far from the state-religion relations conducted in Western Europe. Although the Greek Orthodox Church has its important place in Greece, freedom of religion is granted to the minorities. The Church, with the help of the state, takes measures against the ideas which are considered as a threat (Makrides, 2003, pp. 113-120). There is an Eastern Orthodox Church which is officially recognized in Greece. Not to mention, Laïcité does not exist in the constitution or any other source of jurisdiction. And the

Orthodox Church is at the center of the debates on religion and state relations. According to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) a population exchange was held involving the Muslim residents of Greece and Greek-Orthodox residents of Turkey. Some Muslims became Greece citizens with the Treaty of Paris in 1947 (Papastathis, 2006, p. 171).

Greece's religious character has been an issue of debates in the EU. Nevertheless, its relations with the EU are in a critical situation today due to the ongoing economic crisis in Greece. The long-continued issues between Turkey and Greece like the Aegean Sea and Cyprus have had an international impact and also have influenced the process of the EU accession of Turkey.

Italy is one of the countries governed by the Catholic tradition. It has been through a long and complex road to the establishment of the state and church relations. As a result, with the conclusion of a new concordat with the Roman Catholic Church in 1984, a new era of this relationship has been approved (Shadid and Koningsveld, 1995, p. 16). The Concordat states that Catholic religion is no longer the official religion of the state. Article 19 states that the fundamental of religious freedom is a 'personal' right. The Italian system of religious freedom reflects the European pattern of this right for some reasons: everyone is free to choose whatever religion to believe in without his/her choice entailing any negative consequences on juridical grounds. When there is conflict between the state's policy and religion, state policies will be obtained, the European States sympathize with all religious communities, and this does not include any discrimination. If there is no harmony, there is also no collaboration. In a positive sense, Italian *laicism* stands for a 'regime of confessional and cultural pluralism'. It can be also interpreted as a Habermasian laïcité. It implies not a state indifferent towards religion, but a state guarantee to safeguard religious freedom. However, Islam is not officially recognized in Italy (Ferrari, 2006, pp. 209-240).

One can argue that Poland is also one of the "passive secularist" examples, since there is no formal state church in the State. However, the Catholic Church is often regarded as a national church although it does not claim such a position nor it does not take place in any legal text. Religious education plays a significant role although it is optional. There is no formal definition of religious minorities in any law. However, regarding the majority of population as Catholic, other religions can be

identified as minorities. The Muslim Religious Association represents Muslims in the country with its separate status (Rynkowski, 2006, pp. 241-264).

The State is defined as non-confessional and laic in the Spanish Constitution. The state should be at an equal distance to every religion and should treat believers and non-believers equally. The state can also cooperate with churches and religious denominations for the purpose of guaranteeing the freedom of religion of the citizens. According to the agreement of 1978 and 1980, religious institutions and the state may come together in many arenas. Evidence of this collaboration can be seen in contracts between religious institutions and the state, signed by the Presidency of Religious Affairs under the Ministry of Justice. The state also provides tax reliefs to religious groups. Additionally, religious education is provided not only in Catholic domination, but also in other religions if demanded (Martinez-Toron, 2006, pp. 265-299).

In Sweden, the relationship between the state and church was changed at the beginning of the 21st century. The Lutheran Church of Sweden was the state church until the separation of church and state in 2000. The Constitution provides every citizen with the freedom of religion. Yet, it may not be possible to practice these constitutional provisions in every case. The freedom of religion can be limited according to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. There is no specific definition of laicism or secularism in the Constitution. There is no provision of religious education either. All schools and universities are supposed to be neutral in terms of religion. There are some Muslim communities in the country which are registered as religious communities (Friedner, 2006, pp. 299-319).

Within this context, there are two different approaches to the religious structure of the member states; one argues that there is a common pattern while other one argues that there is no common pattern but some similarities. It can be stated that the common heritage of Europe, Christianity and secular influences (McCrea, 2010, p.16). Namely, there is a common and a prioritized behavior among the European states which is a “spirit of cooperation”, despite the fact that states have different models of religion and state relations (Ferrari, 2006, p.3).

Despite its apparent secular nature, the EU is in fact based on Christian cultural assumptions to a great extent. (Weiler, 1999, p. 48). The Christian tradition has been a crucial element of European history and its evolution, yet it is not the only one. Grace Davie (2000) claims that there are three fundamental factors in the creation of the unity that we call Europe: “Judeo- Christian monotheism, Greek rationalism, and Roman organization” and whether these factors shift and change over time, combinations of these factors can be observed in the forming and reforming a lifestyle that we call Europe, the role of religion is explicit especially within such combinations (p. 23). Besides the fact that religion has a substantial part in the European fiber, there is an ongoing discussion about its place in the European integration which is also the issue in question here. In light of the role of religion in Europe, in the next chapter Turkey’s position will try to be captured.

4. TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

This chapter aims to investigate whether religion is an obstacle more deeply focusing Turkey and its relations with the EU. For the purposes of the chapter, there are some questions will be tried to respond: How is the process of relations between Turkey and the EU? How does religion take place in Turkey's politics? It can be possible to establish a dialogue between different religions, particularly Islam and Christianity?

4.1 A Brief History of Relations Between Turkey and the EU

Relations between Turkey and the EU have been going on for over a half century. The historical process of this relation will be looked into with regard to 2002 year in this chapter. There are two main reasons for this selection. Firstly, the Copenhagen Criteria which play an important part in the accession process, will take effect after this year, since Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 concluded with “if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open negotiations without delay” (Düzgit and Keyman, 2008, p. 249). Secondly, Turkey’s current government JDP, with its founders who known with their Islamist background, was elected for the first time in 2002. This party owed its electoral victory in large part to Turkey’s accession to the EU. The JDP leadership committed itself to a democratic reform process which guided by the Copenhagen Criteria for membership that include democratic institutions, commitment to human rights, a running market economy, and an ability to meet EU membership obligations (Gordon and Taşpinar, 2008, p. 43). Despite the fact that relations between Turkey and the EU have come to a standstill particularly after 2005, many steps were taken on the way to Turkey’s EU membership, the official candidate status was obtained and the overall relations were developed during the term of this government.

4.1.1 The term before 2002

Westernization and relations with the West have been an important factor in foreign politics in Turkey which has adopted the Western type of state organization and legal system. “Modernization, being one of the main goals described in the declaration of the Republic, can be defined as fully and effectively participating in the European organizations” (Akyıldız and Palabıyık, 2006, p. 73). In line with this, Turkey has become a member in several organizations. For example, Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations, and has been a member of the Council of Europe since 1949, NATO since 1952, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 1961.

There was a bipolar world system between the United States of America (USA) and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the period following the World War II. And, Europe was divided into two, the West guided by the USA and the East which was under the influence of the USSR. The USA decided to support Europe with the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine in order to prevent Europe from becoming socialist entirely. While Europe and the USA were interacting, Turkey remained neutral until 1945. Following Greece’s application to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, Turkey had also applied for membership for the first time in 31 July 1959.

The response to this application was the suggestion to establish an association until Turkey’s circumstances permitted its accession. In 1960, a military coup d'état occurred and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and minister of foreign affairs and finance were all executed. The EEC criticized Turkey because of the poor functioning of democracy and the rule of law in both countries. Following that, the Ankara Agreement was signed between the Republic of Turkey and the EU in 1963 (Brusse and Griffits, 2004, p. 18). The Ankara Agreement, as a basis for the legal grounds of Turkey - EU relations, was meant to arrange the process for the accession of Turkey. Therefore, a three-step integration model was adopted for the accession which involved a “preparatory phase”, “transition” and “completion”. According to this, the preparatory phase was started in 1964 when the agreement took effect. Turkey was not obliged to do anything in this phase yet the EU was obliged to support Turkey economically in order to prepare Turkey for the transition (Ülger, 2008, p. 178). The EEC provided Turkey with 175 million ECU in the First Financial

Protocol term (1963-1970) and the trade concessions which were granted to Turkey in the form of tariff quotas were proved. Yet, the EEC's share in Turkish imports was increased from %29 (in 1963) to %42 (in 1972) (Akyıldız & Palabıyık: 74). Although the issue of religion has come into prominence recently, it should be noted that the EEC first started as an economical project and the European identity was not an issue at that time –because it was not a cultural project.

The preparatory stage was completed in 1970 and then the Additional Protocol was signed. Conditions of the transition were defined with the Additional Protocol. In this new stage, it was intended to enhance the trade of industrial and agricultural products between the parties, to provide freedom of movement and to complete the integration of the Customs Union. This obliged the EEC and Turkey to reciprocally void tariffs and quotas for imports and exports (with some exceptions including fabrics) within a period of 12 to 22 years. The harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the EU in economic matters was another issue. Furthermore, the Protocol proposed to provide the freedom of movement for both parties' citizens within the next 12 to 22 years.

The 1970s witnessed constrained periods in Turkey. Oil crisis as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the following US embargo and its rough effects on Turkey's economics were just a few of the difficulties of the decade. Turkey had not been able to fulfill its obligations to the EU due to internal and external events which destabilized the relations between Turkey and the EU. In fact, relations were suspended following the Turkey's 1980 coup. Although democratic elections were held in 1983 and the civil government replaced the coup d'état but the relations didn't heal that quickly.

In 1987, Turkey made an application for full membership to the EU on the basis of article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Turkey's application was then forwarded to the European Commission. According to the Commission's report endorsed by the European Council in 1990, Turkey's eligibility for EU membership was debated and it was decided to be postponed until necessary conditions were fulfilled. At this time the European Community announced it was unsuitable for a new enlargement. Consequently, Turkey's application for full membership was not approved. According to the EC there were some problems in the case of Turkey which included the state of the democracy in Turkey, the endless disputes with Greece, the lack of a

viable solution to the Cyprus problem, relative economic backwardness, the Kurdish problem and human rights violations (Müftüler Baç, 2000, p. 22).

In the meantime, Turkey's foreign policy objective was shifting to find new strategies to guard against possible isolation from the emerging economic and political institutions of Europe and to reassert its significance as a regional power (Aybey, 2004, p. 27). The transition process, which was proposed in the Ankara Agreement, was completed with the Customs Union and took effect in 1995 and adopted its tariff policy according to the EU's Common External Tariff which involved adapting itself to the EU's commercial policy and preferential trade arrangements with specific countries.²⁷

However, Turkey happened to be the first country to conclude a Customs Union with the EEC before becoming a full member. It means that Turkey was not in the decision-making process. Furthermore, Turkey did not take necessary measures in line with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In addition, freedom of movement of workers was not part of the equation. It is obvious that economic relations are working well between Turkey and the EU even though Turkey is not a full member (Aybey, 2004: 27).

