Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11527/17608
Title: Avrupa Topluluğu Ortak Tarım Politikasının Türk Tarımına Etkileri
Authors: Özkale, Lerzan
Aktuğ, Hüseyin
64224
İktisat
Economics
Keywords: Ekonomi
Avrupa Topluluğu
Tarım politikaları
Türkiye
Economics
European Community
Agricultural policies
Turkey
Issue Date: 1997
Publisher: Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Institute of Social Sciences
Abstract: Avrupa Topluluğu Ortak Tarım politikasının Türk tarımına etkileri konulu bu tez üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm, Ortak taran politikası ve bileşenlerini incelemektedir. Ortak tarım politikası incelenirken asıl olarak, politikanın refah etkileri ve bunun kesimler üzerindeki dağılımına önem verilmiştir. Bu da, tezi, aynı konulu diğer çalışmalardan önemli ölçüde farklılaştırmaktadır. Birinci bölümün son kısmı, topluluk ortak tarım politikasından ayrılan ve farklılaşan, ortak balıkçılık politikasına ayrılmıştır. İkinci bölüm; Türkiye'de tarımsal gelişmenin tarihini inceleyerek başlamaktadır. Gelişimleri 1946lardan itibaren incelenmeye başlanan tarımsal göstergeler, 1980'li yıllardan sonra ayrıntılandırılmış ve genel politika bileşenleri içinde, bu bileşenler ile sebep sonuç ilişkileri gözlenmiştir. Bu noktada bizim için önemli olan tarımsal politikalar ile onların bir sonucu olması gerekli tarımsal göstergeler arasındaki ilişkidir. Tarımsal politikalar gerçekten göstergelerin belirleyicisi olabilmekte midir? Üçüncü bölüm, tüm dünya ekonomisinin gelecekteki en önemli yönlendiricisi olacak GATT Uruguay Round'u, Türk tarımı ve Ortak Tarım politikası açısından inceleyip sonuçlan, anlaşmanın muhtemel etkileri ile karşılaştırmaktadır. Tezin son kısmında ekler bölümü yer almaktadır. Ekler bölümünde AT-Türkiye ilişkilerini düzenleyen anlaşmaların tarım ile ilgili hükümleri, FEOGA ve bir tarım ürünleri terminolojisi yer almaktadır.
Community. For the US it would have been a major opportunity missed for securing form protection cuts in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as for using the president's fast-track authority to get reforms to its own costly farm programs through the Congress via the Uruguay Round omnibus legislation. For the EC, the extent of agricultural policy reform likely to be required under on Uruguay Round agreement would be no more than the EC, as it widens its membership, would undertake in any case during the remainder of 1990's. Agreement in the Round to reduce agricultural protection in industrial countries ensures that the beneficial flow-on effects to the rest of the world are enormous. In short, the prospects ahead in the absence of a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round would have been for more uncertain, less stable agricultural trade relations. Those relations would have been characterized by more-managed bilateral trades, more focus on discriminatory regional integration amongements, further US-EC form export subsidy wars, greater tension between Eastern and Western Europe, and a smaller unmanaged international market less capable of absorbing gyrations in excess demand, particularly by former communist countries. xv political economic, social and environmental factors lies behind the creation of the common fishes policy which has operated since 1983 and is now in its second decade. The CFP is a fully fledged EC policy, one of the very few, like agriculture, with common rules through EC member countries covering all aspects of the fishing industry from the sea to the consumer. But tins does not mean that European Commission in Brussels manages the policy of its own. A corner stone of the present strategy is the shared responsibility for decisions, their application and their enforcement by all those concerned- EC institutions, national governments, regional and local authorities, fishermen and fishing organizations. Nor can CFP be isolated from other EC activities. Increasingly, its objectives have to be taken into account when regional, social, environmental, commercial and research priorities are being determined. The communities responsibility and involvement were further confirmed in 1986 Single European Act, the first major review of the Treaty of Rome. It underlined the communities role in promoting the social and economic welfare of all its citizens and regions a commitment which clearly passed fishing communities. History suggests that major changes in domestic political conditions are needed for a multilateral agreement to be reached. Some observers, frustrated by the slow pace of the Uruguay Round negotiations, suggested that agriculture be dropped from the round's agenda as had been done previous GATT-sponsored rounds. This time two things ruled out this option. First, it would have been unacceptable to many smaller and newer developing country members of GATT. Since an agreement requires consensus among the more than 100 contracting parties, the Round would have risked failing to conclude with an agreement. Second, dropping agriculture