THE AMBIGUOUS DIALOGUE
Spaces of Being and the Being of Spaces

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MUĞLAK DİYALOG
Varlığın Mekanları ve Mekanların Varlığı

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HAZİRAN 2005
PREFACE

There are certain moments in life - certainly not many - that are very short in time but immensely powerful in intensity. It is these moments of ‘nearness’ that drive the will for life, and that has driven me to express myself in this thesis. My ambition was to come closer to these moments and understand what is behind this phenomenon. It is as if these incidents eliminate all boundaries and borders to leave behind one ambiguous amalgamate. Existentially it is interesting enough, to merge with world, but architecturally it is even more interesting why certain spaces are felt so distant and repulsive as why others literally invite and open Being. I here think of the space of Mc Donald’s, that shiny sterile and disquieting space, as opposed to say ‘Gadamer’s floor’, that magical parquet floor of Gadamer’s childhood, which he at the age of 96 years mentioned as a response to the very straightforward question ‘What is Architecture?’.

Every so often, I recall what M. Arman Güran pronounced as the ‘fifth dimension of architecture’ - the dimension of life - that he had introduced me to at the very beginning of my architectural education, a projection of life and existence on the walls of architecture. I am more than thankful to Mr. Güran, for it was he who had introduced me to and primed my basis of an existential knowledge of architecture.

If this basis has turned into some maturity, I owe it to my advisor throughout graduate education, to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Belkıs Uluoğlu, who has encouraged and made it possible for me to engage in this subject. Her crisp and sharp critiques, little in quantity but large in quality, has on the one hand retained the thesis on a concrete level, and on the other hand has freed it to allow taking its own form. For the joyful exchange of ideas in her small and ‘dusty’ room at ITU I wish to additionally express my sincere gratitude, as I will bear in mind some moments of approaching.

May 2005

Ahmet Balkan
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THE AMBIGUOUS DIALOGUE

SUMMARY

The relationship human being establishes with things, is principally equivalent to that among humans. In the same way as two individuals meet and establish a dialogue to share meaning, so does human being when confronted with thing or space commence a dialogue to join a certain network of meaning according to the degree and quality of sharing. Being under water for instance creates a different relationship to space, compared to say the experience at the peak of a mountain. Similarly, being in a forest or in a metropolis, being in a cave or in a shopping mall, walking on soil or on asphalt, as well as being surrounded by darkness or by light, are dissimilar circumstances creating different modes of existence. Being then, commences various dialogues in relation to what sort of truth space gathers; it establishes a certain ‘nearness’ or ‘remoteness’ to space according to the extent this truth is being shared and identified with.

If existence is not merely being by one self but a coexistence with space, if in other words, human and space are inseparable entities, at the instant the dialogue turns into ‘remoteness’, when human cannot initiate a meaningful dialogue to space and distances himself from space to become a stranger to it, then, what was initially a unity breaks down to leave behind a scattered existence somewhere lost in space. This is the core problem of the thesis. Since the production of space in the 21st century is to a greater extent an outcome of econo-politic and functional incentives rather than existential concerns, Being encounters a detachment and rupture with space as it experiences indifferent spaces reduced to hollow functionality rather than meaningful spaces. Along these lines, considering architecture as a creatress of space, knowledge on the dialogue between Being and space (however vague it is), as well as knowledge on Being and knowledge on thing gain importance.

The vastness of the problem area has been limited by an existential perspective, which seeks to understand Being and space continually through the eyes of existence. For practical reasons, Being and space are separately analysed in two chapters, wherein each chapter focuses on one entity in relation to the other. In this manner, the first chapter on ‘Being’ and the second chapter on ‘space’ are not essentially dissimilar; they are but forming a whole that is looked at from different angles. The third and last chapter on ‘architecture’ then, supports this whole in gathering and interpreting the subject from architecture’s point of view. It is a visual narrative that reveals in what forms this Being-space dialogue materializes.

What is felt at the end of the debate is, what influences the dialogue between human and thing is largely related to what the thing gathers. At first sight, natural thing and manmade thing seem to inevitably gather ‘nearness’ and ‘remoteness’ respectively, the natural being primal and familiar, the cultural being secondary and alien. In this context, being in natural space denotes to a unity and belonging-to, whereas cultural space denotes to a rupture between Being and space. At second sight however, it is clear that this distinction is not necessarily true. A statue for instance - an artefact - may be nearer to a person than some stone on the ground. Accordingly, what influences the dialogue is beyond the dialectics of nature vs. culture. While the dialogue is certainly influenced by personal attributes such as attentive concern,
interest, and personal identification, it is above all influenced by what the thing gathers. Hence architectural knowledge must include an existential conception of space along a phenomenological awareness of the origin of thing/space, - if, and only if - the intention of architecture is to create a ‘home’ for existence.
MUĞLAK DİYALOG

ÖZET

İnsanın nesnelerle kurduğu ilişki prensipte insanlarla kurduğu ilişkiye aynıdır. İki insan nasıl karşılaşır ve ilişkiye gelip bir diyalog kurup anlaşıverişinde bulunuyorsa, insan ve nesne, veya insan ve mekan ilişkisiardoşlarından farklı ölçüler ve niteliklerde kesişip, belirli bir anlamlı ilişkiye kuruyorlar. Örneğin bir insanın deniz altındaki varlığı ve mekan ile kurduğu ilişki, diyalomuya bir dağın tepesinde kurduğu ve deneyimlediğinden çok farklıdır. Ayrıca şekilde ormanda veya metropolde, mağara veya bir alışveriş merkezinde, toprak veya asfalt üzerinde, karanlıkta veya aydınlıkta var olmak, varlık açısından birbirinden farklı durumlar şekli etmektedir. Varlık mekanın içinde barındırdığı gerçekte göre mekanla diyaloga girer, o gerçeği paylaştığı ve kendini eşleştirdiği ölçüde mekana 'yakınlık' veya 'uzaklık' ilişkisi kurar.

Eğer ki var olmak tek başına var olmak yerine bir mekan örtüntüsünden olun ise, bir deyisyle, insan ve mekan birbirlerinin ayrılmaz birer parçalari ise, aralarındaki diyalog 'uzaklık' ile nitelenmektedir, insan mekanda anlamlı bir ilişki kuramak, mekana dâyiimsâmayıp, onunla onu birbirinden farklı durumlar şekli etmektedir. Bu tezinde ise asil sorunu budur. 21. yy'da üretilen mekan, varoluştan çok ekono-politik ve fonksiyonel girdilerin bir ürünü olduğu ve işin etik boyutu buharlayıştı ise, bu varlığın anlamlı bir çevre yerine, anlamı tüketime indirgenmiş bir çevre olmaktan hakana geçmektedir. Bu anlamda, mimarlığın bir mekan üreticisi olarak insan-mekan diyalogunun (her ne kadar doğası gereği belirsiz ve muğlak olsa da) hangi şekillerde olabileceği bilgisi, varlığın bilgisi ve nesnenin bilgisi önem kazanmaktadır.


Tartışmanın sonunda hissedilen, insanın bir nesneye kurduğu ilişkiye şekillendirenin nesnenin içinde barındırıldığı özlüğ dünyudur. İlk bağış, doğal nesne ve kültürel nesne kendiliklerinden sırasıyla 'yakınlık' ve 'uzaklık' barındırırlar; doğal olanı birincil ve tanıdık, kültürel olan ise ikincil ve yabancıdır. Bu bağlamda doğal mekanda varoluş diyalogun bütünülüğine işaret ederken, kültürel mekanda varoluş diyalogun kopuşuna işaret eder. İkinci bir bağış ise, bu ayrıma her zaman doğrultu yapar. Bu yüzden de örneğin kültürel bir nesnedir ve insanı doğada bulunan herhangi bir taşı parçasından çok daha yakın gelebilir. Burada altı çizilerek, varoluş diyalogun doğa/ kültür diyalıkliğinde öze bir güç tarafından şekillendirildiğidir. Bir yandan (varlık açısından bakıldığında) kişisel merak, özdeşleştirmeye, ve bilinç aradaki diyalogu etkilerken, diğer açıdan bakıldığında (nesne açısından), nesnenin
kendi içinde barındırdığı öz diyaloğun en güçlü etkenlerinden biri olarak öne çıkılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla eğer mimarlık bilgisi mekanın insani boyutu içerişse, ve dahasi, nesnenin/ mekanın fenomenolojik bilincinden yararlanııp özde az da olsa yaklaşabilirse, bu bilinçle üretilen mekan varlık için bir ‘ev’ oluşturabilir.
INTRODUCTION

The thesis you are commencing to read, and indeed have started to, is labelled ‘The Ambiguous Dialogue’. The dialogue, on which it focuses, is between us, Beings occupying spaces of the world, and them, spaces of world in which Beings take place. Analogous to the dialogue that happens between individuals, which rests on an existential engagement of meaning, I hold that there exists a similar dialogue between Being and space. In our everyday life, as social beings, we engage in dialogues to connect to other individuals to share and enlarge our own selves. The exchange that happens between individuals connects beings to each other, to not only form a society, but also give meaning to ones own existence. At the moment two individuals share a certain thought, feeling, or emotion, like two spheres that intersect, their sphere of Being intersects to connect self and other into a greater system. The incident of sharing is thence an incident of enlarging; it consists of recognizing the other in self (or self in other) and binds self to exterior reality. This sort of connectedness or binding gives man a sense of belonging-to and being-inside a greater network. The energy that bursts due to an overlapping of individuals might be considered as meaning, for what is meaning but the incident of sharing.

The dialogue among beings is but one dimension of existence, whereas another dimension is the connectedness to the material world, the dialogue between Being and thing, or Being and space in a larger scale. This sort of dialogue that relates Being to space is essentially similar to that between Being and Being, it rests on an exchange between both spheres, of which the degree of sharing alters according to the degree of ‘proximity’ of the one to the other. Here too, a certain level of nearness or connectedness, an intersection of Being and space on the psychic level, results in varying degrees of belonging-to space and world, respectively. If nearness gathers concern and attachment, remoteness gathers disaffection and detachment, each creating a different mode of existence and different mode of belonging-to. In this regard, the dialogue to be explored is along the lines of phenomenology; it rests on an approximation towards the origins of phenomena. The getting in touch with thing (or space) then employs Heidegger’s notion of ‘nearness’ and ‘concern’ (Heidegger 1926), along Bachelard’s idea of ‘projecting a light of consciousness’ onto the phenomenon (Bachelard 1957).
The significance of the dialogue is apparent when one considers existence as a unity of Being and space, that is, as being-in-the-world (Heidegger 1926). Consequently, a minimum dialogue denotes a distancing between Being and space, which in turn denotes a weakening of existence, a disintegration of the joined. On the other hand, one is amazed by the capacity of space to touch the depths of Being, creating peculiar modes of existence. Consider the calm spaces of the desert, how intense its vastness and purity affects existence, or the fantasy-like spaces of the metropolis, placing Being into his own creations. It is partly due this amazement in space, its capability of ‘speaking’ to the soul that has driven the motivation for this thesis. More importantly though, it has emerged due the above described dis-engagement in the dialogue between Being and space, resulting in all what is inherent to alienation, estrangement, derealization, disjunction or rupture. I hold that the evolution of space (in line with the evolution of consciousness and civilization) has created a serious distancing between Being and space, one that breaks and loosens existential belonging-to into scattered dispersal. Being untied, roams a series of alien spaces, incapable of sharing, incapable of clutching, incapable of existing. Thence the primal concern of this thesis is that Being, with increasing distancing from space, is developing an existential equivalent to the psychological fear of touching – an existential rupture with space.

The built world, somewhere lost between the forces of economy and politics, and architecturally speaking, somewhere lost in-between style, construction, or what is even worse, philosophical discourse, provides little if not no space for existence. If contemporary man suffers from certain phobias and neuroses endemic to modern life, from neurasthenia to agoraphobia and claustrophobia (Vidler 2000), they should be taken as pre-indications to his non-existence; for if man will not physically exterminate himself, he will at any rate psychologically decrease to exist unless he will be at home in his spaces. The wider intention of this thesis then, is but to enquire into existential aspects of architecture, that is, to seek for an enlargement of the epistemology of architecture, one that includes an existo-spatial knowledge beyond the conventional triad firmitas/ utilitas/ venustas.

Another dimension of the dialogue is how far one can reach and communicate with the inner recesses of a thing. The nature of the dialogue seems transcendental in a way, as Being and space do not share a common and precise language to be elaborated on the conscious level. The experience of space, an understanding, amalgamation, and encounter with the heart of space, is then essentially ambiguous in nature, as it transgresses the limits of clear logical comprehending. The
fundamental basis of a thing, that which is conceived as the ‘truth’ of a thing, is for Perez-Gomez, ‘always ambiguous and accessible only through the realm of ‘poetics’” (Perez-Gomez 1983: 467). Looked at the issue from this angle, it is clear as to why there exists practically no literature on the origin or truth of certain spaces, for there is no scientific tool (and thus no systematic process) to assist one to the meaning and ‘truth’ of space. The difficulty of the subject, enhanced by the limits of language and conscious understanding, shall not be an obstacle but rather the driving force to enquire into the unknown.

Regarding methodology then, the tactic is to look at the issue as broad as possible, employing psychological and philosophical insights at the existential (and spatial) level, and utilizing architectural, rhetorical, and phenomenological awareness in the understanding of space (and existence). For practical reasons, although Being and space are not conceived of as separate entities, the debate has been classified and looked at from three different angles, Being, space, and architecture. Accordingly, the first chapter focuses on Being (in relation to space); it looks at who this Being essentially is, that is, who he was and fundamentally is, what he in the civilizing process has become or has not changed, and what difficulties these developments have caused. The second chapter might be regarded as a phenomenology of space that tries to unveil the existential meaning of certain spaces, with the intention to locate today's spaces of nearness. The order of enquired spaces fluctuates sinusoidal between nearness and distance to Being which culminate in Vague Space, the space of poetic nearness pertaining to mutated Being. Finally, a visual documentation of architectures complements the thesis. Its intention is to furthermore accentuate modes of accordance and discordance inherent to architectures of the homely/ familiar and unhomely/ strange. Comparable to a comic book, this chapter is a visual narrative accompanied by little footnotes that recounts the story of ambiguous architecture, that which is suspended somewhere between the homely and unhomely.
PART 1: BEING

1.1. Who am/ was I?

‘The horse, like the man, knows where to put his foot, but only the man knows he knows.’

Teilhard de Chardin (Chardin in Crowe 1995: 20)

Within the long-lasting history of the evolution of planet earth, mankind most evidently developed a distinctive way of existence. He has developed to become the unique living being to comprise of a consciousness, which enabled him to think, to reflect and consequently elaborate a mode of existence. Homo sapiens is not only the sole being that is aware of its own existence, additionally and again through the gift of its given conscious mind, it is marked with an enormous will to control all aspects and events of life. Within the will and intention to control nature, the will to handle the outer environment as well as the inner self, lays the basis of the creation of the manmade world. Man has created and mastered his own realm of existence; he has created a new environment and a new self. In doing so, contemporary Being has distanced himself from his primal nature, to arrive at today's manmade invention of nature – one that might be called the 'second nature'.

How did it happen that the human being established a consciousness? How did it happen that the evolution of being took on a course quite different from that of nature? How did culture emerge to stand against nature? Isn't human being part of nature? Or is its development a rupture from nature, a branching and distancing from the initially given to form and create a manmade 'second nature'? Such are the more general questions driving the will to understand, locate, and give meaning to existence.

To be more specific though, the aim of this chapter is to try to comprehend the essence of existence through an investigation on the vague concept of being and through an enquiry on the archaic man as an initial condition of Being. The exploration thus will be dual in nature, one synchronic, freezing the notion of being in time, and the other diachronic, a temporal-historical investigation on the origins of Being. In this way I hope to reach to a comprehensive understanding and moderate clarification on the concept of being.
1.1.1. On Psyche, Archetype, and Archaic Man

‘In the beginning was the deed.’

Goethe, Faust

Travel in time (or in space) until you find a spot where there is no artifice, no electronics or mechanics, and no object of art, so as to arrive at archaic (or primitive) man. It is the dawn of mankind that is at hand, a gradual passage from darkness to daylight; that morning which is featured by the rise of consciousness. This chapter then, is suspended between night and day; at that ambiguous moment in which mankind commences his own route to branch out and leave behind the darkness of nature. If, as Jung asserts, ‘man’s capacity for consciousness alone makes him man’ (Jung 1946: 143), then it is consciousness alone that differentiates man from animal and locates man outside the realm of nature. The dawn of mankind is then the dawn of culture, or more specifically the dawn of consciousness; it is the inauguration of the path of history - from mud-covered terrain to the digital highway.

However, consciousness alone does not seem to coincide or is equal to the human psyche. If the human psyche is identical with the conscious mind, so Jung, we should be capable of knowing everything that is capable of being known. Under these circumstances then, there would be no cause for disquiet. Conversely though, if the human psyche turns out not to coincide with the conscious mind, in other words, if there exists a secondary psychic system not known to us, then ‘our disquiet must rise to the point of agitation’, as the limits of epistemology would transgress the conscious sphere, through a flimsy threshold, into an unconscious sphere (ibid.: 96). Accordingly, we are conceived as being separated from certain unconscious ‘thoughts’ and ‘insights’ through a threshold that keeps knowledge outside the sphere of consciousness (ibid.). To Jung then, psychic processes are not restricted to consciousness; the psyche rather consists of the conscious as well as the unconscious. For he is content in saying that ‘never yet has any reasonable person doubted the existence of psychic processes in a dog, although no dog has, to our knowledge, ever expressed consciousness of its psychic contents’ (ibid.: 98).

Given the duality of the human psyche, one must include that according to Jung, both psychic systems are not mutually exclusive. This holds that there exist neither absolute conscious nor unconscious contents, but rather varying degrees of consciousness. There is for instance a difference between stating ‘I do this’ and ‘I am conscious of doing this’, and thus one is rather more or less conscious of a fact.
The relativity of consciousness thus suggests that there are no conscious contents that are somewhat unconscious and vice versa (*ibid*.: 115).