The Luxembourg Summit was one of the landmarks in the relations between Turkey and the EU, since the expansion of the EU was reconsidered and finally in 1997 the EU made a call. The EU reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership and asked the Commission to prepare recommendations at the last Association Council, dated 29 April, 1997. The Commission published the report under the title of 'Agenda 2000'. Turkey was excluded from the enlargement process of the EU according to this report. Political and economic discord was brought forward as one of the many reasons for this decision. On the other hand, The Commission suggested to improve relations between Turkey and EU within the current framework.

The Cardiff Summit, held from 15-16 June 1998, has significant impact on EU-Turkey relations. For example, EU leaders endorsed the Commission's "European Strategy" for Turkey and it was requested to find solutions with a view to make the financial resources required for the implementation of the European Strategy

²⁷ For detailed information see official website of Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs URL, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2>

available. However, the strategy was not sufficient to improve relations to a desired level. Nevertheless, there have been many obstacles, such as the veto of Greece.

The European Council was held in Helsinki in 1999 and it opened a new era in the relationship. Turkey was given candidate status during the Helsinki Summit. The EU evaluated Turkey's candidacy in 1999 with respect to the Copenhagen criteria. According to these reports, "recent developments confirm that although the basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria. There are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities" (Müftüler Baç, 2000, p. 24). Candidate countries have to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. An accession partnership protocol for Turkey was defined by the European Union Commission and was declared on 8 March, 2001. 14-15 December 2001 are another important date for EU-Turkey relations. The Laeken European Council mentioned the possibility of resuming the accession negotiations with Turkey, which were being discussed for the first time at the highest level.

Obviously, in the 1990s there were many economic, political and as well as cultural crisis in Turkey. What a significant situation is that there appeared politicisation of identities first time. Political scene witnessed several movements organized around Kurdis, Sunni Muslim and Alevi identities. This was quickly followed by civic and political movements , that attempted to mobilise their followers by appeal to gender, religion, lifestyle, sexual choice, age and other subjective issues, feelings and attachments. The most important cause of the political crisis of the 1990s is the armed Kurdish secessionist movement led by PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers Party) which reached its peak in the second half of the 1990s. Another source of the crisis in these years surely the rise of Political Islam in Turkey. This tendency was represented by many parties which pursued National Outlook (Milli Görüş) tradition all founded by Necmettin Erbakan. In parallel to inability of secular parties to represent pressing problems of Turkey, the country went to new elections in 2002 (Yılmaz, 2009, p. 57)

4.1.2 The term after 2002

In 2002, Turkey faced the significant consequences of the general elections in domestic politics. In the following period, a new government was formed by the JDP

led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This party was originating from a conservative background with a motivation of a hybrid form of ethical conservatism, nationalism, free-market thinking and technological modernization. Therefore, the foreign policy of Turkey has changed quite fundamentally (Zurcher and Linden, 2004, p. 160). The new government expressed its commitment to reformation very clearly and quickly, and stated its dedication to fulfill the EU's Copenhagen criteria which paved the way for the reopening the accession negotiations with the EU (Aybey, 2004, p. 34). The JDP has pursued a policy of reforms purposed at bringing Turkish politics, institutions and society in line with current EU standards. One can argue that "Turkey have entered a historic path of democratic reform" in a broad range of fields from human rights to civilian-military relations; the reforms and legal changes including the abolition of the death penalty, the fights against torture, the enlargements of individual rights and freedoms, the fight against corruption, achieving transparency and accountability of public expenses, and institutional restructuring in the fields of government and relations between government and military relations". Nonetheless, the future of these paths is not clear because of as destabilized depending on a variety of factors (Düzgit and Keyman, 2008, p. 250). Indeed, if Turkey continue accession to the EU, if democratic reforms will go on, it is not exactly clear. Besides many paths, the current government also has established its own hegemony and it seems that the first priority of JDP is not the EU membership anymore.

As a matter of fact, the accession process has stalled and optimist ideas decreased due to several reasons. One of them is which can be called as "enlargement fatigue" in Europe. Following this, the unwillingness of member states to new members. In 2005, after brutal internal discussion, the EU enters a term of political crisis in itself because of French and Dutch rejections of the proposed EU constitution, in large part public interests about immigration and unemployment. Furthermore, in 2005, there were many attacks from Islamists in Europe, such as Britain and Madrid and a murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist (Gordon and Taşpinar, 2008, p. 45).

The EU member states close the deal on starting negotiation talks on Turkey's accession to the EU. The accession negotiations for full membership of Turkey were launched in 2005. This also came to mean that the transition stage was over and it

was time for the completion stage. Henceforth, Turkey must successfully complete the negotiations with the European Commission based on the adoption of 35 chapters of the European Union *acquis* which include taxation, financial services, energy, transport, and foreign, security, and defense policy. As of spring 2008, eight of the chapters that related to trade issues and foreign policy have remained frozen. This situation is like to remain blocked as long as no progress is made in the Cyprus discussion.

However, besides many objections related to economical issues, democratic criteria, and following Cyprus issue and overcoming Austria's determination that Turkey can be offered as a "privileged partnership" instead of full membership, the EU added some significant caveats to its decision to start talks. It noted that the talks could be "open-ended". And there is an ongoing debate on the idea, which is particularly supported by Germany and France, that underlines a "privileged partnership" of Turkey. Moreover, in 2006 French National Assembly approved a bill which criminalizes the denial of genocide against the Armenians during the World War I and this has been one of the most significant debates of issues between Turkey and France.

In parallel to the objections, a number of non-supporters both in Turkey and the EU has been increased and relations came to a standstill. The accession process, squeezed between Turkish Euroscepticism and European Turkoscepticism, may very well fail (Yilmaz, 2009, p. 63). It would be fair to say that the EU relations have turned into a complex process recently, considering the first stages of the relations. Once the ultimate goal of foreign affairs, the EU, is now drawing away from being in the center of the foreign affairs due to the ongoing crises between Turkey and the EU. For instance, Cyprus has been one of the most problematic issues between Turkey and the EU. There are also other events have been causing friction between the EU and Turkey such as the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad in a Danish newspaper or the veil ban issue in France. Moreover, cultural differences has been emphasized as an obstacle which is regarded as a significant barrier to Turkey's membership.

Furthermore, one of the most significant change which cannot be exactly envisaged is that how Turkey's foreign policy will be shaped. It is argued that Turkey's changing axis. By the winter of 2011, JDP's democratic reform process began to

slow down its domestic reform agenda and it is “simultaneously began to emerge as a ‘pivotal actor’ in regional politics, especially in the aftermath of the onset of the street uprisings and political revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria” (Kadioğlu, 2012, p. 55). However, at the same time the accession process to the EU did not come to an end. For this reason, making an exact implication still seems difficult. In this thesis, it is assumed that the process will go on. As a result, religion as a matter between the EU and Turkey obliges to analyze the role of religion in Turkey to find out whether there is possibility for integration. Therefore, the position of religion in Turkey will be examined in the next part.

4.2 Religion in Turkey: Is it Compatible with The European Union?

In this section religion and state relations in Turkey will be examined. Therefore, it will touch on the various issues such as historical regulations on *laicism*, Diyanet, democracy, the increasing influence of political Islam, the role of soft power in Turkish politics, the Gülen movement as a significant non-governmental actor and religious minorities will be discussed.

One can argue that Turkey is historically considered as a bridge between West and East and it is unique and exceptional both culturally and geographically (Bogdani, 2011, p. 19). Furthermore, there is a common saying that Turkey is a good model for many countries with its specific attributes. Although it is debatable, it can be claimed that Turkey while being a part of Europe is out of the club at the same time; on the other hand, Turkey is a part of the Muslim World yet does not resemble any other Muslim country (Zurcher, 2008, p. 477). However, discourse on the “Turkish model” includes a kind of supremacy claims and partial perspective and various conditions which are beyond the scope of this thesis. For this reason, aside from the troubled rhetoric of being a model, hallmarks of Turkey’s history will be examined below.

Primarily, as a general framework, to understand modern Turkey with its Ottoman past and the role of religion in Turkey, historical process of Turkish politics should be examined. I propose to read this history in recognition of religion and state relationship with Şerif Mardin’s center-periphery polarization (1973). In addition to this differentiation, different attitudes of both center and periphery to relations between religion and state can be more easily understood by concepts of “assertive” and “passive” secularisms which propounded by Ahmet T. Kuru. In this context, in

Turkey history Kemalist elites, who found Turkey as a modernization project with an assertive secularist approach, have been at the center for years and in this sense Islamists are regarded as a component of the periphery. However, this situation has started to change recently. Particularly after the hegemony of JDP in Turkish politics, which supports passive secularism compared to oppressive one, “Islamist movements express the aspirations of a new ‘counter-elite’ that attacks the vested interests of Turkey’s Westernized élit” (Jung, 2008, p. 117). In fact, a labelling which refers to Kemalists and Islamists can seem as a problem at first glance, however a discussion on religion and politics have been a problematic issue between founder elites and its *other*, Islamists who reject an oppression of religion. Therefore, this labelling is an ineluctable since it propound main conflict on religion from a foundation of Turkish Republic up to the present.

Secondly, one should initially look the Ottoman Empire to comprehend a modern Turkey history. That's why, even a modern Turkey was founded in 1923 as a nation state, its history cannot be regarded as independent from its past on the contrary of Kemalist foundation narrative. There have been not only cuts but also many ties to the Ottoman past. For this reason, it is impossible to cut out the history of the Ottoman Empire, once sovereign in this land. It is indeed necessary to analyze its historical process in order to comprehend Turkey's inner dynamics and its regional relations. Just as the EU cannot be possible without the notion of Europe which has been evolving for centuries, Turkey also cannot be dissociated from its Ottoman legacy.

The Ottoman era is also significant for providing a comprehension of the historical course of affairs between Turkey and the West. In the mid-19th century, the adoption of a European political, economic and socio-cultural paradigm was tried attempted by the Ottomans. However, it can be said that this situation seems to be a pragmatic one, nonetheless “if Western institutions could rejuvenate the state, they would be adopted. It would be difficult otherwise to explain the ease with which Ottomans slid into westernizing reform” (Mardin, 1981, p. 197).