would have been unwise politically from the viewpoint of the two main parties in dispute, the United States and the European XIV Community. For the US it would have been a major opportunity missed for securing form protection cuts in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as for using the president's fast-track authority to get reforms to its own costly farm programs through the Congress via the Uruguay Round omnibus legislation. For the EC, the extent of agricultural policy reform likely to be required under on Uruguay Round agreement would be no more than the EC, as it widens its membership, would undertake in any case during the remainder of 1990's. Agreement in the Round to reduce agricultural protection in industrial countries ensures that the beneficial flow-on effects to the rest of the world are enormous. In short, the prospects ahead in the absence of a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round would have been for more uncertain, less stable agricultural trade relations. Those relations would have been characterized by more-managed bilateral trades, more focus on discriminatory regional integration amongements, further US-EC form export subsidy wars, greater tension between Eastern and Western Europe, and a smaller unmanaged international market less capable of absorbing gyrations in excess demand, particularly by former communist countries. xv political economic, social and environmental factors lies behind the creation of the common fishes policy which has operated since 1983 and is now in its second decade. The CFP is a fully fledged EC policy, one of the very few, like agriculture, with common rules through EC member countries covering all aspects of the fishing industry from the sea to the consumer. But tins does not mean that European Commission in Brussels manages the policy of its own. A corner stone of the present strategy is the shared responsibility for decisions, their application and their enforcement by all those concerned- EC institutions, national governments, regional and local authorities, fishermen and fishing organizations. Nor can CFP be isolated from other EC activities. Increasingly, its objectives have to be taken into account when regional, social, environmental, commercial and research priorities are being determined. The communities responsibility and involvement were further confirmed in 1986 Single European Act, the first major review of the Treaty of Rome. It underlined the communities role in promoting the social and economic welfare of all its citizens and regions a commitment which clearly passed fishing communities. History suggests that major changes in domestic political conditions are needed for a multilateral agreement to be reached. Some observers, frustrated by the slow pace of the Uruguay Round negotiations, suggested that agriculture be dropped from the round's agenda as had been done previous GATT-sponsored rounds. This time two things ruled out this option. First, it would have been unacceptable to many smaller and newer developing country members of GATT. Since an agreement requires consensus among the more than 100 contracting parties, the Round would have risked failing to conclude with an agreement. Second, dropping agriculture would have been unwise politically from the viewpoint of the two main parties in dispute, the United States and the European XIV Community. For the US it would have been a major opportunity missed for securing form protection cuts in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as for using the president's fast-track authority to get reforms to its own costly farm programs through the Congress via the Uruguay Round omnibus legislation. For the EC, the extent of agricultural policy reform likely to be required under on Uruguay Round agreement would be no more than the EC, as it widens its membership, would undertake in any case during the remainder of 1990's. Agreement in the Round to reduce agricultural protection in industrial countries ensures that the beneficial flow-on effects to the rest of the world are enormous. In short, the prospects ahead in the absence of a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round would have been for more uncertain, less stable agricultural trade relations. Those relations would have been characterized by more-managed bilateral trades, more focus on discriminatory regional integration amongements, further US-EC form export subsidy wars, greater tension between Eastern and Western Europe, and a smaller unmanaged international market less capable of absorbing gyrations in excess demand, particularly by former communist countries.
Description: Tez (Yüksek Lisans) -- İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1997
Thesis (M.A.) -- İstanbul Technical University, Institute of Social Sciences, 1997
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/11527/17608
Appears in Collections:İktisat Lisansüstü Programı - Yüksek Lisans

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