In this respect, for the hypothesis of a second psychic system to be valid, that not only coexists with consciousness but also simultaneously transforms into it, unconscious contents would have to be capable of being changed into conscious ones, and vice versa (*ibid*.: 104). The threshold then would have to be permeable, permitting conscious contents as well as unconscious ones to appear and disappear. Thus conscious contents would become subliminal through a loss of energy, while unconscious ones would become conscious (indirectly) through an accretion of energy (*ibid*.: 99). Given this fluidity, Jung conceives of unconscious contents to be as follows:

‘Everything of which I know, but of which I am not at the moment thinking; everything of which I was once conscious but have now forgotten; everything perceived by my senses, but not noted by my conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, I feel, think, remember, want, and do; all the future things that are taking shape in me and will sometime come to consciousness.’ (*ibid*.: 112)

Furthermore, as both systems are part of the greater human psychic system, the unconscious is thought of possessing similar features as the conscious. In view of that, Jung argues that the unconscious might as well be capable of perception, apperception, memory, imagination, will, affectivity, feeling, reflection, or judgement, all certainly in a subliminal form, below the threshold of consciousness (*ibid*.: 96). Hence over and above conscious will and free choice for instance, the human is as well driven by unconscious motivations occasionally unveiled to the mind. Action is then a function of unconscious factors as well as conscious factors. Consequently, what drives the human body (at the psychic level) is the conscious-unconscious whole. On the other hand, human body is as well driven by physiological urges that which is generally understood as instincts or inborn patterns of behaviour. What is then the relation of the psychic and physiological, spirit and material?

In this regard Jung asserts that all psychic processes are essentially bound to an organic substrate (*ibid*.: 108). At first then, will is conceived of energy pertaining to the psychic sphere, to conscious willing as well as unconscious willing; although at the latest resort, to Jung, will is motivated by instincts and thus bound to the biological. As such the human psyche is in essence ‘conflict between blind instinct and will’ (*ibid*.: 110). If it were but merely a conflict between biological instinct and conscious willing, this would support the axiom psyche as consciousness. What is
important in this respect is that Jung rejects that unconscious contents are physiological; to him, they are part of the psychic. As the psychic, the unconscious yet approximates the instinctual base. Therefore Jung conceives of instincts being dual in nature, both physiological and psychic (ibid.: 106). For instance, feeling-toned complexes in the unconscious are more rigid as compared to those in the conscious stratum; they cannot be altered in the same way as in the conscious and are thus more conservative as they stay in their original form. Not being easily altered, distant from the conscious realm but continuously effecting consciousness, those complexes assume an archaic and mythological character. Thus the unconscious state, with increasing dissociation, sinks back to a more primitive (archaic-mythological) level, and approximates instinctual pattern (ibid.: 114).

For Jung, the psyche, much as the human body, shows traces of its evolutionary history. Much as the vermiform appendix then, there are some archaic remnants to the human psyche, which are closely connected with the instinctual base. Furthermore he argues, ‘instincts and the archaic mode meet in the biological conception of the pattern of behaviour’ (ibid.: 131). Instincts then fulfil images; they bear certain patterns. Leaf cutting ants for instance, fulfil the images of ant, tree, leaf, cutting, and transport etc. Without those images instincts cannot function, as they would lack a totality of pattern. Consequently, those images are a priori types, which are to be found in all individuals belonging to the same species. Likewise, Jung believes that man possesses a priori instincttypes that provide pattern for his activities and cause man to act in a specifically human manner. On the other hand, these instincttypes function only when man acts instinctively and are eliminated or rather limited by conscious willing, hence enabling certain individual freedom and behaviour. For Jung, those images represent the meaning of instinct (ibid.: 132).

Whereas Jung emphasizes the possibility of instinctual patterns, he also points to the difficulty of proving them. Since consciousness is incapable of directly understanding them, it translates or rather transforms the original image into an imprecise image. Nevertheless, Jung argues for an indirect way of approaching the instinctual image that consists of translating the wealth of imagery in dreams to any form of expression – ranging from dancing to painting - in waking life. Resulting from an accumulation of empirical tests done on a variety of patients, Jung observed frequently repeating, essentially identical motifs:

‘Chaotic multiplicity and order; duality; the opposition of light and dark, upper and lower, right and left; the union of opposites in a third; the quaternity (square, cross);
rotation (circle, sphere); and finally the centring process and a radial arrangement that usually followed some quaternary system.' (ibid.: 134)

What Jung accentuates, is the similarity of these motifs to mythological ones, though his patients had practically no knowledge of mythology. Besides, while every individual is certainly conscious of certain dualities or geometrical figures such as the square or circle, Jung asserts that those images, as formative principles, were unconscious. Consequently, Jung conceived of these expressions as the precipitation of an unconscious a priori into plastic form (ibid.: 135). After all, the commonality of those images and the collectivity of certain unconscious conditions led Jung to the hypothesis of the impersonal collective unconscious; the image of the instinct then was labelled as the archetype.

Archetypes, to Jung, have a numinous character; they are ‘spiritual’ if not ‘magical’ in nature (ibid.: 136). Accordingly when encountering an archetype, one is deeply affected by its numinous aura and experiences meaning to an utmost degree. Hence over and above, there is a certain feeling-value attached to the archetype. Natives in east Africa for instance, were unconsciously repeating a certain practice everyday: at sunrise, they were stepping outside their huts, opening their hands, spitting or blowing into them, to then rise their arms towards the sun. Although not even the medicine man knew of what they were doing, Jung were to find out that the moment when the sun appeared was ‘mungu’, and that ‘mungu’ corresponded to ‘mana’ which was in turn translated as god. Spittle and breath is according to Jung soul-substance. Therefore, the natives were nothing but offering their souls to god (ibid.: 141, 142).

It is important for Jung to note the difference between instincts and archetypes. While instinct and archetype are closely bound and belong together, they also form the most polar opposites. This is clear when one considers man engaged in instinctual deeds as opposed to when man is confronted with meaningful/ spiritual archetype. Thence the archetype pertains to the spiritual and the instinct rather to the biological; nevertheless they belong to the greater human psyche, for ‘psychic processes seem to be balances of energy flowing between spirit and instinct’ (ibid.: 138, 139). In this regard psychic processes are similar to a scale on which consciousness slides, at once at the instinctual sphere or at other times at the spiritual. This sliding consciousness, being as well apparent in other forms than the spirit/ instinct duality, is thence the explanation for contemporary man’s so called one-sidedness. For Jung, it can be overcome with what he calls ‘the realization of
the shadow’, ‘the growing awareness of the inferior part of the personality’ (*ibid.*: 140).

Much of the one-sidedness of contemporary man, according to Jung, depends on the repression of the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious as archetypes, both instinctual as natural impulses and archetypal as universal ideas, is excluded from science and rejected as being totally irrational. Hence the gap between the collective consciousness and the collective unconsciousness causes modern man’s one-sidedness, or dissociation of his psyche. In accordance, an identification of the subjective with the collective consciousness or the current ‘isms’, that is, identification with generally accepted truths, is the most serious threat to the meaning of the individual or culture in general as it would cause a mass psyche to emerge. In this regard, the main target of analytical psychology is the integration of unconscious contents to consciousness (*ibid.*: 151).

The basis of our mind is according to Jung, formed by the immensely old psyche of the archaic man, whose psyche was close to that of the animal (*Jung, 1964*). He was in this respect much more governed by his instincts than his contemporary descendants. If modern man has alienated himself from the unconscious, primitive man certainly enjoyed the unconscious to a degree of wholeness, that which the wild animal possesses to perfection. The age-old unconsciousness that once seemed to dominate the human psyche has gradually been suppressed. Although an ideal balance between consciousness and unconsciousness has never existed before, to Jung the integration of the unconscious into the conscious, a becoming whole or the ‘individuation process’, has to be man’s main endeavour. Accordingly, the ego has to assimilate unconscious components of his personality into the ego-consciousness. Once these contents are made conscious of, the ego will be altered into a new totality-figure. If the ego is to weak and displaced due a dominance of the unconscious, a darkening of the ego-consciousness assumes a preconscious wholeness inherent to archaic man. Hence Jung argues:

‘Conscious wholeness consists in a successful union of ego and self, so that both preserve their intrinsic qualities. If, instead this union, the ego is overpowered by the self, then the self too does not attain the form it ought to have, but remains fixed on a primitive level and can express itself only through archaic symbols.’ (*Jung 1946*: 159)

The integration of unconscious contents certainly includes an assimilation of archetypes. For Jung argues that psychologically, the discovery of the archetype is a spiritual goal towards which mankind strives (*ibid.*: 145). The moment of the
encounter with archetype is everything else than unambiguous in nature, as it cannot be directly perceived or conceived by the conscious mind; it is rather an intuitive instant along a heightening of meaning, a heightening of the feeling-value, which gives man a sense of a wider existence. For Jung then, archetypes are present phenomena that are not a matter of believing but rather intuiting. The image though, must not be mistaken for the archetype itself, since archetypal images or ideas are mere visualisations of the real archetype, of an essentially ‘irrepresentable’ basic form. As such, the archetype is transcendental in nature; it is not capable of being grasped by consciousness. Nevertheless, everything archetypal does represent itself as variations on a ground theme. As such, Jung is amazed by and draws a similarity to the endless variations of the mandala motif. These motifs, which seem to revolve around a ‘central’ meaning, simultaneously shift meaning from centre to periphery or gather diverse conceptions such as division and non-division, in which it is not clear which structure is emphasized (ibid.: 146). The structural uncertainty of the mandala motif suggests it’s meaning to be transcendental, a meaning not absorbable by the conscious mind.

Fig. 1.1. Mandala
1.1.2. On Being

It surely is a troublesome task to reach to and touch that, which is concealed within darkness. To approach to the word ‘being’, to enter into the heart to explore the meaning of what ‘being’ is - what it is to be, or what a Being is - resembles an experience of stumbling within darkness. When we shift our attention from the daily use of ‘being’ to the essence of what this ‘being’ means, a shade falls on previous light. To overcome the dark, it is necessary to distinguish diverse denotations of ‘being’, and reveal the ontologically prime meaning of ‘being’. The task of ontology then is dual, specifically the differentiation of ‘being’ from existing and an explication of ‘being’ (Heidegger 1926: 27). The major aim is to illuminate the concept of ‘being’, which will in turn form a basis for the greater discussion – that is to the analysis of the dialogue of Being to space.

In his Being and Time, Martin Heidegger offers an extensive analysis on the meaning of ‘being’. The first sentence to the introduction starts with the statement that today the question pertaining to the meaning of ‘being’ has been forgotten (ibid.: 2). The history of ontology, from the Antiquity through the Middle Ages up to today, has created a dogma on the concept of ‘being’, through which it has become a conviction. To begin with, it is the fact that ‘being’ is understood as the broadest and thus emptiest saying. As such it naturally resists any definition, and moreover needs no definition. In everyday life everyone makes use of the word ‘being’ and furthermore understands what is meant by it. Consequently it has become a conviction. The fact that the concept of ‘being’ is being taken for granted thus is the reason as to why the question on the meaning on ‘being’ has gone out of site. The failure of the question, or the necessity to re-question the meaning of ‘being’, according to Heidegger, is implicit in a threefold prejudice (ibid.).

The first of these prejudices is characterized by Aristotle’s saying, namely that ‘being’ is the broadest saying. In a similar manner, Thomas of Aquinas argues that an understanding of ‘being’ is yet inherent in all that is embraced by that what ‘is being’. Thus the generality of ‘being’ goes beyond any category and marks Middle Age ontology as the understanding of ‘being’ as ‘transcendence’. Finally, as a prolongation of the same idea, Hegel regards ‘being’ as the ‘indefinite inexpressible’ (‘unbestimmte Unmittelbare’). If then, Heidegger argues, ‘being’ is the most general saying, it is neither the clearest nor the least in need of readings, ‘being’ is rather the darkest saying (ibid.: 3).
The second prejudice is that ‘being’ is indefinable, whereas the not definability of ‘being’ stems out of its generality. ‘Being’ cannot be defined through what ‘is being’ (existing); it can neither be derived through higher notions nor expressed through lower concepts. Thus ‘being’ is not something that ‘is being’. Nevertheless, Heidegger argues that this character of not definability, does not dispense from the question to its meaning, but rather sets it in motion (ibid.: 4).

Thirdly, the notion of ‘being’ has become a conviction. Within every comprehension, every statement, every relation to what ‘is being’, and every behaviour of one-to-oneself, we make use of the word ‘being’ without hesitating on its meaning. Heidegger exemplifies this with two sentences. When one states ‘the sky is blue’ or ‘I am happy’, everyone will understand what is meant. However he argues, this average understanding does merely demonstrate incomprehension. Consequently we live within an understanding of ‘being’ simultaneous to a darkening of the sense of ‘being’. Accordingly the need to re-state the question on the meaning of ‘being’ is evident (ibid.).

Regarding the inherent discussion, it shall suffice to point out on which ‘being’ the focus is within all that ‘is being’. Within those that exist, the one who is putting the question - that is we yet ourselves - is the Dasein. The question on ‘being’ thus, is the making transparent of who ‘is being’ – the questioner - in its own ‘being’. The ‘being’ itself, to which the Dasein always relates in this or the other manner, Heidegger terms existence (ibid.: 7). Thus existence is the ‘being’ of that which ‘is being’, explicitly the ‘being’ of Dasein. Moreover, the Dasein is not merely something that exists, but within all that ‘is being’, the ontological primary one to discuss (ibid.: 13). Accordingly, within the discussion on ‘being’, I intend to concentrate on the Dasein.

To avoid any inconvenience, it is necessary to set the inherent terms. Therefore, from this point on, I shall use the term ‘human being’, for what Heidegger terms as Dasein, that which ‘is being’ and questions its own ‘being’; furthermore for the existence of Dasein - for the ‘being’ of that which ‘is being’ - I shall use the word ‘Being’ (with capital b). Thus within the new terminology it is the human being that is the primary concern and subject of interpretation.

However, to be able to give an insight into human being, to envision what human being essentially is, it will prove necessary to turn to the existence of human being, i.e. to its Being. According to Heidegger, within the analytic of the Dasein, the what (essentia) of that which is existing must be understood through its Being (existentia).
Thus the *existentia* has priority over the *essentia* (*ibid.*: 42,43). Consequently what portrays human being is but its existence. Along this fact, the discussion on human being takes a new course, in this case an analysis of existence.

There has been a tradition of thought, rooting and explaining existence with *logos*. But what does the Greek word *logos* truly denote? Although with Plato and Aristotle *logos* embraced multiple meanings, and although *logos* within time gained a variety of meanings such as reason, judgement, definition, cause, or relation, the initial meaning of *logos*, according to Heidegger, was speech. Moreover, *logos* as speech indicates a revealing of that which is included within the speech (*ibid.*: 32). Hence *logos* as speech, denotes a letting-see. If then, so Heidegger, the function of *logos* is a simple revealing of something, *logos* can also denote reason (*ibid.*: 34). Returning to existence, one can find the traces of existence as *logos* in Greek ontology. The Greeks conceived of existence, or the Being of humans, as a living entity featuring a language (*ibid.*: 25). Henceforth existence received two characteristics, the feature of life indicating its temporality, and the feature of language pointing to the presence of reason.

Yet another form of existence as *logos* is apparent in Bachelard’s statement that all that is unique to human being is *logos* (Bachelard, 1957). Accordingly what differs human being from other beings is reasoned on the line of speech and thought. If it is argued that the existence of human being is positioned at the skill of reasoning due to the ability of language, it might be argued that other living beings make use of language, as is the case with bees or chicken, and thus could contain consciousness. Even without the capability of language, one could argue for some form of reason and thus existence, as is the case with small children or apes, when playing with geometrical forms and intelligently fitting them together. Thus one could reason: 1. Human being is not the unique being capable of language or of intelligence. 2. If existence is explained via *logos*, human beings are not the sole beings comprising of existence. 3. Existence is not necessarily linked to language, and intelligence not necessarily to language. 4. There remains the question as to if existence is related to the presence of consciousness.

Similarly Cartesian ontology rests on *logos*, in the sense that Descartes’ ‘*cogito ergo sum*’, was but explaining existence via consciousness. Nevertheless, Heidegger argues, as the *cogito* is to some extent analysed, the *sum* is left without interpretation and is indefinite, although it is likewise positioned at the start. An analytic of the ontological question thus, requests an interrogation on the Being of
sum, with which the cogito would subsequently be understood (Heidegger, 1926: 46).

Furthermore traditional anthropology defines human being as animal rationale, a rational living creature, but also adds a theological character to the definition of Being, according to which Being is exceeding its own Being. Hence in addition to the Greek conception of existence, existence is conceived as transcendence. The idea of transcendence, that human being is more than a rational being, is but rooting in Christian dogmatic, which in turn according to Heidegger, has barely touched the ontological problem of the Being of human (ibid.: 48, 49). The origins of traditional anthropology, that is the Greek definition as well as the theological line of reasoning, indicate that Being was not subject to interpretation and was thus always presupposed as an existence along other creations (ibid.: 49).

A similar difficulty is present in modern anthropology, which is established and solely rests on the res cogitans, the consciousness. Likewise it presupposes a cogito, in which the cogito is something given, but ontologically undefined (ibid.).

What is inherent and indeed problematic in these conceptions of existence is a lack of an interpretation of existence, in which Being is presupposed, or existence explained via its abilities. The task of ontology, requesting an enquiry into the meaning of Being, and an explication of Being, is not inherent to prior explanations of existence. Hence we shall once again turn to existence, and try to reveal how Heidegger interprets existence and thus human being.

Now according to Heidegger, human being (Dasein) is something that is being (existing), and within an understanding of its Being relates to its Being (ibid.: 52, 53). This relationship simultaneously represents the explication of Heidegger’s conception of existence. Moreover, as human being exists, the description of the Being of human must be understood through an a priori state that implies a unitary phenomenon – that of being-in-the-world (ibid.: 53). In other words, being-in-the-world is a fundamental state of human being. Accordingly, the analytic of human being (Dasein) is thus an exposition of the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. This in turn includes an analysis of ‘world’ and ‘worldly’, an analysis of the existing that is the ‘who’, and an analysis of ‘being-in’ (ibid.). As this threefold analysis belongs to a greater unity, so Heidegger, an analysis of any part thus contains an analysis of the whole. Accordingly, traces of existence can be found within an investigation of ‘being-in’. 
Commonly, ‘being-in’ is understood as the being of one thing within the other. It holds a spatial character, in that it describes the locus of a thing in relation to another thing. This is the case when we say, ‘I am in a room’, ‘the room is in a building’, or ‘the building is in the universe’. The presence of one thing in the other, are ontological characters called categories (ibid.: 54).