When it comes to the relations between state and religion, it is also necessary to compare a modern Turkey and the Ottoman era in order to mark out the points of rupture and continuity between the two periods. There are three approaches to the Ottoman studies on the relationship between state and religion. The first approach

mentions a duality of legitimacy existing in the Ottoman World, which were depending on the Islamic canon law and the sultan's acts separately. Although this was not a structure intended to be secular, the seeds of the secular system that was established in the Republican era may have been sown with this dual structure of the Ottomans starting from the 15th century. The second opinion is that there was no duality in the Ottoman structure and the Caliph-sultan had both religious and political identities. According to this approach, the Ottoman state was theocratic and thus, the entire state structure was in accord with the Islamic canon law. The chief religious official, the sheikh UL-Islam, and the grand vizier was second to the sultan in political and religious matters in a way supporting the idea that there was no separation between religious and secular matters in the Ottoman Empire. The third one claims that in the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, there was always state control over religion (Gözaydin, 2012, p. 4). And the current position of religion is tried to understood with based on this continuity approach.

The After World War I, Kemalist elites, led by Kemal Atatürk, pushed through far more radical reforms with the purpose of building a modern state. According to the Kemalists, the reforms were not exactly succeed since the Tanzimat period because of the co-existence of the secular and Islamic institutions (Kuru, 2009, p. 217). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's intention was to remove religion from the social realm and the state affairs and "to confine it to the conscience of people". In this new republican era the primary goal was to secularize and modernize not only the state, but also the society. Actually, the radical program of reform and Westernization pursued in the 1920's and 1930's can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire in the mid-19th century, the period starting from the reception of Western codes and political principles (Gözaydin, 2012, p. 6).

Westernization and disengagement from the Ottoman Empire were the primary purposes of the founding elites. According to Ataturk, Islam and civilization were two conflicting terms and the Caliphate represented Turkey's attachment to the past and to Islam. Therefore the Caliphate was abolished (March 3, 1924) which soon was followed by the elimination of the Seyh-ul-Islam, the Ministry of Seriat (Sharia) and the Sharia courts, not to mention the religious schools. The Ministry of Seriat was then replaced by Diyanet, which will be analyzed in detail in the following pages.

The declaration of the Law for the Unification of Instruction (1924) was a fundamental step in the establishment of a unified, secular national educational system. The adoption of the new dress code (1925), which stated that religious outfits can only be worn by people holding an official title was a part of the Kemalist program of Westernization intended to eliminate visible symbols of the past and the Islamic tradition (Bozdağıoğlu, 2003, p. 47). Nevertheless, Islamic law was rejected and a modified version of the Swiss Civil Code was adopted in 1926. Adoption of the Gregorian calendar, the Italian Criminal Code and the Latin Alphabet were other reforms which soon followed. Apart from that, the day of rest changed to Sunday instead of Friday. The finalizing change was the abolition of the second article of the 1924 constitution stating that “the religion of the Turkish state is Islam” and laicism has become a constitutional principle in 1937 (*Ibid.*, 49). It is clear that, these reforms are the extension of the political reforms made in the Ottoman state in 1839 which had already secularized the law and education systems to a point (Zurcher, 2008, p. 257). The comprehension of *laicism* in Kemalism does not aim to separate state and religion but aims to control religion and even to reform it (Kuru, 2009). Thereafter, it was the growing gap between the radically differentiated modernizing elites and the muted masses. And there was no common ground among the modernizing discourse of the elites and the lifestyle of the masses (Keyder, 2005, p. 38). The significant point is that there remained a conflict-prone relationship between politics and religion. On the contrary a *hope* of founding elites, Islam held its own effective power. Moreover, one can argue that the Islamism was born an ideological form to challenge modern world simultaneously with western adaptations (Türköne, 2011, p. 17).

It is obvious that the Turkish state’s policies toward religion are incoherent. The state, on the one hand, pursues limiting policies toward Islam. On the other hand, it provides Islamic instructions in public schools and conducts public Islamic schools (Kuru, 2009, p.166). This kind of secularism, Kemalist *laicism* established control mechanism on religion unlike western type of secularism. As an other instance of state control on religion which can be given is that state pays the salaries of the imams in mosques who are servants of Diyanet (*Ibid.*, p.166). It is certain that the existence of an institution like Diyanet is one of the basic “matter” of religion and politics in Turkey. It can be argued that this institution was established as a reflection

of Kemalist *laïcité* (Gözaydin, 2008, p. 218). In fact, religion was not free from the Ottoman Empire. It was under the control of political power and the status of Diyanet in Turkey is similar with the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, religion is not free, it is still under the effect of political authority (Kara, 2008, p. 64). The state utilizes the Diyanet institution in reply to the religion and its potential socio-politic influence. As it can be seen in the Kemalist discourse, the comprehension of *laïcité* in Turkey does not cover only the separation of state and religion. On the contrary, Diyanet was founded in 1924 in order to control the phenomenon of religion which was considered as a threat (Gözaydin, 2009, p. 246). In order to make sure about the place of Diyanet in laic Turkey, we should also mention its role and responsibilities which involve services of worship, enlightening the people on religious matters, services of education of religion (Çakır and Bozan, 2005, p. 21). It would be fair to say that Diyanet had been utilized as an ideological and advantageous device for the good of the state at several points in time. Diyanet has played a role as a state based actor in Europe, when it opened a number of mosques to establish an ethno-religious comprehension of Islam among the Turkish workers in Europe, it was also transformed by the European realities (Yavuz, 2006, p. 240). Once founded as an institution to control the religion in the Kemalist context, Diyanet is also being supported by the recent government now. JDP government reinforces Diyanet in order to revitalize religion both in the national and international spheres (Gözaydin, 2012, p 11). The budget of the Diyanet has been increasing and the minister of Diyanet has been backing up the opinions of the government, as we have seen in the specific discussions on abortion recently. In this context, Diyanet has an indisputable role as a religious actor and it seems like Diyanet is going to be an issue to be considered in Turkey's accession process.

It would be suitable to say that the early 1980s were a milestone in Turkish modernization. The Turkish experience seems to be bound up with economic backwardness and social unrest in the early 1980s; conflicts between laicist and Muslim, reason and belief, in other words, the new and the old have been coexisting in this sudden and rapid modernization project. It was being discussed and criticized for the first time in the 1980s. All the myths of the nationalistic history, particularly the *laicism*, have been put into question in the period followed (Kasaba, 2005, p. 13). It can be argued that Kemalism has been inefficient in covering the philosophy and

the ethical gap created with the ejection of the religion from the public sphere (Mardin, 1991, p. 127).

The globalization phenomenon, technological advancements and the increasing debates on identity also have a part in the process of change, aside from the inner troubles and the interruptions of democracy that the country was experiencing. The decreasing trust in the nation states is yet another quality of the ever integrating world since the 1980s and the rise of global capitalism. Islamism in Turkey has taken hold in the new middle class of the rapidly growing metropolitans. It would be fair to say that political Islam has assumed an increasingly important role in the following years. In fact, the state tried to control religion. Turkey has been governed by a political party distinguished by its conservative and Islamist identity, and it is clear that political Islam plays an important role in this country. The resurgence of Islam in Turkey arouses following a period of laicist nationalism and as a response to the depression caused by this period, just like other countries in the region (Gülalp, 2005, p. 44).

Another important point to delve into, before going on to discuss recent events, is the interrupted democratic process of Turkey which is one of the leading reasons for the objections of Turkey's accession to the EU is the issue of democracy (Müftüler Baç, 1998, p. 240). It is obvious that the Turkish military had played an active part in securing the Kemalist and laic texture of the state. It would be necessary to take a short look into history for a better understanding of the course of Islamism and where the military stands in this process. The Turkish military was referred as the "guardians of Kemalism" by Bozdağlıoğlu (2003) for its disposition against the Islamist parties all along the Republican history (p. 135). As it is seen in the brief history, the working on the things was like the military would allow democratic elections yet when a party lacking the Kemalist ideals is elected then a coup was staged and this was conducted until the JDP government (Gellner, 1997, p. 243).

The transition to a multi-party political system in 1946 is a milestone for the revival of the Islamic values and reached its peak during the term of the Democrat Party between 1950 and 1960 (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 130). The democratization process starting with the end of the World War II was identified as a "restless democracy" by Zurcher (2008, p. 321). Thus, the 1960 *coup d'état* was announced to be staged to "save the democracy from the depression it had" (*Ibid.*, p. 351). The politicization of

Islam was polished with the formation of the Islamic National Order Party (NOP) in 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. Following the military coup in 1971, the Constitutional Court banned the NOP and its leader, Erbakan. The increasing public disorder, prominent Kurdish separatism, tangled political system and the disastrous economy, all led to the 1980 coup d'état. Nevertheless, Islamic radicalism also accompanied these events (Zurcher, 2008, p. 387). Hence, the National Salvation Party (NSP), which was founded by the supporters of Erbakan, was banned again after the September 1980 coup d'état.

The party reemerged under the name Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan in 1983. The re-Islamization of Turkish politics was increasing dramatically in the 1980s. In 1996, Turkey witnessed an unexpected event: Necmettin Erbakan, who is inspired by Islamic standards and values both politically and personally, became a prime minister (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 130), which led to the 28 February process. The military presented a list of eighteen conditions which are to be put into effect by Erbakan's government in 1997. Briefly, the military organized a campaign against the government with the help of media, law and bureaucracy. Finally, the government fell in 1997. This 28 February Process is denoted as a 'soft' or 'postmodern' coup d'état' in Turkey (Zurcher and Linden, 2004, p. 93). Erbakan was forced to retire from active politics in this process. Then, the Virtue and Felicity Party picked up where the Welfare Party left off.

The most important of all these parties from the same school is certainly the Justice and Development Party (JDP) which is led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan an apprentice of Erbakan. In the elections held in 2002, JDP formed the government and it has been the government since then, with an increased poll in 2007 and 2011. This government, identified with political Islam, is given as a reason for the controversial state of religion in the EU accession process. JDP is not identified as an Islamist party, although it has roots in the Islamist tradition. JDP has a different agenda than the national vision movement, the "Muslim" identity being the only common ground and yet again JDP won the elections introducing itself as a party that abides by the rules of liberal democracy. JDP, in contrast with the national vision movement, has different opinions on the subjects of globalization, modernization and European integration (Gülalp, 2003, p. 181). Some argue that it is post-Islamist party. Although it is hard to estimate how this process will go on or how it will end; but it

can at least said that JDP formed a government through democratic elections and it is also evidence of that liberal democracy can be worked in a country with a Muslim majority (*Ibid.*, p. 184).