However ‘being-in’ simultaneously is an existential, denoting the state of Being that cannot be understood as the presence of the human body within another occurrence. ‘Being-in’ does not denote spatiality, as ‘in’ originally does not contain a spatial meaning. ‘In’ is derived of dwelling, habitare, a stay, and denotes a being used to, to know to, to care to. As the ‘be’ denotes to ‘at’, and ‘I am’ denotes to ‘I dwell, I stay at…the world, with that which I am used to’, the infinitive form of ‘I am’, that is, being, as an existential means to dwell at… and being used to… Thus ‘being-in’ is an existential proverb of the Being of Dasein, which has the essential constitution of being-in-the-world (ibid).

If human being is characterized through being-in-the-world, if moreover being-in is understood as an existential that characterizes Being, a further reading of being-in will be necessary to reveal a comprehensive understanding of existence. According to Heidegger being-in includes following meanings: to be involved with something, to generate something, to care for something, to use something, to give up something, to undertake, to carry out, to explore, to enquire, to observe, to discuss, to define etc (ibid.: 56, 57). Thus being-in is characterized through modes of attaining, accomplishing, and concern included in the German word Besorgen. Consequently, as being-in understood as an existential denotes to concern (Sorge), Heidegger understands existence as concern (ibid.: 57).

What does this specific insight into existence as concern add to the knowledge of architecture? How does human being relate to space, if it is basically being-in-the-world? What meaning does being-in-the-world architecturally contain, other than a stay of human next to natural and manmade things? Furthermore what does being-in architectural and existential wise imply, other then a categorical containing of subject in object, or human in space? Is being-in, a rather active then passive co-existence that contains an action driven through a will, concern, or intentionality of Being, that simultaneously has an affect on space and Being? The space- Being dialogue is surely a reflective one, in the manner that intention alters thing, and the perception of the thing alters Being. Thus an existential enquiry into architecture - that which is understood as Being-space dialogue - would include an understanding of Being, the revealing of existence as concern, and intention as the making of thing
or architecture, and an understanding of thing, space, or architecture, that which alters Being through processes of perceiving, or experiencing world and everyday life.

1.2. Mutation

Mutation, is strictly speaking a biological term, denoting a change in the genetic structure of an organism that altogether alters its nature. Mutation can occur as a function of adaptation due changes in the environment. Accordingly, in time, species adjust their genetic information due external conditions such as climatic, topographic, or nutritional changes. Unnecessary organs (or even psychic systems) then deteriorate while new formations emerge. Generally, mutations occur due outer influences if not due inner coincidental failures. Hence changes in environmental conditions results in the alteration of species. For man, and only for man, the opposite is also true. That is, human being, more progressive than any being, along his own mutation, austerely alters and mutates his environment. He creates his own spaces, of which the metropolis is the acme, which provide a new environment to result in the mutation of various species including man, rats, or cockroaches for instance. Along these lines, painter Alexis Rockman recounts an interesting point of view:

‘Having grown up in New York, I remember being fascinated by cockroaches and rats; I was curious about the sheer quantity of these organisms and how they survived. It was amazing that they were capable of flourishing in seemingly impossible situations. It is interesting that these species are empowered by environmental situations created by man in urban and suburban models. We are their landscape. These symbolically marginalized species are considered ruthless and out of control. But this perception is really symptomatic of our inability to control nature. I admire their power and adaptability.’ (Rockman 1993)

With a wider understanding then, mutation is the change of organisms as well as the change of spaces, each affecting the other. Nature alters man and animal; man alters nature; second nature then again alters man and animal. What is more is that in the age of genetic engineering, mankind not merely alters spaces that indirectly mutate organisms, but he is as well capable of directly manipulating the nature of species according to will, including himself. The genus Caninus for instance, the original dog, has been bred into various species from the German shepherd to the Pekinese, that today seem natural to us. Similarly, the nature of man, whose life expectancy was around 30s in the 18th century and today progresses towards 90s,
is intervened due medical progress. Hence one can differentiate between two forms of mutation, natural becoming and cultural making.

In this respect, distinct from nature and natural becoming, human being, in the course of history, has generated a second nature that consists of humanly manipulated species and manmade environments. In line with this, Perez-Gomez argues that ‘history as human generated change is not ‘natural’; it is part of the modern Western consciousness, with its obsession for scientific progress and material improvement’ (Perez-Gomez, 1997). Being then, born into the 21st century, is thrown into a world of culture that has developed its own set of laws, other than the rules of nature. Within the system of culture then, being experiences an utmost different reality. This new reality, the external influence of second nature, generates a new form of mutation. This chapter then, shall try to look at Being and describe what Being has become, in relation to what his environment has become. Initially there will be an analysis of what human being has become psychologically, how he is transformed into something new during processes of experiencing, perceiving, and conceiving inside ‘second nature’. Finally there will be an observation on what human being is becoming physically, how it is merging with technology to become a post-organic amalgamate of the animate and inanimate.

Fig. 1.2. Alexis Rockman, *Concrete Jungle V*, 1993-1994
1.2.1. Psychological Mutation

‘I am proposing the notion that we are here in the presence of something like a mutation in built space itself. My implication is that we ourselves, the human subjects who happen into this new space, have not kept pace with that evolution; there has been a mutation in the object unaccompanied as yet by any equivalent mutation in the subject.’

Fredric Jameson (Jameson 1997: 242)

In order to comprehend what Being is becoming and in some ways has become, it is necessary to investigate what the psychological condition of Being is in relation to its present environment. Bernard Tschumi, in his *Architecture and Disjunction*, offers a threefold psychological understanding of space. Within his definition, he argues that space is experienced, perceived, or conceived (Tschumi, 1994). We shall take this definition further and try to understand how Being’s psychology has altered, in relation to what it experiences, perceives, and conceives within today’s spaces. Throughout the investigation on the present Being, that is to say the understanding of the modern man, attention will be drawn on the features that have changed and those that are forced to, but currently resist to change. The psychological mutation of Being - that which is in direct relation to the change in its environment - seems to be in some respects incomplete.

As the intention is to draw on the metamorphosis of being, on how modern man differs from primitive man, an understanding of modern life within its field of existence, i.e. within the metropolis, becomes inescapable. For it is the metropolis that already is and progressively becomes the dominant form of human settlement. What is the metropolis then and what does its inhabitant experience? According to Rem Koolhaas, the metropolis is a ‘mutant form of human coexistence’, that emerged in the 19th century due to ‘explosion of modern technologies and human population on their limited territories’ (Koolhaas, 1977: 322). In his essay, *Life in the Metropolis or the Culture of Congestion*, Koolhaas examines the skyscraper as a characteristic phenomenon of the metropolis. The skyscraper is argued to initiate the culture of congestion, in that it permits the stay of countless residents on limited ground. The attention however is drawn on the skyscraper’s verticality, the existence of multiple levels on particular ground. This phenomenon is considered as a ‘layering of the world’s surface’ (ibid.: 325). Within this multiplication of surface, levels appear to be functionally independent. A one-hundred-story building in Manhattan is visualised regarding its functional richness. The building exemplified comprises of general divisions such as that of industry, work, and living, and
includes functional differences ranging from public plazas in-between, general markets, and theatres, shopping areas, to amusement parks, swimming pools and roof gardens on top. Thus the existence of the skyscraper is argued to allow 'a spectrum of experiences on a single place that was previously unthinkable' (ibid.: 327). Indeed the indeterminacy of the skyscraper, the superimposition of several events on a single place, forms the reality of life in the metropolis. Hence Koolhaas argues, 'the true ambition of the metropolis is to create a world totally fabricated by man, i.e., to live inside fantasy' (ibid.: 330).

Fig. 1.3. O.M.A., Eating Oysters with Boxing Gloves, Naked, on the 9th Floor

Modern man, in comparison to primitive man, does really comprise of a different experience of reality. The events that take place in modern life consist of a different nature; they are so to speak, experienced in a completely indigenous manner originally pertaining to our present condition. To understand the difference in the experience of events, it will be useful to inquire into the nature of an event. In physics, events are defined through their occurrence in four-dimensional space. In other words, an event is regarded as something that occurs at a certain point in space and at a certain time. Hence events are understood as occurrences in space-time (Hawking, 1988: 40). Accordingly, returning to existence, the question concerning the experience of reality fundamentally depends on our experiencing of space and time.
Shortly put, modern man experiences space-time compression. Heidegger, in his essay on *the thing*, starts with a description on how contemporary Being experiences space and time. To cite what has been so delightfully described,

‘All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man now reaches overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months of travel. He now receives instant information, by radio, of events which he formerly learned about only years later, if at all. The germination and growth of plants, which remained hidden throughout the seasons, is now exhibited publicly in a minute, on film. Distant sites of the most ancient cultures are shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst today’s traffic.’ (Heidegger, 1971: 165).

This condition of space-time compression, within the 21st century, is being radically amplified due to improvements in electronic communication technology, and due to a drastic increase of air-travel. The experience of plural times, as well as the experience of plural spaces, to such an extent, is an indigenous occurrence pertaining to the information age. Modern man, experiences plural times, in that it can most easily ‘connect’, to virtually any being located anywhere in space (provided that both parties possess required technology). The experience of real time, the experience of the moment shared by several beings in different spaces, is an original phenomenon. Moreover, modern man is capable of experiencing plural spaces. Through satellites it receives information from all over the world. In an instant he is linked to different events and spaces dispersed all around the globe. Modern man experiences real-time events on the screen of his TV; he witnesses - most passively - joyful sights of festive or harsh scenes war.

The outcome of such a phenomenon on the psychology of being might be described twofold. On the one hand, it comprises of a positive value, one that enlarges the sphere of existence, in that it frees its existence from the formerly solid conception of space and time. Being now is capable of taking part and thus existing in wider areas. It is neither restricted to its nearby space and time, nor to its body, and is thus somewhat freed from space as well as time.

On the other hand though, modern man is experiencing yet another form of reality. To borrow Baudrillard’s term, this new being is encountering a ‘hyperreality’, another level or form of reality, in which the image has displaced reality (Baudrillard 1997). The result could be described as a confusion of image with reality. Being that is increasingly confronted with ‘hyperreality’, develops a psychology of indifference; he unconcernedly observes an accumulation of rather indifferent images. Hence the
image, that which is ‘hyperreal’ and distant to reality, is as well distant to experiencing Being.

Similarly, Heidegger argues that, although ‘distances in time and space are shrinking’, this elimination of distances, does not inevitably bring nearness. For he contends that what is nearest in distance, such as an image on a screen, can remain far from us. And in turn that what is farthest in distance, can be near to us. Thus, ‘short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness.’ (Heidegger, 1971: 165). Consequently Heidegger hints to a condition similar to that of experiencing ‘hyperreality’. Within new forms of reality, one senses the difficulty in experiencing the inner truth or essence of things.

As a further change in the psychology of human being, we shall once again have a glimpse at the metropolis, and draw attention to what modern man perceives within. After establishing a link between perception and conception, we shall then turn to conceptional qualities of human being.

*The Metropolis and Mental Life*, written by German sociologist and philosopher Georg Simmel in 1903, provides a comprehensive inquiry into the psychology of the metropolitan individual. In contrast to rural life, metropolitan life is distinguished by a ‘swift and continuous change of external and internal stimuli’ (Simmel, 1903: 70). Wandering through the streets of the metropolis requires yet another form of awareness. Being, and its sensory perception, is steadily subject to the influence of violent stimuli. Similar to the structure of a movie, in which one perceives 24 images in a sequence of a second, the metropolitan individual, experiencing the metropolis, perceives a set of rapidly changing impressions. This condition of steady stimulation is set in contrast to the perceptual condition in a small town. In rural life, Simmel argues, one is subject to the perception of more lasting impressions. Here one’s sensory-mental phase is under the influence of a ‘slower, more habitual, more smoothly flowing rhythm’ (*ibid*).

Consequently, lasting impressions are consuming less mental energy compared to fluctuating ones. Hence, Simmel believes that the metropolitan individual creates himself a defence mechanism. In order to protect himself against these violent stimuli, these forces have to be coped with a less sensitive stratum of the mind. Comparing the upper and lower strata of the mind, the conscious to the unconscious, Simmel argues that conscious stratum of reason is ‘the most adaptable of our inner forces’ and hence states that, ‘instead of reacting emotionally, the metropolitan type reacts primarily in a rational manner’ (*ibid*).
Within this specific example, perception does have an affect on conception. Perception functions as a medium interrelating the outer environment and the inner self. The metropolitan environment, through the medium of perception, is forming the metropolitan psyche. If so, it will be necessary to further investigate features of the metropolis, in order to arrive at a full comprehension of the modern mind.

Another dominant feature of the metropolis, affecting the conception of modern man, is that it ‘has always been the seat of money economy’ (ibid.: 71). Accordingly there is a strong relationship between economy and the domination of the intellect. As daily life is filled with money economy, qualitative values are reduced to quantitative ones. An example to a reduction of emotive values lies within the new means of production and consumption. In comparison to more ‘primitive’ cultures, in which producer and consumer are in direct contact and knew each other, within the metropolis the end user is often unknown to the producer. Furthermore within the practicality of daily life, the major features of metropolitan life are described as punctuality, calculability, and exactness. Thus Simmel considers the modern mind essentially as a calculating one (ibid.).

Similarly, but in a different manner, C.G. Jung describes the soul of modern man (Jung, 1964). Comparing modern man to archaic man, he argues that the fundamental difference revolves around today’s dominance on rationality. Jung asserts that within daily life, we need to state things as accurate as possible, and we have thus ‘learned to discard the trimmings of fantasy both in our language and in our thoughts’. As a consequence, Jung says, we have lost a quality that is inherent to the primitive mind, for in the primitive’s world, things do not have the same boundaries they do in the modern’s world. Additionally, primitive man was much more governed by his instincts than are his rational modern descendants, who have learned to control themselves. Cleansing the world of all superstitions and irrationalities, Jung believes, that the civilised consciousness has steadily separated itself from the basic instincts. The main characteristic of the condition of modern man thus, according to Jung, is ‘modern man’s split state’.

‘Modern man does not understand how much his rationalism… has put him at the mercy of the psychic underworld. He has freed himself from ‘superstition’, or so he believes, but in the process he has lost his spiritual values to a positively dangerous degree. His moral and spiritual tradition has disintegrated, and he is now paying the price for this break-up in worldwide disorientation and dissociation.’ (Jung, 1964: 84).

Finally, the strongest hints to being’s conception can be found within the field of the theory of knowledge. Most curiously, modern man has chosen himself science as
the only key to knowledge. We have developed a condition termed scientism, which is an attitude towards equating knowledge with science (Habermas, 1973: 13). During the process of becoming modern man, we have lost other mediums of understanding. We have favoured objective knowledge to a degree of neglecting our own personal subjective capabilities of intuitive understanding. Not only have we lost our previous connection to the supernatural world of the unconscious, but also we have created a one-dimensional being whose existence is limited by a world of scientific comprehension.

Concluding the discussion on the present psychology of modern man, we shall resume and once more reveal the differences of the present soul. Experience wise, it has been said that present Being, is in several ways experiencing a different reality. What has indeed mutated to result in a different experience, is the environment in which Being takes place. Other than nature, Being is experiencing a second nature. This second nature, an extreme form of culture, is an utmost abstraction (distancing) from reality. This reality comprises of new conceptions of space and time (that of the compressed), and appears like fantasy or hyperreality, inherent in the experience of the metropolis's skyscraper and the experience of a world of images. Perceptual wise, the conglomeration of fluctuating images, the diversity of sounds echoing within Being's soul, and the attack of various violent stimuli within the metropolis, is but one condition that Being's psychology has not entirely come to terms with. Defending himself against these stimuli, modern man tries to safeguard its emotive mind, via shielding with its cognitive mind. Conception wise, it is modern man's fondness of rationality, that primarily differs it from primitive man. The real mutation that being has gone through, above all seems to rest within the curves of its brain, that have navigated towards austere rationality. There is but no way and no reason to undo this path, but to learn out of it what has been lost and try to let reappear the fullness of our presence. As we discover the richness of our nature, and as we unite certainty with ambiguity, that is to say our rational understanding with a poetic one, a sense of a wider existence will inescapably occur, due to a more sensitive understanding of the self as well as a more responsive appreciation of the greater cosmos.

'At the end of this century, it is often asked what the future of science may be. For some, such as Stephen W. Hawking in his Brief History of Time, we are close to the end, the moment when we shall be able to read the 'mind of god.' In contrast, we believe that we are actually at the beginning of a new scientific era. We are observing the birth of a science that is no longer limited to idealized and simplified situations but reflects the complexity of the real world, a science that views us and
our creativity as part of a fundamental trend present at all levels of nature.’
(Prigogine, 1997: 7)

1.2.2. Physical Mutation

‘Late-twentieth century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between real and artificial, mind and body, self developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert.’


The physical location of Being, simply put, appears as the body. Traditionally the body constitutes the space that encapsulates the event horizon of Being. All thoughts, emotions, and senses, occur - or at least had seemed to occur - within the body. Other than para-psychological phenomena such as out-of-body-journeys or telepathy, existence seemed to primarily reside within the body. In this respect Stelarc argues that ‘in the past, we've considered the skin as surface, as interface. The skin has been a boundary for the soul, for the self, and simultaneously, a beginning to the world. Once technology stretches and pierces the skin, the skin as a barrier is erased’ (Stelarc 1995). The nature of existence, the character of human being, its abilities, all virtually correspond to the features of the body. Body’s anatomical features, such as the five senses, the cognitive and emotive intellect, its bio-rhythm, or even its shape, all together determine human being’s character as well as his sphere of existence. The features of our body for instance, allow us to exist on the ground, in contrast to existing in the darkness of the subterranean world, or within the cold waters of the seas.

So it seems, that there is a powerful link between existence and the features of the body. All existence is limited to the abilities of the body. If so, in order to understand what Being has become, it will be useful to examine what changes the body has gone through.

Without even looking at the changes brought forth by the electronic era, one might find simple changes in the appearance of the body that tell fascinating stories about the essence of existence. The loss of body hair is such an example. It really hints to the nature of human being. The story of clothing tells us that human being is intelligent, that it has the ability to think, that it is not contend with given situations, and that it ultimately has the ability to master situations. The story could have happened as follows: The environment is cold and the chill is perceived by a sense to be felt on the body. Body advises mind to take some action. Being is triggered to
take shelter, hide from the freeze and protect its body through what we today call clothing. Securing the body from outer conditions, Being’s body has mutated to fade away its no-longer useful hair. Through the aid of its intellect so to speak, man has ‘evolved’ to consequently alter its body. Hence the change in body points to one of the main existential attributes of Being – particularly to its will to control nature.

Nonetheless we shall not go through the history of the evolution of mankind, but focus on today’s attributes of the body that in turn might hint to existential modifications. A major shift in the appearance of the body is due to technological additions to the body. Ranging from simpler additions such as eyeglasses (disabled chairs, lenses, dentures) or prostheses, such additions do enlarge the sphere of existence, in that they make possible what was not possible beforehand. Technological additions though culminate within what is called the post-organic paradigm. This specific paradigm is marked by an amalgamation of subject and object. According to Palumbo, what is in fact called post-organic is ‘the new convergence between body and architecture through electronic technology’ (Palumbo, 2000:5). The body seems to enter the inorganic realm, whereas technological objects, robots, or even architecture, is entering the organic realm. This condition of merging, has several outcomes concerning both realms, that of existence and that of architecture.

To start with the body, what sort of additions exist, and how it affects existence, it will be useful to state a few examples. One major category of electronic devices attached to the body, initiate a merge with computers and electronic space. They are tools for Being to enter cyberspace. Through a virtual reality helmet for instance, one is partially able to enter any simulated situation created within cyberspace. The initial example is the Prototype of the First Virtual Reality Helmet created in 1970 by Ivan Sutherland. Putting such a helmet on, one can see or hear for instance, some simulated situation. This, to a certain extent, enables being to enter another realm.¹ The degree to which one is able to step out of a present reality to enter another one, depends on the quantity and quality of simulated stimuli that is to be perceived. Since what we conceive of reality is mainly resulting from what we perceive, a perfect simulation of a real situation would depend on the ability of the device to direct to all five senses.

There exists another brand of electronic devices that aim at a different purpose. In this case, electronics again merge with the body, but do not aim at entering

¹ One could argue that some objects, such as a book, comprises of the same capacity. Reading a book in a way enables being to enter the reality of the inherent story.
cyberspace, but form additions to the body that enhances it with new abilities. It mainly functions as prostheses, but not only as a substitute for what is missing, but also as an extra addition to the body. The cyborg, an organism that is physically attached to electronic (or mechanical) devices, is such a phenomenon. Its body’s physical capacities are enlarged. An example to such an occurrence is the Amplified Body by Australian performer Stelarc, dating 1986. Here the amplification to the body appears as a third, electronic arm.

![Image of Stelarc in Amplified Body](image)

Fig. 1.4. Stelarc, Amplified Body, 1986

What are the outcomes then for Being? In what ways does this mutant Being differ from the purely organic? How does it influence its sphere of existence? Furthermore what are the influences in relation to its environment, or specifically to architecture? One might state several conclusions for this new Being. The change of body does result in a series of differences that lead to a different sphere of existence. The chain reaction starts as follows: the change in body results in the change of its abilities; the change of its abilities result in different experiences. New experiences result in an extended mind that in turn results in an extended existence. As existence was initially limited to act within the boundaries of the body, this new Being in comparison, comprises of a larger sphere of existence. Through an
attached cellular phone for instance, it can easily connect, in real time to virtually every part of the world. It is at the same time here and there, and thus encounters space-time compression, a new experience of space and time. With other devices, such as the virtual reality helmet, it can experience different environments and different events not dependent on physical reality. It enters another reality to experience that reality’s own certain features and laws. Moreover it might also experience different feelings, other than fear or love, only pertaining to virtual reality. (Some kind of agoraphobia pertaining to cyberspace?)

Hypothetically considering an absolute cyborg, body’s new abilities will release new perspectives. ‘New technologies tend to generate new perceptions and paradigms of the world, and in turn, allow us to take further steps’ (Stelarc: 1995). Such as eyeglasses allow for better seeing, and such as that microscopes allow us to enter and perceive the micro-world, the cyborg most probably will be capable of perceiving its environment in a different manner. The difference in perception will alter its conception of reality and simultaneously its existential essence. Furthermore, through physical amplifications, it will not be limited to exist on the ground. Other than that it is capable of entering immaterial spaces, which merely exist in the mind (cyberspaces, telephone talks…), it will and already is able to exist in other physical locations. Divers, through their mechanical devices, already are capable of existing underwater. Astronauts are capable of existing in outer space. As Being is more and more experiencing different environments, Being’s perspective is being enlarged, and it’s conception of reality and existence as well. Along these lines Stelarc argues:

“For me the body is an impersonal, evolutionary, objective structure. Having spent two thousand years prodding and poking the human psyche without any real discernible changes in our historical and human outlook, we perhaps need to take a more fundamental physiological and structural approach, and consider the fact that it’s only through radically redesigning the body that we will end up having significantly different thoughts and philosophies.’ (ibid.)

On the other hand though, one can sense several difficulties. The main problem area is encircled by the concept of ‘change’. Within the different stages that Being is going through, from the first Homo sapiens to the late Cyborg, within this becoming, while gaining new attributes, it simultaneously is in danger of loosing some primal features. Although Homo sapiens was born into planet earth and initially was subjected to laws of nature, it progressively distances itself from its original situation, to create and exist within its own world of culture. Modern man, most curiously, does
not will to harmonise with his environment. He wants to free himself, stand alone, against nature, as an independent rational self-made being. During this stand against nature, during this process of becoming, Being distances itself from itself.

The estrangement that occurs within Being itself is strictly speaking the problem area of ontology. With a wider understanding though, one could argue that it is also the problematic of architecture. As Being ‘mutates’, as it turns into something new to comprise of a different existential essence, together with the change of self, it changes its environment. Thus Being is not only alienated to its self, but also to its environment. Architecturally speaking, if Being is unfamiliar to its surrounding, if it cannot identify or orientate itself within its environment (Norberg-Schulz, 1979), one could speak of a rupture between Being and space. The purpose of architecture thus should be to create spaces that communicate with Being.

1.3. Existential Intricacies

The process of becoming, in which human being has to some extent mutated in accordance to a transformation of environment and self, had indicated some existential intricacies. It was shown how the psychology of human is influenced via environment and how physiological changes alter the sphere of existence. Some instants of disharmony between existence and space were revealed. To approach an existential knowledge of architecture, it is necessary to further dig into how Being distances itself from space. Two major existential intricacies separating Being from space have been traced – homelessness and alienation.

1.3.1. Homelessness

An intriguing condition concerning the state of Being has been observed by German philosopher Martin Heidegger. In his essay *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*, Heidegger offers a particular view on how Being exists and how building, dwelling, and thinking belong to the same realm. Linking the deeper essence of existence to broader issues as to the way we dwell, to how we conceive of the world, and accordingly build, he states that these meanings have been concealed to us. Not being able to conceive of dwelling as existing, or existing as building, we have developed a state of homelessness. This particular condition of homelessness inherent to our age, rather than being the absence of a roof, is expressed as a plight of dwelling, or difficulty in existence. Homeless we are argued to be, in a sense that Being has lost contact to some primal realities. The condition of homelessness thus is argued to be
due to a fracture of the primal oneness of the fourfold – earth, sky, mortals, and divinities (Heidegger 1971).

It must be reminded though, with existing or dwelling, Heidegger points to a deeper meaning as to the simple act of breathing, living or residing. In his own words, ‘dwelling is the manner in which mortals are on the earth’ (ibid.: 148). According to this view, the manner in which we dwell is the manner in which we relate ourselves to our surrounding, of how we conceive of it, and how we reflect our conception of the world in what we build. Furthermore with existing or dwelling, he hints to a web of relations. For when Heidegger uses the word dwelling, he actually means existing, and with existing, he hints to the fact that Being is mortal and thus subject to divinities. Additionally he argues that in thinking of Being, one already includes the stay of mortals on earth under the influences of the skies. ‘Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling’ (ibid.: 150). Dwelling thus is not thought of a simple residing of Being in space. Dwelling is conceived as an interrelation of certain phenomena - an interrelation of beings, thoughts, things, and happenings – essentially the interrelation and coexistence of Being and space. Seen as such, the rupture of the relation of Being to space marks the condition of existence, to be more precise, the condition of homelessness.

To be at home then, or the occurrence of dwelling, is claimed to take place through ‘the fourfold preservation of the fourfold’ (ibid.: 151). What is meant with preserving here, is to preserve the thing at hand from harm and danger, to safeguard it, to spare it as it is, and thus to set it free. This setting free basically is leaving the thing at hand in its own nature (in contrast to mastering, controlling, and interfering). Accordingly, to preserve the fourfold, to dwell, is realized through sparing the earth and sky, to await divinities and to initiate mortal’s own nature. Preserving the earth, in Heidegger’s sense, is to free it. Unlike mastering or exploiting, to spare the earth is to leave it to its own nature and let it appear in its full presence. To preserve the sky, similarly, is to receive the sky as it is, to let stars take their course, to receive day and night as they are. To dwell by preserving divinities, (even if they are absent), is to await divinities as they are, and constitutes hope and belief. Finally, the sparing of mortals is the sparing of mortal’s nature, to recognize life and death as they are.
As we dwell on earth, under the skies, between mortals as mortals, awaiting divinities, we dwell by preserving the fourfold. At this point, Heidegger questions as to wherein this keeping or preserving happens, where the essence of the fourfold is safeguarded. To cite his own answer: ‘Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things.’ (ibid.: 151). If then, it is within things that the fourfold is present, Heidegger argues that, it is necessary to bring the presence of the fourfold into things. Consequently the relation between dwelling and building, dwelling as existing, and building as a reflection of existence, is elaborated. Building
thus, is regarded as something more than mere constructing. Building is thought of dwelling as it brings forth the presence of the fourfold (ibid.: 159).

Hence in Heideggerian terms, there seems to be a strong relation between dwelling and building, in architectural terms, a strong relation between existence and architecture. If letting dwell, as Heidegger argues, is the nature of building, architecture appears to be a reflection of existence. Again in architectural terms, if one agrees that Being dwells and exists by preserving/ participating/ bringing forth some forms of primal reality, an inquiry into spaces, into what spaces gather, might provide clues for genuine existential building.

This existential condition of homelessness, brought forth by Heidegger, is a result of not being able to fully dwell. If one gives thought about our ever increasing distancing from reality, about the construction of an abstract world, or about culture in general, it becomes clear as to why Being is not able to dwell, to reside, and thus alienates to its surrounding. Being under these circumstances, not finding traces of the self, nor of some primal realities, becomes detached to its self as well as to its environment. Being in a way is forced to change, mutate and adapt to its new condition. Within the process it distances itself from its primal nature, maybe to a point where it cannot recognize anything anymore. If Being would be capable of a perfect mutation, in which it perfectly accustoms to its second nature, there would be no difficulty in dwelling, at least in existential terms.

1.3.2. Alienation

Alienation is one of the existential difficulties that contemporary Being encounters. It denotes to a rupture of the coexistence of Being and space, a distancing of Being to space in which the dialogue between Being and thing is of Babylonian muteness. The phenomenon of alienation might as well be described as a clear-cut separation of Being and space, within which each of the entities turns introvert to form its own reality, speaks of different languages, and has no common sphere of existence. With commonality or coexistence I point to the condition where space gathers traces of existence - as it is the case at the walls of Çatalhöyük that bear the identity (handprints) of its dwellers, and as it is the case at the Lascaux cave that bears the belief (paintings of animals) of its inhabitants - and Being gathers traces of space and world, in the sense that Being embraces things, spaces, occurrences, or traces of reality within its inner existence and reflects by expressing them within its nearby environment. The absence of a bi-directional existential-worldly dialogue between Being and space is but the phenomenon of alienation. In accordance to this dual
perspective, an analysis on alienation within the field of architecture requires a look into the thing (specifically manmade thing, manmade space), along a look into Being (particularly how Being conceives of world and nature).

Within a brief enquiry on the thing, I shall concentrate on the manmade thing that is a product created through the interface of culture. In contrast to the natural thing, that is a direct product of nature and thus unavoidably gathers world, manmade thing additionally gathers culture. Thus it is within the manmade thing where human being’s conception of world is concealed. The first clue to an outstanding character of manmade thing can be found within the structure of consumer society, revealing things as objects of consumption that are thrown away after use (Marx in Norberg-Schulz 1979:168). The meaning of these things, or the intention behind their creation, merely rests on the capability of surviving the market.

Furthermore, within the organization of technology, the technological thing is increasingly becoming modular, in which ‘each element is identical and interchangeable with others’ (Mugerauer 1994:110, 111). As the modular due to its nature is combinable with other parts, it can be exchanged with, disposed of, and replaced with other parts (ibid.:112). The meaning of a module is within its relation to the whole. As a thing in itself it holds no meaning. Furthermore, the replace-ability of a thing contrasts to authenticity. It suggests no meaning in itself, but rather exists as an abstract prototype of an idea.

Fig. 1.6. Manmade Thing
At this instant, the thing leads to Being and thus to its conception of world. According to Heidegger, the technological epoch holds the conception of thing as stock (Heidegger in Mugerauer 1994:108). In view of that, the meaning of a thing as stock is within its availability, in that it has to be in reserve and wait to be used. Mugerauer provides an example to this occurrence:

‘Think of an elevator. We go into a building and walk to the bank of elevators. There might be six or eight of them. We push a button indicating that we wish to go up. The one button operates all the elevators, bringing the closest one to our floor. We wait a bit. We push the button again. We are annoyed if a door does not open quickly so we can be on our way.’ (ibid.)
The picture is further exemplified in the case of an airplane, as a thing as stock, whose importance is within its availability at a certain time, and its function of being used as a tool for travel. The plane as a thing itself, its uniqueness, is of no importance provided that it stands in reserve and is ready for use (ibid). Similarly, electricity, water, gas, food, and a wide variety of things appear as reserve. Consequently, the conception of a thing as stock does culminate in the idea of nature as resource. Hence it is not only the manmade thing that is object of consumption, but it is also the natural thing and nature that is ultimately to be consumed.

If the environment of existence turns into an accumulation of things to be consumed, if thing merely contains a functional meaning, the bond between existence and thing decreases. If Being is no longer attached to thing and consequently to space, if Being is indifferent to space, if it is as you might say detached to space, it will stand alone disoriented in space and alienated to world. The foundation of existence, which has been revealed as being-in-the-world and concern, would consequently dissolve into being-anywhere and indifference - a condition that could be expressed as inexistence.

Meaning hence plays a vital role in the rupture of Being and space. It was indicated before that things hold certain truths, that there is a world concealed behind the thing. In accordance, the meaning of any object can be found in what it gathers (Norberg-Schulz 1979:166). A thing does in many ways gather world. If natural thing, naturally gathers nature; does manmade thing additionally gather culture? Does the manmade thing consequently hold other meanings than the natural, a meaning per se? According to Norberg-Schulz, in spite that everything that man creates is in the world and thus roots in nature, there also are ‘new’ meanings pertaining to mankind. However, he argues, ‘to be meaningful … the inventions of man must have formal properties which are structurally similar to other aspects of reality, and ultimately to natural structures. If this is not the case, they would isolate themselves within a purely artificial world, and lose contact with reality’ (ibid.:169). Hence the creation of a thing, is necessarily a ‘setting-into-work of truth’ (ibid.:170).

The phenomenon of alienation thus includes a lack of identification. For Norberg-Schulz, ‘alienation is… first of all due to man’s loss of identification with the natural and man-made things which constitute his environment’ (ibid.:168). If in other words, thing does not contain traces of existence or of reality in general, thing does not hold a relation to the individual. As Being cannot identify itself with thing, it is so to speak
alien to and thus indifferent to thing, or in the case of architecture indifferent to space.

Two further forms of alienation, pointed out by Mugerauer, are ‘placelessness’ and ‘displacement’ (Mugerauer 1994:118). Both concepts are essentially related to problems of identification. What is indicated by placelessness is a ‘non-fitting’ placement of an object within a surrounding, a placement of architecture for instance, that comprises of a different language and separate reality than that of the placed environment. The international style, suggesting a universal truth in architecture and thus the placement of an architecture regardless of contextuality; or the phenomenon of globalisation, westernisation and thus the de-differentiation of world, are examples to placelessness. In Mugerauer’s words, ‘we are in danger of creating a homogeneous no-place for anyone and no one’ (ibid.).

Displacement is the other side of the coin, in which the individual is placed (that is displaced) into another reality not being able to identify itself with the new environment. Whereas displacement might occur due to the individual’s own will, there are also enforced displacements caused by natural disasters, environmental change, or cultural changes (ibid.: 157). The transition from rural to urban life has been and still is being a major form of displacement. Here the individual is exposed to the dynamics of urban life and experiences yet a new reality strictly contrasting to that of the rural. The difficulty in adaptation is due to a difficulty in identification, in which the individual does not find traces of reality with which it is familiar to.

In terms of architecture, if architecture includes an existential concern and intends a meaningful coexistence of Being and space, the meaning of thing and thus the meaning of space will be of prime importance. Awareness on the meaning of spaces, of what certain spaces gather and how these spaces communicate with Being, will provide positive knowledge in the creation of space. Although an analysis on the meaning of space is to a greater extent a subjective interpretation, I trust human essence to follow collective patterns. The subsequent task thus discloses as an existential analysis on space.
PART 2: SPACE

The inherent interpretation on space is not a general analysis on space that takes the abstract idea of space and dissects it to reveal its basic characteristics. Space itself shall not be extracted to a solitary occurrence; it shall rather be regarded as a mutual form of existence. In other words, space shall be understood as a fundamental belonging-to existence. Hence the inherent analysis will emphasize on the coexistence and dialogue of Being and space. The dialogue, being bi-directional, suggests the flow of influence to be two-way as well. Bernard Tschumi for instance has exposed how ‘bodies violate spaces’ and ‘spaces violate bodies’ (Tschumi, 1994). Nevertheless, as the object is to establish foundations of an existential knowledge, attention will be given to existence, that is to how space intrudes Being. To reveal then how space influences existence and what space ‘speaks’ to the psyche, is yet a study into the psychological aspects of space. This in turn, suggests a wider understanding of space, which requires a study into the immaterial qualities of space beyond concrete ones. In other words, a record on the morphology or substantiality of space will not suffice to reveal what narrative is concealed within space. The innate truth of space cannot be directly disclosed but fundamentally involves ambiguous and poetic understanding (Perez-Gomez 1983: 467). The ‘listening-to-space’ is a complex practice requiring ‘meditation-on-space’, ‘awareness-of-space’, and ‘proximity-to-space’. An insight into space furthermore necessitates the contribution of emotions as well as cognition, and may occur at an instant of intuition.