It is clear that there is a friction between Kemalists and Islamists in the country; the reestablishment of the religious schools and freedom for wearing Islamic headscarves in the public sphere have led Kemalists to think *laicism* is under attack. On the other hand it may be regarded as a response to exclusionist laicism, or “Islamist challenge to assertive secularism” (Kuru, 2009, p. 161). Indeed, JDP assumes a kind of passive secularism with a Western touch rather than Kemalist *laicism* (assertive secularism). JDP was elected by promoting the minority rights, freedom of religion –not limited to Islam- and with its pro-EU membership tone, as distinct from its antecedents. On the other hand, the same party has bureaucrats making conservative provisions like dressing artworks since they are unacceptably nude. Namely, one can argue that conservative tendencies started to dominate in the public sphere.

Not only the domestic affairs, but also the foreign policy of Turkey has changed with the JDP. In 2001, a book titled ‘Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu’ (Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position), was written by the current minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu. It can be argued that this book provides a basis for the JDP’s foreign policy. It refers to the Turkish soft power in a popular manner simultaneously with the JDP’s coming power. The actual question is that what kind of a foreign policy JDP pursues? Davutoğlu re-interpreted Turkey’s geopolitics. According to him, the geographic situation of a country is a constant factor; yet its geopolitical dimension is a dynamic variable connected with the international power balance and swings (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 116). The geopolitical situation should not be regarded as a means of maintaining the status quo, but should be regarded as a means of channeling the regional activity to a global level, in other words, gradually globalizing (*Ibid.*, p. 117). There is no doubt, JDP inspired by Ottoman history. In Davutoğlu’s sentence JDP’s understanding on Turkey history is clear. He states that Turkey emerged from the Ottoman legacy with new definitions (*Ibid.*, p. 23).

It would certainly be an overstatement to take the Ottoman legacy as continuous with the Turkish Republic. Yet again, the founding elite of Turkey can be traced back to

the Ottoman period and also the Westernization movement dates back before the Turkish Republic was founded. However, these two forms of modernization are very different from each other. One was a way to bail out a falling empire and the other is an out of the blue Westernization in a pursuit to identify itself as European and modern. The third legacy of the Ottoman Empire inherited from Turkey is the skepticism towards the other states.

First of all, one of the most decisive factors in the formulation of a country's foreign policy is, of course, the geographical situation. Geographical situation, while providing with opportunities, is a double-edged sword with serious challenges. Turkey, located in middle of Europe, Asia and Africa, is considered a key country in international politics. Particularly with JDP's "zero problem" strategy, Turkey has started to be a more active regional actor. JDP, from its beginning, wanted to keep good contact with Turkey's neighbors, the USA and the EU. For instance, several multilateral dealings were handled in the term of JDP's government. 'Iraq's Neighboring Countries Process' was institutionalized in 2003 with the meeting of foreign ministers of countries, which are Iraq's neighbors, in Istanbul for the first time. Sequential meetings took place in other countries with the participation of several countries. Nine official and three non-official summits of foreign ministers were held in this context until 2009. In 2007, these regional meetings were broadened to include representatives from the UN Security Council, the European Commission, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and G-8 countries.

With regard to religion and contemporary politics, it can be argued that soft power has been influential in the term of the JDP. In terms of its foreign policy vision and Strategic Depth, it stands on elements of soft power such as persuasive diplomacy, economic interdependency and dialogue. The efficiency of soft power is particularly prominent in the Middle East affairs. On the other hand, there is an ongoing issue of Cyprus which is overwhelming foreign affairs and also is a drawback in the relations with the EU.

Turkey's foreign policy, in other words being a state actor, is a good example of application of soft power, yet it cannot go without mentioning the Gülen movement, a non-state actor with its own TV channel, a daily newspaper and several educational institutions both in Turkey and the world. This movement developed its own identity

over the last decade although it originated from the Nurcu movement (Zurcher and Linden, 2004, p. 120). Whilst Nursi was focused on personal transformation, Gülen has focused on personal and social transformation by utilizing new liberal economic and political conditions (Yavuz, 2003, p. 19). Basically, Fethullah Gülen stresses the compatibility of Islamic ideas and practices with the market economy, and his followers control a complex web of businesses and a significant broadcast and print media in Turkey and Central Asia (Gözaydın, 2009, p. 1219). The Gülen movement mainly has two goals. One of them is bringing up a new type of generation, called as “golden generation” consisting of modern Muslims who are able to reconstruct a new world, who are both closer to God and still active in a social environment. Gülen defends that this possibility of such a combination has been ignored by the westernization oriented Turkish founder elites. The second aim of the movement is based on education activities which is a global intention to introduce Turkish culture to the world (Lorasdağı, 2008, pp. 157). As it mentioned in the second chapter, Fethullah Gülen is also an effective defender of interfaith dialogue. In this sense, Gülen movement is influential non-state actor which play a significant role with regard religion and politics. And as it is known Gülen movement supported JDP. Between Gülen movement and JDP, there are two tacit significant points. One of them is pro-globalization, it means take an advantages of globalization’s opportunities, rather than pursuing an isolationist policy and an obvious indicator of this is to defend the membership to the EU. The second point that Gülen movement and the JDP have been agreement is interfaith dialogue. Gülen movement has been very active in interfaith dialogue in Turkey and abroad. The JDP also tried to pursue benevolent policies toward non-Muslim communities (Kuru, n.d, p. 147)²⁸

However, one of the most controversial issues of religion and state relations in Turkey is the case of religious minorities. Non-Muslim minorities living in Turkey are recognized by the articles of the founding Treaty of Lausanne. After this treaty, state practices and discourse have come to confine this reference to Lausanne to three specific non-Muslim communities: Jews, Armenians and Orthodox Greeks and it was the EU reform process that raised the issue of the rights of smaller groups, for

²⁸ It is a rather complicated issue which cannot be detailed in this study. For more detail about Gülen’s movement, see Yavuz and Esposito (2003), Yavuz(2003), Özdalga(2007), Kuru(2009), Gözaydın (2010). We will mention the movement’s active role in the World under the title of Inter-religious dialogue.

instance Assyrians and Chaldeans (Oran, 2004, p. 36). However, non-Muslim minorities have faced with various difficulties since the founding of the republic. JDP initiated reforms to solve certain problems of Christian and Jews, for example property rights, however non-Muslim communities still face with various bureaucratic obstacles. And resolution of non-Muslim problems will show to what extent passive secularism accomplished by the JDP (Kuru, 2009, pp.179-181).

One of the significant examples of the multilateral initiative is the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’²⁹ which was brought forward by the Spanish government. The Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero proposed this initiative to the secretary general of the UN in his speech for the first time at the 59th UN General Assembly in 2004. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan supported the idea forwarding the process to include a Muslim country as a co-sponsor, and consequently Turkey was offered to take on this position for its dual identity as an Islamic country culturally and a Western one politically, and for its stance towards global terrorism (Balcı and Miş, 2008, p. 392).

Turkey has been increasing its influence in multilateral organizations and institutions. Assuming the non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council in 2008 is a testament of this influence. Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)³⁰ is another political entity in which Turkey plays an active role. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, a Turkish academic, is the first vote-elected Secretary General of the OIC and there are three reasons why his election is important: First of all, it was the first time to hold a democratic elections were held in adapt assign someone to the position. Second, it was also the first time that a Turkish candidate was assigned to the post. And third, it is the second biggest international organization after the UN and it is the world’s largest Muslim body. It is obvious that Turkey, not only a connected with the above-mentioned organizations but many others, and has been playing a much more active role in the regional context in comparison with the past.

Therefore, Islam is not only about the Sunni sat but also involves the Alevi. The “Alevi question” has been on the agenda since the very first days of the Turkish Republic. Alevi lodges and its practices are banned if not governed by the Diyanet (Dressler, 2011, p.190). The Kemalist exclusionist *laicism* played its part in this case

²⁹ For more detail, you can see offical website, URL, <http://www.unaoc.org/>

³⁰ For more detail, see the official website of OIC: http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=58

too and the Alevi question has remained an unsolved issue. Besides Kemalist *laicism*, JDP's passive secularism model also does not exactly response to "Alevi question". In the public sphere, still many situations and/or regulations far from to prevent sovereignty of Sunni Islam on Alevism on the contrary of JDP's secularism definition.

In sum, Turkish politics is conducted by a post-Islamist party government. And it is a fact that Turkey as an influential political actor utilizing religion as soft power, is drifting away from Kemalist *laicism*. Ironically, EU relations have been at their peak during the government of this party known with its conservative identity. Although it has been stagnant recently, it would be impossible to overlook the efforts placed towards EU accession by the government. Nevertheless, in parallel to the slowdown of the accession process, distinctions for instance about democratic secularism is not so clear always in Turkish daily politics, because of intervention in private life with conservative justifications and religious minorities. However speculations on this process and where it is going would be just a bunch of conspiracy.

From the point of the EU, it might maybe be possible to overlook the religious identity of Turkey with a government having a comprehension of liberal democracy approaching the one Europe has, and emphasizing democratic principles while embracing secularism. Surely, the role of JDP can play more influential role to Turkey's long standing accession journey to the EU if it will want to continue this process effectively. Both JDP's effects on accession process and the role JDP can play as a pivotal regional actor related to "its ability to continue with democratization" (Kadioğlu, 2008, p. 55). In other words, how a democratic state with internalized secular and pluralistic comprehension and values can be a threat for Europe. Then only then, when Turkey could meet European specific values, such as democracy, secularism, human rights, a consequence of the accession process will be understood. However, while a process is going on, there are some efforts to make a deal between different religions. In the next section, specially interfaith dialogue as an alternative to create harmony will be focused on.

4.3 Interfaith Dialogue: Is Compromise Possible Between Different Religions?

On the contrary to the notion which labels religion as a source of conflicts, attention has drawn to the question of whether religion can be considered as a beneficial

element of conflict resolution and peace-building, particularly in the period after 2001. Interfaith dialogue is regarded as a crucial step of the international peace-building by many scholars. For example, Hans Kung asserted that:

Our generation has arrived at the threshold of a new era in human history: the birth of a global community. Modern communications, trade, and international relations as well as the security and environmental dilemmas we all face make us increasingly interdependent. No one can live in isolation. Thus, whether we like it or not, our vast and diverse human family must finally learn to live together. Individually and collectively we must assume a greater sense of Universal Responsibility. No peace among the nations without peace among the religions. No peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions. (1991, p. 138).