2.1. A Phenomenological Disclosure of Space

Phenomenology – that is the science of phenomena – does appear to be a suitable method to deal with the phenomenon of space. Before attempting a phenomenology of space though, and before revealing why it is a suitable method, it is necessary to expose what phenomenology is. Heidegger discloses the meaning of phenomenology throughout the meanings and amalgamation of the words phenomenon and logos. Accordingly, the Greek word phenomenon refers to that which shows itself. It is derived from showing itself, which in turn is derived of bringing to daylight, and ultimately roots in light and brightness. Thus a phenomenon
is the apparent, that which shows itself; and phenomena are the totality of that which is present at day and can be brought to light (Heidegger 1926: 28). On the other hand the fundamental meaning of logos is speech, and logos as speech is a revealing of that which is inherent to the speech (ibid.: 32). Hence the formal meaning of phenomenology is a letting-see of that which shows itself (ibid.: 34). However, the essentially phenomenological differs from the formal and ordinary definition in that it is a revealing of that which initially and mostly does not show itself, what is concealed behind what initially and mostly shows itself, and is essential to it - that is its meaning and reason of existence (ibid.: 35). Thus a phenomenology of a certain space would be the letting-see or making come to light what is concealed behind that space, that is, a revealing of its meaning.

At this point though, it is important to distinguish between certain structures of meaning. The meaning of a space in itself, which is what certain spaces gather and mean regardless of the experiencing subject, contrasts to what meanings are culturally injected into space and furthermore what meanings space hold in view of the experiencing subject. Whether space gathers some meaning regardless of an interpreter, is an intriguing question, but out of scope, as we are to analyse its affects on the soul.² Cultural meaning is as well out of scope, as it is a secondary meaning that is learned and attached to the phenomenon, and not a collective meaning pertaining to the entire humankind. The pyramid for instance, is such a case. Its meaning is established through the aid of text. History and the entire written documents on the pyramids disclose its present meaning. Without text, its present meaning is lost (Descombes in Mugerauer 1994: 32). Now consider a collision of an individual with a pyramid, in which the individual has no knowledge on the pyramid. What does the pyramid in this case mean? Would it mean similar things to several individuals having no knowledge? Such is the meaning of space that is sought for, a meaning that is common to human being regardless of prior knowledge. Hence the meaning of certain spaces that is sought for will include the human factor.

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl seems to a larger degree focus on the human aspect. In Husserl’s view, things are appearances due reflection, that is, through reflection one becomes conscious of things. Hence things, or in other words ² The existence of a thing is strongly related to the presence of a further existence. A solitary thing abstracted from all existence cannot be regarded to exist. It does only gain meaning due to the existence of a further thing, since meaning is embodied in a web of relation to other things. Human being for instance, if it is solitary confined, looses the feeling of existence. It is in need of a further existence, an observer that proves his existence.
phenomena, are considered as ‘appearances-of’, or the ‘consciousness-of’ things (Husserl 1988 :122). The idea of an object to be essentially the ‘consciousness-of’ something, weighs on the importance of the subject rather than the thing in itself. Within the relatedness of object and subject, as Husserl points to a series of psychic experiences such as the ‘perception of something’, ‘recalling of something’, ‘hoping for something’, or ‘fearing something’, he does designate a ‘phenomenological psychology’ (ibid.:123). Now regarding the object, how objects appear, Husserl exposes different modes of appearances. Accordingly, objects appear different due to ‘orientation’, that is the perspective in which they appear, such as right and left, or nearness and farness. A further difference is exposed as the difference between the ‘actual seen front’ and the ‘unseeable’ (ibid.). Whereas the actual seen could be interpreted as the object’s substantiality, its material, geometry, or structure; the ‘unseeable’ could be considered as the intangible or immaterial, such as character, spirit, or meaning of the phenomenon. The target, which according to Husserl is to reach the ‘purely psychical’ or the access to a ‘pure phenomenological field’, requires a certain method, specifically that of ‘phenomenological reduction’ (ibid.:124). The how of the method, the noesis, is a positing of the phenomenon in the psychic sphere. The what, the noema, is the description of multiple appearances of the phenomenon (ibid.:125).

In terms of how the revealing will be done, I will primarily adopt and combine certain aspects of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s methods. Appropriate to the method of ‘phenomenological reduction’, I shall concentrate on the psychic aspects of space and try to reveal multiple appearances of space. As of Heidegger’s method, ‘originary’ and ‘intuitive’ thinking shall be attempted. Subsequently, interpretations provided by significant observers will provide some knowledge on the psychology of space, or more accurately on the meaning and existential aspect of space. Interpretations will range from philosophers, psychologists or sociologists to architects, poets, filmmakers, or authors. Nevertheless an exclusion of subjective interpretations will not be the case, considering the idea that knowledge is to a greater extent interpretation. Hence I will offer a further interpretation and disclose a personal phenomenology of space.
2.2. Appearances of Space

2.2.1. Inaugural Space

Regardless of sex, will, social condition, or any such difference, a collective condition of humankind is that existence, before being thrown into the space of culture, initially happens in the space of the uterus. Here, within the organic walls of the intrauterine space, one might trace an initial dialogue between Being and its ‘exterior’ realm. The importance of this inaugural space, further than being the first space of existence, is that the dialogue is intimately strong and thus denotes a primeval existential condition of belonging-to. As Being and uterus do not stand across each other as separate entities placed at a distance, they form a coexistence that may be envisioned as a fundamental belonging-to. The prenatal state thus portrays a condition of Being that is a belonging-to space; in other words a belonging-to uterus, -to mother, and ultimately -to nature. Similar to a plant, animal, or even to archaic man, this developing Being does not stand against but rather stands in nature, it is part of it, belongs-to it, and truly is it. The relation of the foetus to its environment is so thoroughly strong, that it is almost absurd to distinguish between Being and space. The small foetus is not only concretely bound with space due to the umbilical cord, but it actually feeds from space, grows together with it and
essentially is space and likewise mother or nature. Yet as a part of nature, not having detached itself from it, it does not seek protection, but is naturally protected by the motherly organism to which it belongs-to.\(^3\) Contained by the mother, existence is secured by the warmth and homeliness of the gentle uterine walls. Unaware of the brightness of the outer-uterine space of culture, Being rests blissful in the dark corners of nature.

The passage from the inaugural space to the second space, that is to say the birth of the foetus, not only physically separates Being from mother but also symbolizes the separation of Being and nature. Here within the second space, Being is exposed to the world of culture where it will develop its consciousness, objectify the world to create a rift between itself and the outer world, and thus will ultimately seek protection in the form of homesickness and nostalgia. Throughout the difficulties of life, in moments of hopelessness, fear, or solitude, existence will desperately desire to return to the once enjoyed safety of the womb. For those fortunate newborn Beings with a loving mother, the home will initially shield Being from all possible dangers of the outside world, protecting it from the heavenly rains and earthly hazards of crime. Our home, Bachelard argues, is our first universe in the world, our corner of world (Bachelard 1957: 32). For those miserable Beings that are dejected, abandoned to the street, and left outside the warmth of the home, life will penetrate much sooner and more cruelly into their unshielded Being. Hence existential wise the home gains significance in that it forms an architectural substitute for the mother, as it not only protects but also mimics her intimate relation with Being. Consequently, the maxim ‘architecture as shelter’ – again ontologically – turns into the notion of ‘home as mother’.

An explicit exemplar to the idea of the home as mother is Tristan Tzara’s *intrauterine architecture*. Emerging as a radical criticism ‘against the cold rationalism of the modernists’, Tzara alike other surrealists ‘called for an architecture more responsive to psychological needs’ (Vidler 1992: 151). For Tzara, the dwelling symbolized prenatal comfort, and he subsequently conceived of dark, tactile, and soft houses reproducing the intrauterine state. In his own words:

> ‘When one returns what was torn away during adolescence and childhood, man could possess those realms of ‘luxe, calme et volupte’ that he constructed for himself beneath the bed covers, under tables, crouching in cavities of earth, above all at the narrow entry; when it is seen that well-being resides in the *clair-obscur* of

\(^3\) Compare with Heidegger’s concept of ‘unshieldedness’ of man in contrast to plants and beasts in his essay ‘What Are Poets For?’
the tactile and soft depths of the only hygiene possible, that of prenatal desires, it will be possible to reconstruct the circular, spherical, and irregular houses that mankind has conserved from the time of the caves to the cradle and grave, in his vision of intrauterine life which knows nothing of that aesthetics of castration called modern. This will not, in valorizing these arrangements with acquisitions of actual life, be a return to the past, but a real progress, based on the potentiality of our most strong desires, strong because latent and eternal, the possibility of being liberated normally. The intensity of these desires has not changed much since the stage of man’s savagery; only the forms and satisfactions have been broken up and dispersed over a large mass, and, enfeebled to the point of being lost, with their acuity, the sense of true reality and quietude, they have, by their very degeneration, prepared the way for that autopunitive aggressivity that characterizes modern times. (Tzara in Vidler 1992: 151, 152).

Fig. 2.2. Man in Cave like Uterine Structure, excerpted from the short movie Vague II

Nevertheless, in our case, the enquiry into inaugural space shall not be misinterpreted as revealing a replica of the intrauterine space. Within the query, an existential and psychological essence of the prenatal state (as well as postnatal maternal relations) shall be drawn to disclose the spirit of inaugural space.

The inaugural space had revealed two meanings for Being. On the one hand, the prenatal state suggested a fundamental belonging-to space (and to nature), and on the other hand as a consequence of the belonging-to nature, it had disclosed a
natural protection. Likewise, the meaning of home as mother, or of the motherly space, rests on the feature of protection and blossoms as an intimate relationship between Being and space. It shall be my duty to reveal the meanings of protection and intimacy to disclose the nature of the ambiguous dialogue that Being holds with the maternal space of the home.

At first sight, protection really means to safeguard something from a potential menace, to keep from harm or danger. In this manner protection shields something from an incidence and thus excludes one realm from the other. Hence to protect also means to separate. While this separation can be in a positive spirit, as to separate the harmful from the harmless, it equally denotes a distancing from one realm to the other. At first glance, the home provides a space for Being that keeps harm and danger outside, in doing so, quite as the mother, it shields and safeguards being. However, unlike the intrauterine space, the home does in several ways separate Being from nature as well as from the outer environment. The whole act of sheltering is indeed a mode of separation and detachment. Likewise the essence of culture is based on this stand against, separation or control of nature. As Being dwells in his home, he is protected but additionally separated from the rhythms of nature. Not responding to day or night, or not influenced by seasonal shifts, Being is in this way abstracted and separated from outer reality. Similar to Heidegger's notion of homelessness, I shall term this phenomenon a minimum dialogue with space, indicating a minimum concern and minimum interest to any event, space or place, in this case with the outer reality. An example for such an experience can be drawn from everyday life: 'driving an air-conditioned car on a rainy day at a speed of 180 km per hour while listening to Beethoven'.

The above-pictured experience stresses on the dis-connection of an individual from his nearby environment. The individual is detached and abstracted from present reality to exist in an alternate one. This separation while suggesting a rift between existence and present reality – signifying a certain degree of indifference to the outer - does simultaneously suggest a concentration on the alternate, in this case the interior. Similar to the incidence of daydreaming, where the individual is almost unaware of the outer world as it is focused on the interior psyche, separation from the outer suggests a re-directing of an individual’s attention to the inner. The home

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Robert Mugerauer has sought several ways to overcome ‘homelessness’ in architecture in his ‘Interpretations on Behalf of Place’. Exemplifying Swiss vernacular architecture as genuinely dwelling (being at home), as it responds to the Heideggerian fourfold of earth, heavens, mortals, and divinity, Mugerauer seeks ways for a homecoming in a technological era, and subsequently introduces a concept of fitting placement: camouflage and display.
as mother, as it protects and separates the outer realm from the inner, is essentially introverted. This introversion contrasts to the modernist vision of extroversion and transparency. Surrealism was in this manner standing against modernism as it was putting ‘the life of the interior psyche against the externalising ratio’ (Vidler 1992: 150). Louis Sutter, as opposed to modernist transparency, conceived of the future house as follows: ‘the minimum house or the future cell should be in translucent glass. No more windows, these useless eyes. Why look outside?’ (ibid.: 151).

Accordingly, the home was conceived of as a space in which the individual could concentrate on itself, redirect its attention from outer happenings to inner psychological aspects. The home was thus the place of individual's psyche.

A further meaning within protection as separation is present in the act of hiding. While protection may separate the harmful from the harmless, it can likewise shift the equation into hiding and separating something ‘disagreeable’ from the ‘agreeable’, to be precise, hiding a secret and secluding it from general knowledge. Thus the home, again somewhat like the mother\(^5\), can conceal, put out of sight, and bury certain mysterious phenomena. In doing so, the home transforms from being homely into unhomely - that is into an uncanny occurrence. This phenomenon is very excellently described in Anthony Vidler’s ‘Architectural Uncanny’ (Vidler, 1992).

The German word for homely, *heimlich* is in Daniel Sander’s dictionary of 1860 first defined as ‘belonging to the house or family’ and as ‘not strange, familiar’ (Sanders in Vidler 1992: 24). However, *heimlich* also possesses a second meaning, of being ‘concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know of or about it’, as ‘to do something *heimlich*, i.e., behind someone’s back’ (ibid.). Thus the *heim* (home), which initially protects and provides a *heimlich* (homely) feeling, is at the same time the space of the *geheim* (secret), and subsequently turns into its opposite – the *unheimlich* (literally translated as the unhomely but essentially denoting the uncanny). The home is thence both a space of the homely and the uncanny.

Furthermore, in Sander’s dictionary, *heimlich* as something concealed is joined with being buried. The German preposition *un-* denoting a negation, thus implies the *unheimlich* to be the negation of being buried, and psychoanalytically suggests ‘the return of the repressed’ (ibid.: 26). Taken from the philosopher Schelling, Sanders quotes: ‘*Unheimlich* is the name for everything that ought to have remained ... secret and hidden but has come to light’ (ibid.). In this manner the *unheimlich* \(^5\) The mother for instance, in aiming a protection after birth, desires to keep and maintain her child and hence does not set it free. She tries to cover existence and conceals it under her shield.
gathers the following story: a first burial along ‘a return that in civilisation was in a real sense out of place’, a return of a ‘power that was long thought dead’ (*ibid.*: 27).

The home thus, which on the surface seems homely, gains an uncanny attribute due to protection as concealment. Taken literally, uncanny means ‘beyond ken’, that is beyond knowledge, from ‘canny’ meaning possessing knowledge or skill (*ibid.*: 23). Hence Vidler describes the uncanny as the ‘mysterious, unfamiliar, frightening, preternaturally strange, eerie, and weird’ (*ibid.*: 230). The home, shifting from the homely to the unhomely, that is from the familiar to the unfamiliar, by means of burying some mysterious or inexplicable occurrences that once in a while reappear, is a space gathering unfamiliar or forgotten forces of the magical, incomprehensible, and ghostly drives of the underworld.

In addition to protection as safeguarding, separation, or concealment, there is but another meaning of protection. To protect really means to care for, to preserve and leave a thing to its own nature, to not interfere, and thus essentially denotes a setting free. True love, or in-depth care, contrasts to shielding off, in that it is an unlocking of the shield, a letting go and merging with the ‘Open’. In this sense, a truly protecting mother sets her child free, much as the truly protecting home. If the home is truthfully felt as motherly space, protection turns into undoing the shield and into a setting free, which allows space to become a space of freedom for Being. Not dictating or controlling Being, preserving Being, or permitting existence, the home turns into a space of unobstructed existence. Being unfastened, opens to fearlessly reflect its existence into the inhabited space. As the walls of the home turn into an expression of the deepest traces of existence, Being enters into an intimate relationship with space.

At this point I wish to shift attention from protection to intimacy as a further feature of the home as mother. Thus the following question: Are there moments of intimacy at home that can be compared to the ultimate intimacy of being inside the mother’s womb? In essence, intimacy points to a thorough dialogue, a sincere dialogue that is unobstructed by doubt, and based on an in-height degree of sharing. Sharing is possible due communication or an intersection of and amalgamation of two realms – in this case of Being and space. How do these two realms truly meet, how does the lifeless communicate with the alive? Vidler for instance, recognizes ‘the habit of the inanimate to take on the characteristics of the animate, and vice versa’ (*ibid.*: 154). Situations in which the home acts like the mother, is thence such an intersection, as the inanimate (space) takes on the characteristics of the animate (mother), and communicates and intersects with another animate (Being). Furthermore,
intersection is yet a mode of ‘nearness’, and without nearness there can be no intimacy. In other words, nearness is a prerequisite for intimacy. However, according to Heidegger, nearness is not the absence of distance, but rather a consequence of ‘concerned sight’ (*umsichtige Besorgen*) (Heidegger 1926: 107). Concurrently nearness is exemplified with the following cases: a pair of eyeglasses that is so short in distance as it is actually sitting on the nose, in comparison to a picture hanging across the wall, may be remote to us. Similarly, considering a telephone talk, the friend on the other side of the cable may be nearer than the receiver resting on the ear (*ibid.*). Moreover, Heidegger argues, nearness has an aspect of direction, a ‘directional de-distancing’ (*ausrichtendes Ent-fernen*) (*ibid.*: 108). It is related to what we are concerned of and includes an aspect of direction as we shift our attention from one phenomenon to the other. All together what distinguishes nearness from remoteness to a thing, according to Heidegger, is ‘concerned sight’; translated to our case, nearness or remoteness to space is related to the intensity of dialogue between Being and space.

In line with the inherent understanding of intimacy, to disclose an intimate relation with space, it is necessary to reveal several situations of ‘nearness’ to space. In his *Poetics of Space*, Bachelard exposes several interpretations of great novelists on their impressions of home. To begin with, Baudelaire senses that, under the attack of winter, the intimacy of home increases (Bachelard 1957: 64). The warmth of the home, as it contrasts to the chill of the snowy exterior, provides a space of comfort, ease and tranquillity. Merely the imagining, memory or recollection of the winter season does in itself empower the pleasure of dwelling, it increases the value of living at home (*ibid.*: 66). Furthermore, Bachelard argues that the intimacy of home increases as a result of the winter season forming a dialectical relationship between home and cosmos. As snow erases the traces of the outer world, minimizes the outer environment, the winter season reduces the cosmos to a single dimension – that of snow. For the dwelling Being, the cosmos is expressed with a single word – snow – and in doing so is annihilated. While the cosmos homogenizes as it eliminates boundaries, masks colours, and chokes noises, the home differentiates and multiplies as it bears life and colours of the interior. As the existence of the outer world thence decreases, the home flourishes by turning into a space of empowered intimacies (*ibid.*).

Henri Bosco, stated again in Bachelard, conceives of a similar phenomenon, as he illustrates a further intimacy as an outcome of a storm attacking a home (*ibid.*: 69-74). In his *Malicroix*, Bosco argues that every attack, whether humane or worldly,
has an animate character. Hence he describes how the home heroically fights back against the violent attacks of animate nature. The home, as it fights back as well gains an animate feature, it nurses it’s inside Being, and thus is even more than animate - it behaves as a mother. Protection turns into a shared strength, an amalgamation of two spirits, as Being and home stand together against the attack. All at once the home verges upon Being, the walls come closer, and Being and home unify as they stand together against this storm.

Besides these moments of intimacy resulting from the protective feature of the home, there exist further instants of nearness within everyday life at home. For instance, meditating on life within home, Bachelard focuses on daily domestic work (Bachelard 1957: 89). Within the routines of domestic work, the work operates automatically. Now considering a mechanically done work somewhat short of desire, if Being ‘projects a light of consciousness’ onto the thing it is occupied with, for example while cleaning an old furniture; if one shifts his attention, that is if one does phenomenology, over and above these daily habitual experiences, new impressions will occur (ibid.). In accordance Bachelard argues that consciousness refreshes things; a woman for instance, engaged in the household, when ‘doing phenomenology’, awakens this furniture that has been asleep (ibid.). Similar to Heidegger’s ‘concerned sight’, due to a shift in awareness, a shift in direction, the process creates new impressions and thus new meanings for the thing at hand, and subsequently revives. Thus in contrast to things conceived of as geometrical entities indifferent to the environment, things that gain the attention, care, or concern of Being, reach a higher mode of reality. In this manner, sending a new existential reality to its environment, the thing intimately bonds with the system (ibid.: 90).

The story of the housewife hence holds: along a relocation of attention, insignificant things gain significance and meaning. Through meaning then, as it intensifies the dialogue, an intimate relation is established. Enhancing this situation from thing to space, the outcome could be described as an awareness of home. Awareness, one might argue, is an existential condition, strongly merging Being to space (space in the large sense, as of universe or nature), and creating a greater belonging-to the wider cosmos. This merge with the ‘Open’, somewhat similar to the prenatal state, is but a mode of inaugural existence – a mode of unity as opposed to detachment.
2.2.2. Bright Space

‘Soon the streets of the city will glisten like white walls. Like Zion, the holy city, the capital of heaven.’

Adolf Loos, *Ornament and Crime* (Loos 1908: 20)

Modern man’s existence, his being-in-the-world, spatially takes place within the bright spaces of culture. The ever-shimmering spaces of the metropolis eradicate virtually every dark corner of anxiety. In the city, night does not exist; electricity stands-in. Fear of the dark, of the mysterious, or the uncanny is overdone by projecting a light of sanity. Darkness is the malady of modern man. He deeply fears and avoids the dark as he senses that it is within the dark where he ceases control, that darkness is the location of chaos and the irrational. Walking along a gloomy street, he feels something sinister lurking behind his back. As long as there is light, there exists the safety of discernability. As long as there is light, there is no obscurity. As long as there is light, there is reason - but the shadow remains.

![Fig. 2.3. Bright Space, Photograph by Berenice Abbott, 1932](image)
Gradually the world is turning into a shining globe. Only gradually is light invading the dark. A look at the globe from outer space at night displays brightness around the urbanized places of highly developed civilisations, while darkness remains silent within the unenlightened ones. The Dark Age is past, Enlightenment still reigns. It is still the ratio that brings to light the unknown; it is still the ratio that builds our perfectly smooth, geometric, and shining spaces. We inhabit the space of culture; we inhabit the space of light; our places are bright spaces.

Daytime is the phase of reason. During daytime one can clearly discern one object from the other. Brightness as the reflection of light allows one to enter into the realm of objects; light is the access to the material realm. Through light, things come into sight; they materialize, and turn into things at hand. During daytime we are able to see, not only do we differentiate the one from the other, but also we observe, we explicate, and we understand. Light is the access to knowledge, light illuminates. Light reveals as it simultaneously dissects and differentiates. The clearer and brighter the day, the clearer are the borders between one thing and the other. Light cuts out one object, and reveals it as a clear-cut entity. Brightness is not merely the opposite of darkness; brightness is sharpness and the opposite of obscurity and ambiguity. Daytime is the sphere of daily life, of precision and accuracy; nighttime is the sphere of dreams, of ambiguities and mysteries.

No wonder that modern man has developed an obsession for brightness. Not only is his mind bright, but also his planet, his cities, streets, and interiors. Modern man does not walk on muddy soil; he walks along his echo on the bright surfaces of marble. May it be that man is competing with god?

Brightness, when enormously intense, is often associated with divinity. Pure white, radiating immense light, is such a form of absolute brightness. Its purity suggests an extremity, an end or limit to positivity. As such, whiteness is affiliated with ultimate goodness, innocence and perfection, and thence contrary to the imperfection of the worldly gathers god as ens perfectissimum. Pure white does not exist in nature; it is man’s accomplishment on the quest for the ideal. In nature, the only ultimate brightness is inherent in the radiance of the sun. Likewise, the only ideal geometry is again inherent in the circular sun. Thus the sun, not only as the life giving but also as the single perfect thing in nature, is often conceived of as a deity, as was the case in Egyptian civilization and in many pagan religions.

How then could one interpret the development of bright culture against dim nature, or the birth of absolute geometries and pure whiteness on the surface of our planet?
Isn’t it a recreation, a bringing-down of heavenly perfections into planet earth? Isn’t it a rise above, a stretching to heavens as the tower of Babel? Isn’t the quest of culture a quest for brightness, a search for perfection and absolute geometry? What is the creation of abstract whiteness other than a recreation of the divine or a search for superiority, a mute to nature or a challenge to god?


The evolution of culture is certainly driven by a will to perfection. Mankind, in many ways seeks perfection. He considers himself somewhat different than nature. Being aware of his intelligence, he differentiates himself from other living beings. The feeling of superiority to nature inevitable separates himself from imperfect nature, and results in his quest for the ideal. His primary tool in reaching the perfect is his intelligence. Through knowledge of the ideal he advances to complete himself. His degree of development is his proof of superiority. The more he approaches the divine, the more he separates himself from the earthly, and the superior he is. Hence in making he seeks to recreate the divine, and not a mimesis of the natural.
This is especially the case in modernity, as the duality between man and nature is over-exaggerated and tends to weigh on man, rather than on nature. The artefact of man as opposed to the natural thing is thence bright not dim, it favours the pure over the impure, the sterile over the filthy, the smooth over the uneven, and the ordered over the disordered. The bright artefact, or bright space thus gathers all abstract qualities of the ideal not inherent to the natural. Brightness, as conceived of here, shall thus express a standing-out, a shining in which a thing or space is discernable from others, especially from natural ones. Bright space is thence an abstract space – a space that does not occur within the natural - it is an endemic space only pertaining to mankind.

The modernist project was in this sense an abstraction of space, a cleansing and brightening of space. Space was abstracted in the sense that it had to gather the ideal. Accordingly space was cleansed of ornament, of myths, and the irrational; it had to be brightened and illuminated by transparency. Not only was ornament a superfluous entity obstructing the brightness of space, for Adolf Loos ornament was crime; it was a phenomenon of ‘backwardness and degeneration’ with which only criminals or primitive men were engaged with (Loos 1908). Furthermore, one had to get rid of ornament as it was conceived of being highly irrational; since ornament was inflicting ‘serious injury on people’s health, on the national budget and hence on cultural evolution.’ (ibid.: 21) In view of that, Loos imagined the evolution of culture ‘synonymous with the removal of ornament from utilitarian objects.’ (ibid.: 20). As such, the degree of development depended on freedom of ornament; it was a sign of spiritual strength, a character of modern man.

The ethics of transparency was another tool in cultural evolution and architecture. Hence transparency was not merely the physical brightening of space, it was a rationalization and illumination of both, man and space. In his essay on Transparency Vidler describes the myth of transparency as follows: ‘transparency of the self to nature, of the self to the other, of all selves to society, and all this represented, if not constructed, from Jeremy Bentham to Le Corbusier, by a universal transparency of building materials, spatial penetration, and the ubiquitous flow of air, light, and physical movement’ (Vidler 1992: 217). Transparency was thence a moral exhibition. It suggested that neither space nor man had secrets to hide; space and man, as self-confident logical entities, were unwrapped from their closedness into certain openness, due transparency both should honestly be revealed. Transparency was thence a tool to unfasten the unfamiliar, an un-burying and illuminating of the covert. In Vidler’s words, ‘transparency, it was thought, would
eradicate the domain of myth, suspicion, tyranny, and above all the irrational’ (ibid.: 168).

Consequently, transparency was a major act of cleansing. The dusty space of the irrational was turning into the hygienic space of the rational. The cleansed space of modernity was brighter than ever; it was polished, cleared, and smoothened to ultimately reflect reason. Corbusier’s Manual of the Dwelling profoundly reveals his conception of a sanitized, hygienic dwelling:

‘Demand bare walls in your bedroom, your living room and your dining-room…Demand a vacuum cleaner…Buy only practical furniture and never buy decorative ‘pieces’…Keep your odds and ends in drawers or cabinets…Teach your children that a house is only habitable when it is full of light and air, and when the floors and walls are clear…’ (Le Corbusier 1931: 123)

‘No wonder’, Vidler argues, ‘that Marcel Duchamp, Man Ray, and of course Georges Bataille were all in favor of a little dust’ (Vidler 1992: 218). To quote Bataille’s ironic anecdote of dust:

‘The storytellers have not imagined that the Sleeping Beauty would be awakened covered by a thick layer of dust; no more have they dreamed of the sinister spiders’ webs that at the first movement of her brown hair would have torn. Nevertheless the sad nappes de poussiere endlessly invade earthly dwellings and make them uniformly dirty; as if attics and old rooms were planned for the next entry of obsessions, of phantoms, of larvae living and inebriated by the worm-eaten smell of the old dust. When the big girls ‘good for anything’ arm themselves, each morning, with a big feather duster, or even with a vacuum cleaner, they are perhaps not entirely ignorant that they contribute as much as the most positive savants to keeping off the evil phantoms that sicken cleanliness and logic. One day or another, it is true, dust, if it persists, will probably begin to gain ground over the servants, invading the immense rubbish of abandoned buildings, of deserted docks: and in this distant epoch there will be nothing more to save us from nocturnal terrors.’ (Bataille in Vidler 1992: 218)

Somehow the initial intention of cleansing ‘nocturnal terrors’ did turn into its mere opposite. The brightness of space, its simplicity and clearness, should have eradicated the uncanny effects of obscurity to create a reassuring homely environment. As space was stripped naked and reduced to certain pureness, it was so to speak, ultimately abstracted from reality. Space, because of its abstract qualities, was neither recognizable (and familiar), nor was it identifiable to multifaceted human being. On account of its out-of-world brightness, space had a
disquieting effect. Much the same as the perfectly smooth, geometric and shining monolith of Stanley Kubrick’s *2001: a Space Odyssey* had for the apes.

![Monolith](image)

**Fig. 2.5. Monolith, excerpted from Kubrick’s *2001: a Space Odyssey* **

The response to modernist abstract space is summarized in Tzara’s crisp statement: ‘Modern architecture as hygienic and stripped of ornaments as it wants to appear, has no chance of living.’ (Tzara in Vidler 1992: 151). Existentially then, bright space indicates a not belonging-to, a discordance between the dialogue of Being to space. Although it is an artefact of man and should thence be familiar to him, it is unforeseeable if man - one day - will identify himself and be at home within his bright spaces of culture.

### 2.2.3. Dark space

‘Where there is nothing, everything is possible. Where there is architecture, nothing (else) is possible.’

Rem Koolhaas (Koolhaas 1995: 199)

To enter into the world of darkness, one needs to shut out the constant gaze of bright light. Once the switch to electrical light is turned off, one is displaced into a new world at the speed of light. All at once, what stood before one’s eye, a table, a chandelier on the table, a colourful painting on the wall, as if sucked out of space, disappears. What is left behind is a vacuumed space, emptied and freed of all its materiality, relieved of the burden of gravity. In this new reality the intangible replaces the concrete; the rigidity of reality disintegrates to initiate a fantasy world of imaginings. Within darkness, space is thus first weakened but thence intensified. Once totally dark, space diminishes to the degree of nothingness, it turns into an absolute void. The void, unlimited and devoid of boundaries, extends to infinity; it is at first nothing but thence everything, emptied of substance but filled with
ambiguities. Dark space has thence something positive; its event horizon out sizes that of light space. In darkness the unthinkable is present. Imagination replaces the duty of ones eyes. The mind ‘sees’ the intangible, creates its own individual associations in this new world of obscurities. Freed from the firmness of light, darkness fluidly expands; it is the domain of fluctuating occurrences, the realm of mysteries. How material reality can bend in darkness, is shortly expressed by Freud:

‘I read a story about a young couple who move into a furnished house in which there is a curiously shaped table with carvings of crocodiles on it. Towards evening an intolerable and very specific smell begins to pervade the house; they stumble over something in the dark; they seem to see a vague form gliding over the stairs - in short, we are given to understand that the presence of the table causes ghostly crocodiles to haunt the place, or that the wooden monsters come to life in the dark, or something of the sort. It was a naïve enough story, but the uncanny feeling it produced was quite remarkable.’ (Freud in Vidler 1992: 154,155)

Psychologically, darkness is often associated with fears and phobias. Fear of the dark haunts man, as darkness masks the known world and presents the unknown, as it buries the familiar to revive the unfamiliar. What is more is that the absence of light suggests an absence of control; darkness swallows the protecting gaze of light. Furthermore, dark space is at once claustrophobic and agoraphobic, as it shifts between certain nothingness and everything-ness. Reduced to emptiness, space infinitely compresses to pressurize Being and causes claustrophobia. Expanded to infinite vastness, cosmic space weighs on miniaturized Being to generate agoraphobia. Moreover, within the homogeneity of darkness, the occupant is cruelly disoriented. The individual is being nowhere and everywhere, or more accurately, somewhere lost in space. Schizophrenic’s spatial experience, according to Roger Caillois, is akin to such disorientation. To the question ‘where are you?’ schizophrenics would respond ‘I know where I am, but I do not feel as though I’m at the spot where I find myself’ (Caillois in Vidler 1992: 174).

The peak disturbance in the relation of Being to space occurs when space intrudes Being. Similar to camouflage, or ‘insect mimicry’ as Vidler has it, where the insect imitates its immediate surrounding to blend in and dissolves in space, so does Being in darkness, as his boundary between body and space dissolves, melt in space. Darkness, Caillois argues, ‘touches the individual directly, envelops him, penetrates him, and even passes through him’ (ibid.: 175). Hence space violates Being, as it not only permeates but also displaces and replaces Being. Being becomes space. For the loss of identity, at once lost in space and intruded by space, Caillois introduces ‘legendary psychasthenia’, a weakness of soul, or loss of subject. Under
these circumstances, ‘the feeling of personality, considered as the organism’s feeling of distinction from its surroundings, of the connection between consciousness and a particular point in space’, is deeply weakened (ibid.: 174). The loss of subject culminates in Callois’s imagination of the schizophrenic ‘eaten up by space’:

‘To these dispossessed souls, space seems to be a devouring force. Space pursues them, encircles them, digests them in a gigantic phagocytosis. It ends by replacing them. Then the body separates itself from thought, the individual breaks the boundary of his skin and occupies the other side of the senses. He tries to look at himself from any point whatever in space. He feels himself becoming space, dark space where things cannot be put. He is similar, not similar to something, but just similar. And he invents spaces of which he is ‘the convulsive possession’.’ (ibid.)

Arguing from within a rational world, a loss of identity may perhaps be considered as a weakness. That modern man experiences disorientation in darkness, that he feels he is lost in space and subsequently panics, is not at all surprising. The organization of everyday life in civilized world demands the existence of a tough and sound individual. As well as life in the metropolis requires a well developed, differentiated, and identifiable individual. Without being located not only at a certain point in space, but also at a certain point in the network of economics, without identity so to speak, his existence is considered superfluous if not labelled abnormal or insane.

From another point of view, stepping outside the forces of everyday life, a loss of identity as well contains a positive aspect. For the experience of darkness - the merging of Being and space as body dissolves in space and existence liquefies in space - does uncannily generate an experience of unity. Once then, in darkness, the formerly distant is extraordinarily near. If light separates, darkness unites. Not only does it blur the boundaries between body, stone, or air, it deliriously displaces existence into any/every point in space. Existence expands, as darkness unbounds the solid ties present at daylight and sets the individual out of the closed everyday network into the Open. It is in dark space that Being becomes space and experiences a certain warping, not a warping of space as Vidler might have it, but a warping of existence, one that warps the animate into the inanimate, flesh into stone.

One cannot fail to notice some religious aspect in this warping, for what is more important for the oriental mystic than to ‘loose’ his identity, to recognize the self in the other, to recognize the other in self, and merge with the greater oneness of god? In this respect dark space gathers the mystical, a magical alchemy that transforms
Being into the wider cosmos. As such, darkness is not barely a hideout for criminals in which they may secrete their identity, but a refuge for existence within which he escapes the ‘split’ to experience the bliss of genuinely belonging-to.

![Mevlevi in Istanbul](image)

Fig. 2.6. *Mevlevi* in Istanbul, photograph by Gültekin Çiğen

Dark space thus, as admittance to a wider realm, has a rather opening than closing effect, to be more precise, dark space is open space not closed space. As such, being the reverse of an absolute vacuum, it might be compared to ‘the Open’ so often used by the poet Rainer Maria Rilke. In his essay *What are Poets For?*, Heidegger explicitly interprets Rilke’s Open:

‘In Rilke’s language, ‘open’ means something that does not block off. It does not block off because it does not set bounds. It does not set bounds because it is in itself without all bounds. The open is the great whole of all that is unbounded. It lets the beings ventured into the pure draft draw as they are drawn, so that they variously draw on one another and draw together without encountering any bounds. Drawing as so drawn, they fuse with the boundless, the finite. They do not dissolve into void nothingness, but they redeem themselves into the whole of the Open.’ (Heidegger 1971: 106)

In the place of the boundless, in the infinite fluidity of dark space, the unconscious roams the realm of imagination through dispersed fragments of knowledge to merge the incomplete with the complete. Indeed, for within Eugene Minkowski’s ‘dark
space’, ‘vision is unconscious and “losing one’s way” is the key to knowledge’ (Vidler 2000: 128).