Interfaith dialogue is significant with regards to the mutual dealings between different religions. It can be differentiated from other types of dialogues with its specific point that spirituality being at the center of the dialogue. Interfaith dialogue uses or emphasizes symbols and rituals. And sacred scriptures and texts are significant features of the dialogue. Interfaith dialogue can be enriched by them (Abu-Nimer, 2002, pp. 15-32). Interfaith dialogue can be distinguished from secular dialogue with these features. However, it is not necessarily the only way of peace-building. Sometimes, both secular and faith-based dialogue act in a similar way just as they do for global issues like environmental concerns or fatal diseases.

In fact, this is not a very new issue. The Council for a Parliament of the World's Religions held in 1893 in Chicago can be accepted as a starting point of interfaith dialogue among faith-based actors. It is the first formal gathering of representatives from both Eastern and Western spiritual traditions.³¹

There are some faith-based actors which are effective in interfaith dialogue. These are organizations, individuals and institutions which are motivated by their religious and spiritual traditions and values to provide peace as a faith-based organization. Among these kind of actors are; religious NGOs, religious militants, national and transnational religious hierarchies, ecumenical and interreligious bodies and local religious communities (Appleby, 199, p. 211). In the case of Turkey and Islam, Gülen's movement can be given as an instance of an NGO. One of the activities of Gülen movement is to advance transnational interfaith dialogue. According to Gülen, the importance of interfaith dialogue originates from five main reasons; saving

³¹ For more information on the Parliament of the World's Religions, see the official web site. URL: <http://www.parliamentofreligions.org>

modern humans from materialism; all religions have the same sources and natures; the Koran's call for interfaith dialogue; religious tolerance as a purpose of human life; and love as the essence of being tolerant. He refuses to acknowledge fundamentalist, violent, and exclusivist interpretations of religion (Gözaydın, 2010, pp. 3-4). Instead, Gülen emphasizes the importance to fight materialism and to revive faith in people's lives as he considers it the common goal of all religions. In other words, he is concerned with bringing religion back to the lives of contemporary humans in order to increase both tolerance and interfaith dialogues (Gözaydın, 2009, p. 1225). Gülen, in his pursuit to increase interfaith dialogues, has held talks with many religious leaders and institutions, such as Greek Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeos (1996), Pope John Paul II (1998), and Sepharadic Chief Rabbi of Israel Eliyahu Bakshi Doron (1999) via the Intercultural Dialogue Platform –a project of the movement (Gözaydın, 2010, p. 4)

Diyanet, which is an institution peculiar to Turkey, has also made "dialogue" a part of its agenda since 1998. Popes Paul VI and John Paul II visited Turkey in 1967 and 1979. Pope Benedict XVI also visited Turkey in 2006, on a tour of Muslim countries (*Ibid.*, p.4). The following quote from the official website of Diyanet sums up its stance about interfaith dialogue:

Our religion, Islam, attached great importance to the establishment of positive relations between individuals and religions, and has called for eliminating discrimination in the World and eradicating the moral degeneration and injustice that threaten humanity. Dialogue between the adherents of two different religions does not necessarily mean that they approve of other's stance, but rather that they are trying to understand one another and to set up a healthy communication based on knowledge, emotion and action. In this context, as dialogue makes it possible for there to be an atmosphere of tolerance, enabling the recognition and understanding of one another, as well as providing sound and unprejudiced information about the other, this forms an important step in the general call for peace and permanent happiness in Islam³².

Not only the religious actors use faith as a policy, but also secular organizations -such as the EU- do utilize faith in a way assuming the role of religion without emphasizing it (Appleby, 1999: 211). In compliance with the purposes of this study, analyzing the interfaith dialogue will be useful if only focused on Turkey, Islam and the EU. Several conferences have promoted to study the effects of religion in Europe and to develop an alternative approach to the Huntington's "Clash of Civilization" by the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission in the mid 1990s. *The Mediterranean*

³² <http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/english/weboku.asp?id=792&yid=31&sayfa=7>

Society: A Challenge of Islam, Judaism and Christianity and the Carrefour Européen des sciences et de la culture (European meeting point of sciences and culture) took place in Spain in 1995 and consequently in Portugal in 1996.

Interfaith dialogue was formalized with the Barcelona Process which is also called the Euro Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) which is the first attempt in the history of the European Union to create strong bonds based on political and economic stability and peace between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Social and cultural dialogue came onto the agenda with the Barcelona Process (Schumacher, 2005, pp. 281-290). From the beginning, this process is about developing contacts between Europe and the Muslim World since Islam is a major part of the cultural expression of the North African and Middle Eastern countries. Dialogue is a key concept of the Barcelona Declaration. How intercultural and interfaith dialogue should be conducted was addressed in the third chapter of the declaration:

Greater understanding among the major religions present in the Euro-Mediterranean region will facilitate great mutual tolerance and cooperation. Support will be given to periodic meetings of representatives of religions and religious institutions as well as theologians, academics and others concerned, with the aim of breaking down prejudice, ignorance and fanaticism and fostering cooperation at grass-roots level³³

Another important fact is that the enlargement of the EU in 2004. This enlargement decision made an impact on the initiatives of Europe for furthering the dialogue. With this enlargement, the EU faced with a growing multiplicity of cultures, traditions and states. These differences needed not only being acknowledged but also to be in a harmonious relationship with each other (Silvestri, 2005: 393). European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was developed to avoid the emergence of new gaps between the enlarged EU and its new neighbors in the Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The ENP was first outlined in a Commission Communication on Wider Europe in 2003, and followed by an improved Strategy Paper on the ENP published in May 2004. This was an attempt to add new dynamics into the existing framework that was outlined in the Barcelona Process. It keeps the dialogue in the agenda as well as the Barcelona Process and it was made clear by stating that: “An effective means to achieve the ENP’s main objectives is to connect the people of the Union and its neighbors, to enhance mutual understanding of each others’ cultures,

³³ (Barcelona Declaration, available on-line. URL, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf

history, attitudes and values, and to eliminate distorted perceptions”³⁴. Secularity stands out as a dimension of dialogue both in the EMP and the ENP. However, the ENP has a deeper focus on security due to the implications of September 11 and changing borders of the EU. The fight against common threats, such as organized crime, international terrorism and illegal immigration are at the top of the agenda (Lynch, 2005, pp. 33-43).

In Europe, Islam is seen as a threat to universal values. The threat of Islam in Europe brings out the concerns about security particularly after September 11. Islam has become the core object of the dialogue initiatives, and the EU started to place a special attention to engage in dialogue especially with the Muslim tradition (Silvestri, 2005, pp. 385-405). Besides the security concern, one can argue that negative associations with Islam play an important role in the establishment of West’s rationality, culture, identity and secular. That is the negative representations of Islam, which exist in dialogue projects, contribute to the revival of secularism. Even in the dialogue level, there is a huge influence of the secular modernist perspective, since religion is regarded as problematic. The resurgence of religion, particularly the one involving Islam, is identified as a consequence of incomplete modernization (Hurd, 2008, p. 52).

In sum, a well-established interfaith dialogue can provide a steady basis for a mutual understanding of Christianity and Islam. Nevertheless, the real problem will arise between the religions looking down at each other, therefore it is necessary to question whether a proper dialogue is even possible. Even if it is rigorous and it is necessary to give time to knowing, trusting, and respecting each other, and even if we should take on the widest possible responsibility to report back, it is only one step or one aspect of the encounter between various religious traditions, “dialogue is not enough” (Ramadan, 2005, p. 211).

³⁴ ” (European Neighborhood Policy, Strategy Paper. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/World/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf.

5. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have attempted to investigate the role of religion in Turkey's long-continued accession process to the EU. There has been an increasing opposition from the member states to Turkey's membership to the EU, which implies cultural and religious differences, particularly intensified following the end of the 20th century. The main objective pursued in this thesis is to find out if religion can be the main obstacle all by itself as it is proposed by the defenders of such an idea. It is clear that cultural difference is an obstacle which grounded history and memory. However, it should be argued whether the cultural difference is a definite border between two parties.

This thesis has a positive perspective regarding the Turkey's accession to the EU with its approach which underlines the possibility of integration due to the accomplishment of various "criteria" by Turkey, such as economic development, democracy, human rights, minority rights as well as providing a continuance of "secular" characteristic of the state with freedom of thought, belief and consciousness and ensuring the neutral status of the state to religion and religious denominations. (In addition to that, there are several politic matters, for example Kurdish question and Cyprus which needs solution). The main idea defended is that religion all by itself cannot be an obstacle in the way of full membership of Turkey to the EU and it should not be a definite borderline.

This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first chapter, introduction, aimed to provide information regarding the general framework and approach to the subject. It includes attempts to define significant concepts employed in the thesis and to search different ways of studying religion and politics referring to religion and secularism that is the core of western European mentality. The general approach to religion and the secular employed in the thesis follows Foucault's genealogical analysis. The defended idea is that neither religion nor secular is a universal concept.

The second aims of the second chapter to explore discussions about the role of religion in contemporary politics. “Religious phenomena” have always been a component of politics for centuries. Perhaps even more than before, its political impact is felt to the contrary of western policy makers who claimed that it was marginalized to the private sphere. What is certain that, in parallel with the technological innovations and globalization, religion became more visible. On the one hand, there have been many conflicts correlated with religion. On the other hand, religion can be a tool for peace-building and a part of foreign policy as a “soft power”, especially in an age of multiple actors in politics.

One can argue that secular modernism is an implicit feature of the western European mindset. In fact, it cannot be possible to clarify the role of religion in the European mindset with one viewpoint or theory. Despite the fact that the EU was established due to the economical reasons, it does not mean that religion does not have an influence on politics. If one analyzes politics in Europe, one also should think about the historical background of relations between economy and religion, which have effected one another mutually in European history and have a *sui-generis* characteristic regarded as peculiar to Europe. Therefore, one cannot argue that religion does not play a key role even in secular European politics. It has been already included in politics, but its limits have been demarcated by a secular understanding of European modernism. However, today’s world witnessed a changing perception, the reality shown that secular modernism is not a universal, immanent and a single one.

The third chapter was based upon a special focus on Europe. It can easily be stated that today’s EU was established around economic and political goals. However, it is difficult to claim that there is a single reality. The historical process is much more complicated. Today, particularly with the enlargement process of the EU, the borders of Europe both as a continent and identity are being interrogated. This attempt has accelerated with an enlargement process and it has been discussed that the EU is also a cultural project.