2.2.4. Delirious Space or/ Alice in Wonderland

‘Since the “instrumentarium” of true modernity creates states and situations that have never existed before, it can never escape its aspect of fabrication – of being the result of human fantasy.’

Rem Koolhaas (Koolhaas 1977: 324)

This text is an investigation into manmade ‘out of this world’ spaces. It seeks acmes of human fantasy, delirious spaces created by the human mind. Overall, the text owes its inspiration to Rem Koolhaas and his insights into metropolitan life as well as to his depiction of the deliriousness of New York. The metropolis - at least in the physical realm - is in fact an acme of human creation, a chaotic occurrence of erratic layers of meaning. The enquiry shall therefore start with an observation and portrayal of the metropolis, of its fragments and diverse on the edge spaces. From there, I shall leave the metropolis behind to unearth true delirious spaces – from mad spaces to spaces of the mad.

The pathology of the metropolis is strictly speaking a delirium characterized by restlessness, excitement, and delusion. Its continuing vivaciousness infinitely circles throughout day and night. The city never sleeps, it never exhausts. Countless individuals densely occupy spaces of the metropolis; numerous events occupy its places. It is not a strict mechanism, as Corbusier might have imagined, that divides time and space into strict sequences. Everyday life is thence not a punctual waking up in residential zones, going to work at working zones, and taking free time at recreational zones. The metropolitan individual is rather a freelance worker somewhat freed of space and time. His working hours are unpredictable, beyond daytime and beyond local time; his working space is not compelled to specific locations and can be performed at home over the network; his office is his home. If the metropolitan leaves home for amusement, he goes skiing in the midst of summer, in a sports hall comprising a manmade mountain sprayed on with artificial snow. Monday morning, after breakfast, he can go enjoy himself in a club that has not seized its volume since the weekend.

When the individual leaves home, as he steps from his private space, through the door, into public space, the venture begins. Roaming the streets like Benjamin’s flaneur, somewhat distracted, he only unconsciously notes the violent stimuli ever-present at the background: The intertwined noise of crowds conversing via
headphones and cars jammed in traffic; the ever-shimmering advertorials of new products and digital screens presenting latest news around the globe.

The space of the *flaneur* – public space – is no longer restricted to +∞ - 0.00. He walks underground, on the ground, and overground, if not cyberground. Consequently the ennui of walking along endless straight boulevards is replaced by a labyrinthine experience of interconnected levels. He moves through three-dimensional volume rather than on two-dimensional surface. Once in the underground, the subway system may connect with a department store to then connect with a series of buildings that are in turn interconnected through horizontal and vertical corridors. Whole systems of n-dimensional paths exist independently to transgress the restricted surface of soil. Rather disoriented Being moves through these routes, unaware of his position in space but enjoying one space after the other, only to be then surprised when he is suddenly ejected on firm ground to find himself dislocated somewhere in space.

![Fig. 2.7. O.M.A., Asian City of Tomorrow, from S,M,L,XL](image)

The metro is one of the delirious spaces of the metropolis - a labyrinthine world of movement underground. It swallows the individual from one place to beam him into another one. Inside, reality is suspended; space and time dissolve into abstract
movement in abstract space. Places in-between vanish, time sequences of travel shrink. The underground is thence nothing but a spatial model of the space-time compression inherent to cyberspace. Beyond this experience though, the spaces in-between the two places of departure and arrival, that is the labyrinthine corridors and complex network of tunnels, are truly abstract spaces pertaining to another level of reality. The metro is the ultimate manmade interior detached of exterior reality – it entirely gathers traces of the human mind.

In Heideggerian terms it might be conceived of the site of absolute homelessness rather lacking the full presence of the fourfold synchronization of earth, skies, divinity, and mortals. Earth as surface is absent; soil is concealed behind concrete tunnels. Skies and stars are displaced in favour of vaults and electric lighting, minor if not absent is the presence of the divine. Present are the mortals within their own creation. What the metro lacks in reality it has in fantasy. The metro is the site of ‘being at home’ for metamorphosed existence; it gathers an alternate fourfold of invented reality – synthetic substance, fantasy, oscillating meaning, and the post mortal.

In spite of the multiplication of the street level into skyways or subways, there is but another major metropolitan occurrence participating in the multiplication of limited terrain. It is the skyscraper that at first sight amplifies terrain, multiplies ground level and extends it via skies. More importantly though, through the delirious superposition of innumerable events on specific ground, the former certainty of solid terrain dissolves into vague uncertainty. For Koolhaas notes that ‘through the medium of the skyscraper, each site in the metropolis accommodates – in theory at least – an unstable and unforeseeable combination of superimposed and simultaneous activities whose configuration is fundamentally beyond the control of architect or planner’ (Koolhaas 1977: 328). Hence each parcel in the metropolis is fundamentally chaotic, beyond control, and indeterminate. What seems on the surface solid, that is the exterior of the skyscraper, is internally fluid. The frozen structure of the building infinitely metamorphoses in the interior. Koolhaas conceives the interior to be ‘in a constant state of flux – of themes, programs, iconographies – in which the volatile metropolitan citizens, with their overstimulated nervous systems, combat the perpetual threat of ennui’ (ibid.).

In the macro scale, the metropolis is the delirious space per se, a labyrinthine site of endless wandering along an infinite experience of stimulating events. In contrast to modernist ‘grand designs’, such as the ‘Ville Contemporaine’ of Corbusier or the ‘Vertical City’ of Ludwig Hilberseimer, preconceived and rationally ordered, the
metropolis is fundamentally irrational, it ‘naturally’ develops. The metropolis thus oscillates between the two opposing Greek conceptions of ‘world as becoming’ and ‘world as making’; it is a ‘natural’ becoming generated by human making. Kojin Karatani, meditating on Paul Valery’s conception of nature and making, argues that nature ‘is not restricted to ostensibly natural objects such as the seashell; it also includes things that are made by man but whose structure – how they are made – is not immediately discernible’, therefore the word natural ‘indicates everything that we do not know how to make’ (Karatani 1995: 25). In this respect the metropolis is a space that gathers the obscurities and mysteries of culture – if one might say - it reveals the ‘natural facet of culture’.

At once, conceived of as a ‘natural’ space, the brightness of comprehensible metropolis diffuses into unintelligible mistiness. It is a product of human making, of which we do not possess knowledge on. Somewhat dreamlike then, as a product of the unconscious, is the metropolis that absurdly correlates the disjointedly to create ‘new’ meanings. If there exist ‘other meanings’ solely pertaining to mankind, they surely exist within the fantasy world of human 21st century gigantic settlements. Consequently, the metropolis may be regarded as the site of new experiences as well as new meanings; it is the home of the unhomely, the site of the unfamiliar.

The architectural equivalent for the creation of new meanings, that is the association of new relationships, is thence what is inherent to deconstruction and ‘technologies of defamiliarization’, to use Bernard Tschumi’s term. His text ‘Architecture and Disjunction’ is but a manual for architecture that transgresses traditional space into delirious space. It favours change over permanence, indeterminism over determinism, permutation over similarity, conflict over concord, and above all defamiliarization over familiarization, if not madness over the sane. In his own words:

‘My ambition...is to deconstruct architectural norms in order to reconstruct architecture along different axes; to indicate that space, movement, and event are inevitably part of a minimal definition of architecture, and that the contemporary disjunction between use, form, and social values suggests an interchangeable relation between object, movement, and action.’ (Tschumi 1994: 186)

Tschumi’s architecture, its deliriousness, is mostly due the process of a shift in meaning. It seeks to transgress the ordinary into the conflictual that holds the tension of madness and the irrational. ‘Skating on the skating rink’, for instance can shift into ‘skating in the schoolyard’ as well as twist into ‘skating in the chapel’ or ‘skating on the tightrope’ (ibid.). The primary and maybe most traditional norm of
architecture then to be deconstructed is the cause-and-effect relationship between space and its use, in other words form and function. For ‘a bank must not look like a bank, nor an opera house like an opera house, nor a park like a park’ (ibid: 204).

In the instance that space is disjointed from use to be thence rejoined in combinative madness, the outcome is more or less delirious, a fusion of the dissociate. A bank may then look like a circus, an opera house like an elephant, or a park like a skyscraper. MVRDV’s Dutch Pavilion for the Expo 2000 might serve as an example for such a shift in meaning. It displaces nature as it relocates trees from ground level into upper levels of the building, creating a somewhat dreamlike surreal experience not inherent in reality. Certainly, all cultural creations, from the simple axt to the complex metropolitan space, are creations of the human mind not inherent to ‘reality’. On the other hand it does not mean that all cultural creations are delirious. The degree of deliriousness, if there exists such a thing, is rather dependent on the object or space’s intensity of dissociatedness - somewhat like a neurotic - and its degree of rupture with reality.

In this respect it is within the surreal and fictive realm where reality fanatically transforms. In arts the equivalent would particularly be surrealism and Salvador Dali’s hallucinatory realities. In literature it would above all be William Burroughs’s *Naked Lunch* that violently transgresses reality to meander through the ambiguous unconscious. Then again, turning to the real world, what does present itself as reality gradually loses its credibility. In the context of indeterminism, from Kurt Gödel’s *Incompleteness Theorem* in mathematics to the *Uncertainty Principle* in physics, and in the context of deconstruction, from Heidegger to Derrida, the rigid line between reality and fiction dissolves to leave behind a vast sphere of ambiguity. Knowledge is constantly being fragmented and displaced. Concrete spaces are displaced by simulation and representation. Existence, under the circumstance of the reign of absence over presence, is rather characterized by being-in-some-fiction than being-in-the-world. Nietzsche, in his *Twilight of the Idols*, crisply states that ‘the real world, finally, will become a fiction’. Along these lines, the whole planet is but one giant delirious space.

Withdrawal from reality is not exclusively a theoretical phenomenon; it is an existential tendency most utterly occurring within the lunatic’s world. If one might draw a comparison between the schizophrenic and space, thence schizophrenic space would suffer from a withdrawal from reality and cause Being to suffer violent emotional, intellectual, or behavioural disturbances; the experience of such a space would rather be delusive and hallucinate. Space itself would thence be volatile,
changing from mood to mood quite as the manic-depressive. Kaas Oosterhuis’s *Transports* project, as it changes its form due the ‘mood’ of nature, might be read as quite restless. Furthermore, the organic and fantasy like digital interior space, the highly intelligent space, ‘communicates’ to an unusual degree. Space itself is caught in a split state being a post-organic hybrid, somewhat animate somewhat inanimate. Its surfaces are hallucinating surfaces of shifting electronic simulation. Inside, Being is in a state of violent excitement and emotion pertaining to a delirium.

Architecturally, surreal spaces are spaces of immateriality, often enhanced by media technology, detached from and dislocated in reality. In the context of feverish immateriality, Herzog and De Meuron’s *Kramlich Residence and Media Collection* in Oakville is an excellent example. The project consists of three levels, each bearing a specific type of space, of which the below grade is defined as immaterial (cinematic) space. Designed to present media installations, it is a collection of different dark rooms connected by a 'labyrinthine system of interstitial spaces' (Herzog 2001: 119). Entering the underground, one is dislocated from the exterior materiality into an abstract cinematic immateriality. Herzog portrays the experience of this underground space as follows:

‘The whole below-grade area of the building is a kind of immaterial and shapeless architecture in which no architectural form or particular material should be visually active. The visitor is exposed to the radiating light of the artist’s work rather than to the material world of walls, ceilings, and floors delimiting the galleries. In approaching the building, imagine yourself walking or driving through the lush vegetation of the Napa Valley, with the intense smell of trees and bushes and the glaring daylight. All of a sudden you find yourself in a totally artificial world below grade. Your perceptions of reality will then literally shift into something cinematic and almost immaterial.’ *(ibid.)*

Dislocation then, the feeling of being lost in space, is but another feature of the schizophrenic. The labyrinth, dark space, and Jameson’s post-modern hyperspace are examples to such a schizophrenic experience of the disjunction of body and space. But what happens when space itself is lost in space, when space is displaced? Then space is either alien to space, and exists as the other or abnormal in the *genius loci*, or it is in itself essentially different than habitual space. Within a rural settlement an outstanding skyscraper, or within the metropolis a squatter house might be regarded as space lost in space. A training space for NASA astronauts for instance might be argued to be essentially different as space is no longer compelled to gravity (zero-G) and objects may freely roam and form space in space. On the other hand, space is as well disjointed if it is ‘disconnected’ from
greater space, isolated from other space and put out of the network of the fluid unity of space to exist in solitary confinement. Introvert space for instance, is dislocated space. It holds a minimum dialogue with exterior space creating an unawareness of location in space, the opposite of the dialogue created by transparency, solid and abstract spaces of no dialogue. Extreme introvert spaces are spaces of no dialogue, self-sufficient spaces (like the Biosphere II in Arizona) or spaces of no permittance.

Abstract spaces then create abstract realities. If space is disjointed from space, it is as well disjointed from reality. Inside a solid space of no dialogue then, an alternate reality emerges. In the case of the cell, where Being is condemned to a closed space, in which day and night does not exist, in which there is no other Being to assure his existence, a genuine delirium occurs. Within the cell reality is suspended; existence is undermined. In everyday life on the other hand, our spaces are not entirely introvert and ruptured. However, within the developments of electronic communication systems, the home turns into a self-sufficient introvert space merely permitting data in and out. Within the electronically enhanced home one is increasingly able to perform any of his needs, ranging from nutrition supply to communication, from information retrieval to working. The home is thence lost in space, it is somewhere in space as it is not only introverted and detached, but as the location of home is of no more importance. The home is displaced from its environment to be replaced into cyberspace. Similarly Being is lost in space, displaced into the space of home and space of zeros and ones. Akin to the cell, this abstracted home turns into a surreal world, into a delirious space for Being to exist.

Being, is nonetheless not always home alone. At times, solitary Being is yet accompanied, or rather haunted by his double, fairly analogous to schizophrenic split selves or multiple personalities. The theme of the mysterious double is widely explored in literature, from Stephan Zweig’s Schachnovelle to Hermann Hesse’s Steppenwolf or Dostoevsky’s The Double. The appearance of the double is the encounter of the perfectly well known yet unknown stranger; it holds nearness and distance in unison. In this respect the double merges the familiar with the unfamiliar; at once alien and outside the self, and at once uncannily familiar. One of the narrations of a disquieting doubling is J.G. Ballard’s short story Motel Architecture. The subject, Pangborn, lives for twelve years in solitude, only to be intruded by the feeling of the presence of some stranger. Though the stranger is absent, Pangborn feels his presence; he senses a vague scent and even the warm breath of a body somewhere lurking behind his back. Distressed by his presence, Pangborn sets up traps to proof his existence and chases the stranger to take his life. The tension
between the searching subject and chased stranger increases as the subject approaches the stranger and reaches its climax as chaser and chased meet and overlap; as Pangborn recognizes that the stranger is but he himself. Understanding that the burden comes from within, that it is his own consciousness that bothers him and that he has become a stranger to himself, he is only to be relieved as when he stabs a knife into his own chest and give an end to all suffering (Ballard 1982).

Fig. 2.8. Delirious Space, scene from The Wall

In the light of delirious space, the doubling as the ultimate estrangement to self can be compared to the uncanny effects of all mirroring - mirroring as the doubling of self and unveiling of the stranger within self. Split spaces then, similar to Victor Burgin’s paranoiac space (Vidler 1992: 224), are spaces that comprise the self and the other, and exist as an unstable pulsation between the familiar and unfamiliar. Those feverish spaces that wildly merge the self and the other; at once transparent and opaque, equally exterior and interior, animate as well as inanimate, and above all present and absent.

2.2.5. Vague Space

However solid and definite spaces might appear to be on the surface, solid constructions of certain form and material, the ‘inside’ or ‘truth’ of any object and space and the experiencing and collision with that inside (if ever possible) is essentially ambiguous in nature. Again however precise today’s measuring,
observing and computing processes are, the intangible ‘truth’ of the thing is still a sphere of obscurity. Due its nature, its insubstantiality so to speak, it has widely been ignored within the rational world. Since the experience of a thing, or of space in this case, is argued to be a personal incident that alters from individual to individual, the knowledge of the origin of space is to a greater extent refused to exist at the outskirts of architectural knowledge. Precisely because of the lack of such knowledge it is necessary to investigate into this realm, however subjective and vague this realm may be. On the other hand, if there exists a practice concerning the origin of things, it should be rather the work of art, and above all the realm of poetry. In line with the understanding of ‘art as truth’, that is art as the disclosing of certain truths, I shall enquire into ‘spaces of truth’ - spaces of nearness that present rather than represent certain truths.

The experience of every space might argued to be vague in nature. Every dialogue or encounter with space is a vague incident beyond a mere function of perception. Hence we do not merely see, hear, touch, or smell space, but as we experience a certain space, complex networks of functions intermingle. To state a few, those would include and range from memory of space to knowledge, from individual qualities to one’s psychology and existential features, or from the state of mind such as attention or awareness to the state of one’s emotions. Hence when entering a space, a multifaceted dialogue commences. However, what is in this context understood as an ambiguous experience is the moment of direct apprehension of- and dialogue with space, that ambiguous instance, in which we come to vaguely grasp the essence of a certain space. For a moment then (quite like in dark space) Being and space vibrate at the same frequency, communicate, and fuse.

An example might prove to be of use. There are several ways to experience a flower for instance. One may imagine a flower and reflect on it, look at a representation of it, say a picture or a poem on a flower, or come across one and directly observe it. Considering a direct encounter with a flower, amid all forms of perception, one of them – smelling it - is especially close to the inherent understanding. Seeing a flower is a rather firm mode of perception that results in a definite image of it, clear-cut and unambiguous. It speaks less of its essence then its shape and exterior. Yet the smell of a flower is a truly ambiguous experience. Not tangible and immediately co-relatable, the scent opens the imago; it initiates a number of feelings of which their totality might argued to be the essence of a flower. For an instance then, the scent dislocates one into another realm, into the ambiguous inner recesses of the flower.
Spatially, such an ambiguous experience might argued to be present in the Holocaust Tower of Libeskind’s Jewish Museum. At first glance, the building is a memorial for the Jewish Holocaust; a representation and symbol to that human crime committed in the history of mankind. In his own words, ‘the Jewish Museum is conceived as an emblem in which the Invisible and Visible are structural features which have been gathered in this space of Berlin and laid bare in an architecture where the unnamed remains the name which keeps still’ (Libeskind in Schneider 1999: 6). Beyond its representational function then, hidden within the walls as an invisible feature, there exists the presence of an unnamed aspect. If it is the unnamed that remains as the essence of those spaces, I shall try to name this unnamed through an interpretation of the space of the Holocaust Tower.

Unaware of the interior of this tower, one stands in a brightly lit space before the threshold, a heavy metal door. As one opens this door to enter the tower, one finds oneself alone in an introvert dark space solely lit from one corner of the ceiling. The passage from light to dark is simultaneously enhanced by the thunderous slam of the door echoing brutally in the naked void. Within an instant, surprised by the first shock generated by the play of light and sound, body and mind are dislocated into an abstract realm. By the intense stimulus of the uncanny space, the terrifying echo within dark space, the mind swiftly roams an enormous amount of ambiguous feelings generating what could altogether be described as fear.

With previous knowledge then, with the aid of text so to speak, that space might be considered as a representation of the horror and helplessness of the victims of the Holocaust. More importantly though, without the aid of text, these walls and spaces gather a vague sense of fear, that I assume, is more or less shared by any individual experiencing that space. The space of the tower, its unnamed feature, is thence the presence rather than the re-presence of inexpressible fear.
The examples of the flower and the tower have something in common. Both are experiences of the truth of a thing, equally vague dialogues with the essence of the thing. They are incidents of nearness, an approaching towards a thing’s inside, which occurs not as a strict understanding, but rather as a vague feeling of-, an intuiting of-, or emotive comprehension of a thing. Furthermore, the flower and the tower had in common that they were in themselves rather unambiguous entities. In this respect, I shall shift attention to what happens when the thing in itself is vague, when space itself is truly vague.

Before stepping into a vague dialogue with something vague, I want to expose the concept of vagueness through the realm of linguistics. In his essay The Brain’s Software, S. Ryan Johansson discusses the feature of natural languages opposed to unnatural languages invented by logicians. Comparing human language to computer language, he draws on the essential difference that ‘the natural languages rely on vagueness, complexity and context as much as the unnatural languages devised by logicians, and used to programme computers, rely on precision, binary simplicity, and the escape from context’ (Johansson 1993: 13,14). Accordingly, due its vague nature, natural languages require constant interpretation and negotiation,
since the inherent meaning changes in line with the sign users. On the other hand, in a system comprising of strict rules and definite signs, there can only be a single truth or a single result to an operation. The result is neither doubtful nor vague and therefore does not require any negotiation about its meaning or any further thinking on itself. Vagueness implies the variability of meaning and leads to different possibilities of truths; it is the clue to creative thinking. Thus the intellect is forced to search for a possible answer; it is forced to interpret and to negotiate with other geniuses. The variability of meaning thence forms the basis of intellectual evolution, as vagueness results in the emergence of novel perspectives.

Conceiving of space as a sign that possesses certain meaning, vague spaces would rather be metaphoric and poetic spaces not embracing a definite meaning but triggering ones imagination. Due to their ambiguity, they would initiate imagination; the mind would start to work, associate, interpret, and individually comprehend. Every individual would experience a vague space in an individual manner and encounter its ‘inside’ as a function of his own imagination. In other words, Being would experience ‘truth as imagination’.

Consider the natural occurrence of fog, when fog fills space to blur all boundaries. As the water particles fill space to eliminate the clarity of space, one is dislocated from the everyday concrete realm to an intangible and emotive realm, somewhat reminiscent of the shift of attention so dear to phenomenology. Being-in-concrete-world is then replaced by being-in-vague-world. Inside this ambiguous realm of imaginations and metaphoric associations, one poetically experiences the world’s ambiguous truth.

An edifice that perhaps most directly translates this sort of vagueness into architectural space is Diller and Scofidio’s Blur Building for the Swiss national Expo of 2002; it is a manmade cloud floating on a lake. To a certain degree, the building is directly mimicking a natural occurrence; it imitates the familiar experience of fog. In this respect, it does not go further then the well-known incident of fog, but recreates its ambiguous space. Nonetheless, the building does warp and deform our conception of architecture; it physically and most unusually melts what is solid into air. Solid stone is replaced by vague vapour, and frozen space dissolves into liquid space – somewhat like the liquidity of space conceived of in futurist sculpture. What Boccioni had theoretically written in his Technical Manifesto of Futurist Sculpture, that ‘areas between one object and another are not empty spaces but rather continuing materials of differing intensities’ (Boccioni in Kwinter 2001: 62), concretely takes places in this building. Hence the Blur Building oscillates between
familiar fog and unfamiliar architecture; it is suspended in an ambiguous state, somewhere between the homely and the unhomely.

The third condition of ambiguity then, besides vague experience and actual vague space, is the suspense between the familiar and unfamiliar. Unlike the delirious split state, this condition is one of poetic and calm amalgamation of the duo. It is outside the domain of feverish haste and deliriousness but inside the domain of tranquil existence; it is the sphere where nature and technology, as well as the homely and unhomely rest at peace together. It favours attunement over instability and strengthens being-in-the-world. As such, the dialogue is one of nearness and not rupture; it binds existence to thing and thus supports existence.

The approach of Jean Nouvel, once more in the Expo 2002 in Switzerland, is fully analogous. In his own words, there, ‘what is needed is calm and at certain times silence’, his site ‘is the Earth of human beings, the universe’, and ‘the time of these projects is not a time of outrageous consumption’ (Nouvel 2002: 214). Within the different pavilions then, one is of especial interest, particularly ‘the stacked logs’, logs piled over one another to form unusual architecture. Within this architecture then the familiar as well as the unfamiliar resides; on the fragmentary level dwells the familiar, a natural thing, a log, while on the total level the unfamiliar resides, the architectural thing as the stacking of logs. Similarly the exterior and interior oppose as the exterior apparently natural thing interiorizes audio-visual technology. Altogether though, this space might argued to be attuned between an existential
dialogue with the cross-section and ‘interior’ of the log and between the civilizing interaction with media; one may focus onto the magical curves inside the log and communicate with nature, and may simultaneously loose himself in the continuing video-show and pass onto the wonders of civilisation. Regarding the whole project consisting of the stacked piles, the military tent, the monolith, and the craters of pebble, Nouvel expresses the site as follows:

‘This is the privileged site of the latest technological art: video, computers, digitization; the contrast between modernity and history, technological expression and archaism; the privileged site of eternal or ephemeral inscription; the privileged site of minimalist expression contrasted with the figuration of historical life. This is a place for routes, discoveries and surprises.’ (ibid.: 217)
PART 3: ARCHITECTURE

3.1. Appearances of Architecture

3.1.1. Homely Architecture

Fig. 3.1. Hearth in an Old Norwegian House
Fig. 3.2. Fire
Fig. 3.3. Pitched Roof as Familiar Form, David Chipperfield, *Knight House Addition*, 2001
Fig. 3.4. Tent as Archetypal Form, Frei Otto and Rolf Gutbrod, *German Pavilion*, Expo 1967, Montreal

Fig. 3.5. Stone as Familiar Material, *Atelier*, Bodrum
'There is no such thing as international architecture. A building is as tied to its location as a plant, so that it must react to its immediate surroundings and the local climate in the same way. You can't plant date palms in the Swiss Alps, any more than you can build a Swiss chalet in the desert.' (Fathy in Lieckfeld 1996: 32)
Fig. 3.8. Alvar Aalto, *Own House and Studio*, Helsinki, 1936

Fig. 3.9. Homely Atmosphere, Alvar Aalto, Interior of *Own House and Studio* ⁶

⁶ Personal Experience
Fig. 3.10. Tree as Familiar Thing, Von Gerkan, Brauer, and Staratzke, *Stuttgart Airport*

Fig. 3.11. Structural Principle
3.1.2. Unhomely Architecture

Fig. 3.12. Abstract Geometry, Etienne Louis Boullee, *Newton Cenotaph*, 1784

Fig. 3.13. Etienne Louis Boullee, *Newton Cenotaph*, Day and Night Sections

Fig. 3.14. Etienne Louis Boullee, *Temple of Death*

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7 ‘Boulee… might well have intended, if not the first architectural figuration of death, certainly the first self-conscious architecture of the uncanny, a prescient experiment in the projection of ‘dark space’.’ (Vidler 1992: 171)
Fig. 3.15. Uncanny Expression, Adolf Loos, *House for Tristan Tzara*, Paris 1925-26
Fig. 3.16. Sterile Home, Werner Sobek, Own House, Stuttgart, 1999-2000
Fig. 3.17. Peter Eisenman, Axonometric View of *House 3*, 1970

Fig. 3.18. Deconstruction of Home, Peter Eisenman, *House 3*, 1970
... Le Parc de la Villette does not achieve what deconstruction desires: removal of posturing traditional (male and rationalistic-scientific) power for the sake of liberation."

(Mugerauer 1994: 40)
Fig. 3.22. Trees Wrapped in White, Sanaa, *Japanese pavilion in the 8th Venice Biennale*, 2002

Fig. 3.23. Artificial Flowers in a Grid, Sanaa, *Japanese pavilion in the 8th Venice Biennale*, 2002

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9 Making, brightening, sanitizing, and rationalizing of nature.
Fig. 3.24. Rational Labyrinth, View from the Garden of Exile and Emigration, Daniel Liebeskind, Jewish Museum, Berlin
Fig. 3.25. Hygienic Space, Eren Talu, Evtkbükü, Bodrum, 2004
Fig. 3.26. Perfect Grid as Abstract Phenomenon, Whiteread Mausoleum, Under Construction

Fig. 3.27. Cast of Interior Space, Rachel Whiteread, *House*, 1993-1994

10 Absolute Claustrophobia, extermination of space…
‘… the domestic subject is finally out in the cold forever.’ (Vidler 2000: 148)
There is nothing spatial about 0’s and 1’s.
3.1.3. Ambiguous Architecture

Fig. 3.29. Spectrum of Light within Darkness, Installation, Helsinki
Fig. 3.30. Ambiguous Doubling, Steven Holl, Sarphatistraat Offices, Amsterdam, 1996-2000
Fig. 3.31. Unfamiliar Architecture/ Familiar Thing, Jean Nouvel, *Stacked Logs*, Expo 2002, Switzerland

Fig. 3.32. Ambiguous Journey between Screen & Wall, Jean Nouvel, Interior of *Stacked logs*
Fig. 3.33. Toyo Ito, Model of Relaxation Park, Torrevieja, 2002-

Fig. 3.34. Cultural Creature, Toyo Ito, Relaxation Park, Torrevieja, 2002-
Fig. 3.35. Narrating space, Daniel Liebeskind, *Holocaust Tower*, Jewish Museum, Berlin
Fig. 3.36. Cave like Interior, David Chipperfield, *Access to the Paseo del Ovalo*, Teruel, 2001-2003
Fig. 3.37. Intrauterine Space, Eero Saarinen, Interior of *TWA Terminal*, New York, 1956-1962

Fig. 3.38. Animate-like Building, Eero Saarinen, *TWA Terminal*, New York, 1956-1962
Fig. 3.39. Mathematical Poetry, Anish Kapoor, *Tarantata*, Gateshead
Fig. 3.40. Ambiguous Wall, RCR Architects, *Les Cols Restaurant*, Olot, 2002-2003
Fig. 3.41. Herzog & de Meuron, *Oscar Dominguez Museum and Cultural Centre*, Tenerife, 1999-

Fig. 3.42. Oceanic Ambiguity, Herzog & de Meuron, Interior of *Oscar Dominguez Museum and Cultural Centre*, Tenerife, 1999-
Fig. 3.43. No Comment, excerpted from the short movie *Vague I*
CONCLUSION

‘Contemporary architecture, disillusioned with rational utopias, now strives to go beyond positivistic prejudices to find a new metaphysical justification in the human world; its point of departure is once again the sphere of perception, the ultimate origin of existential meaning.’

Alberto Perez-Gomez (Perez-Gomez 1983: 473)

The origin of the discussion rests on the suggestion that human being has distanced himself from space. This distancing is understood as a separation from primal nature, a not belonging-to world in the forms of homelessness and alienation. Hence the evolution of mankind is regarded as a passage from unison to alienation. It is interesting to note that there exists an opposite view. Accordingly, Worringer asserts that ‘man has conceived the history of his development as a slow process of estrangement between himself and the outer world, as a process of estrangement during which the original sense of unity and confidence gradually disappears’. However, he argued, the exact opposite was true. Primitive man was not poetically enjoying unison and accord with his environment. He was a rather helpless and ‘dumbfounded animal’ perceiving imprecise, blurry images of world. This ‘monster’ was then a stranger to his environment, not capable of understanding and giving meaning to his environment. Accordingly, the passage was not from unity to estrangement, but from strangeness to familiarity (Worringer in Vidler 2000: 45).

What is more is that abstraction for Worringer is not a modern phenomenon but rather an age-old incident. If we are argued to dwell in abstract spaces, that is, spaces of culture distant and abstracted from nature, it indeed roots in primeval fear and of the ‘feeling of being lost in the universe’. In this regard, Worringer argues, that it is the ‘sensation of fear’ that is ‘the root of artistic creation’ (ibid.). For it is fear that drives the will to understand and project the ‘understood’ on say the walls of Lascaux. The act of creation is thence an act of locating meaning, an act of revealing and freezing truth in time. Consequently, Vidler notes, ‘that it is such fear, finally, that drives the search for absolutes, the rigid line, and abstraction’ (Vidler 2000: 45).

Nevertheless there seems to be a paradox in the above paragraph. If one regards the creation of thing as the setting-into-work of truth, it still is obscure whether
absolutes and perfection coincide with truth. I hold that nature is rather imperfect, irregular, and unpredictable, yet man’s search for perfection is the search for a meaningful universe and meaningful existence. Hence the creation of perfections is a paradoxical involvement between existential meaning and abstraction as alienation and distancing, in the sense that abstraction is the setting-into-work of a non-existent truth. As Prigogine argues, man is undeniably caught in-between two conceptions that equally lead to dead-end streets: ‘What we have tried to follow is indeed a narrow path between two conceptions that both lead to alienation: a world ruled by deterministic laws, which leaves no place for novelty, and a world ruled by a dice-playing God where everything is absurd, acausal, and incomprehensible’ (Prigogine 1997: 187,188).

Regarding nearness and remoteness in the evolution of mankind, I would argue that there has been no progress towards nearness. Contemporary man dwells within an abstract world, a second nature that gathers bright artifact and genetically engineered species, his spaces are spaces of the unfamiliar and unhomely, abstract spaces of repulsion. Moreover, progress - in approximating truth - is merely a temporal shift of paradigms lacking direction. If truth is a point, it is a point that distances itself at the instant of approaching; it is a never-ending chase. Nevertheless, arguing from within today’s episteme, where the end of certainty has undermined the search for absolutes, the creation of space has to draw its knowledge not from abstraction and the ideal but from fact and ‘imperfect’ nature, if and only if the intention is being at home. And indeed, firm grids are turning into organic webs, rigid lines into soft and curving contours, and firmness into uncertainty. Nature, once again, becomes the source of all knowledge.

Then again, the creation of space cannot solely rest on a mimesis to imitate nature, for present reality is almost entirely driven by the forces of consciousness and culture. When Dostoievsky rhetorically asks ‘why do we have our minds but to go our own way?’, one must assert that this consciousness should strive for a way that approximates but not separates nature and culture. Hence in the post-mimetic era, where knowledge transgresses knowledge of nature and man’s own creations have become his source of knowledge, somewhat like a master giving reference to his own work, a gentle intermingling of cultural and natural knowledge has to replace violent abstraction and nostalgic conservation. In this manner I have sought different spaces gathering the homely and unhomely respectively and have tried to visualize in which manner both can come to peace; inaugural space as the ultimate homely space of intimacy, bright space as the unhomely and irritantly shining space of
culture, dark space (though at first sight uncanny but essentially homely) as a belonging-to world, unhomely delirious space as totally abstract and belonging-to fantasy, and finally vague space that poetically attunes and approximates the familiar with the unfamiliar. Existentially, to dwell in vague space, would then denote a being-in an amalgamation of the given and made.

Moreover, what is implied with vagueness is the suggestion of a rather weak formation as opposed to modernism’s absolute and monistic view of reality, somewhat like Ignasi de Sola-Morales’s *Weak Architecture*, that appears as a ‘polyphonic instant’ experienced as multiple interpretations. In his own words, ‘an architecture whose aim is to go deep… can’t find support in a fixed image, can’t follow a linear evolution… Each design must catch, with the utmost rigor, a precise moment of flittering image in all its shades, and the better you can recognize that flittering quality of reality, the clearer your design will be. It is the more vulnerable as it is true’ (De Sola-Morales in Hays 1998: 614). The intention of vague space then, is the setting-into-work of multifaceted ambiguous reality that initiates an approximation of Being and space, and not merely a de-distancing, but a collision with transcendental truth, setting of an experience akin to ‘the lingering resonance of poetry after it has been heard’ (De Sola Morales 1987: 623).

If along these lines, architecture could provide a niche for existence outside functional everydayness, the theory of architecture has to exceed present architectural knowledge. It had been indicated that abstraction is the overall reason for a distancing, and that it can be overcome if knowledge is directed towards earthly fact and obscure nature rather than on heavenly ideal. Thence the role of perception, that which is to Perez-Gomez our primary form of knowledge, has to regain importance, perception of fact, and a thorough (maybe phenomenological) knowledge of natural thing as well as manmade thing. Theory would have to transgress the invariance of objective knowledge to come to a wider understanding of the unity of the objective and subjective, somewhat like Jung’s integration of the collective unconsciousness into the collective consciousness, and akin to the Deleuzean *pli* that folds the subjective and objective into a single reality. In view of that, the sphere of knowledge has to expand to include that which is beyond the capabilities of rational thought; it has to include all that is inherent to the irrational world of the unconscious - the ambiguous and dark realm of the unknown, from poetry and mystery to the uncanny realm of magic. For even science is at the juncture of not only recognizing but also accentuating the creative and individual aspect of knowledge:
‘We all realize that if Shakespeare, Beethoven, or van Gogh had died soon after birth, no one else would ever have achieved what they did. Is this also true for scientists?’ (Prigogine, 1997: 188)
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