Europe itself, if it is a concept, is a contested one. Attempts to identify the European identity and its components led to discussions about different definitions of Europe throughout the centuries and even deconstruction of Europe concept. Today, there is a significant tendency to identify “European” with the EU. It is a discursive construct

which is appropriated by the EU. Indeed, the geographical borders of Europe was re-identified with the enlargement process. Nonetheless, the components and borders of European identity are being discussed and an attempt to define Europe as a cultural concept is underway. Namely, there are no fixed meanings of Europe.

The meanings attributed to “Europe” become considerably important in terms of enlargement debates. Different approaches can enlighten the issue of integration, since it shows different attitudes to the membership of Turkey. In light of different arguments that the enlarged Europe is a “New Europe” or a “Cultural Europe”, different ideas, which clarify consents or rejections to Turkey’s accession, can be understood more clearly. On the one hand, some people defend that an enlarged Europe is a “New Europe” which has a political identity based on universal norms of democracy and modernity. According to this approach, “Copenhagen Criteria” is a sufficient condition when it is accomplished by a candidate state. On the other hand, some people argue that Europe is a “Cultural Europe” which has an accurate line implies the basis of cultural and geographical understanding of European identity. Contrary to the idea of “New Europe”, “Copenhagen Criteria” could not be sufficient for full membership (Düzgit and Keyman, 2007, p. 252). In fact, the consequence of the accession process has long been unclear. A final decision will show which approach has more influence on the accession process. A stance of this thesis is closer to the idea of “New Europe”.

However, how the EU will be shaped in the future is an uncertain “matter”. The European Union is being continually redefined in parallel with the changing world politics. The EU is experiencing internal economic problems, particularly the economic crisis in Greece, which consequently affect its internal dynamics. Debates claiming that the end of the EU has come or is coming are being held in the academic spheres. Regarding all the statements above, it is quite difficult to suggest or predict the future of the EU and its relations to Turkey in this ever-changing world.

There have also been debates about “European-ness” of Turkey. This concept based on cultural and religious identification rather than of political and economic references. That is to say, it's defined in terms of Islam versus the West (Arisan Eralp and Eralp, 2012, p. 167). Throughout centuries, Islam has been the “other” of Europe. Turkish accession has shown symbolic situation of European apprehension about religion and especially Islam and politics (Hurd, 2006, p. 405). To comprehend

this matter clearly, firstly the historical background of the idea of a united Europe was investigated in the third chapter. Following the deep annals of “Europe”, the secular character of the EU was analyzed. Both the formal documents of the EU and state practices were examined to find out a common basis of European understanding. Secularism is a necessary condition to become a member of the EU. Nevertheless, member states do not have the same practices about religion. In spite of various state practices, they are all secular which implies a neutral status of a state to different religions and religious denominations (although some countries have a state church, they are secular) and they all guarantee individual rights such as freedom of thought, belief and consciousness. According to the Article 6 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty, “principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of the law” are common to the member states.

One of the significant questions is: Can Turkey maintain all the responsibilities and balance its stance on the subject of religion and politics. In line with this main question, Turkey’s accession to the EU is investigated in depth in the fourth chapter. This thesis focuses on the relations regarding JDP government, since relations have reached the highest phase than ever before with this party, even it seems outstanding for a few years. As distinct from many other political parties that formed governments before, JDP’s foreign policy, which was affected by a “Strategic Depth doctrine” developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, has been apt to promote relations with the EU.

Yet, the current government JDP is a subject of discussions since it won election firstly in 2002. This is an ironic situation, as JDP with its Islamist base or *in spite of* its Islamist base has seemed closer to the EU, as opposed to the Kemalist tendency with its laic base. It can be identified as a “conservative democracy” maybe, but its stance seems closer to European understanding of democracy. Despite the existence of Islamist base, the JDP government has made the highest progress of accession history. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the full membership process has been interrupted since 2005. Ayrıca, bir westernization project olarak kuluran modern turkey avrupalı devlet modelinden ziyade gittikçe amerikan modeliyle benzerlikler göstermektedir. Bu da incelenmesi gereken ayrı bir durumdur. Now, Turkey has become a more significant actor in the Middle East and JDP and its usage of “soft power” is being under discussion.

The main basis of the objections, as assumed by many scholars, is that Muslims are attached to the values based on Islamic belief, which are opposite to the ones that a modern secular state have (Asad, 2003: 159). Besides ongoing debates on new constitution during the period of debatable current government, Turkey has constitutionally been a laic state. Therefore that it cannot be evaluated as an Islamist state. Similar to Europe which has *suigeneris* characteristics with regards to relations between religion and politics, Turkey also has *suigeneris* characteristics since it is a laic state with its Muslim majority of populations as well.

It is obvious that not only the future of the relations between Turkey and the EU, but also the future of Turkey and the future of Europe, are blurry. It cannot be predicted whether Turkey would be a member of the EU. And the course of Islamism in Turkey is also ambiguous. Commenting on this does not go beyond conspiracy theories.

One can argue that JDP has received rather widespread support from various actors thanks to its pro-democracy tendencies and inclination towards laissez faire economy. It is also significant to note here that the government has taken concrete steps towards democratization. However, the government is building its own hegemonic system internally with its conservative discourse. Interfering with art works and TV broadcasts is an extreme example of this. It can be stated that the very subject of democracy -and integral to that, secularism- has long been a double-edged sword in Turkey. One can argue that the country has rather diminished the repressive *laicism* (or assertive secularism) policies in favor of a “more democratic” *laicism* (passive secularism). It can, however, be an exaggeration to claim that the *laicism*, which has been considered as a pervasive characteristic of the country ever since the foundation of the Republic, has come to an end. Yet the conservative arrangements to the public sphere (such as the regulations on abortion and alcohol) can be considered as a warning since they are against *laicism* and fail to guarantee individual freedom. It is safe to state here that there is a lack of tangible data that can ensure concrete comments regarding the future. Time will tell the future of JDP and thus Turkey, as in the case with the European Union and the relations between the EU and Turkey.

Particularly September 11, 2001 and other Islamist attacks led to more interrogation of the existence of Islam in world politics. Since objections show European angst

about Islam, in the second section of the third chapter, firstly the place of Islam in Europe was emphasized. Following this section, the place of religion in Turkey since the foundation of modern Turkey until now is investigated. This is important, because of the existence of religious and secular dichotomy is not occurring only in Europe but also in Turkey itself. In the last section the fourth chapter, it is investigated whether interfaith dialogue can be a way of integration between several religions. Actually, an interfaith dialogue is not sufficient in itself but can prove a great contribution to the Turkey's accession.

However, even after many examinations, the main question remains without a certain response: Can Turkey be a part of the EU *with* its different cultural heritage? This question may be interpreted as: Is the EU, which was founded for economic and political purposes -not cultural ones but also includes a tie with its cultural heritage *de facto*, going to grant full membership status to Turkey? In the essence of these questions is that: What is the role of religion in both Europe and Turkey with respect to the developments in the world? How does Christianity influence the European mindset against Turkey with its Muslim majority population? Does religion constitute an obstacle between Turkey and the EU? Although the question is being reproduced and remains unsettled, there have been many different responses to the question.

Basically, one can argue that the collaboration between Turkey and the EU, in other words Islam and Christianity, seems impossible. If so, if the EU is a project of "Cultural Europe", the discussion can be over. Nonetheless, it is also possible to see that there can be other responses suggesting a harmony is possible between Turkey and the EU. There are several approaches which see a possibility of full membership. For example, one can support Turkey's full membership with *utilitarianist view* that underlines Turkey's contribution to the EU with regards to economics, security, etc and vice versa. One can also emphasize the contribution of Turkey to the EU. Another approach is based on post-national hypothesis. This is like a "New Europe" hypothesis which underlines the significance of democracy, human rights, superiority of law rather than cultural differences. This idea is also convenient to the idea of a united Europe whose motto is "united in diversity".

It is also noteworthy that Turkey's accession to the EU should be taken into consideration not merely on the grounds of the EU's consent (which ultimately

highlights the superiority of the EU) but also on the grounds of the Muslim population in Turkey and Europe. Aside from the question of Europe's admission of a Muslim country, it should be asked if it is possible for the Muslim minorities living in the secular European countries to be represented (Asad, 2003, pp. 192-216). If it is not possible, European pluralist mind should be reconsidered. As long as the notion of Europe is not correlated with multiculturalism and transnational citizenship, the European identity should be received with doubts (Delanty, 1995, p. 161). Nevertheless, if it is not providing the grounds for different cultures to flourish not only for multiple identities, it will never be able to go beyond being an economic community of an imperialist civilization (Asad, 2003, p. 180).

However, it is clear that Europe and Turkey are different since they have different cultural values and historical progress of relations between religion and politics. Nevertheless, religion all by itself does not seem to be an obstacle for Turkey's full membership to the EU. Moreover, different religions can exist together. It is just required to prove dialogue, interaction and particularly *mutual* wish of existing together provided by current political decision-makers. "In this way, Turkey's EU accession call for a reframing of past history as well as the manner in which Turkey's place in Europe is imagined" (Kirişçi, 2008, p. 37).

Turkey, with its Muslim majority, does not seem to be afraid of Christianity. Naturally, monotheistic religions whether they promote inter-religious dialogue, may well conflict with each other given their claims of superiority; yet the idea that interiorized secular understanding getting harmed can only come up if an exclusionist identity is defined.

People have the right to adhere to different religions and of course religiousities in a secular country. However a constant emphasis on secularism while at the same time ostracizing one religion per se leads to question marks regarding the nature of secularism. Secularism, on the contrary, can be universal as long as it can guarantee religious freedom and differences, which ensures that people- be they in Europe or in Turkey, whether they support Turkey's accession to the EU or not- exercise their religiosity as they wish. In case religion is a private matter, it becomes rather problematic to justify the tendency to reject other religiousities, aside from the remnants of the accumulative collective memory. However it is required for the citizens of Turkey and the Muslim population to manage to live their religiousities

individually. Considering that the EU would prefer to base the integration process on secular principles, Turkey would be required to transform its *laicism* to be in line with the European secularism; otherwise the very process of integration is risked in a way that it can come to a deadlock.

One can ask again and again: is religion an obstacle? The answer is both Yes and No. On the one hand, it has been introduced as an obstacle and on the other hand it does not constitute an obstacle by itself. In sum, we can say that it is not proper to claim that Turkey's accession will be inappropriate only by looking at the religious facts. It is true that religion has been 'presented' as an obstacle, yet however much it was debated and remained on the agenda in the accession process, it is due to the lack of knowledge and a reference to prejudice to present it as an obstacle. For a better understanding of what is really going on, all the arguments about the welfare, migration and the potential of decision-making of the European organizations should be taken into account (Zurcher and Linden, 2004).

However, in the midst of all this, other questions come to the focus; is it possible for the EU, with its valued pluralist approach which represents further values than Christianity and its inner processes, to embrace another religion? Or does it prefer to go for this option? And if not, would not that be contradictory by itself? On the other hand, can any actor be identified with only its political or cultural features under the influence of global capitalism? Can the role of the economy in this respect be overlooked? All the questions and their answers aside, it would contradict Europe's long-established values if Turkey's accession has failed based only on religion, in a time when the economy is ever important.

However, the discussion on Islam in Europe is also related to the whole project; the idea of a united Europe. Does Europe, with its significant values and 'peaceful' purposes, unify different religions or *not*? Furthermore, arguments related to poverty, migration, human rights must be investigated seriously. It should be remembered that this thesis does not cover these aspects. In light of the all of these critical issues, this thesis concerned with the idea that Turkey could not, or should not, be excluded from an enlargement process, if it will occur, because of the fact that the majority of its population is Muslim.

It is rather implausible to speculate on the future of Turkey, the EU or the relations between two parties. However it is significant to note here that it would be in line with the EU's own values if the union render its decision according to "the principle of fairness." Senem Aydin Duzgit and E. Fuat Keyman mention this principle that "entails that the progress reports written on Turkey and decisions about Turkey's success in full accession negotiations should be *universal* and *impartial*" (Aydin Duzgit and Keyman, 2007, p. 253). The principle of fairness entails also the *Copenhagen Criteria*. It means that "the level and the nature of democratization and modernization in Turkey, which constitutes fairness in Turkey-EU relations" (p. 254). In this context, fairness and objectivity can provide "a reciprocal relationship between Turkey and the EU, in which both parties have mutual benefits". It means that

With its secular modernity and mostly Muslim identity, Turkey has the potential to reshape the political identity of Europe as a multi-cultural space governed by the universal norms of democracy and liberal economy. With such a political identity, Europe has the potential to reshape international relations as a democratic space of world governance which our extremely dangerous post-September 11 world needs today. (*Ibid.*, p. 256).

It can be stated that the determinative factor will be the "willingness" of both parties, along with the principles of fairness and objectivity. The establishment of fairness and objectivity and the idea of living together can solely be ensured by the willingness of both parties. If Turkey prefers to make the required constitutional amendments, that is if Turkey shows a willingness, then the determinative factor will be the willingness of the EU. Within this context, it is also enigmatic whether the EU will have a precise definition or not. One should also take cognizance of the current arguments claiming that the EU has lost its effect.

Moreover, the "willingness" of Turkey is also consequential in that whether the European Union consents to or rejects the accession of Turkey based solely on "religious reasons" can be unveiled only if Turkey makes the required amendments regarding the Kurdish question, minority rights and economic progress. It can be said that Turkey shows a willingness to improve these issues, yet is far from an ultimate outcome. With regards to the issue of religion; it is necessary to diminish the oppressive laicism at the heart of modern Turkey for a more democratic country, yet the current improvements regarding the issue are not sufficient. One can argue that JDP with its tendency to increase its influence in the Middle East and with its

“conservative” identity that can be described as a “soft power” bears a resemblance to the American model rather than the members of the European Union. One can also argue that JDP displays rather “conservative” inclinations. Whether JDP succeeds in ensuring “democracy” as required by the “conservative democracy”-in its own words- is a controversial subject, which demands a close monitoring.

It is also required to provide solutions to various subjects based on mutual expectations, notably the Cyprus issue. The sum and the substance of it is that the solution to mutual expectations can be established with the willingness of both parties.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the political interests of both parties will be decisive in the outcome of the process, whether it results in a willingness or unwillingness. It is extremely challenging to predict the ever-changing political interests of the parties; one can merely speculate on the subject, which is rather irrelevant for the purposes of this thesis. Within this context, the most sensible thing to do for now is to “wait and see” in lieu of speculating on Turkey’s accession to the EU.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Turkey Timeline – A Chronology of key events³⁵

1923 - Assembly declares Turkey a republic and Kemal Ataturk as president.

1928 - Turkey becomes secular: clause retaining Islam as state religion removed from constitution.

1925 - Adoption of Gregorian calendar. Prohibition of the fez.

1938 - President Ataturk dies, succeeded by Ismet Inonu.

1945 - Neutral for most of World War II, Turkey declares war on Germany and Japan, but does not take part in combat. Joins United Nations.

1950 - Republic's first open elections, won by opposition Democratic Party.

Military coups

1952 - Turkey abandons Ataturk's neutralist policy and joins Nato.

1960 - Army coup against ruling Democratic Party.

1961 - New constitution establishes two-chamber parliament.

1963 - Association agreement signed with European Economic Community (EEC).

1965 - Suleyman Demirel becomes prime minister - a position he is to hold seven times.

1971 - Army forces Demirel's resignation after spiral of political violence.

1974 - Turkish troops invade northern Cyprus.

1976 - Earthquake kills more than 5,000 people in western Van province.

1978 - US trade embargo resulting from invasion lifted.

1980 - Military coup follows political deadlock and civil unrest. Imposition of martial law.

1982 - New constitution creates seven-year presidency, and reduces parliament to single house.

1983 - General election won by Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party (ANAP).

PKK war

1984 - Turkey recognises "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."

Kurdistan Workers' Party launches separatist guerrilla war in southeast.

1987 - Turkey applies for full EEC membership.

1990 - Turkey allows US-led coalition against Iraq to launch air strikes from Turkish bases.

³⁵ It is taken from Bbc News, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1023189.stm

1992 - 20,000 Turkish troops enter Kurdish safe havens in Iraq in anti-PKK operation.

Turkey joins Black Sea alliance.

1993 - Tansu Ciller becomes Turkey's first woman prime minister, and Demirel elected president.

Ceasefire with PKK breaks down.

1995 - Major military offensive launched against the Kurds in northern Iraq, involving some 35,000 Turkish troops.

Ciller coalition collapses. Pro-Islamist Welfare Party wins elections but lacks support to form government - two major centre-right parties form anti-Islamist coalition.

Turkey enters EU customs union.

1996 - Centre-right coalition falls. Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan heads first pro-Islamic government since 1923.

1997 - Coalition resigns after campaign led by the military, replaced by a new coalition led by the centre-right Motherland Party of Prime

Minister Mesut Yilmaz.

1998 January - Welfare Party - the largest in parliament - banned. Yilmaz resigns amid corruption allegations, replaced by Bulet Ecevit.

1999 February - PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan captured in Kenya.

1999 July - Ocalan receives death sentence, later commuted to life imprisonment.

1999 August - Devastating earthquake with epicentre at Izmit in Turkey's heavily populated northwest kills 17,000 people.

1999 November - Second quake in same region kills hundreds more.

Into the new millennium

2000 - Ahmet Necdet Sezer takes over from Suleyman Demirel as president.

2001 January - Diplomatic row with France after French National Assembly recognises the killings of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide.

2001 May - European Court of Human Rights finds Turkey guilty of violating the rights of Greek Cypriots during its occupation of northern Cyprus.

2001 June - Constitutional Court bans opposition pro-Islamic Virtue Party, saying it had become focus of anti-secular activities. New pro-Islamist party Saadet is set up by former Virtue Party members in July.

2001 November - British construction firm Balfour Beatty and Impregilo of Italy pull out of the controversial Ilisu dam project. Swiss bank UBS follows suit in February 2002.

2002 January - Turkish men are no longer regarded in law as head of the family. The move gives women full legal equality with men, 66 years after women's rights were put on the statute books.

2002 March - Turkish and Greek governments agree to build a gas pipeline along which Turkey will supply Greece with gas.

2002 July - Pressure for early elections as eight ministers including Foreign Minister Cem resign over ailing PM Ecevit's refusal to step down amid growing economic, political turmoil. Cem launches new party committed to social democracy, EU membership.

2002 August - Parliament approves reforms aimed at securing EU membership. Death sentence to be abolished except in times of war and bans on Kurdish education, broadcasting to be lifted.

Islamist party victorious

2002 November - Islamist-based Justice and Development Party (AK) wins landslide election victory. Party promises to stick to secular principles of constitution. Deputy leader Abdullah Gul appointed premier.

2002 December - Constitutional changes allow head of ruling AK, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to run for parliament, and so to become prime minister. He had been barred from public office because of previous criminal conviction.

2003 March - AK leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan wins seat in parliament. Within days Abdullah Gul resigns as prime minister and Erdogan takes over.

Parliament decides not to allow deployment of US forces ahead of war in Iraq but allows US use of Turkish air space. It authorises dispatch of Turkish forces into Kurdish areas of northern Iraq.

2003 May - More than 160 people, many of them schoolchildren trapped in a dormitory, die in an earthquake in the Bingol area.

2003 June-July - Eyeing future EU membership, parliament passes laws easing restrictions on freedom of speech, Kurdish language rights, and on reducing political role of military.

Istanbul attacks

2003 November - 25 people are killed and more than 200 injured when two car bombs explode near Istanbul's main synagogue. Days later two co-ordinated suicide bombings at the British consulate and a British bank in the city kill 28 people.

2004 January - Turkey signs protocol banning death penalty in all circumstances, a move welcomed in EU circles.

2004 February - More than 60 people killed when apartment block in city of Konya collapses.

2004 March - At least two people killed in a suspected suicide attack on a building housing a Masonic lodge in Istanbul.

2004 May - PKK says it plans to end a ceasefire because of what it calls annihilation operations against its forces.

2004 June - State TV broadcasts first Kurdish-language programme.

Four Kurdish activists, including former MP Leyla Zana, freed from jail.

Nato heads of state gather for summit in Istanbul.

2004 July - Three die in car bomb attack in southeastern town of Van. Authorities accuse the PKK of involvement which it denies.

2004 September - Parliament approves penal reforms introducing tougher measures to prevent torture and violence against women. Controversial proposal on criminalising adultery dropped.

EU talks

2004 December - EU leaders agree to open talks in 2005 on Turkey's EU accession. The decision, made at a summit in Brussels, follows a deal over an EU demand that Turkey recognise Cyprus as an EU member.

2005 January - New lira currency introduced as six zeroes are stripped from old lira, ending an era in which banknotes were denominated in millions.

2005 May - Parliament approves amendments to new penal code after complaints that the previous version restricted media freedom. The EU welcomes the move but says the code still fails to meet all its concerns on human rights.

2005 June - Parliament overturns veto by secularist President Sezer on government-backed amendment easing restrictions on teaching of Koran.

2005 July - Six killed in bomb attack on a train in the east. Officials blame the PKK.

2005 October - EU membership negotiations officially launched after intense bargaining.

2005 November - Multi-billion-dollar Blue Stream pipeline carrying Russian gas under the Black Sea to Turkey opens in the port of Samsun.

2006 April - At least a dozen people are killed in clashes between Kurdish protesters and security forces in the south-east. Several people are killed in related unrest in Istanbul.

2006 May - Gunman opens fire in Turkey's highest court, killing a prominent judge and wounding four others. Thousands protest against what they perceive as an Islamic fundamentalist attack.

2006 June - Parliament passes new anti-terror law which worries the EU and which rights groups criticise as an invitation to torture.

2006 July - Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline opened at ceremony in Turkey.

2006 August-September - Bombers target resorts and Istanbul. Shadowy separatist group Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAC) claims responsibility for some attacks and warns it will turn "Turkey into hell".

2006 30 September - Kurdish separatist group, the PKK, declares a unilateral ceasefire in operations against the military.

2006 December - EU partially freezes Turkey's membership talks because of Ankara's failure to open its ports and airports to Cypriot traffic.

2007 January - Journalist and Armenian community leader Hrant Dink is assassinated. The murder provokes outrage in Turkey and Armenia. Prime Minister Erdogan says a bullet has been fired at democracy and freedom of expression.

Secularist protests

2007 April - Tens of thousands of supporters of secularism rally in Ankara, aiming to pressure Prime Minister Erdogan not to run in presidential elections because of his Islamist background.

Ruling AK party puts forward Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as its candidate after Mr Erdogan decides not to stand. He narrowly fails to win in the first round.

2007 May - Parliament brings forward national elections to 22 July to try end the standoff between secularists and Islamists over the choice of the next president.

Parliament gives initial approval to a constitutional change allowing the president to be elected by a popular vote, but the amendment is vetoed by President Sezer.

Tension mounts on Turkey-Iraq border amid speculation that Turkey may launch an incursion to tackle Kurdish rebels.

Bomb blast in Ankara kills six and injures 100. PKK denies responsibility.

2007 July - AK Party wins parliamentary elections.

2007 August - Abdullah Gul is elected president.

2007 October - Diplomatic row with United States after a US congressional committee recognises the killings of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire as genocide.

Parliament gives go-ahead for military operations in Iraq in pursuit of Kurdish rebels.

Voters in a referendum back plans to have future presidents elected by the people instead of by parliament.

2007 December - Turkey launches a series of air strikes on fighters from the Kurdish PKK movement inside Iraq.

Headscarf dispute

2008 February - Thousands protest at plans to allow women to wear the Islamic headscarf to university.

Parliament approves constitutional amendments which will pave the way for women to be allowed to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities.

2008 July - Petition to the constitutional court to have the governing AK Party banned for allegedly undermining the secular constitution fails by a narrow margin.

2008 October - Trial starts of 86 suspected members of a shadowy ultra-nationalist Ergenekon group, which is accused of plotting a series of attacks and provoking a military coup against the government.

2009 February - Protesters marking the 10th anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the banned Kurdish PKK movement, clash with police in south-east Turkey.

Prominent Kurdish politician Ahmet Turk defies Turkish law by giving speech to parliament in his native Kurdish. State TV cuts live broadcast, as the language is banned in parliament.

2009 June - Trial starts of a further 56 people in connection with the alleged ultra-nationalist Ergenekon plot to bring down the government.

2009 July - President Abdullah Gul approves legislation proposed by the ruling AK Party giving civilian courts the power to try military personnel for threatening national security or involvement in organised crime.

PM Tayyip Erdogan holds a rare meeting with the leader of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party, Ahmet Turk, as part of efforts to solve the Kurdish problem politically.

Rapprochement

2009 October - The governments of Turkey and Armenia agree to normalise relations at a meeting in Switzerland. Both parliaments will need to ratify the accord. Turkey says opening the border will depend on progress on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

2009 December - The government introduces measures in parliament to increase Kurdish language rights and reduce the military presence in the mainly-Kurdish southeast as part of its "Kurdish initiative". The Constitutional Court considers whether to ban the Democratic Society Party over alleged links to the PKK, in a move that could derail the initiative.

2010 January - Newspaper carries report on alleged 2003 "Sledgehammer" plot to destabilise country and justify military coup. Head of armed forces, Gen Ilker Basbug, insists that coups are a thing of the past.

2010 February - Nearly 70 members of the military are arrested over alleged "Sledgehammer" plot. Thirty-three officers are charged with conspiring to overthrow government.

2010 March - US House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee passes resolution describing killing of Armenians by Turkish forces in World War I as genocide, prompting Ankara to recall its ambassador briefly.

Constitutional reform

2010 April - Parliament begins debating constitutional changes proposed by the government with the stated aim of making Turkey more democratic. The opposition Republican People's Party says the Islamist ruling party is seeking more control over the secular judiciary with some of the proposals.

2010 May - Relations with Israel come under severe strain after nine Turkish activists are killed in an Israeli commando raid on an aid flotilla attempting to reach blockaded Gaza.

2010 July - Istanbul court indicts 196 people, including serving and former senior military officers, accused of plotting to overthrow the government as part of the alleged anti-Islamist Ergenekon organisation.

PKK leader Murat Karayilan says it is willing to disarm in return for greater political and cultural rights for Turkey's Kurds. Turkey refuses to comment.

2010 September - Referendum on constitutional reform backs amendments to increase parliamentary control over the army and judiciary. Critics see it as attempt by the pro-Islamic government to appoint sympathetic judges.

2010 October - Trial of 151 people accused of links to the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) begins in south-eastern city of Diyarbakir.

2010 November - The whistle-blowing website Wikileaks publishes confidential cables revealing that France and Austria have been deliberately blocking Turkey's EU membership negotiations.

2011 January - The EU's Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fuele voices frustration at slow pace of talks on Turkish membership.

2011 June - Ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins resounding victory in general election. PM Erdogan embarks on third term in office.

Thousands of refugees fleeing unrest in Syria stream into Turkey. Ankara demands reform in Syria.

2011 August - President Gul appoints top military leaders after their predecessors resign en masse. This is the first time a civilian government has decided who commands the powerful armed forces.

Turkey launches retaliatory military strikes against alleged Kurdish rebels in the mountains of northern Iraq.

2011 October - PKK rebels kill 24 Turkish troops near the Iraqi border, the deadliest attack against the military since the 1990s.

Iran, Turkey agree to co-operate to defeat Kurdish militants.

Tensions with France

2011 December - Relations with Paris are soured after French MPs pass bill making it a criminal offence to deny that the mass killings of Armenians during the Ottoman Empire amounted to genocide. Though the bill has the backing of President Sarkozy and is approved by the French Senate, it is later struck down by France's Constitutional Court, which rules that it infringes on freedom of expression.

2012 January - A court jails three people for incitement over the 2007 killing of prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, one of them for life. The verdict prompts protests that no one has been convicted of the killing and allegations of state collusion in Mr Dink's death.

2012 March - Former armed forces chief Gen Ilker Basbug goes on trial on charges of attempting to overthrow the government.

APPENDIX B: The Different Meanings of “Europe” in the Discourse on the European Idea³⁶

- 1) **Europe as a word with a distinct etymology:** Through the original meaning of the word “Europe” is not clear, it is often thought that it comes from the Greek words “euros” (meaning “broad”) and “opsis” or “optikos” (meaning “eye” “sight” or “face”)
- 2) **Europe as a geographical concept:** In Antiquity, “Europe” was mainly used as a geographical concept. According to the Greeks, the world consisted of Europe, Asia and Libya (later called Africa).
- 3) **Europe as a concept in mythology:** According to Hesiod, Europe was a beautiful princess who Zeus took a fancy to. In the shape of a bull, he lured Europe away to Crete (Europe and the Bull).
- 4) **Europe in the thought of Medieval Christianity:** During the Middle Ages the two concepts of Christianity and Europe started to merge. In the 1600s the terms were often used interchangeably.
- 5) **Charlemagne as the Father of Europe:** Charlemagne’s empire in the 8th and 9th century is seen as an early incarnation of a united Europe. The famous epithet that a court poet bestowed on Charlemagne (“Rex pater Europae”) is often approvingly cited.
- 6) **Europe in the peace plans of the 17th and 18th century:** The famous peace plans by such people as Henry IV (Sully), Abbé de Saint-Pierre and William Penn are seen as early attempts to unify Europe.
- 7) **Cosmopolitan Europe:** Cosmopolitanism is seen as associated with les philosophes, especially Voltaire (“I see with joy that an immense republic of cultivated minds is being formed in today’s Europe”).
- 8) **Napoleon’s attempt to unify Europe:** Some people argue that Napoleon’s realm aim was to unify Europe – including Metternich according to whom Napoleon wanted to create an empire like that if Charlemagne.
- 9) **The Concert of Europe:** Some of the statesmen who met in the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 were positive to some kind of united Europe, such as Castlereigh who spoke of the need to create a European Commonwealth.

³⁶ Swedberg, R., 1994. “The Idea of ‘Europe’ and the Origin of the European Union – A Sociological Approach”, p. 382

- 10) Europe and Nationalism (“The United States of Europe”):** While the rise of nationalism threatened the ideal of a united Europe, some literary figures (e.g. Victor Hugo) tried to fuse nationalism and Europeanism (The United States of Europe”).
- 11) Movements for a united Europe during the interwar period:** The interwar period was very difficult for the European ideal. Nonetheless, there were some attempts to unite Europe, such as those by Aristide Briand and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi.
- 12) Hitler’s New Europe:** In the early 1940s the Nazis started to use the notion of “Europe” as part of their anti-Bolshevik propaganda. Hitler, however, said that what matters is blood, not if one is born in Europe.
- 13) The plans for a federal Europe in the resistance movements during World War II:** In practically all of continental Europe the resistance movements had a united Europe as their ideal. At a conference in Switzerland in 1944 the unification of Europe was discussed.
- 14) The revived European movement after World War II:** There existed strong sentiments for a united Europe during the years just after World War II. High points include Churchill’s plea for a United Europe in 1946 and the founding of the Council of Europe in 1949.
- 15) The creation of the European Union (the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, The European Common Market, the Single Market, the European Union):** In 1950-1951 Jean Monnet began the creation of today’s European Union by helping to form the European Coal and Steel Community. Despite various ups and downs during the years after the early 1950s, the European Union has continued to advance.

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